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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In 1914 two tendencies existed in the Indian 
national movement - on the one hand, the Moderate 
tendency, inclined to caution, seeking a rational solution 
to Indian political problems, desirous of building a 
secular, democratic state on the British model, and of 
preparing thoroughly for this by the spread of education, 
by social reform and by the gradual introduction of the 
institutions of self-government; on the other, the 
Extremist tendency, based on the rise in Hindu self- 
confidence associated with the Hindu revival, asserting 
India’s fitness for self-government, and moved by 
emotional appeals to patriotism and to rejection of 
Western innovations in favour of a return to indigenous 
institutions and traditions. Pew members of the national 
movement can be identified as belonging entirely to one 
of these types: in most, elements of both were combined.
During the first decade of the twentieth century 
the balance in the movement swung toward Extremism.
Leaders emerged in Bengal and Maharashtra, who played 
upon the vague desire for national freedom. They were 
helped in rousing bitterness and defiance towards the 
British by the example of the Japanese defeat of the 
Russians, and by British provocation culminating in the
Partition of Bengal, which was seen as an attempt to 
divide and weaken the bhadralok from whom came the
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nationalist elite in that province. In the ensuing 
agitation the Extremist leaders advocated passive resis­
tance in the form of the boycott of Government institutions 
and the non-payment of taxes.
Those who were students during this decade were 
particularly affected by the agitation, which was largely 
directed at them, and their bitterness toward the British 
and their admiration for the Extremist leaders were 
increased by the repression of these leaders by the 
British.
In 1906-7 the Extremist leaders challenged the 
older leaders for control of Congress, the national 
organisation built up by them in the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century to debate political reform, and 
to represent their conclusions to the Government. By 
their command of the constituent associations of Congress, 
the Moderates excluded the Extremists. Members of 
Congress were thus forced to identify themselves as 
either Moderates or Extremists. The unreality of this 
choice was demonstrated, however, by the yearning for 
reunification from the time of the split among all, 
except a handful of Moderate leaders mainly concentrated 
in Bombay.
VThe rest of the Moderates were inclined to 
readmit the Extremists to Congress: they were disappointed 
by the meagreness of the advance to self-government 
granted by the British in the Morley-Minto Reforms of 
1909; they were reassured of the ’moderation” of the 
Extremists by the quiescence of the latter, following the 
removal of their leaders by British repression; they felt 
that the Extremists might help to revive the Congress, 
which declined after the split; and they vaguely felt 
that in unity was strength*
In 1906 the Indian Muslims’ sense of separateness 
and insecurity (which had been aggravated by Extremism 
associated with the Hindu revival movement) was reflected 
in the establishment of the Muslim League to further the 
political interests of the Muslim community. But from 
1909 they were encouraged to seek an entente with Congress 
as the result, partly of an increased sense of security 
due to the safeguards granted to the Muslims by the 
Morley-Minto Reforms; partly of the Muslim feeling that 
the Repartition of Bengal demonstrated that the Hindus 
had been right in agitating; and as the result partly of 
Muslim anger toward Britain - particularly among Pan- 
Islamists - due to British acts or omissions in relation 
to Muslims inside or outside India.
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Thus in 1914 there was readiness for rapprochement 
between the Moderates and Extremists and between Congress 
and the Muslim League, and leaders, or would-be leaders 
were presented with the opportunity of uniting these 
three groups. To accomplish this the leaders would have 
to provide a programme which was acceptable to the 
widest range of outlooks. Such a programme must satisfy 
the feeling of the Moderates and Extremists (shared by 
the young men especially) that the movement should be 
more active. It must give expression to the defiance of 
the young men and the Pan-Islamists toward the British, 
but it must avoid alienating the more cautious members 
of the movement. It must promise to satisfy the general 
desire for more rapid devolution of power by the British. 
Finally, it would have to guarantee the Muslims* desire 
for security. To put this programme into effect and to 
ensure control of the movement, the existing organisation 
must be developed or a new organisation established.
A leader did emerge in 1914 who, temporarily at 
least, solved these problems. Mrs Besant put forward a 
programme which balanced the Moderate and Extremist 
positions: it postulated rapid progress to self-government 
to be attained by a vigorous press and platform agitation 
(which pleased the Extremists and the young men), while
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eschewing all resort to passive resistance or other 
sanctions (which were anathema to the Moderates, 
particularly the Bombay leaders).
Finding that the Moderate leaders were reluctant 
to share leadership of Congress with her, or to allow 
Congress to be used for rousing such agitation, Mrs 
Besant founded her Home Rule League to rouse the agitation. 
In this she was joined by Tilak who established a League 
in Maharashtra. Their aim, however, was to capture 
control of Congress, first in order to benefit from the 
prestige that Congress enjoyed among both Indians and 
British, secondly to claim to speak for united India and 
thirdly (in Mrs Besant*s case) in the hope that the 
Moderates would help to restrain the more ardent spirits 
while the latter stimulated the former.
The death of Pherozeshah Mehta in 1915 removed the 
leading Bombay opponent of Tilak*s readmission to Con­
gress and of the Home Rule agitation. The 1915 Congress 
Session agreed to readmit him and the Extremists. The 
continued refusal of the British to make any political 
concessions led Moderates to despair of gradual advance 
to self-government and many of them to support the Home 
Rule agitation.
In conjunction with Jinnah and his fellow
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’’nationalist" Muslims, Mrs Besant and Tilak won the 
support of the Muslim League for the agitation for self- 
government by agreeing to give the Muslims a definite 
share of any power which was obtained from the British.
Thus at the end of 1916 the three groups had been 
united behind the demand for Home Rule.
This unity was, however, a fragile thing.
First, new socio-economic groups were emerging, 
which until this time had been greatly under-represented 
in the national movement. These groups, rich peasant- 
proprietors in western and southern India and rich 
traders, now began to claim a share of any power which 
was devolved by the British. Fearing that any power which 
was devolved in the near future would be concentrated in 
the hands of the intellectually- and socially-dominant, 
upper-caste groups which dominated the national 
movement, these groups opposed the Home Rule agitation.
A strong sense of identity was given to them in the 
south and west of India for there they were all non- 
Brahmins and found themselves confronted by a Home Rule 
movement manned almost entirely by Brahmins. Mrs Besant 
and Tilak had based their strength largely on the Brahmins 
of these areas and were forced to grapple with this new 
threat to the unity and programme of the national movement.
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Secondly, many Muslims opposed the rapprochement 
of the Muslim League and the Congress. Conservative 
Muslims were suspicious of any attempt to make common 
cause with the Hindus against the British. They remem­
bered the outbreaks of communal violence and feared that, 
if Home Rule were won, the Hindu majority would oppress 
the Muslim minority. Their fears seemed to be borne 
out by the Hindu-Muslim riots in Bihar and the UP in 
Se|>tember-0ctober 1917. Many Muslims in the Muslim- 
majority provinces of Bengal sind the Punjab were dis­
satisfied with the share of power allocated to them by 
the Muslim League leaders. Together these two groups of 
Muslims set up organisations to oppose the demand for 
self-government. In an effort to divert them from their 
opposition to the national movement, Mrs Besant, Tilak 
and Jinnah took up the complaints of Pan-Islamists at 
the wartime internment of their leaders, the Ali Brothers. 
The "nationalist" Muslims were averse to continuing the 
Pan-Islamist opposition to Britain, because this would 
have made them liable to internment likewise, but also 
because a Pan-Islamic agitation might provoke violence 
among the Muslim masses. The "nationalist" Muslims thus 
also came under attack from the more impetuous young 
Muslims, for being inadequately aggressive toward the 
British.
XThirdly, the basis of the unity between the Moder­
ates and the Extremists was unstable. Recruiting dele­
gates through their Home Rule Leagues, Mrs Besant and 
Tilak brought a majority to the 1916 Congress. The 
Moderates nevertheless retained important positions in 
the Congress executive bodies and frustrated the attempts 
of Besant and Tilak to amalgamate the Home Rule Leagues with 
Congress and to attain undisputed control of it. The 
Moderates could be yoked with the young men and the 
Extremists only so long as the Home Rule leaders could 
prevent any reversion to Extremist methods and so long 
as the British refused to grant any political reform.
Tilak and Besant, however, responded to continued 
British obduracy and mounting British repression (which 
culminated in the internment of Mrs Besant in June 1917) 
by rousing an increasingly bitter agitation, until in 
mid-1917 the young men raised the demand for a campaign 
of passive resistance which, in the heat of the moment, 
the two leaders endorsed. Almost immediately Montagu, 
the Secretary of State, announced that limited reforms 
would be introduced, and this revived the Moderates' 
faith in the possibility of gradual progress to self-gov­
ernment. Thus began the alienation of the Moderates 
from Mrs Besant, Tilak and the young men, which was
completed a year later when the latter rejected the 
Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. Finding themselves in a 
minority in the Congress, the Moderates withdrew from it 
and formed their own organisations.
The Home Rule agitation frightened the Moderates 
but was inadequate nevertheless to satisfy the young 
lieutenants and followers of Besant and Tilak. The 
leaders aroused a deep sense of bitterness against the 
British among them but without providing them with a 
means of expressing these feelings in action: hence the 
demand for passive resistance. Again, while the branches 
of the Home Rule Leagues were adequate for the rousing 
of agitation, they were too loosely organised and 
articulated to enable the leaders to use them to control 
and restrain their followers. During her internment,
Mrs Besant realised that she was in danger of losing 
control of those she had helped to rouse. After her 
release from internment she was inclined to agree with 
the Moderates that the Reforms put forward by Montagu and 
Chelmsford could best be improved by consultation with 
Montagu: she called off the passive resistance campaign 
and would have liked to suspend further agitation. But, 
having provided no outlet for the bitterness of the young 
men and lacking any adequate organisation to control them,
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she found herself rejected by them at the end of 1919. 
Tilak believed that continued agitation would result in 
an extension of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms and he 
encouraged the Congress (which now consisted largely of 
the young men) to reject the Reforms as an agitational 
device. Toward the end of 1919 he left for England, 
where he hoped to be able to influence the shaping of 
the Reforms more directly. His ability to do so was 
limited, however, by the suspicion with which he was 
regarded by the British, and his departure from India 
betokened virtual abdication of the leadership at a time 
when the young men were most vociferously demanding a 
programme of action for the expression of their bitter­
ness toward the British. At the 1919 Congress, C. R. Das 
emerged as the young men's spokesman, but he had no 
programme which would give more than vocal expression 
to their feelings.
In the Muslim League Jinnah and the "nationalists" 
acceded most unwillingly to the demand of the young 
Muslims and Pan-Islamists that they voice Muslim anger 
at the contemplated dismemberment of Turkey by Britain 
and her wartime allies.
The stage was thus set for Gandhi's emergence to 
leadership at the beginning of 1919.
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Mrs Besant’s Home Rule League and agitation 
mobilised members of the educated classes, especially 
those who as students had been affected by the rise in 
Extremism in the first decade of the century. She had 
drawn into the national movement new areas, notably 
Gujarat, the UP, Sind and the Madras mofussil, of which 
the first two were to become increasingly important.
She gave training to young men who were to become leaders 
and lieutenants, and her agitation created channels of 
communication which were available for future use and 
development.
Gandhi had prepared himself for leadership. He 
had espoused the anti-British Khilafat grievances of the 
Pan-Islamists and thus had a sizable following among the 
Muslims. His conduct of the passive resistance campaigns 
in South Africa between 1906 and 1913 and of similar 
campaigns among the peasantry in Bihar and Gujarat and 
the workers of Ahmedabad in 1917-18 made him a hero in 
the eyes of many young men. During these campaigns he 
had built up throughout India a cadre of devoted lieu­
tenants with varying degrees of experience in his methods. 
Gandhi had begun his practice of making whirlwind tours 
throughout India, in the course of which he established 
face-to-face contact with audiences of all castes,
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appealing to their religious beliefs, instilling into 
them a sense of pride and self-confidence and calling for 
sacrifice. At the same time, by emphasising the need 
for non-violence he assuaged the fears of many more 
cautious Indians.
In finding a cause on which to unite these groups, 
he was assisted (as Besant and Tilak had been before him) 
by the British, for early in 1919 the Government of India 
introduced the repressive Rowlatt Acts, which were 
criticised by Indians of all shades of political tempera­
ment. Thus when Gandhi launched the Rowlatt satyagraha 
(a form of political action in the tradition of passive 
resistance) the participants included the young men; the 
Pan-Islamists, and other Muslims who feared for the fate 
of the Khilafat; the emerging peasant and trading 
groups in Gujarat,and the townsfolk who had been reached 
by Gandhi himself and his lieutenants. The resort to 
satyagraha was opposed only by those Moderates who 
objected to his appeal to religious sentiment as running 
counter to their goal of a secular state and who feared 
that his appeal to mass groups and his call to break laws 
would lead to outbreaks of violence; by Mrs Besant, who 
added to her fear of violence the personal antipathy of 
a defeated rival; and by the non-Brahmins of south and west 
India.
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Gandhi's satyagraha did result in violence and in 
May 1919 he called it off. There ensued a period of 
uncertainty as to the programme to be followed by the 
movement. Gandhi himself feared that violence would 
break out if he revived satyagraha, and reiterated the 
need for restraint; but at the same time he was anxious 
to prevent the excitement turning to depression as the 
result of his suspension of the movement. Until early 
1920 he was at a loss to suggest any programme other than 
acceptance of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, such as 
had been advocated by Mrs Besant, and such as Tilak 
likewise advocated once the passing of the Government of 
India Act embodying the Reforms made it clear that no 
further concessions were to be gained by continued 
agitation.
The Rowlatt Act satyagraha had provided a partial 
catharsis for the bitterness of the young men. Neverthe­
less, the severity with which the Government had put down 
the violence which accompanied it (especially in the 
Punjab) exacerbated the feelings of bitterness which 
remained. At the same time Muslim anger and anguish rose 
with the increasing evidence after the War that the 
British contemplated the dismemberment of the Khilafat. 
Early in 1920 Gandhi resolved to use these feelings to 
launch a programme of Non-Co-operation with the British,
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through which he hoped to inculcate satyagraha, to 
buttress Hindu-Muslim unity and to instil a sense of 
self-confidence among the Indians by making them inde­
pendent of the institutions proffered in the Reforms. He 
proposed in the first instance the boycott of government 
employment, schools and law courts, and of the reformed 
Legislative Councils, the establishment of parallel, 
"national1 institutions and constructive work among the 
masses. This programme was opposed by those who had been 
in the front rank of the Congress and the Muslim League. 
Many older Extremists recognised the impossibility of 
rejecting India’s British heritage in toto. They did not 
relish sacrificing their legal practices or the promised 
power (however limited) in the Councils; still less did 
they wish to leave the Councils to the Moderates and the 
anti-national Muslims and non-Brahmins; Muslims opposed 
the boycott of schools, for their community was already 
proportionately less well-educated than the Hindus; 
communally-minded Hindus objected to making sacrifices 
for the Khilafat cause; and many (the Bengalis especially) 
were fearful of any attempt to involve the masses in the 
movement, for this threatened violence and the downfall 
of their domination of the national movement.
In September 1920 Gandhi*s Non-Co-operation was
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adopted by the Congress. The opposition of the old 
leaders was overborne by the young men and the Pan- 
Islamists, and by Gandhi’s tactic of threatening to 
work through the formal and informal organisations which 
he had created outside the Congress in his cadre of 
lieutenants and the Khilafat Committees.
This marks a major turning-point in the Indian 
national movement: Gandhi’s programme and leadership 
had now been accepted by the Congress, and in the Congress 
Gandhi had acquired an India-wide organisation which he 
was to refashion as a weapon for use during the next 27 
years. During those years there were to be periods when 
the movement would work through the institutions provided 
by the British and when Gandhi would retire into the 
background. But at times of crisis the national movement 
turned back to Gandhi and his programme of Non-Co-operation.
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PREFACE
In 1914 the Indian national movement was dominated 
by the Moderates, many of them the men who had founded 
the first nationalist associations and brought them 
together in the Congress in the previous century; the 
main activity of the Congress for the year consisted of 
sending a deputation to England and the annual Session 
at the end of the year. At the end of 1920 the dominant 
figure in the national movement was Mahatma G-andhi, who 
through Congress had just launched it on the first of 
the campaigns of Non-Co-operation with the Government 
that he was to lead. The seven turbulent years between 
marked the prelude to the modern Indian national movement. 
In order to understand the changes which occurred in that 
period the thesis focusses attention on the leaders who 
initiated them.
In concentrating on the leaders, the thesis devotes 
proportionately little space to the detailed analysis of 
those who constituted their following and, in dealing 
with the leaders at the all-India level and in attempting 
to see the movement as a whole, it gives less emphasis to 
the local peculiarities and the differences in response 
to those leaders than to the broad similarities. The 
sorts of groups, from which the members of the movement 
came, have been touched upon, as have those groups, from
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which opposition to the national movement arose. But 
much further investigation of these questions is required. 
Some academic and journalistic analysis of current Indian 
politics is being done in terms of social and regional 
group loyalties,1 2but much detailed historical research 
is required to extend similar insights into the politics 
of pre-Independence India. Y/ork has been begun in this 
field, particularly for Maharashtra and Bengal. The 
overriding unity of the Indian national movement cannot 
be denied, particularly in view of the centralised leader­
ship which emerged out of the period 1914-20, but more 
detailed studies of the regions will facilitate advance 
at the national level.
Plainly, too, much work is waiting to be done on 
the economic factors in Indian nationalism, both in the 
period under review and in those before and after it. I 
shall only hint, for example, at the significance of the 
large profits made at the beginning of the First World War 
by firms importing material for the cotton industry,
1. e.g. S. Harrison, India: The Most Dangerous Decades; 
M. Patterson, ’’Caste and Political Leadership in 
Maharashtra”, Economic Y/eekly, VI, no. 39, 1065-7.
2. see R. Kumar, ’’State and Society in Maharashtra in 
the Nineteenth Century” (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Aust­
ralian National University, 1964); J. H. Broomfield, 
’’Politics and the Bengal Legislative Council, 1912-26” 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 
1963); cf. E. Irschick, ’Politics and Social Conflict in 
South India: A Study of the Non-Brahmin Movement and Tamil 
Separatism, 1916-1929” (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univer­sity of Chicago, 1964).
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which enabled those who were connected with them to con­
tribute largely to the funds of the Home Rule movement;'1 I,'
or again at that of the high price of foodstuffs during 
and after the War, which increased the wealth of the 
rising peasant-proprietor and trading groups and probably 
contributed to their assertiveness, while increasing the 
discontent of landless, rural and urban workers.
I wish to thank the Australian Rational University 
for the Scholarship and for financing the year’s field­
work in India, which made this study possible. It is 
impossible for me adequately to thank my supervisors,
Ur D. A. Low and Dr B. D. Graham, for their inspiration 
and guidance of my work; and Dr H. A. Lamb, who was in 
the unenviable position of taking over supervision during 
the last few months of the writing of the thesis. I 
remember with gratitude the stimulus of discussion and 
disputation with colleagues of the University.
I am most grateful for the help I have received 
from the Director of the National Archives of India, New 
Delhi and his staff (especially Messrs V. G. Joshi and 
S. Roy and Miss D. Keswani); Bihar State Central Archives,
I. see Jamnadas Dwarkadas, ttA Memoire of GandhijiM 
(unpublished memoirs held by the author); »Uoint Select 
Committee on the Government of India Bill, Report. Vol
II, Minutes of Evidence”, House of Commons Papers. 1919, 
IV, 80, Q 1419[Mrs Besant's evidence].
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Patna; the Secretariat Record Office, Bombay; Punjab 
State Record Office, Patiala; from the Librarian and 
staff of the Australian National University Library; 
the S. Sinha Library, Patna; the National Library of 
India, Calcutta; Madras University Library; AICC Library, 
New Delhi; the Bombay Presidency Association, Indian 
Association and the Madras Mahajana Sabha; Professor 
N. R. Phatak and the staff of the History of the Freedom 
Movement Office in Bombay; Dr Dighe of the History of 
the Freedom Movement Office, New Delhi; Mr Sri Ram, the 
President of the Theosophical Society, the staff of the 
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and Dr S. Raj, New Delhi.
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Note on Spelling;:
In spelling the names of individuals, the form 
preferred by the individual himself has been used wherever 
this is known; where this is not known the most frequently- 
used form in printed works is employed. While introducing 
an element of complexity, this, it is hoped, will assist 
the reader in differentiating between individuals with 
similar names. Hence one meets Surendranath Banerjea 
and Jitendralal Bannerjee, S. Subramania Aiyer and 
C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, Mazharul Haque and Pazlul Huq.
Por the names of towns and regions the modern Indian
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spelling has been used: if this differs markedly from 
spelling used during the early twentieth century the 
latter form has been shown in brackets wherever this 
seems helpful. Other words from Indian languages have 
been explained briefly in the Glossary.
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GLOSSARY
Adi-Dravidian ’’Original Dravidian”, title taken by 
untouchables of Madras.
Agarwal Trading caste of northern India.
ahirasa ’’Not killing”, i.e. non-violence.
Ahir A caste, traditionally shepherds, but 
comprising landless labourers in 
general, mainly in the UP, also in 
other parts of north and west India.
Aiyar A title added to the names of Shaivite 
Brahmins of south India.
Aiyengar ’Rather”, a title added to the names 
of Srivaishnava (or Ramanujiya) Brah­
mins of south India.
alim See ’ulema” below.
Amil The outstanding caste of the Hindu 
minority of Sind; originally adminis­
trators in the service of the Muslim 
rulers of Sind, they have traditions 
of scholarship.
Anavia (Anavil 
Brahmin) The dominant agricultural caste of the Surat, Broach and Panch Mahal 
districts of southern Gujarat.
an j um an A communal assembly or association.
archana Hindu religious ceremony.
Arya Samaj 
ashram
Hindu sect founded by Dayanand in 
Punjab, whence it spread into the UP 
in particular; opposes caste restrictions 
aggressively proselytising especially vis-ä-vis Muslims.
”A hermitage”, the abode of persons 
leading a religious or contemplative life; also a school.
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B a l i ja (or 
Banajiga)
Caste of traders (occasionally agri­
culturists) of the Telugu-or Kannada­
speaking areas, usually Lingayats.
Bania (Vani, 
Vania)
Caste numerous in Gujarat; divided into 
2 main groups, Vaishnavas and Jains, 
both of which are engaged chiefly in 
trade and banking. Also used of any 
trader.
Baqr Id Festival observed by Muslims on the 
10th of the month Zilhaja - the feast 
of the ox, in commemoration of the 
offering of Ismail by Abraham (accord­
ing to Muslim tradition).
Bapu Father (Gujarati); a term of affection­
ate respect, applied to Gandhi in 
particular.
bhadralok ’’The respectable people” : the upper 
castes of Bengal, Brahmins, Kayasthas, 
Vaidyas.
bhakti Faith, devotion, service. The reform­
ing bhakti cults in Hinduism stress 
devotion and love, as opposed to k n o w ­
ledge and duty, as the means of 
realising God.
Bharata Varsha Classical term for ’’India” .
Bhatia Trading caste of Gujarat and Bombay, 
accorded Kshatriya status.
bigha A measure of land, varying in extent in 
different parts of India.
Bohra Banker, money lender or merchant of a 
tribe originally in Gujarat, converted 
to Islam.
brahma The ultimate source of the universe, 
the inmost reality.
brahma chary a Celibacy and self-denial; the condition 
of a student leading such a life.
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Brahmin Member of the highest, or priestly, 
caste among the Hindus.
Brahmo A member of the Brahmo Samaj.
Brahmo Samaj A monotheistic sect founded in Bengal 
by Raja Rammohan Roy. It found its 
support among the Westernised intell­
igentsia of Bengal.
eharkha (Spinning)-wheel.
Ghaturh Agricultural caste of Jains in southern 
Maharashtra and Karnatak.
chawl Tenement; also used of the open spaces 
formed between blocks of such buildings 
in Bombay.
Ghetti Non-Brahmin caste of south India, trad­
itionally weavers or tradesmen; 
particularly applied to rich trader- 
moneylender-bankers .
Chitpavan
[Brahmin] Sub-caste of Maharashtrian Brahmins, traditionally dominant in Maharashtra 
since the rise of the Peshwa from among 
them.
crore 10 million [printed 1,00,00,000].
Deshbandu “Friend of the country“, title 
bestowed on G. R. Das.
dewan Prime Minister of a Native or Princely 
State.
dharma Hindu religious duty or duty imposed by 
one’s caste.
Dhed Untouchable caste of Gujarat.
dharma-yuddha “War of duty”, righteous struggle.
dhurna Tapasva fa.v.1 undergone with th* 
intention of bringing about a change of 
heart in another, but often involving 
non-violent coercion; notably takes the 
form of sitting at the door of the one 
to be influenced.
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fatwa Written oüinion of ulema on a matter 
of Islamic law.
Ganpati A name of Ganesh, the propitious god for all undertakings, round whom Tilak 
built a nationalistic festival.
Ghadr Mutiny.
goonda Rowdy, ruffian, gangster.
guru Hindu spiritual teacher.
hakim A physician.
hartal Closure of the shops of a market as 
passive resistance to exaction, hence 
suspension of work and business as a 
mark of indignation.
hat ’Bazaar” or •’market”, hence a village, 
especially in Bengal.
hijrat Plight from one’s country: course im­
posed on Muslims if they are not free 
to practise their faith.
istifta Interrogatory epistle exchanged by 
ulema to ascertain opinions on questions 
of Islamic doctrine ^preparatory to the 
issuing of a fatwa Ta-v.l).
Jainism Non-Brahminical sect, which has its 
own priesthood (see ”Chaturth”, 
”Bania”).
jihad A religious war of Muslims against 
unbelievers, inculcated as a duty by 
the Quran and ’’Traditions”.
Kamma (Kammarar) Dominant agricultural caste in parts of 
Andhra.
Kanyakubja Sub-division of Brahmins, originating 
in Kanauj (UP), from whom the Brahmins 
of Bengal are reputed to spring.
Kapu (Reddi) Leading caste of cultivators in Andhra; 
especially village-headman in that 
region.
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karma Pate or destiny, following as effect 
from one’s action.
Karnatak Kannada-speaking area, particularly 
that part north of Mysore.
Kathi (Kattha) A measure of land; in Bengal and Bihar 
the twentieth part of a bigha Ta.v.l.
Kayastha A caste group whose occupation is writer 
or accountant; associated with admin­
istration under Muslim rulers in 
northern India and with scholastic 
traditions.
khadi Hand-woven cloth from hand-spun thread.
Khalif ’’Successor**, the religious head of Islam 
(as acknowledged by Sunni Muslims).
Khilafat Sovereignty, the office of Khalif.
Khoja Tribe and sect of Shia Muslims in 
Gujarat, largely settled in Sind and 
Bombay City.
”...ki jai” ”Victory to...” or ”Hail...,f.
kirtan Hindu religious song.
kirtankar Singer of kirtans.
Komati Caste in south India who consider them-
selves Vaisyas; shopkeepers and mer­
chants, they assume the denomination of 
Shet or Chetti [q.v.].
Kshatriya Generalised term for castes of the 
second (warrior and kingly) status, or 
varna.
kunbee ’’Agriculturist”; also the name of cul­
tivating castes in Maharashtra and 
Gujarat.
lakh 100,000 [printed 1,00,000].
lathi A club, bludgeon, stick.
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Lingayat Member of the Vira-Saiva sect, which 
rejected Brahmin priestdom and worships 
Shiva as the linga; concentrated in the 
Kannada-speaking region where they form 
20 per cent of the population.
Lokamanya ’’Beloved of the people” , title 
given to Tilak.
mahalwari land-revenue settlement by which a whole 
village (’’estate” ) is responsible for 
payment of the revenue.
Mahar Untouchable caste of rural Maharashtra. 
Village-watchmen, they are often em­
ployed in the village as scavengers.
Mahatma A title (given to Gandhi but also to 
others, e.g. Shraddhananda) meaning 
’’Great S o u l ” .
Mali Gardener caste of Maharashtra.
Manu Traditional author of the famous Hindu 
law-code bearing his name.
Maratha Dominant agricultural caste of Mah a ­
rashtra, of which 96 clans claim 
Kshatriya status by virtue of their 
relationship to former rulers of the 
Deccan.
Marwari A native of Marwar settled in other 
parts of India, usually banker, broker, 
merchant; mostly of Jain religion.
maya Illusion.
mofussil The rural localities of a district (or 
region) as distinguished from the chief 
station (or capital).
Mohurrum Annual celebration in the first month 
of the Muslim year.
Moplah Muslim of Malabar, descendant of Arabs 
who settled there.
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Mudaliar A title of trading, agricultural and 
other respectable, non-Brahmin castes 
in Tamilnad.
muha j rin Participant in hi.irat Ta-v.l.
mullah Muslim learned in theology and sacred 
law.
Naidu A title of respectable persons among 
the non-Brahmin castes of Andhra.
Uair The dominant, ruling and warrior caste 
in Malabar.
Namasudra Low-caste or outcaste agriculturist in 
Bengal.
Pallan 
(pi. Pallar)
Outcaste agricultural labourer, common­
ly the slave of the Vellalar agri­
cultural caste in Tamilnad.
pan supari Areka nut and spices rolled up in leaf 
of Piper betel offered as courtesy to 
guests. Pan supari parties are held 
to celebrate a favourable event.
panchayat A council of 5 (or more) persons assem­
bled as a committee to decide on matters 
affecting a village, community or body.
pandal Marquee, tent.
Pariah Outcaste in southern India, commonly 
slave of agricultural caste.
parishad Conference, or Congress.
Parsee Race settled chiefly in Gujarat and 
Bombay City who observe Zoroastrian 
religion: distinguished as merchants, 
traders, industrialists.
Pathare Prabhu Writer caste of western India, claiming 
Kshatriya status which was denied by 
the Brahmins.
Patidar Dominant cultivator caste of districts 
around Ahmedabad.
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Pillai ‘’Child*’, a respectable adjunct to Tamil 
names in some agricultural castes, 
especially Vellalar.
pir Among Muslims a saint, a spiritual guide.
Prarthana Samaj The western Indian equivalent to the 
Brahmo Samaj [q.v.], which undertook 
social reform.
qurbani Muslim sacrifice of cows.
raj Sovereignty, rule, kingdom.
Rayalaseema The Ceded Districts of Andhra.
Reddi See ”Kapu” .
rishi An inspired sage, the author or teacher 
of those works which are considered 
sacred.
ryot A peasant.
ryotwari See ”Ryot”. A land-revenue settlement 
in which the peasant enters into a 
direct contractual relationship with 
the State.
sabha An assembly, association.
Sakta Prom ”sakti”, power, especially of a 
goddess: sects, especially in Bengal, 
which worship the goddess Durga or Kali 
either publicly or privately. Such 
worship was associated with the activ­
ities of certain Bengali anti-British, 
terrorist associations after 1905.
Saktic Relating to Sakta [q.v.].
sarkar The government, applied particularly to 
the British Government of India and its 
representatives.
Sarvajanik Sabha ’’People’s association”, representative 
associations founded in a number of 
towns in Maharashtra in 19th-century; 
the most outstanding was at Poona.
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Satya Shodhak 
Samaj
’’Society for the Propagation of Truth”, 
a non-Brahmin educational and political 
organisation founded in Maharashtra by 
Jyotiba Pule.
satyagraha Truth-force or soul-force, term coined 
by Gandhi to cover forms of non-violent 
coercion, e.g. civil disobedience.
satyagrahi One who practises satyagraha [q.v.].
Shaivite (Shaiva) Worshipper or votary of Shiva.
shastri An expounder of Hindu law and texts.
Shet (Seth, 
Chetti)
Merchant.
Shia The second of the two great divisions 
of Muslims, following Ali, son-in-law 
of Mahomed and his lawful successors. 
Shias do not recognise the ’’Traditions”.
shroff A banker.
Smarta Aiyar Shaivite Brahmin, the larger of the two 
principal sects of Brahmins of south 
India [see ’’Aiyar”].
sowcar A substantial urban financier.
Sri Vaishnavism The branch of the votaries of Vishnu 
who follow the teachings of Ramanuja.
Sufi One of a sect of Muslim ascetic mystics 
who in later times embraced pantheistic 
vows.
Sunni The orthodox Muslims who accept the 
Sunna (’’Traditions” of Mahomed) as of 
almost equal authority with the Quran.
swadeshi Belonging to, or made in, one’s own 
country.
swami Title of the head of a religious order or 
establishment (especially in northern 
India); in southern India, a title given 
to idols and thence incorporated in the 
names of devotees.
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swaraj "Self-rule", self-government; had been 
used of Hindu states of the Deccan, 
which wrested their independence from 
Muslim rulers.
taluq Area of administration next in size 
and rank below district.
taluqdar Contractor for revenue (in Oudh chiefly) 
granted proprietary rights by the 
British; cf. zamindar Ta.v.l.
tamasha An entertainment, show, display, public 
function.
tapasya Self-suffering for self-purification or 
as form of supplication.
tihkathia Illegal land-tax in indigo-growing 
areas of Bihar, by which three kathies 
[q.v.] in each bigha had to be sown with 
indigo for the landlord.
ulema (sing, 
alim)
Those specially trained in Islamic 
religion and law, who are regarded by 
Muslims as the authorities on these 
matters.
Vaishnavite 
(Vaishnava)
Worshipper of Vishnu.
Vaishya Generalised term for the castes of the 
third (trading) status, or varna (in 
which Manu also included agricultur­
ists). Bania [q.v.] is used similarly.
vakil A pleader or lawyer.
Vani Moneylender (see "Bania").
varna A caste; especially each of the four­
fold generalised classifications, 
Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, Sudra.
Vedantic Deriving from Vedanta, one of the lead­
ing systems of Hindu philosophy, 
founded by Sankaracharya.
Vedas The general name of the chief scrip­
tural authorities of the Hindus.
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Vellalar Member of the great cultivating caste 
of Tamilnad.
Virashaiva See "Lingayat“.
vyapari A trader, a dealer, a man of business.
Wahabi A follower of the doctrine of Shaikh- 
ul-Wahab, an Arabian reformer of Islam 
who tried to reform many abuses in the 
religion, especially practices of the 
Shi as.
zamindar "Zamin” , land; "dar11 he who has: formerly 
a revenue farmer; in Bengal, Bihar, 
eastern UP and Madras they were accor­
ded proprietary rights by the British 
(see ”zamindariM); in Punjab, any 
cultivator, but especially those who 
held village lands in common (see 
"mahalwar i M).
zamindari The office and rights of a zamindar; a 
land-revenue settlement, in which the 
zamindar was granted proprietary rights 
and became responsible for the collection 
and payment of revenue, usually perman­
ently fixed, from all tillers of the 
soil.
zillah A division, a district, a tract of 
country.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTORY: THE SITUATION IN 1914«
The seven years between 1914 and 1920 constituted 
a most formative period in the history of the Indian 
national movement. New leaders emerged, with new strat­
egies for the deployment of the movement's forces and 
for the attainment of its objective, self-government, 
and with nev/ organisational ideas for putting these 
strategies into operation.
This was also a time of experimentation. The 
first of the new leaders was Mrs Annie Besant, who worked 
in co-operation with Tilak and Jinnah. By the end of 
1918, however, their leadership was proving inadequate.
C. R. Das rose to prominence and it seemed as if he might 
take their place. But by the end of 1920 Gandhi emerged 
as the leader, with the programme of Non-Co-operation 
which was to be applied repeatedly over the next twenty- 
seven years, and with the reconstructed Congress which 
was to be the vehicle of the national movement for the 
rest of its existence.
Gandhi's success was qualified by the decline in 
his leadership between 1922 and 1927 and again in the 
mid-thirties, and this has to be borne in mind in
1
2
considering his leadership as a whole. Nevertheless 
in 1920 he had clearly succeeded where Mrs Besant and 
others had failed.
The thesis seeks to understand his success and 
the others' failure. To do so it examines the problems 
confronting the leaders in this period and their response 
to these problems.
The activity of this period and the developments 
within the leadership contrasted strikingly with the 
disruption and stagnation that had characterised the 
previous six years since 1908. Nevertheless the devel­
opment of the national movement since the 1870s and 
British reactions to the movement, and even the inactivity 
of the years 1908-14 gave rise to the problems with which 
the leaders were faced in 1914.
I
The National Movement and the British Response.
The first nationalist political movements in India 
arose among the Western-educated professional men, the 
lawyers, journalists and professors. Their education 
had taught them of the movements for liberty among the 
representatives of the people in Britain, her colonies 
and in Europe. They had come to regard themselves as the
3representatives of the Indian people and during the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century organised to acquire 
power, and the institutions through which to exercise it. 
At the same time they became increasingly conscious of 
the restrictions on the avenues of employment (important 
for prestige as much as for remuneration) open to them: 
although many of them were as highly educated as the 
English members of the higher Civil, administrative and 
military services, they found entry to these services 
barred to them. These and other grievances they sought 
to present to the Government for reform through their new 
organisations.
The largest concentration of these professional 
men was in the Presidency towns - Calcutta, Bombay and 
Madras - each one a great capital where law courts, news­
papers, universities and other institutions had grown up 
round the commercial offices and the Government House, 
and in Poona which was both a traditional and modern 
political and educational centre. In these cities the 
first national political organisations were set up, the 
Indian Association in Calcutta in 1876 and, during the 
following decade, the Sarvajanik Sabha in Poona, the 
Mahajana Sabha in Madras and the Bombay Presidency 
Association in Bombay. The most active members comprised
4
the executive Council of the Association which met 
monthly or more frequently to discuss political matters 
of the moment: on more important matters they might call 
together the general body of the Association or hold a 
public meeting which would be attended by respectable 
citizens and authorise a representation to the Govern­
ment .
The elite nature of these Associations was reflected
in their size. A year after its foundation the Indian
Association claimed 200 members, while in 1914 the Maha-
jana Sabha, for example, had 440.1 2 Generally no more
than 20 attended Council meetings. Public meetings
might attract up to 3000, or on specially contentious
2matters, 10,000 or more.
Attempts to co-ordinate the demands of these organ­
isations culminated in 1885 in the first Session of the 
Indian National Congress. Congress sessions were held 
annually thereafter in the Christmas week, and provided 
a brief forum for leading speakers from the several 
provincial Associations. Resolutions were passed urging 
the Government to reform the system of administration,
1. J. C. Bagal, History of Indian Association, p. 21; 
Mahajana Sabha, Annual Report 1914. p. 5«
2. e.g. J. C. Bagal, op. cit., pp. 34, 41, 60.
t;KJ
above all in two ways, by introducing representative 
government and by admitting Indians in larger numbers 
to the public service.^" ’’Representation is...the
2gospel of our political redemption”, said one speaker, 
and others pointed to Canada and Australia as the models 
for India.^
Congress appointed Standing Committees in each 
province, which were practically identical with the 
Councils of the provincial Associations, but no central 
Committee was set up until 1899 when a Constitution was 
finally adopted.^ Even after this the co-ordination of 
the activities of the provincial Associations and Congress 
Committees was carried out informally by private corres­
pondence between their leading members and the Congress 
General Secretaries.
Conventions developed for the running of Congress: 
at each session the venue of the following session was 
agreed upon; the host Congressmen then appointed a
1. see D. Chakrabarty and C. Bhattacharyya, Congress in 
Evolution, especially pp. 2, 138; extracts from Congress 
records in A. Besant, How India Wrought for Freedom, pp. 
30, 45, 52, 71, 90-1.
2. S. Banerjea in Congress 1886. Report, p. 99.
3. e.g. Malaviya, Congress 1885. Report, pp. 31-4.
4. see M. V. Ramana Rao, Development of the Congress 
Constitution, pp. 1-8.
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Reception Committee to raise funds, prepare for the 
Congress and to chart the resolutions to be adopted in 
correspondence with leading Congressmen elsewhere; and 
the resolutions and speakers upon them were finally 
decided at the time of the session by a Subjects Comm­
ittee appointed by the leading delegates from among them­
selves. Delegates were "elected" by the provincial 
Committees and Associations or by public meetings: any­
one willing to attend could count on being elected, at 
least during the first 20 years of the Congress. Annual 
attendance between 1892 and 1904 varied between 471 and 
1584, of whom on the average about half were professional 
men.^
In addition the provincial Standing Committee took 
over the running of annual Provincial Conferences 
(inaugurated by the Indian Association) which were 
miniature Congress sessions at the provincial level.
Foremost among those responsible for the formation 
of Congress was a British ex-Indian-Civil-Servant, A. 0. 
Hume (1829-1912), who urged the members of the provincial
1. 1892-1904? Total delegates, 10,550;
Lawyers, 37$; other Professional Men, 10$;
Landed Men, 19$; Commercial Men, 16$;
Others or not known, 19$. One assumes that those,
whose occupation was not known, also included professional 
men. Source, P. C. Ghosh, The Development of the Indian 
National Congress. 1892-1909. p. 24»
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Associations to combine their forces.'*“ When, after the 
third Congress Session, it became clear that the Govern­
ment would make no practical response to the resolutions 
passed, Hume launched a propaganda campaign modelled on 
Cobdenfs Anti-Corn Law campaign of 1839-45» distributing 
pamphlets and arranging over 1000 lectures and meetings 
throughout India. As this produced no apparent favourable
response, Hume and others turned to win the sympathy of
2the British Government and its electorate. Between 1889 
and 1893 a British Committee of Congress and a newspaper, 
India, were established and Members of Parliament 
interested in Indian affairs formed into a Committee.
The leading figure in these activities was another ex- 
Indian-Civil-Servant, Sir William Wedderburn (1838-1918) 
who after his retirement in 1887 pressed the case for 
representative government for India as President of two 
Congress sessions, as a Liberal MP from 1887 to 1900 
and as the confidant of Liberal statesmen.^ Prom his 
vantage point in Westminster Wedderburn provided leading
1. see W. Wedderburn, Allan Octavian Hume, pp. 50-9; 
cf. Bagal, Indian Association, pp. 80-8.
2. Wedderburn, Hume, pp. 62-6, 85-102.
3. S. K. Ratcliffe, Sir William Wedderburn and the 
Indian Reform Movement, especially p p. 23-51. 63.
68-93, 104, 137, 143.
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Congressmen with information and advice on programme and 
strategy between 1887 and 1917. A propaganda campaign 
like that initiated in 1888 by Hume was not repeated 
(and the propaganda in England was hampered by the diff­
iculty of raising funds in India): Congress confined 
itself to passing resolutions at its annual sessions and 
to sending deputations and representatives to England to 
press its case on the Secretary of State, most notably 
in 1906-08 on the subject of Morley*s Reform Bill.
In the 1890s and early 1900s a new spirit entered 
the national movement, more defiant of the British. This 
spirit rose out of the Hindu religious revival of the 
second half of the nineteenth century, which was in part 
a reaction against the zeal of reformers who had sought 
to "purify” Hinduism and reconcile it with Western thought, 
and in part the result of recognition of the greatness 
of Hinduism by Western scholars like Max Müller. The 
Arya Samaj, for example, proclaimed the greatness of the 
Vedas and sought to base a national religion on their 
teachings,'1' while Swami Vivekananda strove to give 
Indians a sense of strength through exposition of the 
Vedanta. Bipin Chandra Pal, who was deeply affected by
1. see Census of India. 1911» XIV, ‘Punjab*, part i, 
133-9; XV, ‘UP*, part i, 132-40.
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the new spirit, affirmed that the Theosophical Society, 
founded in the USA by Madame Blavatsky and ”Colonel”
Olcott and brought by them to India in 1879»
was perhaps the most powerful of the forces that 
brought in this movement of Hindu religious 
revival....This Society told our people that 
instead of having any reason to be ashamed of 
their past or of the legacies left to them by 
it, they have every reason to feel justly proud 
of it all, because their seers and saints had 
been the spokesmen of the highest truths.••.This 
new message, coming from the representatives of 
the most advanced peoples of the modern world, the 
inheritors of the most advanced culture and civi­
lisation the world has as yet known, at once raised 
us in our estimation and created a self-confidence 
in us....
This spirit was first manifested in national 
politics in Maharashtra. Here in the 1890s festivals 
were inaugurated, one for the worship of the Hindu god 
G-anesh, an other to celebrate the Maharashtrian 
national hero, Shivaji who, by defeating a Muslim 
general, had launched the Marathas on the road to 
power. These festivals were celebrated with displays of
pgymnastics and lathi-play. They gave the Hindus of Maha­
rashtra a sense of solidarity and strength but at the 
expense of ill-feeling between the Hindus and Muslims 
which culminated in riots.^ The leaders of
1. B. C. Pal, Memories of My Life and Times. I, 425; cf. 
II, xlv, xlvii.
2. the lathi is a weighted stick used in self-defence.
3. Pile 3074/H/l, Police Commissioner's Office, Bombay: 
extracts held at History of Freedom Movement Office, Bombay 
pp. 6, 14, selections printed in HPM Bombay. II, 204-6.
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this movement, notably Tilak, set out to alienate mass
groups from the Government: in 1896 they urged peasants,
who were suffering from famine to withhold the payment
of land-taxes, and in the following year championed
plague-victims in Poona in their allegations of harshness
in the application of the Government’s sanitary measures.1 2
This defiant spirit toward the British was next
seen in Bengal following the Partition of that province
by the Government in 1905« Regarding this as an attempt
to divide and weaken the professional groups and hence
the national movement, the older Bengali politicians
called for a day of mourning (foreshadowing the later
hartals of Gandhi), began a boycott of British goods and
defied the authorities* ban on shouting the slogan
"Bande Mataram** - "Hail the Motherland". The older
politicians found that they could not control the
agitation they had begun and representatives of the new
spirit, like Bipin Chandra Pal, took it over, advocating
the boycott of colleges by students and the severing of
2links between rulers and ruled. In 1907 Pal visited
1. HPM Bombay. II, 207-8.
2. see J. H. Broomfield, "Politics and the Bengal 
Legislative Council, 1912-1926" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis), 
p. 95.
il
Madras where he lectured to large audiences, including 
many students, arguing the case for complete independence 
from Britain.1 234 In the Punjab at the same time, 
"agitators”, mainly members of the Arya Samaj, urged 
policemen and soldiers to quit the service of the Govern­
ment and farmers to resist the implementation of the
2unpopular Canal Colonies Act.
Indian self-confidence and defiance toward Britain 
received encouragement from the first defeat of a 
European by an Asiatic power in the Russo-Japanese War 
of 1904-05 and by the boycott of American goods by the 
Chinese in 1906.1
The Congressmen who had been affected by this new 
spirit referred to themselves as the "New Party” or 
"Extremists” to distinguish themselves from those who 
adhered to the aim of gradual reform, whom they called 
"Moderates”.^  The Extremists challenged the existing 
leaders of Congress for control of that body. They 
proposed a campaign of passive resistance against the
1. see A. Gupta (ed), Studies in the Bengal Renaiss­
ance. p. 565.
2. H. H. Dodwell (ed), Cambridge History of India. VI, 
553; Lajpat Rai, "The Story of My life”, p. 137.
3. C. M. Case, Non-Violent Coercion: A Study in Methods 
of Social Pressure, p. 330.
4. see B. G. Tilak, "Tenets of the New Party", speech,
2 Jan 1907, in All About Lok. Tilak. p. 492.
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Government, which, included the boycott of Government 
schools and courts and the refusal to pay land-revenue 
and taxes.1 23 In Britain Morley, the recently-appointed 
Liberal Secretary of State, had reforms on the anvil 
which the Moderates hoped would largely fulfill their 
demands for representative government; Morley told them 
that "If your speakers or your newspapers set to work to 
belittle what we do, to clamour for the impossible, then
pall will go wrong". The Moderates therefore resisted 
the threats to their authority and to the expected success 
of their methods of demanding reform, and excluded the 
Extremists from Congress at the 1907 Session at Surat.
The Moderates were able to expel the Extremists 
because they formed a majority of Congress delegates and 
still had control of the Provincial Congress Committees 
[hereafter "PCCs"]. In September 1906 one Moderate had 
estimated that "the whole of Madras, two-thirds of 
Bombay, the whole of the United Provinces, two-thirds of 
the Punjab, two-thirds of the Central Provinces and 
about half of Bengal are with us [i.e. the Moderates]".
1. ibid., p. 503; Sri Aurobindo, The Doctrine of Passive 
Resistance, passim.
2. Mary, Countess of Minto, India, Minto and Morley. 
1905-10. pp. 99-100.
3. Gokhale to V. Krishnaswami Iyer, 29 Sept 1906, in 
V. Krishnaswami Iyer Papers.
At Surat about 900 of the 1600 delegates attended a
Convention called by the Moderates immediately after the
'•split”, while only 300 attended an Extremist meeting."1 23'
The Moderates ensured their control of Congress by
drawing up a new Constitution in 1908. Under this the
PCCs became crucially-important bodies. Delegates to
the annual session could only be elected by the PCCs or
2bodies recognised by them. As before, the PCC of the 
host province was to form the Reception Committee of the 
annual session. In addition, the All-India Congress 
Committee [hereafter "AICC”] was set up as the executive 
body of the Congress: apart from ex-officio members, its 
members were to be elected by the PCCs or by the dele­
gates to the annual session.*^ The PCCs themselves were 
comprised entirely of those who were known to be Moder­
ates and who signed a declaration that they desired
the attainment...of a system of 
government similar to that enjoyed by 
the self-governing Members of the 
British Empire...by strictly con­
stitutional means, by bringing about 
a steady reform of the existing system 
of administration...
1. Besant, Wrought, p. 649*
2. Congress Constitution, Art. XX, printed as Appendix 
Congress 1908. Report, pp. xix-xxiii.
3. ibid., Arts XXII, XIV.
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and future applicants for membership were to be
scrutinised by the council of the appropriate PCC.'1 23'
Under this Constitution the Moderates proposed to
set up a hierarchy of district organisations to bring
the Moderate leaders into touch with the new areas that
were being tapped by the Extremists with their exciting,
defiant speeches, After a good beginning in Madras and
the United Provinces [hereafter "UP"], this attempt to set
2up district organisations collapsed and even existing 
Congress institutions, like the Provincial Conferences, 
were allowed to lapse. Attendance at the annual sessions 
fell away; that of 1912 was the most poorly attended of all.
Before the Surat split the Extremists had possessed 
no formal organisation outside Congress and it was only 
after their expulsion that they set about creating any 
such organisation. In 1908 they held Conferences in 
Poona and Bombay and planned a "Congress" for the end of 
the year.^ The Government now stepped in to crush the
1. ibid., Arts Vl(6), VII; Bombay PCC Rules (1908),
Rule 5; Indian Association, Rule 3; Bombay Presidency 
Association, Rule 5; Deccan Sabha, Rule 5» Por the work­
ing of these rules see e.g. N. K. Ramasami, letter to 
Mahratta. 20 Dec 1914, p. 395.
2. see letters of V. S. S. Sastri to V. Krishnaswami Iyer 
28 and 29 Sept, 3 and 17 Oct 1908, VKI Papers: Gokhale to 
Mrs Besant, 21 Nov 1914, Adyar Archives.
3. V. Gr. Bhat, Lokamanya Tilak (His Life, Mind, Politics 
and Philosophy), pp. 80-1; G-okhale to Bhupendranath Basu,
14 Dec 1914, Adyar Archives.
defiance of the Extremists. It deported the Punjab 
leader, Lajpat Rai, without trial, and procured sentences 
of six months1 to six years' imprisonment upon the lead­
ing Extremists of Bengal, the Deccan and Madras for their 
newspaper writings and speeches, which the courts held to 
contain incitements to disaffection and violence. Those 
who escaped or received short sentences were cowed; 
bereft of their leaders, the Extremist rank-and-file 
sank into inactivity.
The British reaction to the Indian national move­
ment between 1885 and 1914 was a combination of reluc­
tance to accede to the demands for reform and (after 1907) 
of repression of the Extremists.
In 1893 the friends of Congress in the House of 
Commons passed a resolution in favour of the admission 
of Indians to the Indian Civil Service on terms of 
equality with Europeans. This was rejected by the 
G-overnment of the day after consultation with the Viceroy 
who opined that ’’material reduction of the European 
staff...was incompatible with the safety of British 
rule”.'*' So much for Parliament’s responsibility for 
IndiaI
1. Cambridge History of India. VI, 368-71.
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As for representative government, the Legislative 
Councils constituted in 1861, while following quasi­
parliamentary procedure, were empowered only to consider 
legislation laid before them by the executive. Further­
more they were not representative of the indigenous 
population: they consisted of nominees of the Governor- 
General, of whom a few were Indians.^" In 1892, in 
response to the demands of Congress and its advocates 
among Members of Parliament the British Government passed 
the Indian Councils Act to reform these legislatures. 
Since 1886 Congress had reiterated its opinion that at 
least one-half of the members of the legislatures should 
be elected by Indians, and the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, 
had urged the Home Government to introduce an elected 
element into the Councils.1 2 3 The 1892 Act failed to 
introduce the right of election, although under the 
guise of "selection" it allowed local-government and 
other bodies to choose a few Councillors. This dealt a 
biov/ to Congress optimism about the rate of advance 
toward representative government. In addition the
1. fMontagu-Chelmsfordl Report on Indian Constitutional 
Reforms (1918)% pp. 39-41.
2. ibid., pp. 43-4.
3. see 1892, 1893 resolutions in Chakrabarty and 
Bhattacharyya, Congress in Evolution, pp. 6-7; Besant, 
Wrought. p. 154.
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Councils’ powers were frustratingly limited for while
they could discuss the Budget they could not vote upon
it. Nevertheless Congress set out to use these Reforms
as a platform for winning further advance.
Curzon, in defending the Government’s refusal to
grant the right of election had referred to the Congress,
in a famous phrase, as representing ”a minute and almost
microscopic minority of the total population of India”.’1 234'
As Viceroy from 1898 to 1905, Curzon further antagonised
the educated classes from which the Congress was drawn
by his unconcealed aversion to them, which found
expression in the Partition of Bengal in 1905, by which
he hoped to ’’split up and thereby weaken a solid body of
2opponents to our rule”.
A further expansion of the Councils was made by 
the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909, largely in response to 
criticism of the existing Councils.^ But once again 
Congress was disappointed.^- Gokhale, one of the leading
1. Ghosh, Indian National Congress, p. 20.
2. see J. H. Broomfield, op. cit., pp. 38-42.
3. see Montagu-Chelmsford Report, p. 47.
4. Congress 1909. Report, pp. 18-19, 47-48; cf. Motilal 
to Jawaharlal Nehru, 30 Aug 1909, in B. R. Nanda, The 
Nehrus. Motilal and Jawaharlal. p. 109«
^7 IB
Moderates, who had discussed the Bill at length with Morley, 
the Secretary of State, felt "certain" in 1908 that 
elected majorities would at last he granted in the prov­
incial legislatures, hut this was not done except in 
Bengal.1 23 Thus Congress had failed to obtain what it had 
asked for as early as 1886. The provision in Morley1s 
original Bill to establish Executive Councils in the UP,
the Punjab and Assam was deleted on the Bill's passage
2through the House of Lords. Morley gave Indian 
Moderates no solace by saying that he did not envisage 
Parliamentary Government in India for the foreseeable 
future.1 The Moderates were further disillusioned by 
their experience of working the reformed Councils.
Morley*s Bill had promised the elected Council-members 
a greater role in financial policies in particular. But, 
as the leading Moderate member of the Bombay Legislative 
Council, Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, pointed out in 1912, while 
the official members had months to consider the Budget,
1. Gokhale to Vamanrao, 30 Oct 1908, Gokhale Parers.
2. Congress 1909. Report, p. 26. For opposition to the 
Reforms from returned "men on the spot" in the 
Secretary of State’s Council and the House of Lords,
see K. G. Gupta to Gokhale, 17 Sept 1909> Gokhale Papers; 
Morley to Minto, 25 Feb and 5 May 1909, in Minto, Countess, p. 282.
3. see Mehta's interview with Times of India. 18 Dec 
1908 in P. Mehta, Some Unpublished and Later Speeches and 
Writings of the Hon. Sir Pherozeshah Mehta. J. R. B. Jeejeebhoy (ed), pp. 217-8.
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the non-official members of the Budget Committee had 
only a weekend to do so; and the Budget debate was 
narrowly restricted to a discussion of the matters con­
tained in the Budget. The ’’arrangements”, he said, 
are ”more or less of a farce”.^
In 1911 it seemed that the Government of Minto’s 
successor, Lord Hardinge, had gone far toward accepting 
the Congress’ ultimate goal of self-government, for in 
its famous ’’Delhi” Despatch of that year it wrote:
in the course of time the just demands 
of Indians for a share in the government 
of the country will have to be satisfied, 
and the question will be how this devolution 
of power can be conceded without impairing 
the supreme authority of the Governor- 
General in Council. The only possible 
solution of the difficulty would appear to 
be gradually to give the provinces a larger 
measure of self-government, until at last 
India would consist of a number of adminis­
trations, autonomous in all provincial 
affairs, with the Government of India above 
them all, and possessing power to interfere 
in case of misgovernment, but ordinarily 
restricting their functions to matters of 
Imperial concern.1 2
Indian Moderates welcomed this as a portent of advance
1. ibid., p. 316; cf. Motilal to Jawaharlal Nehru,
29 April 1910, in Nanda, The Nehrus. p. 110.
2. Despatch from the Government of India to the 
Secretary of State, 25 Aug 1911» par. 3, in Home Dept A, 
Dec 1911, nos 8-11.
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to self-government along the lines of Canada and
Australia.Hardinge and the members of his Executive
Council recorded, however, that they regarded "the
permanency of British rule in India" as "essential", and
"colonial self-government on the lines of the British
2Dominions" as "out of the question", while the Secret­
ary of State, Lord Crewe, made similar disclaimers in 
Parliament.
The slowness of political advance permitted by the 
British, and the constant disappointment of Indian hopes, 
culminating in these categorical denials that India 
would ever progress to Parliamentary self-government, 
served to embitter those who had been affected by the 
defiant spirit of the Extremists and to disillusion the 
Moderates who had expelled the Extremists from Congress, 
in the hope of thereby assuring the gradual and peaceful 
acquisition of political power.^
The disappointment and disillusionment of the 
Moderates with the British response to their demands for
1. Presidential Address, Congress 1911. Report. pp. 20-1.
2. Note by Hardinge, 30 June 1912, in Home Poll Dep.
Sept 1912, no. 7; Minute by R. H. Craddock, 26 June 1912, 
in ibid.
3. Home Poll Dep. Peb 1913» no. 1, p. 2.
4. see e.g. Home Poll B, Aug 1912, nos 26-30, pp. 7, 20.
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reform prepared many of them for rapprochement with the 
Extremists. To understand this change of attitude it 
is necessary to examine the Moderate-Extremist tension 
more closely.
II
The Nature of Moderate-Extremist Tension.
The doctrine of the Moderates was "based on the 
conclusion that British rule was both necessary and bene­
ficial to India. It was necessary, in that without it 
India would be plunged into disorder. "With the Hindus 
not united among themselves, with the Mahomedans occupy­
ing an attitude of almost open antagonism to them, is it 
possible for the country to get on except under the 
guidance and control of a strong power like the British?" 
asked one Moderate,1 2and in 1908 Gokhale wrote: "It is 
not difficult at any time to create disorder in our 
country - it was our portion for centuries - but it is 
not so easy to substitute another form of order for that 
which has been evolved by Englishmen in the course of a
pcentury."
1. R. N. Hudholkar to D. E. Wacha, 15 July 1906, Mehta 
Pacers.
2. G-okhale to Vamanrao, 15 May 1908, G-okhale Pacers.
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British rule was beneficial, according to the 
Moderate view, since it opened to India the storehouse of 
V/estern knowledge, and acquainted India with Western con­
cepts of individual worth, of justice, rationality and 
political organisation. This view was most rigorously 
elaborated in western India, by M. G. Ranade (1842-1901), 
founder of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha and one of the 
founders of the Congress. He expressed the Moderate view­
point thus:
Indian learning, even in its most 
flourishing period, has to be pronounced 
immature, whereas today European knowledge 
has advanced to a mature stage....India is 
in a fortunate position as compared with 
the Chinese and Japanese, since she is so 
favourably situated for acquiring [European 
knowledge].
In 1904 Gokhale, who had taken Ranade as his guru, his 
intellectual and political preceptor, longed for ’the 
liberation of the Indian mind from the thraldom of old- 
world ideas and the assimilation of all that is best in
pthe life and thought and character of the West".
The liberation of the Indian mind and its self- 
realisation, for which Ranade and Gokhale longed, were to
1. translation of Marathi speech, 1878, quoted in J. 
Kellock, Mahadev Govind Ranade. Patriot and Social 
Servant, pp. 12-3.
2. Speech on Universities Bill, Indian Legislative 
Council, in T. V. Parvate, Copal Krishna Gokhale. p. 164; 
cf. his letter, 1909, quoted in ibid., p. 307.
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be effected by the spread of education, by the reform of 
social abuses hallowed by religious usage and by the 
development of secular democracy. Education would release 
Indians from the limitations imposed by their own cultures 
and would also break down the social barriers of religion, 
caste and language, which imposed such a threat to order. 
Hinduism must be purified through reforming societies 
like the Brahmo Samaj and the Prarthana Samaj, of which 
Ranade was a leading member. Education and socio­
religious reform would prepare the way for secular demo­
cracy, but meanwhile Indians should be given “practical 
training [in Gokhale’s words]...for the proper exercise 
of the political institutions of the West“ by the intro­
duction of representative, parliamentary institutions. ^* 
The strategies employed by the Moderates for the 
achievement of these ends were generally confined to the 
submission of the resolutions of annual Congresses and 
public meetings to the Government, to deputations of 
Congressmen and to consultations such as Gokhale held 
with Morley in 1907-08: Hume’s agitation of 1888 and the 
anti-Partition agitation launched by the Bengal Moderates 
were exceptional.
1. Presidential Address to 1905 Congress, in Parvate, 
Gokhale. p. 212; cf. D. Naoroji, Speech in Congress 1885. 
Report, p. 33.
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The Extremists on the other hand professed to 
regard the British presence as neither necessary nor 
beneficial, but dated India’s decline from the commence­
ment of British rule.1 234 They denounced the Government
2system of education as irreligious, and regarded social 
reform as undesirable, since by making Indians aware of 
their ’shortcomings” it sapped their self-confidence.1 
India, the Extremists claimed, had as much right to self- 
government as any other country: it was unpatriotic and 
self-degrading to argue, as did the Moderates, that India 
had to be taught by the British how to rule herself.
India should demand not representative government, but 
independence.
The Hindu revivalist movements, with which 
Extremism was closely related, inculcated self-confidence 
in the Hindus and denied that the institutions and
1. Kesari, 18 Peb 1902 in S. A. Wolpert, Tilak and 
G-okhale: Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern 
India, p. 150.
2. Tilak in Kesari, 19 Mar 1901, in ibid., p. 138.
3. see P. V. Athalye, The Life of Lokamanya Tilak. p. 61; 
cf. B. 0. Pal, Swadeshi and Swara.i (The Rise of New 
Patriotism), pp. 21-2.
4. see quotation from Bande Mataram, 1906, in Pal’s 
second Madras speech, 1907, in ibid., p. 154; cf. ibid., 
pp. 9» 11; Bombay Police 1908, par. 13(b) in HPM Bombay,
II, 221.
systems of thought of the West should he models for
India.'1 2' Aurobindo, one of the leading Extremists,
insisted that "Swaraj [self-government] as the fulfilment
of the ancient life of India under modem conditions
[and]...the final fulfilment of the Vedantic ideal in
2politics” was "the true Swaraj for India”.
The Extremists’ rejection of the West was to a 
great extent unreal. Aurobindo, for instance, never 
defined the "Vedantic ideal" that he wished to fulfill 
under conditions of Indian self-rule. The turning back 
of Indians to their past was in the tradition of 
European romanticism which, since 1830, had been turning 
Frenchmen and Germans back to their respective pasts. 
Furthermore Western education, which had provided Indian 
Moderates with the models of British liberalism and 
reform, presented the Extremists with examples of 
European revolutions, violent as in the case of Italy 
against Austria, or non-violent as in the cases of 
Ireland against Britain and Hungary against Austria.
Lajpat Rai, for instance, while at Law College, deter­
mined to "make Mazzini my guru" and later wrote
1. Regarding the Arya Samaj, see D. F. Pocock, "Notes 
on the Interaction of English and Indian Thought in the 
Nineteenth Century", Journal of World History. IV, no. 4, 
p. 844.
2. quoted in H. and V. Mukherjee, Sri Aurobindo’s 
Political Thought (1893-1908). p. 40.
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biographies of Mazzini and Garibaldi.^"
From studying Western models the Extremists con­
cluded that Britain would never give up India of her own 
free will or in response to the appeals of the Moderates 
to her sense of justice. Some form of sanction, they 
decided, must be employed to drive the British out.
Looking at Russia, some of them - notably in Ben­
gal - advocated terrorism. Aurobindo encouraged the
establishment of secret terrorist societies in Bengal and
2taught young men to make bombs, but other Extremists 
found bomb-throwing distasteful or felt it could have 
little effect on the British. Armed uprising, the Extrem­
ists saw, was extremely unlikely of success. Under the 
Arms Act the civilian population was disarmed; the poss­
ibilities for seducing the armed forces were severely 
limited by the care with which the British deployed troops 
from one region to another, and by the British refusal to 
commission Indians, which inhibited those classes from 
which the national politicians were drawn from enlisting. 
Also, armed resistance was rendered unattractive by the 
availability of a weapon which seemed easier to
1. Lajpat Rai, nMy Life”, pp. 24» 96, 108.
2. J. H. Broomfield, op. cit., p. 47; K. M. Munshi,
I Follow the Mahatma, p. 1.
1 2 wield, passive resistance on the Hungarian or Irish
model.
Tilak quoted the example of Ireland in advising 
the peasants of the Deccan to refuse to pay taxes in 
1896, as did Aurobindo in 1907 in proposing no-tax cam­
paigns and obstruction in the councils of G-overnment. ^ 
The agitation against the Partition of Bengal prompted 
the Extremist leaders to elaborate plans of passive 
resistance in 1906-07. Aurobindo, for instance, wrote:
By an organised and relentless boycott 
of British goods, we propose to render 
the further exploitation of the country 
impossible....We refuse to send our boys 
to Government schools or to schools aided 
and controlled by the Government;...the 
control of its [India*s] youthful minds 
[will] pass out of the hands of the for­
eigners. ...We refuse...to have any resort 
to the alien courts of justice....We 
refuse...to go to the executive for help 
or advice or protection....If Indians no 
longer consented to teach in Government 
schools or work in the Government offices, 
or to serve the alien [sic] as police, 
the administration could not continue for 
a day. 4
1. see Tilak, “Tenets of the New Party”, in All About 
Lok. Tilak. p. 502.
2. see Case, Non-Violent Coercion, pp. 326-8.
3. see Wolpert, p. 122; Sri Aurobindo, Passive 
Resistance, p. 27.
4. Sri Aurobindo, Passive Resistance, pp. 27-32, 37-9; 
cf. Pal, 18 Sept 1906. in Swadeshi and Swaraj, pp. 62-3«
Tilak declared:
We shall not assist them [the 
Government] in fighting beyond the 
frontiers....We shall have our own 
courts, and when the., time comes we 
shall not pay taxes.
The Extremist leaders spoke of involving the
masses, India's "sweating, swarthy populations", her
peasants and "proletariate" in their passive resistance 
2campaigns. Here again they were influenced more perhaps 
by European revolutionary examples than by the facts of 
Indian political life. Tilak, to be sure, strove to 
identify himself with the dissatisfactions of the 
Maratha peasantry and Lajpat Bai espoused the grievances 
of the Hindu farmers of the south western Punjab over the 
Canal Colonies Act in order to "win the sympathy and 
affection of the people".^ But these were spasmodic 
attempts, and in Bengal no serious attempt was made by 
the Extremist leaders to rouse the peasantry.
The Extremist leaders were advocating programmes 
which involved much larger groups than the elite which 
comprised the Associations affiliated to Congress. Their
1. "Tenets of the New Party", loc. cit., p. 503.
2. see Mukherjee, Aurobindo's Thought. pp. 107-9; Pal, 
8 Apr 1905 in Swadeshi and Swaraj, p. 20.
3* Lajpat Bai, "My Life", p. 137.
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speeches advocating passive resistance excited their 
audiences, composed of smaller townspeople and students, 
and they proposed to involve peasant, and town, mass 
groups. There was little indication however that they 
had considered the need for more elaborate organisation 
either inside or outside Congress to direct and control 
such groups. Their proposals constituted an emotional 
response to their situation rather than a rational 
campaign of action.
Extremist doctrine was indeed highly emotional and 
expressed the discontents of groups in Indian society.
Two kinds of such groups may be distinguished. First 
were those, like the Chitpavan Brahmins of Maharashtra, 
who had been dispossessed of power by the intrusion of 
the British. Secondly were those groups which had 
received Western education but which by the beginning 
of the twentieth century found that due to the increase 
in educational facilities unmatched by any comparable 
increase in professional and administrative positions, 
the possibilities for employment were decreasing. Typical 
of these groups were the younger members of the Hindu 
castes of Bengal with traditions of learning, the 
bhadralok, who found the competition for suitable jobs
30
increasingly intense.^ Moderate doctrine by contrast
appealed rather to more successful professional men, men
2of f,wealth, influence and prestige", who did not share 
the discontents of those to whom the Extremists appealed 
(at least not in the same degree) and who were wary of 
the Extremists1 2 threats to involve mass groups with the 
possible consequence of violence.
It would be misleading however to equate Moderates 
with one class or group, Extremists with others. Such 
equations would ignore the fact that the Chitpavan 
Brahmin community produced both Moderates, like Ranade 
and Gokhale, and Extremists, like Tilak, or that both 
Extremists and Moderates came from various income levels 
within the bhadralok.
The distinction between Moderate and Extremist was 
rather one of temperament. The Moderate temperament was 
cautious, concerned to maintain order and to make the 
most of the opportunities for acquiring Western civilis­
ation: the Extremist temperament was more ebullient and 
reacted sharply and bitterly against the disabilities and 
what it felt to be the ignominy of foreign rule. This
1. J. H. Broomfield, op. cit., p. 45.
2. V. S. S. Sastri to V. Krishnaswami Iyer, 28 Sept 
1908, VKI Papers.
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distinction was seen by leaders on either side. Tilak,
for instance, wrote that
The difference, if any [between Extremist 
and Moderate] is in their temperaments; 
one will work with greater energy and 
vigour and is prepared to use the liberty 
allowed by the law to the utmost extent, 
not much caring for the official opinion; 
while the other will keep within a res­
pectable distance even from the limits of 
liberty allowed to them and will not push 
their constitutional agitation, if it be 
calculated to offend in any way the powers 
that be.l
It has been argued that the doctrines and strategies, 
which had been evolved by Moderate and Extremist leaders 
respectively, were "ideal types” and that the actions 
of "any one individual or group show, when analysed, a
pmixture of both types”. Moderate and Extremist leaders
had elaborated their respective doctrines and strategies,
but few of the rank-and-file of Congress had thought out
their position as rigorously as their leaders. On the
Moderate side, Gokhale saw that
The number of men who can form a sound 
political judgment in the country is not 
large. But you can find any number of 
unthinking men, filled with an honest but 
vague longing for the emancipation of the
1. Mahratta, 27 Dec 1914, p. 401; cf. H. P. Mody,
Sir Pherozeshah Mehta: A Political Biography. II, 546.
2. D. F. Pocock, "English and Indian Thought", p. 842.
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country, ready to follow any plausible 
leaders, whom, in their heart of hearts, 
they believe to be wholly “against the 
foreigner“. 1
In fact most members of the national movement shared this 
“honest but vague” patriotism in greater or lesser degree, 
and it was to these feelings that the Extremists appealed.
Several observers have pointed out that the two 
temperaments which we have distinguished as Moderate and 
Extremist were often seen to exist, side by side or in
2conflict, within the same Indian nationalist personality: 
in the same breast caution fought with impatience, and 
recognition of the desirability of moving steadily toward 
a synthesis of Western and Indian culture and political 
forms battled with angry or “patriotic“ rejection of the 
West.
In 1907, by challenging the Moderate leadership 
and by demanding that their programme of passive resistance 
be endorsed by Congress, the Extremists forced the rank- 
and-file to choose between their doctrine and that of the 
Moderates. But the Moderate-Extremist tension within
1. Gokhale to Mrs Besant, 5 Jan 1915, quoted in Wolpert,p. 268.
2. see B. T. McCully, English Education and the Origins 
of Indian Nationalism, pp. 390-1; J. H. Broomfield, op. 
cit., p. 26; cf. R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of 
Capitalism (London, Murray, 1948), p. 211: “In every 
human soul there is a socialist and an individualist...”
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the personality of many nationalists made this an unreal 
choice.
That the majority of the rank-and-file chose to 
support the Moderate leaders can be traced partly to 
the recent emergence of the Extremists. As a result 
the Moderate leaders were still in charge of Congress and 
its affiliated Associations and could shift the venue of 
the session and enlist support in the name of preserving 
the Congress. More important, the Extremists’ speeches 
roused fears of violence among the Congress rank-and-file 
and, temporarily at least, resolved the Moderate- 
Extremist tension in their minds in the direction of 
caution. Furthermore, Morley’s promise to give reforms, 
on condition that Indians did not ’clamour for the 
impossible”, inclined many to leave control of Congress 
with the Moderates, since this appeared to ensure steady 
progress toward self-government for India.
The Extremist leaders had won a considerable foll­
owing in Bengal, the Deccan and, (as a result of Pal’s 
speeches) in Madras.'*’ As Grokhale wrote, ’the bulk of 
the so-called extremists are men who are adopting an 
anti-British attitude, because they have despaired of
1. see Grokhale to V. Krishnaswami Iyer, 29 Sept 1906, quoted p. 12 above.
getting any real reforms”.1 Clearly therefore the 
Reforms would have to he substantial if the drift of 
support to the Extremists was to be halted.
The Morley-Minto Reforms however were disappointing 
and were capped in 1912 by Crewe’s denial that Britain 
regarded self-government as India’s goal. This disillus­
ioned members of the Congress rank-and-file with Moderate 
methods of consultation with the British and helped to 
prepare them for rapprochement with the Extremists.
This increasing readiness for rapprochement between 
1908 and 1914 arose partly out of the desire of the 
Moderate leaders to preserve their dominant position; 
partly out of the growing dissatisfaction of the rank- 
and-file with the Moderate Congress; and partly out of 
a growing feeling among both Moderate rank-and-file and 
leaders that the differences between the two wings into 
which the national movement had split were not so very 
great.
The first of these factors was particularly relevant 
to Bengal. Even before the split, the Bengali Moderate 
leaders, Surendranath Banerjea and Bhupendranath Basu, 
were at pains to minimise the cleavage between themselves
1. G-okhale to Sir Lawrence Jenkins, 29 Jan 1909,G-okhale Papers.
and their Extremist opponents. It was they who inaugur­
ated the boycott campaigns over the Bengal Partition in 
1905, while Moderate leaders of other parts of India 
looked on in horror: G-okhale deplored "Surendranath' s 
inexcusable excesses”.'1 2' But with Pal's advocacy of the 
boycott of colleges, Banerjea's caution and moderation 
reasserted themselves and he opposed Pal's boycott as a 
threat to order and an incitement to the Government to 
repress the whole movement. The Extremists retaliated by
trying to capture the Indian Association which Banerjea,
2dominated.
Thus when the split came at Surat, Banerjea and 
the Bengal Moderates welcomed the drawing up of a 
Constitution which gave control of Congress to the Moder­
ates. But they did not welcome the exclusion of the 
Extremist leaders and their followers. They would have 
preferred to keep them in the Congress organisations, 
while trying to ensure by means of the Constitution that 
they did not gain control. Gokhale estimated that the 
Extremists were stronger in Bengal than elsewhere: to 
exclude them was to invite the setting up of a rival
1. Gokhale to V. Krishnaswami Iyer, 29 Sept 1906, 
quoted p. 12 above; for analysis of Bengal Moderates' 
motives, see J. H. Broomfield, op. cit., pp. 20-48.
2. R. C. Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in 
India. II, 197, 199, 210; Home Poll A, Peb 1913, nos 
9-35, pp. 66, 69.
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organisation to the Congress and its affiliated 
Associations, which would attract to it the young nation­
alists. In fact, the Extremists were excluded from 
neither the Indian Association nor the Bengal PCC,^ 
though the Rules of both ensured the continuity of 
Moderate control.
In addition to the deep dissatisfaction with the 
Reforms and their working among the Moderate leaders and
prank-and-file, many of them were also disturbed by the 
decline in activity of Congress and its institutions.^
The Moderates* plan of 1908 to establish a network 
of local Congress organisations to spread a ’’living 
interest” in the Congress^- fell through. The suppression 
of the Extremists removed the Moderates' rivals and, 
with them, the immediate need for a Moderate propagandist 
organisation. The Moderates relied upon consultation with 
the Government rather than upon rousing agitation, for 
winning reforms and therefore had little use for such
1. see Mody, Mehta, II, 542.
2. see L. A. Covindaraghava Iyer in New India. 31 Oct 
1914, p. 6b, and T. B. Sapru in ibid., 9 Pec 1914, p. 5b.
3. see note by A. C. Mazumdar, President, Indian 
Association, 13 May 1913 enclosed in Indian Association, 
Executive Council Minutes.
4. Gokhale to Mrs Besant, 21 Nov 1914, Advar Archives.
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organisation. Had the reformed legislatures under the 
Morley-Minto Reforms been popularly-elected bodies, the 
Moderates might have been encouraged to execute their 
plan for local bodies. On the contrary the representatives 
of ”the people at large” in the central and provincial 
legislatures were elected indirectly by local government 
bodies.'1 2' The Moderates permitted Bombay, Punjab and 
other Provincial Conferences to lapse after 1907. Activ­
ity continued only in Bengal in the form of the anti- 
Partition agitation, and with the revision of the Partition 
in 1911, this came to an end also.
By 1914 dissatisfaction with this inactivity was
prompting even some of the more cautious Moderates to
suggest that some modus operandi might be sought with
the Extremists Mfor unitedly carrying on the work of the
Congress which already suffers from lack of earnest 
2workers”. Like the Congress President for 1911 they 
argued that ”in every active and reforming body there 
is always an extreme wing...moderation sometimes means 
indifference, and caution timidity....Our agitation, in
1. Montagu-Chelmsford Report, pp. 49, 53-4.
2. N. Subba Rao Pantulu, Joint Secretary, Congress, in 
Hew India. 7 Nov 1914, p. 6b-d; cf. letter from A. K. Iyer, 
ibid., 9 Nov 1914, p. 13(a); G-. Subramania Aiyer, ibid.,
28 Nov 1914, p. 5.
order to be effective must be National not sectarian, 
persistent not spasmodic”
Many of the Moderate rank-and-file saw little 
difference between the Moderate and Extremist doctrines.
In 1914 a number of them wrote that they could find ”no 
irreconcilable differences between the Extremists and the 
Moderates”, since both had accepted self-government 
within the Empire as their goal; that Indian nationalists 
”ought in no way to divide” themselves; and that the 
’■Congress authorities” should ’’bring about unification,
p...sacrificing all trifling technicalities”. Among the 
Moderate leaders G-okhale advocated the readmission of 
the Extremists as early as 1910.^ The quiescence of the 
Extremists following the blows of British repression 
led him to believe that they had abandoned their pro­
gramme of boycott and obstruction,^" and he urged that they 
be readmitted, in the Subjects Committee of the 1911 
Congress. There the desire for rapprochement was so
1. Besant, Wrought. p. 532.
2. articles, letters in New India. 3 Nov 1914, p. 13b;
18 Nov 1914, p. 5; 19 Nov 1914, p. 11c; 25 Nov 1914, p. 5; 
28 Nov 1914, p. 5.
3. see Wacha to Wedderburn, 12 Aug 1910, Mehta Pacers.
4. Gokhale to Bhupendranath Basu, 14 Dec 1914, Advar 
Archives.
strong that his proposal was carried by some 92 or 93 
votes to eight. His eight opponents included the 
leading Bombay Moderates who, from caution and deter­
mination not to lose their leadership to the Extremists, 
had set their faces against readmission. They threaten­
ed to leave Congress if Cokhale's resolution were 
adopted and, rather than face "another unfortunate split", 
G-okhale withdrew it.^
The readiness among the Moderate leaders and rank-
and-file for rapprochement with the Extremists was
matched by a similar readiness for rapprochement on
the part of the Extremist leaders. The determination of
the Moderates to exclude them from the Congress at Surat
came as a complete surprise to them. They assumed that
sooner or later they would be readmitted to Congress:
when they met after the Surat split, the Extremist
leaders constituted themselves into a "Congress
Continuation Committee" and, though they held conferences
of their own, these were held as substitutes for Congress
2conferences and all nationalists were invited to them.
1. Cokhale to Mrs Besant, 21 Nov 1914, Advar Archives.
2. see [Proceedings of so-called] 16th Bombay Provin­
cial Conference held [by Extremists] at Satara, 26«
27, 28 April 1914, p. 4; Bhat, Tilak, pp. 80-1.
Several Extremists, notably Lajpat Rai and one of Tilak*s 
lieutenants, R. P. Karandikar, renounced their adherence 
to Extremist doctrine and joined the Moderates in Congress 
in the hope of arranging a compromise.1 23 Up to the time 
of the split, the Extremists do not seem to have doubted 
that sooner or later they would win the support of the 
majority of Congressmen by appealing to their patriotism.
Had the Extremists not lapsed into inactivity 
under British repression between 1908 and 1914, they 
might have developed an organisation parallel to Con­
gress. In 1908 they proposed to hold their own "Congress”
pat Nagpur but the British refused to allow this, making 
them more anxious than ever to rejoin Congress since for 
them to organise separately was to invite further British 
repression.
Among those who were anxious to see the breach 
healed were the men of the younger generation whose 
national spirit had been stirred since the rise of 
Extremism in 1904*1 This generation was to be swept up
1. R. P, Karandikar "Diary" (Poona), 28 Dec 1907.
2. Gokhale to Bhupendranath Basu, 14 Dec 1914, Adyar Archives.
3. see e.g. M. R. Jayakar, The Story of Mv Life. I. 
89-91.
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by the nationalist agitation of the second decade of 
this century, and its more outstanding members were to 
provide the Congress leaders with many of their prin­
cipal helpers during that, and subsequent, decades. The 
men of this generation were in their late teens, their 
20s or 30s in 1914. Like the older members of the 
national movement, most of them joined the professions, 
notably the law, though (in Bombay in particular) some 
of them went into business. They had received Western 
education, most having a degree from an Indian or, in 
some cases, an English or European university. While 
students in the last years of the nineteenth, or in the 
early twentieth, century, they had come very much under 
the influence of Extremism. Their youthful idealism 
had responded to the Extremists’ call for self-sacrifice 
for India’s sake, to their challenging defiance of the 
British and to their demand for independence.
The Japanese defeat of the Russians in 1905-05 
provided unprecedented proof of the ability of Asiatics 
to match and beat Europeans and increased the self- 
confidence of this generation in challenging the British. 
’’After the Japanese victory we felt an immense elation”,
1 Cokhale to Wedderburn, 29 April 1910, Qokhale Papers
wrote one of them.1 234 Revolutions against despotic Govern­
ments in Persia and China, seemed to portend the rise of
2liberal democratic regimes in Asia.
Rot only was the emotionalism of Extremism 
attractive to the young, but the Extremist leaders 
specifically aimed their appeal at the students. B. C. 
Pal called for the boycott of colleges by students. To 
young Bengalis the anti-Partition agitation transformed 
the Government from a protector into "an agency of 
oppression and usurpation”:1 students participated in 
the picketing of shops selling British goods, a National 
Council of Education was established to replace Govern­
ment schools with ’’National” institutions and young 
Bengalis who had recently graduated participated in the 
organisation of the boycott and the speech-making 
associated with it.^
The influence of the anti-Partition agitation was 
not confined to the young men of Bengal, for it stirred
1. N. C. Chaudhuri, The Autobiography of An Unknown 
Indian, p. 107.
2. see D. Naoroji, Presidential Address, Congress 1906. 
Report. p. 24.
3. see N. C. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 48.
4. e.g. Jitendralal Bannerjee, see Home Poll Dep. Oct 
1919» no. 19, pp. 1-4; for others, Home Poll A, July 
1913» no. 85; N. C. Banerji, At the Cross-roads (1885- 1946). pp. 68-78.
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Indian students in other provinces and even in England.^
Of the Extremist leaders Tilak and Lajpat Rai lectured
in the UP while Aurobindo, who had been a teacher at
Baroda, had influenced many Gujarati students, and
lectured on Rational Education in Bombay. And one
young Madrasi nationalist testified that
The first event that altered my life 
definitely was Bepin Chandra Pal’s 
lecturing in Madras in the early 
summer of 1907....I felt drawn towards 
the ideal he was preaching - of service 
to my country....How I was going to 
serve I could not quite determine; but 
it was in the direction of making India independent of England.3
The trials and conviction of the Extremist leaders 
in 1906-09 made them martyrs in the eyes of the student 
population. This was particularly so in the case of 
Tilak^ who had already been imprisoned in 1897 and whose 
sentence of six years’ imprisonment in 1908 was greeted 
by strikes on the part of students. Some of the young 
men were themselves caught in the net of repression. In
1. see letters Jawaharlal to Motilal Nehru, B. R.
Nanda, The Nehrus, pp. 81, 86.
2. interview with S. G. Banker, 27 June 1963; Jamnadas 
Dwarkadas, ”A Memoire of Gandhiji” (unpublished memoirs 
held by the author), p. 50; Munshi, I Follow the Mahatma, 
p. 1; Nanda, The Nehrus, pp. 59» 85-£>.
3. B. Shiva Rao, ’The Value of the CHC [Central Hindu 
College] to Me”, in CHC Magazine. XIII (1913), 215-6.
4. Jamnadas, ’’Memoire”, pp. 38- 46; interviews with
Durgdas Adwani, 25 Apr 1963, S. G. Banker, 27 June 1963; 
CHC Magazine. VII (1907), 313; M. Felton, I Meet Raiaii. 
p. 169. ---------
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Bengal some who were active in the Partition agitation 
and who had places of employment which could be influen­
ced by the Government lost their jobs.^ In Madras, for 
example, the Government accused two young men of com­
plicity in the murder of a Government official. They 
had helped to foment anti-British feeling through their 
speeches, but the prosecution could not prove any direct 
implication in the matter. Nevertheless they were con­
victed of sedition and given the very heavy sentences of 
transportation with hard labour. One of them succumbed 
to tuberculosis as the result of his ordeal but the 
other, V. 0. Chidambaram Pillai, was to become one of
the bitterest assailants of the British after his 
2release.
Although the Extremists were silenced after 1908, 
the strategy of passive resistance was put into practice 
among the Indian population of South Africa by Gandhi, 
to the admiration of the young men in India.^
1. e.g. Jitendralal Bannerjee, see Home Poll Dep. Oct 
1919, no. 19.
2. V. K. Narasimhan, "Kasturi Ranga Iyengar: A 
Biography” (unpublished); Amrita Bazar Patrika. 31 Pec 
1912; Home Poll Dep. April 1913, no. 1.
3. see I. K. Yajnik, Gandhi as I Know Him. (1943), 
pp. 1-3; Jamnadas, ’Memoire", pp. 55, 101; Chaudhuri, 
Autobiography, p. 400; interview with C. Rajagopala- 
chariar, 21 Mar 1903.
In the circumstances of the decline in both
Moderate and Extremist political activity in India
between 1908 and 1914, some of the young men whose
patriotism had been stirred by the agitation turned to
terrorism and bomb-throwing. This was particularly so
among the young bhadralok of Bengal, amongst whom there
was a tradition of personal vendetta by murder.^ Others
studied the Sinn Pein movement and discussed the making 
2of bombs, but most either shrank from clandestine 
violence or rejected it as unlikely to have any apprec­
iable effect on the British. Furthermore, the Extrem­
ists' advocacy of passive resistance and Gandhi's 
practice of it in South Africa prepared them rather for 
this form of sanctions against the British.
Needless to say this younger, more impetuous 
generation found the inactivity of both Congress and the 
Extremists particularly galling. Jawaharlal Nehru, who 
returned to India from Cambridge and the Inns of Court 
at the age of 23 in 1912, found the Congress Session of 
that year very dull. Like other men of his generation
1. interview with N. C. Chaudhuri, 26 July 1963.
2. interview with K. Dwarkadas, 1 June 1963; Munshi,
I Follow the Mahatma, p. 1.
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he was not attracted by terrorism
but [he wrote] the idea that we must 
not tamely submit to existing conditions 
and that something must be done began to 
obsess me more and more. Successful 
action, from the national point of view, 
did not seem to be at all easy, but I 
felt that both individual and national 
honor demanded a more aggressive and 
fighting attitude to foreign rule.
Ill
The Problems of Leadership.
In 1914 therefore, the national movement was 
divided and its two wings were languishing. There was 
however a general desire to change this. Among Moderates 
and Extremists there was a readiness for rapprochement, 
which was being prevented by a handful of determined 
Moderate leaders. The sense of community was sharpened 
by the disappointment which both groups shared at the 
meagreness of the reforms granted by the British.
There was a strong, if vague, feeling among the 
rank-and-file of Congress that it ought to be a more 
active and "aggressive” body, a feeling particularly 
marked among the younger generation. Extremist
1. J. Nehru, Toward Freedom: The Autobiography, pp.
39, 43.
/propaganda and the Partition agitation had stirred 
groups outside Congress, the smaller bhadralok in Bengal, 
the townspeople of Madras and Maharashtra. Their 
inactivity in 1914 reflected that of the two wings of 
the national movement, but they were a dormant audience 
waiting to be roused again.
Despite their dissatisfaction with the inactivity 
of Congress, many nationalists, both Moderate and 
Extremist, were still cautious. Many Moderates were 
fearful of any course of action which threatened to 
provoke violence. In advocating the readmission of the 
Extremists to Congress many members of the Moderate 
rank-and-file assumed that Extremists would no longer 
urge boycott and passive resistance for the gaining of 
India's ends, and a few made this assumption explicit.^" 
Clearly any rapprochement to be lasting and stable would 
have to take into account Moderate caution.
Among the Extremists, the more reckless had found 
their newspapers required to pay crushing securities and 
themselves threatened with imprisonment, and had learnt 
to express their criticisms of the British with
1. articles in New India. 7 Nov 1914, p. 6b-d; 19 Dec 
1914, p. 5.
restraint. Repression had strengthened the position of 
the more cautious among them,1 who were inclined to seek 
rapprochement.
Opportunities and problems faced those who would 
lead the national movement in 1914.
The outlook for reunification was good. But the 
leaders would have to evolve a programme which would 
provide a satisfactory basis for reconciliation. On the 
one hand the programme would have to satisfy the desire 
for greater activity. It would have to satisfy the 
young men's feeling that "something must be done", to 
capture their enthusiasm and to express their defiance 
toward the British. To do this it would almost 
certainly have had to include some form of continuous 
agitation, possibly in the shape of press and platform 
criticism of the G-overnment.
On the other hand it must not lead the more 
cautious to fear violence or renewed British repression. 
Such a programme would be extremely difficult to evolve. 
Particularly as it became necessary to draw up more
1. see "Contribution to Freedom Struggle in India by 
Shri 1'T. C. Kelkar of Poona" (unpubl., HFM Bombay), pp. 
3-4; "Contribution to Freedom Struggle by the late Shri 
Shivaram Mahadeo Paranjpye of Poona" (unpubl., HFM 
Bombay), pp. 4-5; "Contribution to Freedom Struggle by 
Shri Krishnaji Prabhakar Khadilkar of Poona" (unpubl., 
HFM Bombay), pp. 1-3.
detailed plans for action, either the more cautious 
would be frightened or the more impetuous dissatisfied.
At this point it would be necessary to try to carry a 
majority of the movement, hoping that the minority 
would accept the majority sentiment but being prepared 
in the last resort to see the minority secede.
Those who sought to lead would have to evolve 
strategies which promised to accelerate India's advance 
to self-government, since nationalists of all tempera­
ments had been disappointed by Britain's dilatoriness 
and obduracy. There was the danger, however, that 
those of more moderate temperament would be satisfied 
by more gradual advance than those who had been attracted 
by Extremist leaders' demands for independence. If the 
British could be prevailed upon to modify their obduracy 
in only a small degree, therefore, some Moderates might 
be wooed from their desire for rapprochement with the 
Extremists.
In order to lessen the likelihood of further 
splits, the leaders would have to build up a more elabor­
ate and better-articulated organisation than existed in 
the part-moribund Congress with its decentralised, 
affiliated Associations in the provinces. They would 
have to create local, district organisations like those
CO
on which a beginning had been made by the Moderates in 
1908 and establish well-articulated channels of 
communication between themselves and these local 
organisations in order to gauge the mood and the needs 
of their following and, at the same time, to exert 
adequate discipline.
Such organisation was needed to direct and control 
the large potential audience which now existed outside 
Congress thanks to the Partition agitation and to 
agitation aroused by the Extremists.
IV
Contenders for Leadership
The most venerable of nationalist leaders was 
Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917), a Parsee of Bombay. His 
career was symbolic of the whole Indian national move­
ment for, while he was identified with the Moderates, he 
had become increasingly critical of British obduracy 
regarding political reform and the employment of Indians 
in the ICS, and had even welcomed the rise of Extremism:
1. see R. P. Masani, Dadabhai Haoro.ii (Delhi ed.), 
pp. 148-55.
as President of the 1906 Congress he had striven to 
effect a compromise between Extremists and Moderates.
After 1907 however he was precluded by increasing ill­
ness from playing an active part in the leadership.
Among Moderate leaders, Pherozeshah Mehta (1845- 
1915) was the dominant personality from the 1890s until 
his death. By 1901 his fellow-founders of Congress in 
Bombay were dead; his skill in argument had brought 
him pre-eminence at the Bombay Bar, in professional 
society and thus, in the elite which comprised the 
Bombay Presidency Association. While Moderates, by and 
large, were timid men,1 23Mehta was quite fearless: it
was he, above all, who kept his head at Surat and
2insisted that the Extremists be expelled. Despite 
(or, rather, because of) his pre-eminence among the 
Moderates, Mehta was clearly unsuited for carrying out 
the tasks which confronted the leadership of the move­
ment in 1914. He had no sympathy for rapprochement 
between the two wings, the desire for which he dismissed 
as "mawkish sentimentality".1 He conceived of nationalist
1. see e.g. G-okhale to V. Krishnaswami Iyer, 7 Oct 
1907, VKI Papers.
2. see Morley to Minto, 31 Oct 1907 in Minto, Countess, 
p. 161; cf. Mody, Mehta. II, pp. 416, 540.
3. Mody, Mehta, II, pp. 549, 656-9.
political organisation as a society, in which the 
professional elite considered the political questions 
of the day and which conveyed the opinions of the elite, 
where appropriate, to the Government. He had no notion 
of organising to rouse agitation or to involve groups 
outside the professional elite.
While he was critical of the paucity of British 
response to the Indian national demands, Mehta continued 
to rely on remonstrance and on consultation with the 
British to remedy this situation. He was totally averse 
to mounting a programme of agitation aimed at intimidat­
ing the British into granting larger reforms, and thus 
held out no promise of satisfaction to those Moderates 
and to the younger generation who were hoping for a 
revival in Congress activity. Signs of rebellion against 
his authority were appearing among both these groups but, 
without an alternative leader to Mehta, they were too 
timid to challenge him openly."^
Mehta1s attitudes were shared by a number of 
outstanding Moderates who accepted the role of 
lieutenant to him. Of these the most important were 
V. Krishnaswami Iyer and Dinshaw Wacha.
1 . see e.g. Bombay Police 1915. par. 705(a).
Krishnaswami Iyer, a lawyer of Madras, resembled 
Mehta closely in personality. Like him he was fearless 
but utterly devoted to Moderate principles: from the 
time of Pal’s visit to Madras in May 1907 he called 
for the expulsion of the Extremists from Congress.'1'
By force of personality and forensic ability similar 
to Mehta’s, he dominated the Moderates of Madras until 
his death in 1911. His place was never really filled, 
and the Madras Moderates remained virtually leaderless.
Mehta’s most devoted associate was his fellow 
Parsee, Dinshaw Wacha (1844-1936). He was Joint 
Secretary of the Congress from 1895 to 1913, and in his 
mountainous correspondence with Dadabhai in London and 
with provincial secretaries and leaders, he is seen 
guiding the politically-inexperienced with the arrange­
ments for the sessions, suggesting members for the various 
committees, gathering funds, assessing friends and foes 
and urging his associates - including Mehta - to action.
1. see his letters to Gokhale, 11 May, 12 Dec 1907, VKI Papers.
There is little doubt that the final decisions were
Mehta’s, but a great deal of the hard work was Wacha’s.^  
7/hen Mehta died, his mantle passed to Wacha but, 
although Wacha had learnt much from his chief, he lacked 
the qualities of a great leader. He lacked the voice 
and temper of a debater. To his undoubted courage he 
added a certain petulance which, together with his 
proprietorial attitude to the Congress, won him enemies
prather than followers.
A key figure among Moderates was G. K. Gokhale 
(1866-1915)» a leading Moderate thinker and parliamentary 
debater. Unlike many Moderates who v/ere successful 
professional men and who attended to national politics 
in their spare time, he had given up his teaching career 
to devote himself wholly to politics and social work 
and had founded the Servants of India Society in 1905 
for others who would do likewise.
Like Mehta, G-okhale relied on consultation with, 
and representations to, the Government to win reforms,
1. see letters from Wacha to Mehta, 29 Oct 1895, 7 Nov 
1896, 26 Oct 1896, 4 Dec 1897, 31 Dec 1899: Gokhale to 
Wacha, 1 Heb 1904, etc., Mehta Papers.
2. see Who’s Who in India (Newul Kishore), part vii, 
pp. 137-8; V. S. S. Sastri, Sir Linshaw Wacha Memorial, passim.
and travelled to England seven times to argue India’s 
case at Whitehall.
Unlike Mehta, however, Gokhale recognised the need
to build local organisations to counter the challenge
throv/n out by Extremist appeals to young men and groups
outside the professional elite. By 1910 he was also
seeking some basis for the readmission of the Extremists
to Congress. He was particularly anxious that ’’the
rising generation of the country should not have to grow
up under the baleful tradition of that breach,”^ lest
the split become permanent and the Extremists set up a
separate organisation which would attract this rising
generation. Gokhale had not evolved a programme of
agitation which would satisfy the young men’s desire for
’’more aggressive” activity. As President of the 1905
2Congress he had criticised the Government bitterly, 
but he lacked the taste for demagoguy and probably also 
the style of oratory to sway crowds that would be required 
to lead an agitational movement. Furthermore he
1. G-okhale to Bhupendranath Basu, 14 Bee 1914, Adyar 
Archives.
2. Congress 1905. Report, pp. 7-14.
3 . see T. V. Parvate, Copal Krishna Gokhale, p. 414.
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deferred to Mehta’s age and domineering personality and 
did not press for the compromise for which he, like so 
many other Moderates, was prepared.
The eminence of Mehta and Gokhale among Moderate 
leaders was only equalled in 1914 "by Surendranath 
Banerjea (1848-1925) of Bengal. Professor of English 
and history and editor of the Bengalee., he had been 
dismissed from the ICS because (he believed) of racial 
prejudice.1 2 He was a co-founder of Congress and of the 
Indian Association, a majority of members of which were 
his personal adherents.
At first sight he was more fitted to be a leader 
of the national movement as it was in 1914 than was 
either of his Moderate rivals. His oratorical gifts 
had brought him great renown. He had wanted to avoid 
the split at Surat while keeping Congress and its com­
ponent institutions under Moderate control. His 
leadership of the anti-Partition agitation, which he
2continued after the Extremists were scattered in 1907-08, 
showed him as a Moderate who was prepared to seek a
1. S. Banerjea, A Nation in Making: Being the Reminis­
cences of Fifty Years of Public Life, pp. 32-3; for biog­
raphical details see J. H. Broomfield, op. cit., pp. 92-6; 
Home Poll A, Peb 1913, nos 9-35.
2. see his speech, Congress 1908. Report, p. 48; Home 
Poll Dep. Oct 1919, no. 19, p. 4.
programme to satisfy the more ardent spirits. But his 
popularity suffered as the result of his opposition to 
the Extremists’ proposals to extend the Partition 
agitation, and it was further reduced by his discontin­
uance of agitation after Repartition in 1911 and by his 
failure to achieve anything worthwhile in the Legislative 
Council (to which he was elected in 1912) due to the 
Indians’ lack of power.1 His leadership of the national 
movement in Bengal was weakened by the continued attacks 
on him by the Extremists, in which his moderation was 
emphasised and presented as lack of patriotism. This 
continuing feud took up much of his energy.
Furthermore, like other Moderates he lacked 
appreciation of the kind and complexity of organisation 
necessary for the rousing and control of agitation, 
particularly in the presence of rivals who were only too 
anxious to deprive him of leadership.
The most outstanding Extremist leaders in 1908 had 
been Aurobindo Chose, Lajpat Rai, B. C. Pal and Tilak.
Of these Aurobindo fled to Pondicherry in 1909 under the 
threat of prosecution by the British and never rejoined
1 . J. H. Broomfield, op. cit., pp. 95» 121.
the national movement.
Lajpat Rai (1865-1928), as a lawyer from one of 
the Hindu moneylending castes, was a typical member of 
the nationalist elite in the Punjab. He sought support 
specifically from the Hindus, having joined the Arya 
Samaj, not so much because of his concern with Hinduism 
as a religion, as because the Samaj promised to give 
Hindus self-confidence and the will to assert themselves. 
In 1906-07 he aroused groups outside the elite, notably 
the Hindu peasantry, and young Hindu Punjabis with his 
speeches calling for passive resistance.
G-overnment repression was even more severe in the 
Punjab than in other provinces. Rai was transported in 
1907 without trial and, though soon released, was much 
chastened; so much so that at Surat he renounced 
Extremism and joined the Moderate Convention. National 
politics remained quiescent in the Punjab until 1917, 
and in 1914 Rai went into voluntary exile in the USA, 
returning only in 1920.
Bipin Chandra Pal (1858-1932) also moved toward 
compromise with the Moderate position. Before 1908 he 
had won popularity by his oratory and writings
1. Lajpat Rai, f,My Life”, pp. 92-3.
advocating passive resistance and asserting India's 
right to independence. Imprisoned in 1907 and released 
in 1908, he went to England until 1911 where he became 
convinced that the greatest threats to India were posed, 
not by Britain but by the Pan-Islamic movement and Japan. 
On his return to India he proposed that India should seek 
"equality" with Britain, but now on the basis of 
federation with Britain and not of independence from 
her.1 He concentrated on publicising these ideas, but 
his new style, more reasonable and less denunciatory, 
was less exciting than his former oratory. Furthermore 
he lacked any plan of action or organisation and dropped 
back in the ranks of the main contenders for leadership.
Bal Gangadhar lilak (1856-1920), known as 
"Lokamanya", was the leading Extremist of western India. 
A Chitpavan Brahmin of Poona, he had left teaching to 
take up the management and editing of two papers, Kesari 
(in Marathi) and the Mahratta (in English) to expound his 
views and to finance his other political activities.
His leadership was based on his popularity with his 
Chitpavan community, which he had won, first, by
1. see B. C. Pal, Nationality and Empire; A Running 
Study of Some Current Indian Problems, passim; J. Pal, 
"Bipinchandra Pal" in A. Gupta (ed)Y Studies in the 
Bengal Renaissance, p. 571.
2 . "Revered by the People".
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expressing the community’s resentment against British 
overlordship and, secondly, by espousing its opposition 
to social reform movements. Not only were the majority 
of the Chitpavan community traditional Hindus, but they 
also saw that reform threatened their social and religious 
dominance. With these allies he won control of the 
Poona Sarvajanik Sabha in 1895 and strove to capture 
Congress, thus conflicting with Hanade and Gokhale and 
earning the lasting dislike of the Moderates of Bombay.
He was mainly responsible for launching the Ganpati and 
Shivaji festivals which mobilised groups outside the 
Congress elite: the poorer Chitpavans (many of them 
Government servants), peasants and traders. He also 
roused peasant and labouring groups by exploiting their 
economic grievances.’1'
When Tilak was released after six years’ imprison­
ment in 1914, his popularity was unequalled. He was 
identified however with his native region of Maharashtra, 
and continued to restrict his activities to this area. 
Extremists and young men looked to him to revive his 
advocacy of passive resistance and his demand for
1 . HPM Bombay, II, 207-8.
independence,1 2but being understandably anxious to avoid 
further imprisonment, he hesitated to do so. The 
collapse of the Extremist movement during his imprison­
ment made Tilak pessimistic about the likelihood of an 
adequate response to a programme of passive resistance.
He always held that "to be a political leader, you must
2never get too far ahead of the people you wish to lead", 
a principle which made him unwilling to draw up a clear, 
consistent plan of campaign.
Tilak had built up a network of lieutenants through­
out Maharashtra consisting of his most devoted 
followers - Brahmins, with one or two exceptions. They 
had echoed his speeches and helped to arrange the 
festivals. This was a useful beginning, but more 
elaborate organisation was required, embracing townspeople 
and peasants, should Tilak plan to direct and control a 
passive resistance campaign or a widespread agitation.
He had tried to capture Congress but there is no 
indication that he recognised the need to expand it if 
he wished to turn it to agitational purposes. By cap­
turing it,he hoped rather to legitimise his claim to
1. for his demand for independence in 1907, see HEM 
Bombay. II, 22.
2. interview with Mr Kher, April 1963; cf. R. G-. 
Pradhan in Mahratta. 23 Aug 1914, p. 271.
make demands of the British on behalf of India. After 
his release from prison he tried to re-enter Congress 
with his followers, again with the hope of capturing 
control of it, since for him to act outside Congress was 
to invite suppression by the British.
In 1914 Tilak thus toned down his programme and 
moved toward a compromise with the Moderates. This 
would be a difficult manoeuvre to accomplish, however, 
since many of his Maharashtrian Extremist followers and 
the newer generation were expecting to find him as 
"aggressivew as before; and, on the other hand Tilak 
probably underestimated the antipathy with which the 
leading Moderates regarded him.
V
The Muslim Problem.
Would-be leaders of the national movement in 1914 
were also confronted with the problem of winning the 
support of the Muslim community. Hindu revival move­
ments, with v/hich political Extremism had been linked, 
had sought to give Hindus confidence and a sense of 
identity by recalling Hindu victories over the Muslims
It was necessary therefore to
G3
or deprecating Islam.  
dissociate Extremism (or a reunited national movement) 
from the Hindu revival or to play down the anti-Muslim 
features of that revival if the Muslims were not to 
become permanent enemies of the national movement.
Muslim aloofness preceded the rise of Extremism. 
Having ruled most of India when the British arrived, the 
Muslims disdained to mix with the Hindus. They had 
clung to their traditional ways and hung back from 
Western education. During the last quarter of the nine­
teenth century they became increasingly conscious of 
their backwardness in comparison with the Hindu majority 
community. Under Syed Ahmed Khan's guidance they set 
about developing a Western-educated Muslim elite, through 
the establishment of the Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental College 
at Aligarh, and had relied on conspicuous loyalty to the 
British to ensure the protection and advancement of 
their interests. They stood aloof from the Congress 
fearing, on the one hand, that participation in agitation 
would call down the displeasure of the British and on the 
other, that their interests would be overlooked by the 
majority community in any system of representative
1. e.g. the Shivaji Festival and the work of the Arya 
Samaj; HFM Bombay. II, 210-1; Home Poll A, Dec 1913, 
nos. 1-4«
government such as was desired by the Congress.
In 1906 the leading Muslims founded the Muslim 
League, to promote Muslim loyalty to the British Govern­
ment, and to ’protect and advance the political rights” 
of Muslims."^
The immediate occasions for the establishment of 
the Muslim League were the Partition of Bengal and the 
Liberal victory at the British elections in 1905. The 
Partition brought into being East Bengal and Assam,a 
province in which the Muslims were in a large majority, 
with a Government which could be expected to favour their 
interests, and with a capital city, Dacca, which would
pcreate jobs and draw wealth to it. The leading Muslim 
landowner in East Bengal, the Nawab of Dacca, to whom 
the British had lent considerable sums, was active in 
convincing his co-religionists that the new province 
was advantageous to them and that they should organise 
for the ’’consolidation and conservation of the strength 
of the Mohammedans of the new Province”.^  At the same
1. M. Noman, Muslim India, Rise and Growth of the All- India Muslin; League, p. 78.
2. J. H. Broomfield, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
3. A History of the Freedom Movement (Pakistan 
Historical Society), Ilf," 10, 16-17; J. H. Broomfield, op. cit. , p. 59.
time the resentment of the Muslims was roused by the 
agitation against the Partition among the Hindu bhadra- 
lok.1 23
After the Liberal victory in England the Muslims 
suspected that Morley, the new Secretary of State, was 
inclined to revise the Partition in the face of this 
agitation. Por though he told Parliament that the 
Partition was a "settled fact", he admitted in the same 
speech that he thought that "nothing was ever worse
pdone". More important, the Liberal victory fore­
shadowed the attainment by Congress of its long-desired 
reforms.^
The Muslims presented an address to the Viceroy on 
October 1, 1906, urging that in any scheme which 
expanded representation in the legislatures, the Muslims 
should receive separate electorates; they formed the 
Muslim League at the end of the year to continue to 
urge these claims, which had been cordially received by
1. see Resolution 3 of Muslim League Central Committee 
meeting, 9 Aug 1908, in Lai Bahadur, The Muslim League: 
Its History. Activities and Achievements, p. 74*
2. J. Morley, Speeches on Indian Affairs, pp. 108, 110.
3. Morley, Indian Budget Speech, Aug 1906 in Speeches, 
p. 32; Pak. HEM, pp. 32, 35.
Lord Minto.1
The Muslim League was smaller than Congress, 
reflecting the relatively small proportion of Muslims 
who were professional or moneyed men and hence politically 
articulate. The League was first organised as an all- 
India body, which established provincial branches. Its 
Constitution, which was redrafted in 1912, enabled a 
small group to control the League's activities. Its 
executive was the Council of 300 members; of these only 
60 retired each year, 30 new Councillors being elected 
by the provincial Leagues and 30 by the Council itself. 
Every candidate for membership of the League had to be 
approved by both the central Council of the League and 
the League of the province in which he lived. The 
President, Secretary and other office bearers were 
elected at three-yearly intervals by the annual session 
at which as few as 75 members constituted a quorum. For 
Council meetings the quorum was a mere 10 members; 
moreover the Council could delegate its pov/ers to the 
Secretary, and "in an emergency" the Secretary might call 
a meeting of the "members of the Council present at the
1. "The Viceroy's reply to the Muslim address", 1 Oct 
1906 in G-overnment of India Judicial Department, 
compilation 1894, Vol. 136, 1907.
Headquarters” to act for the League.^" It will be 
realised how important under this Constitution was the 
position of the Secretary and his associates in Lucknow, 
where the Headquarters were situated from 1910.
Between the end of 1909 and 1914 the Muslim League 
became less guarded in its dealings with Congress and 
moved towards a rapprochement with that body. This 
shift in emphasis was due to several factors: the gain­
ing of safeguards for the Muslim community in the 
Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909; overtures for rapprochement 
from Congress; a series of actions on the part of the 
British which alienated Muslims, in conjunction with the 
rise of Pan-Islamism; and the increasing influence of 
"nationalist” Muslims in the League.
Morley was initially disinclined to grant separate
2representation to the Muslims, but he was continually 
pressed to do so by Muslim leaders like the Aga Khan, 
the permanent President of the League, who resided 
principally in London. This pressure was supported by 
the Government of India: Minto argued that "the only
1. Draft Constitution and Rules of the All-India Muslim 
League, 1912 in Home Poll A, Peb 1913, nos 85-86; Lai 
Bahadur, The Muslim League, pp. 73-6.
2. see Aga Khan, The Memoirs: World Enough and Time, 
p. 103.
representation for which India is at present fitted
is the representation of Communities, as I said in my
reply to the Mahomedan deputation [of October 1906]”. ^
Against his will, Morley gave way and granted separate
2Muslim representation in the Indian Councils. This 
resulted in an immediate increase in Muslim confidence.
At the January 1910 Session of the League the Aga Khan 
was reported to have said: ’Now that we have separate 
electorate[s], I hope that this...[will] lead to a 
permanent political goodwill and a real unity between 
the two neighbouring communities”.^
The Congress Moderates were working for the devel­
opment of a secular democracy, in which men should be 
treated as individuals not as members of separate 
communities. They therefore regretted the decision of 
the Muslims to hold aloof from Congress, and opposed the 
separate representation granted to the Muslims in the 
Morley-Minto Reforms not only as ’monstrously unjust”
1. Minto, Countess, p. 102; Morley’s first response was 
to suggest joint electorates with reservation of seats for 
Muslims, see his Despatch of 27 Nov 1908, in Lai Bahadur, 
The Muslim League, p. 79.
2. see J. Morley, Recollections, p. 278.
3. translated from M. Ansari, Tarikh Muslim League in 
Lai Bahadur, The Muslim League, p. 82.
(since the Muslims’ representation was proportionately 
larger than their share of the total population) but 
also as tending to perpetuate the division between the 
Muslim and Hindu communities.^ Hindu Congressmen in 
the Punjab and a few in UP founded Hindu Leagues to
pprotect Hindu interests. Among the Moderates, however, 
G-okhale came to realise how insecure the Muslims felt 
in the face of the Hindu majority, and he publicly 
accepted the Muslim separate electorates.^ A Hindu- 
Muslim Conference at Allahabad in 1910, organised by 
Wedderburn and G-okhale, foundered on the resentment of 
Hindus from the Punjab and the UP at Muslim separate 
representation, but its discussions helped to prepare 
the ground for rapprochement.^
Thereafter Congress made a series of conciliatory 
gestures towards the League. In 1912 Congress met in
1. see G-okhale to Wedderburn, 3 Dec 1909, Uokhale 
Papers; Bombay Presidency Association, Council Minutes,
1 July 1909.
2. see G-okhale to Wedderburn 24 Sept 1909 in Wolpert, 
p. 235; Cokhale to Wedderburn 30 June 1910, G-okhale 
Papers.
3. speech to Deccan Sabha, 11 July 1909, in Wolpert, 
p. 234; cf. Speech in Indian Legislative Council, March 
1909, in A. C. Banerjee, Indian Constitutional Documents 
p. 303.
Noman, pp. 111-3.4.
Bihar, where nearly half the Congressmen were Muslims,
and the President ’recognised the expediency of adopting
...communal representation [for Muslims]”.^  The following
Congress session was held in the conspicuously Muslim
2city of Karachi, with a Muslim as President.
The Muslims’ reliance on loyalty to the Government 
for the advancement of their interests received a blow 
from the Repartition of Bengal in 1911. ’’...the old
feeling among Mahomedans of keeping aloof from the 
Congress has altered”, observed Craddock, Home Minister 
in the Government of India,^ ”on the ground that the 
Hindus were right in agitating”.^  The Repartition seemed 
to invalidate a premise of the Muslim League, that agi­
tation would only bring down Government repression.
The Muslims were further alienated by the British
1. Mudholkar's Address.Congress Presidential Addresses. 
II, 71; S. Sinha to Gokhale, 8 Aug 1912, Gokhale Papers.
2. see H. Vishindas to Gokhale 18, 20 Mar and 7 Aug 
1913, Gokhale Papers.
3. 1864-1937; Home Member of Viceroy’s Executive Council 
1912-17; Chief Commissioner, CP, 1907-12; Lt-Governorof Burma 1917-22.
4. Minute, 19 July 1912 in Home Poll A, Mar 1913, nos 
45-55, p. 1; cf. Government of UP, 16 July 1912, and 
Government of Bombay, 21 Oct 1912, to Government of India in ibid., pp. 26, 42.
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Government’ s failure to help Turkey, when the latter
was attacked by Italy and the Balkan States in 1911 and
1912 respectively, and by the speeches of British Cabinet
members making it clear that they approved of the
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire by Christian States.^
The Ottoman Empire had special significance for the Sunni
majority of Indian Muslims, since the Sultan of the
2Empire was also their Khalif or spiritual head. The 
other major group among Indian Muslims, the Shias, did 
not regard the Sultan as Khalif: their sympathies lay 
rather with Persia, where some of their principal shrines 
were situated. At this time their ire was also roused 
against Britain when the latter*s ally, Russia, attacked 
Persia and bombarded the Shia Shrine at Meshed.^
The Muslims who reacted most bitterly to Britain*s 
failure to assist Turkey were the Pan-Islamists. Pan- 
Islamism was a movement for the rehabilitation of 
Islamic Brotherhood on an international scale as a means
1. see Home Poll A, Oct 1913, nos 100-18, pp. 51, 181.
2. see e.g. W. Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern 
History, p. 209.
3. see Home Poll A, Mar 1913, nos 45-55, pp. 24-5.
of arresting the decline of Islam due to autocracy and 
Western imperialism. It had been introduced to India 
about 1880.1 This spirit had been revived in the early 
years of this century, largely by graduates of the 
Aligarh College who had been made aware of Islam's 
decline through the Western learning they imbibed, and 
some of whom had gone on to study overseas, where they 
had met revolutionaries from other parts of the Islamic 
world.
Among the more outstanding Aligarh graduates were 
G. Khaliquzzaman (1889-1962) of Lucknow, Dr S. Kitchlu 
(1888- ) of Amritsar and the Ali Brothers, Shaukat
(1872-19??) and, above all, Mohamed (1878-1931). After 
graduating from Aligarh in 1896, Mohamed Ali read 
History at Oxford and on his return to India in 1900 
worked in the service of two Indian states, Rampur and 
Baroda. He was an enthusiastic founder member of the 
Muslim League. In 1911 the troubles of Turkey prompted 
him to leave Baroda and launch a paper, the Comrade, 
which he edited at first in Calcutta and, when the 
capital was shifted, in Delhi. He has testified that 
he had little interest in Islamic theology until
1 . see Pak. HFM. pp. 88-106.
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detention by the Government gave him the opportunity of
reading the Quran: it was rather the temporal troubles of
1Islam that called him to action.
Among Pan-Islamists who were not "old boys” of 
Aligarh, the most outstanding was Abul Kalam Azad 
(1888-1958) of Calcutta, who had received both traditional 
and Western education. In 1908 he travelled to the Middle 
East and Europe where he was the enthusiastic recipient 
of the ideas of Egyptian and Turkish revolutionaries.
He returned to India in time to take a leading part in 
kindling the Muslim agitation against the British through
pthe newspaper A1 Hilal. which he founded in June 1912.
Prom 1912 papers like the Comrade and A1 Hilal  ^
denounced the British Government, and Christians in gen­
eral, in increasingly violent tones. Even the most 
’’moderate'1 23Muslim leaders were dismayed by Britain’s lack 
of sympathy, and the Pan-Islamists found it easy to rouse 
bitter resentment against the British. In 1912 Dr 
Ansari, a Pan-Islamist of Delhi, led a Medical Mission of
1. M. Ali, My Life« A Fragment: An Autobiographical 
Sketch, pp. 4-5, 28-37, 40-1, 45, ^0, 107-33.
2. see A. K. Azad, India Wins Freedom: An Autobiog­
raphical Narration, pp. 2-8.
3. also notably Zafar Ali Khan's Zamindar and Vakil, 
published in Lahore.
enthusiastic young Muslims (including Khaliquzzaman) to 
the battlefields in the Balkans, while Shaukat Ali founded 
a Society1 2whose members pledged themselves to "sacrifice 
their lives and property" for the protection of Muslim 
sacred places. In 1913 the Pan-Islamic papers roused 
bitter and widespread resentment at the destruction by 
the UP Government of a washplace attached to a Kanpur 
mosque: in this heavily-charged atmosphere, the same 
newspapers proposed a rapprochement between the Muslim
pLeague and Congress.
A number of "nationalist" Muslims joined hands with 
the Pan-Islamists in urging the League to substitute an 
entente with Congress for the policy of loyalty to the 
British.
The "nationalists" looked forward to the creation 
of a secular state in India, in which religious differ­
ences should be unreflected in political institutions, 
and to this end they sought to make common cause with 
the Hindus in Congress. They had joined Congress and 
formed a valuable bridge between their community and that 
organisation. The Pan-Islamists on the other hand were
1. the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Ka’aba (Society of the 
Servants of the Ka’aba).
2. Home Poll A, Mar 1913* nos 45-55, p. 39; B, Nov 
1913, no. 149, p. 2.
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concerned, as had been the founders of the Muslim 
League, with the interests of the Muslims as such, and 
sought rather an alliance of the Muslims as a community 
with the Congress against a common foe, the British.
From 1912 the Pan-Islamists were beginning to reach out 
to involve the Muslim masses in political agitation by 
appealing, through the Muslim divines, the ulema, to 
Muslim religious sentiment. The “nationalists” were 
averse to rousing mass groups before they had been educ­
ated in preparation for the operation of Western political 
institutions and were particularly opposed to rousing 
religious feelings which might encourage violence. To 
make such a distinction between "nationalist” and Pan- 
Islamist Muslims is instructive but it must be borne in 
mind that in the reality, from which it is abstracted, 
there were many shades of outlook ranging between these 
extremes.
The most outstanding Muslim "nationalist" was 
Mohamed Ali Jinnah (1876-1948). The son of a Karachi 
merchant, he was a member of the Khoja sect, which was, 
strictly-speaking, heretical from the viewpoint of the 
Sunni majority of Indian Muslims:1 he was rational, a
1. W. Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India. A Social 
Analysis, p. 206.
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man of the world, rather than religious. He studied law 
from 1892 to 1896 in England and there came much under 
the influence of Dadabhai Naoroji. Returning to India, 
he built a. brilliant reputation as a lawyer in Bombay 
and, through his legal contacts, joined Mehta and the 
circle of the Bombay Presidency Association. In 1914 
Congress recognised his talents by sending him on a 
deputation to England and, though not the leader of the 
deputation, Jinnah acted as its spokesman. "It is my 
ambition to become the Muslim G-okhale", he was reported 
to have said, and indeed G-okhale found him free from 
"all sectarian prejudice”.^  His antipathy to the 
communal goals of the Muslim League made him shun member­
ship of it until he believed he might help to link it 
with Congress.
Other leading "nationalists" were the Raja of
2Mahmudabad, Wazir Hasan, and Mazharul Haque. Mahmud- 
abad (1878-1931) as one of the largest landowners of the 
IIP, dominated Muslim society in Lucknow and exercised 
great influence in the Headquarters of the Muslim League.
1. see S. Eaidu, "Pen Portrait" in Mohomed Fsicl Ali 
Jinnah An Ambassador of Unity: His Speeches and Writings, 
1912-17, pp. 1-18. ~ At the 1906 Congress he opposed any 
special treatment of Muslims: Congress 1906. Report, p.120.
2. also Sarfaraz Husein Khan in Bihar and Hawab Syed 
Mahomed of Madras.
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He contributed substantially to the League’s finances 
and became its President in 1916. From 1907 he was a 
member of the Viceroy’s Legislative Council, where he 
became closely acquainted with Jinnah.
Wazir Hasan, like Mahmudabad a Shia, was the son 
of a G-overnment official and became a lawyer on his 
graduation in 1896. Moving to Lucknow in 1903 he under­
took cases on behalf of the Mahmudabad estate and joined 
the Raja's circle. In 1911 he was appointed to the 
crucial position of Secretary of the League, and as such 
joined Mohamed Ali in a deputation to England to protest 
at the Kanpur Mosque affair.'*'
Mazharul Haque (1866-1930), a lawyer of Bihar, had 
studied in England. As a member of the central Legis­
lative Council from 1910 he came in contact with other 
"nationalist” Muslims. He was largely responsible for 
establishing a Congress Committee in Bihar and devoted
phimself to Hindu-Muslim reconciliation.
These men belonged to the Muslim elite of the UP 
and Bihar, which shared its Persian culture with
1. interviews with Hon. S. A. Zaheer, 4 Aug 1963, 
Maharajkumar M. A. Hyder Khan, 4 and 5 Aug 1963.
2. see e.g. his letter to G-okhale 18 Apr 1911, Qokhale 
Papers; Hew India. 4 Jan 1916, p. 13b.
important Hindu groups, the Kayasthas in Bihar and the 
Kashmiri Brahmins in the UP, which had provided the Mugh­
al rulers with their administrative cadre and now produced 
many professional men from whom came the leading Congress­
men of the region.1 2 These groups had frequent social 
contact and helped to link Congress and the League.
As a step toward reconciliation with Congress, the 
"nationalists1* and Pan-Islamists urged the Council of the 
League to amend the Constitution. Wazir Hasan visited 
Councillors throughout India, arguing for amendment.
Jinnah (though still not a member) participated in the 
Council meeting at Mahmudabad House in December 1912, 
which added to the aims of the League,
the attainment of a system of self-government 
suitable to India by bringing about, through 
constitutional means, a steady reform of the existing system of administration...2
This echoed the goal laid down in the Congress 
Constitution of 1908, but was less precise than the Cong­
ress goal of "a system of government similar to that 
enjoyed by the self-governing Members of the British 
Empire", and represented a compromise between conflicting
1. see D. A. Low, "U.P. 1860-1960: the fHusk-Culture' 
and its Aftermath" (unpublished paper, Australian National 
University); S. Sinha, "Recollections and Reminiscences", 
Hindustan Review. Dec 1946, Peb and April 1947.
2. quoted in Lai Bahadur, The Muslim League, p. 92.
views. For, while Muslims were generally critical of 
Britain, many of the League Councillors still feared 
Hindu domination and clung to loyalty to the British.
These "conservatives" included the Presidents of the 
Punjab and Bombay branches of the League, Mian Mohammad 
Shafi1 2and Rafi-ud-din Ahmad respectively. At the League 
Session in December 1913 they defeated a resolution des­
igned as a conciliatory gesture to Congress by 89 votes to 
40. The "nationalists” saw this as a sign of progress, how­
ever: "Last year", said Mazharul Hague, there had been 
"nobody even to second" such a resolution but now it was
2supported by nearly one-third of the members of the Session.
By 1914 the Muslim League and the Congress under 
the Moderates had come far toward an understanding. Those 
who were working toward this consummation had yet to 
overcome the opposition of Muslim "conservatives" and to 
solve the problems posed by Hindu communalism both among 
Congressmen (particularly from the Punjab and the UP) and 
among Extremists outside Congress. There was danger too 
in the rousing of religious sentiment by Pan-Islamists.
1. born I869, entered Middle Temple 1889, called to 
English Bar 1892; prominent Lahore lawyer; Education Member 
Viceroy’s Executive Council, 1919-22, Law Member 1923-24.
2. UP CID Report 10 Jan 1914, in Bombay Police 1914. 
par. 235.
During 1913 however, Wazir Hasan and Mohamed Ali had 
strengthened the forces favouring entente with Congress 
by persuading Jinnah to join the League.
During 1914 there were also developments at the 
leadership level on the side of Congress, which held out 
hope that the problems posed by the division of Congress 
into Moderates and Extremists would be taken up. For 
in January Mrs Besant became a member of Congress and in 
June Tilak was released from Mandalay Jail.
PART Is THE RISE OF MRS BESANT AND TILAK
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Chapter II
RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION
The years 1914 and 1915 saw the revival of the 
national movement.
During this period, the Muslim League and Congress 
moved toward a rapprochement, which was consummated in 
their adoption of a Joint Scheme of Reforms at the end of 
1916. This v/as largely the work of Jinnah and the 
"nationalist” Muslims, and will be considered in the 
following chapter.
On the side of Congress, activity increased both 
among Moderates and Extremists during 1914 and 1915» due 
to Tilak's return to India and to Mrs Besant’s launching 
of agitation. This agitation marked an attempt to evolve 
a new programme which would induce the British to hasten 
the devolution of power to India: Indians themselves 
were encouraged to contemplate more rapid progress to 
self-government as their goal.
Mrs Besant’s agitation also marked an attempt to 
evolve a programme which would be acceptable to both the 
more cautious and the more impetuous members of the 
movement, and thus provide a basis for reconciliation
obetween the two wings. Continued British refusal to 
grant reforms during this period deepened the disill­
usionment of the Moderates with the methods they had 
employed hitherto and made them more prepared for 
reconciliation with the Extremists.
New organisational ideas were introduced, again 
mainly thanks to Mrs Besant. Finding that her attempts 
to re-invigorate Congress and to use it for her 
agitation were frustrated by a hard core of older 
leaders, she turned to set up her own organisation with 
branches throughout India. Congress nevertheless was to 
remain the vehicle of Indian nationalism, since Mrs 
Besant wanted to capture its leadership, and regarded 
her organisation as supplementing, and not replacing, 
Congress.
During 1914-15, therefore, the movement took 
tentative steps toward the adoption of new strategies, 
toward the reformulation of its goals and toward the 
reformation of its organisation.
I
Annie Besant.
The creative role in this transformation was played
ro
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by Annie Besant, although, even had she not joined the 
movement, it is unlikely that the quiescence of 1908-14 
would have continued: in Maharashtra, for example, national 
political activity revived in anticipation of Tilak’s 
release, quite independently of her activity.
At first sight she was a most unlikely leader: a 
woman, elderly - she was 66 in 1914 - and, above all, 
European. Eventually indeed these were to be among the 
factors contributing to the downfall of her leadership.
But she had a number of qualities which fitted her 
for leadership. Even in being white there lay advan­
tages. Indians still deferred to Europeans and her white 
skin shielded her from Government repression for a 
considerable time. The Government generally permitted 
greater freedom of expression to Europeans than to Indians; 
and, furthermore, it discounted the likelihood of Indian 
politicians allowing a white woman to assume leadership 
and so refrained from moving to limit her freedom.^
As for her personal qualities Annie Besant had 
tremendous drive and energy, and she had developed great 
powers of oratory and journalistic expression as a 
propagandist of Free-Thought, Radicalism, Fabianism 
and Theosophy in England.
1 . see Home Poll A, Nov 1915» nos 166-8.
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Since her arrival in India in 1893 she had iden­
tified herself with India as closely as a Westerner can. 
Already a vegetarian on her arrival, she adopted the 
sari, made India her home and referred to Indians as 
"we".^ The identification was most closely made through 
her activities in the Theosophical Society, as Head of 
its Indian Section until 1907 and thereafter Inter­
national President up to her death in 1933*
The Theosophical Society expounded the thesis that 
all religions are paths to truth, and investigated 
occult and psychic phenomena. It drew much of its 
inspiration from Buddhism and Hinduism, and notably 
the notion that all human beings contain a reincarnated 
element of the divine. "Adepts”, according to the 
Society, might so develop their occult power as to 
escape from the process of reincarnation and join the 
Masters (or Mahatmas or Rishis) who guide the destinies 
of the world. Mrs Besant believed that, as an "adept", 
she was directed by two Masters, and Theosophists res­
pected her wishes as inspired by these superhuman agencies. 
Under the guidance of its co-founder, "Colonel" Olcott,
1 . New India. 9 Jan 1915, p. 7d.
the Society in India had emphasised its debt to Buddhism, 
but Annie Besant gave it a more pronounced Hindu 
orientation.1
Through the Theosophical Society she contributed
substantially to the revival of Hinduism. By 1914 the
2Society had nearly 6000 members, and Mrs Besant gave 
them, as well as many non-members, renewed faith in 
Hinduism and confidence in its greatness, by means of 
her lectures and writings and English translations of 
the G-ita and other texts, and through schools and coll­
eges where Hindu principles were taught. Mrs Besant 
spoke no Indian language and her work was mainly confined 
to the professional and business classes, deracine as 
the result of their Western education.
Initially Mrs Besant contributed to the retrograde 
features of the Hindu revival and to its rejection of
the West, condoning the caste system, for example.-^ But
%
as she found herself increasingly accepted as a Hindu, 
so she advocated social and caste reform, which attracted
1. Builder, pp. 19-22.
2. TS Indian financial members: 1913:5840;
1914:5747; 1915:5936; 1916:5360; 1917:5649 (includ­
ing Ceylon and Persian Gulf); 1918-20:not available;
1921-2:5016. Sources: TS Indian Section, Annual Reports 
in annual Proceedings (Benares).
3. see also A. Besant, Hindu Reform on National Lines,p. 4. ...... ........
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more liberal-minded Indians to her.^
Because of its close identification with Hinduism, 
the Theosophical Society did not attract Muslims.
However, by emphasising the Society’s tenet that all 
religions were paths to G-od and by stressing the affinity 
of the Society's mystical aspect with the Sufi strain in 
Islam, Mrs Besant won a number of Muslim adherents, 
particularly among the elite of the community in the UP 
and Bihar.1 2
One of Annie Besantfs advantages in seeking leader­
ship in the national movement was that she had not been 
connected with the movement hitherto, and was not iden­
tified therefore with a particular group or party in the 
movement. She could act her chosen part of mediator 
between groups and draw support from different parts of 
the movement. Nor was she identified (as a native-born 
Indian would have been) with a particular region. As 
President of the Theosophical Society her Headquarters 
were in Madras, as Head of the Indian Section they had 
been in the UP and it was in these two provinces that her 
work was best known. Having been less active in national
1. interview with I. N. Gurtu, 7 Aug 1963; A. Besant, 
"The Passing of the Caste System", lecture given 16 Nov 
1913, in A. Besant, Wake Up India: A Plea for Social 
Reform, pp. 292-3.
2. CHC Magazine. IX (1910), 137; Theosophist. XXIX,
Nov 1907, 98 and Jan 1908, 386.
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politics than Bombay or Bengal, these provinces lacked 
strongly-entrenched Moderate leaders, and Mrs Besant 
was able to seek leadership there without arousing 
strong opposition. In addition, the Theosophical 
Society provided her with devoted followers among Western- 
educated Indians not only in Madras and the UP but in 
much of the rest of India, notably in Bombay City, Sind 
and Gujarat.1 2 Mrs Besant was thus well-situated to bring 
regions, hitherto relatively inactive, into the movement, 
to base her power on these regions, and to reach out for 
leadership on a nation-wide basis, which had hitherto 
eluded leaders who were identified with their native 
region.
Mrs Besant was perspicacious in assessing the
national movement in 1914. In the course of her
educational work, she realised how young men’s imagin-
2ations had been stirred by Extremism and how they han­
kered after some form of expression for their patriot­
ism, and she recognised that the widespread longing 
for unity among Extremists and Moderates provided her
1. in 1914 the Bombay City lodges of the TS had 457 
members: TS, Indian Section Annual Report, loc. cit.
2. see CHQ Magazine. VII (1907), 313-4; VIII (1908) 
113, 275; IX (1909), 109.
with an opportunity for leadership if she could evolve a 
programme of activity on which all elements could agree. 
The only important wealoiess in her diagnosis at this 
stage was in underestimating the antipathy of the Bombay 
Moderates to reunification and to the Extremists 
personally, and the jealousy with which they clung to 
the leadership.
Moderate and Extremist elements were combined in 
Mrs Besant's personality and outlook and fitted her for 
the task of reconciling the two wings. Highly emotional, 
she was easily angered by injustice and her enthusiasm 
aroused by causes in which she believed. This identified 
her with the younger and more impetuous members of the 
national movement. Like the Extremists, she believed 
that India was ready for self-government and rejected the 
need for preparation and gradual advance under British 
tutelage advocated in Moderate doctrine. While she 
believed that India had much to teach England in matters 
of religion, and that India had much to learn in matters 
of organisation, and the application of principles to 
practice,^ she did not believe that self-government for
1. Builder, p. 186.
India would halt this process. On the other hand she 
shared the Moderate abhorrence of violence. In 1908 
she had deplored Tilak’s writings which she regarded as 
incitements to terrorism, denouncing his advocacy of the 
boycott of colleges (which she termed an incitement to 
"aimless disaffection"), and his desire to "use the 
student population as a continual menace to public 
order".^
In joining the national movement her primary aim 
was to prepare the way for a stable, lasting Imperial- 
Federal alliance between India and Britain. "One thing 
that lies very near to our heart is to draw Great 
Britain and India nearer to each other", she wrote. She 
believed that to achieve this alliance Britain must win 
Indian good-will and that Britain could do so only by 
granting self-government to India.^ At the same time 
she wanted to woo young Indians from violence and to 
forestall the possible revival of Extremist advocacy of 
passive resistance, which she saw as leading to disorder.
1. GHG Magazine, VIII (1908), 113-4, 141, 247.
2. "Our Policy", in the first issue of her paper Common­
weal , 2 Jan 1914, p. 4; see JSG on G of I Bill, p. 78,
Q 1382.
3. "India’s Plea for Justice", lecture 11 June 1914, in 
Besant, India and Empire, pp. 113-4.
She hoped to attain both these ends by rousing agitation 
which would absorb the energies of impetuous nationalists 
and move the conscience of the British Government and 
electorate.
The sort of agitation she had in mind was shaped 
very largely by her experience as orator and journalist 
in England"^ and by the example of Hume’s Congress 
agitation of 1888, which in turn had been modelled on
pCobden’s Anti-Corn-Law agitation.' She indicated the. 
prototype of the agitation she had in mind when in April 
1914 she wrote*.
The strength of the English feeling [on 
the question of Imperial Federation] is 
shown...by the enormous Hyde Park Demon­
stration - the favourite Radical weapon - 
with its fourteen platforms, its twenty- 
two processions, its banners representing 
seventy-six constituencies of Greater London, 
and with Mr Balfour speaking in Hyde Park 
for the first time in his life....the purpose 
is obvious - to create a situation in which 
the problem of Federalism must come to the 
front, and...enter... the sphere of practical
politics.3
1. see A. H. Nethercot, The First Five Lives of Annie 
Besant, pp. 55-292.
2. Hume was a Theosophist, and Mrs Besant was well ac­
quainted with his work: see e.g. Commonweal. 2 Jan 1914, 
p. 4; Wrought, pp. 51, 71.
3. ‘’Federation”, in Commonweal. 10 and 17 April 1914, 
reprinted in A. Besant, The Birth of New India, pp. 70-1.
Monster meetings, outstanding speakers - together with 
newspaper articles and pamphlets - this was the stuff of 
political agitation, which would, she believed, make the 
demand for reform "irresistible" and absorb potentially 
dangerous enthusiasm.
It was in the hope of turning Congress into a 
vehicle for this agitation that she joined it in 1914«
She was not tempted to set up a new organisation, since 
Congress already had Committees throughout India and she 
hoped to revive the 1908 plan for a network of District 
Congress Committees [hereafter "DCCs"] and to link them 
with district Theosophical and Social Conferences for 
continuous work.^ The Moderates, it was clear, would not 
leave Congress in order to join a new organisation and 
Mrs Besant was anxious that they should act as a brake 
upon the young men, while the latter per contra provoked 
them to greater activity. As a European and a newcomer to 
national politics she wished to acquire the cachet of 
membership in the only organisation which had achieved
recognition as the mouthpiece of educated India among
2Indians and the British.
1. see ibid., pp. 74-7; A. Besant, United India [Oct. 
1913], reprinted in For India’s Uplift ('1921), pp. 211-29.
2. see New India. 9 Nov 1914, p. 12a.
II
January - August 1914»
To supplement her work in Congress and to help her
capture it Annie Besant founded two newspapers, the
weekly, Commonweal in January 1914 and the daily, New
India in July.^ During a lecture tour of England from
April to June she placed India’s case for self-government
2before newspaper editors and before large meetings.
There was much talk of reorganising the British Empire on 
a federal basis but, while Britain and the Colonies with 
white populations were mentioned, ’’India", she wrote,
"is always left out. If she is shut out of the Empire, 
as a self-governing country, will she be to blame if she 
refuses to remain in it as a dependency?’’^
By her efforts in England on India’s behalf Mrs 
Besant identified herself with Moderate methods (with 
the difference that she appealed more directly to the
1. together with C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar she bought the 
Madras Standard, published it first on 14 July, renamed it 
New India on 1 Aug. See Mrs Besant to G-okhale, 16 and 24 
July 1914, Ookhale Pacers; Madras Standard, 14 July 1914, 
p. 4b; 20 July 1914, p. 6e.
2. see Mrs Besant to G-okhale, 28 May 1914, Gokhale 
Papers; Besant, India and Empire, pp 100-53«
3. letter, 28 May 1914, to The Times, in Besant, India 
and Empire, p. 38; cf. ibid., p. 62.
electorate) and co-operated with G-okhale and the 
deputation of Moderates in England at the time.'1 23' But 
this was the last occasion on which she left India until 
1919* On her return from England she decided to concen-
träte on national political work in India for ten months: 
before that time was up overseas travel had been rendered 
difficult by the outbreak of the Y/orld War, and Mrs 
Besant had become so embroiled in politics that she was 
unable to leave India.
She made the readmission to Congress of the Extrem­
ists her first task.^ In this she was joined by an out­
standing Madrasi lawyer, C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, then aged 
34» They had met as opponents in a law-suit (in which Mrs 
Besant had conducted her own case), after which he agreed 
to join her in politics,^- becoming her staunchest, non- 
Theosophist follower. Like her, he wished to see the 
Congress become more active but opposed any course which 
he believed might lead to violence. He was an admirer of
1. see New India. 9 Nov 1914, p. 12; G-okhale to Mrs 
Besant, 26> June 1914, Adyar Archives.
2. see Madras Standard, 24 July 1914. p. 6b-d; Mahratta, 
26 July 1916, p. 237.
3. she had foreshadowed this in the first issue of 
Commonweal, 2 Jan 1914, p. 4.
2
4. see C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, Annie Besant. p. 68.
G-okhale and, with Mrs Besant, urged G-okhale to seek some
basis on which his fellow-Moderates would accept the
readmission of the Extremists G-okhale in return hoped
that Mwe may succeed in devising some scheme which will
bring together the more earnest spirits in the country
2in active co-operation”.
This was an opportune moment to press for the 
reconciliation of Moderates and Extremists, for the 
Moderates had just received another rebuff from the 
British. The Congress deputation in England had been 
pressing for the abolition of the Secretary of State’s 
Council or for the reduction of returned ICS-men, and the 
increase of Indians, among its members. The Secretary of 
State laid a Bill before Parliament which went far toward 
satisfying the alternative request, but Curzon led the 
House of Lords in throwing the Bill out.^
During Mrs Besant’s absence in England, Tilak was 
released from prison on 17 June. Her newspapers welcomed 
him cautiously, recognising his ’’greatness” but
1. Mrs Besant to Gokhale, 6 Feb 1914, Gokhale Papers: 
interview with C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, 3 1 Mar 1963.
2. Gokhale to Mrs Besant, 26 June 1914, Adyar Archives.
3. House of Lords debate, excerpts in Madras Standard. 22 July 1914, pp. 2, 3« See ibid., p. 6.
reiterating Mrs Besant’s opinion that his judgment had
been ’mistaken". She hoped to prevent him from returning
to his advocacy of passive resistance and his supposed
support of terrorism by drawing him into Congress, and
urged him to seek a compromise which would ’’bridge the
gulf...between the two parties of the National Congress”.
’’Co-operation with varied temperaments is the secret of
success of great souls”, wrote the Commonweal.^
The approach of Tilak’s release had provoked a
revival of activity among his lieutenants in Maharashtra:
they held the first ’’Bombay Provincial Conference” for
six years in April at Satara. This Conference augured
well for rapprochement since it was attended not only by
Extremists but also by a number of Moderates from the
mofussil. The attendance of the mofussil Moderates
indicated growing rebelliousness among the Congress rank-
and-file against the Bombay Moderate leaders, since the
PCC controlled by the latter refused to authorise the 
2Conference. By its principal resolution, the Conference 
set up a Committee
to try to bring about a reconciliation 
between the two Congress parties on the
1. quoted in Mahratta, 21 June 1914, p. 194«
2. Satara ’’Provincl”. Conference. 1st day, pp. 5, 9.
following basis*. ’The Congress shall be 
open to every person elected as a dele­
gate to it at any public meeting or any 
public association in the British Empire, 
provided the delegate accepts in writing 
Article I of the present constitution of  ^
the Indian National Congress organisation’.
This resolution was so worded in an attempt to satisfy 
both parties. The Moderates insisted that delegates 
should affirm their adherence to ’constitutional means” 
of activity mentioned in Article I, by which they under­
stood that methods leading to violence would be avoided.
The Extremists wished to enter Congress from public meet­
ings, since this would avoid the necessity of joining a 
Congress Committee controlled by the Moderates who could 
exclude applicants of whom they disapproved. Others 
followed the lead provided by the Satara people: at Salem 
in Madras, for instance, those who had followed Tilak into 
the wilderness met with Congressmen and arranged to hold a
District Conference, to which delegates would be elected by
2public meetings.
Ill
August - December 1914.
After an initial period of silence following his
1. ibid., 3rd da,y. p. 8.
2. Home Poll B, Aug 1914, nos 259-62, p. 13.
release1 2Tilak indicated his support for these movements 
for readmission to Congress. He saw the strength of the 
feeling in favour of rapprochement among the Moderates 
and the opening this gave him to re-enter Congress and 
again seek leadership of it. Moreover, he hoped to 
shield himself from renewed Government repression by- 
joining Congress. He was doubtless urged to do so by 
several of his more cautious lieutenants, notably Kelkar 
and Karandikar. N. C. Kelkar (1872-1947) was Tilak's 
closest co-worker: he had taken over the editorship of 
Tilak's English-language paper, the Mahratta in 1897, 
and in a letter from prison in 1909 Tilak entrusted the 
Kesari to him also, recognising that Kelkar was more 
circumspect than his other lieutenants. Kelkar had kept 
in touch with the Moderates, particularly Gokhale, during 
Tilak's incarceration, and in 1914 he supported rapproche­
ment along the lines of the Satara "Provincial Conference"
2resolution in his editorial columns. Karandikar 
(1857-1935) was one of Tilak's chief legal advisers and 
his leading lieutenant in the Satara District. With
1. he likened himself to Hip Van Winkle, Home Poll A, 
July 1914, nos 135-8, p. 18.
2. e.g. Mahratta. 10 May 1914, p. 145; Gokhale to 
Mrs Besant, 18, 21 Nov 1914, Adyar Archives; "Contribu­
tion to Freedom Struggle in India by N. C. Kelkar",
HFM Bombay.
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Kelkar, Karandikar had taken the lead in organising the 
Satara Conference: having joined the Moderate Convention 
at Surat in 1907, he was, in his own words, a ”connecting 
link” between the Moderates and Extremists.^
Several of Tilak's more fiery co-workers, on the 
other hand, opposed re-entry to Congress on the basis of 
any compromise involving the forfeiture of the Extremist 
pose of "aggressive” nationalism. S. M. Paranjpe,
K. P. Khadilkar and Gangadharrao Deshpande were the most 
outstanding of these. Shivram Mahadeo Paranjpe (I864- 
1929) had been a college professor in Poona until the 
British forced him to resign in 1897 for his part in 
organising Tilak’s Shivaji and Ganpati Festivals. As 
editor of the Marathi newspaper Kal (The ’’Times”) and as 
public speaker he was noted for oblique, but pointedly 
satirical, criticisms of the British. He was silenced by 
15 months' imprisonment in 1908, followed by the 
imposition of Rs 10,000 security on Kal. Khadilkar 
(1872-194-8) was editor of the Kesari until Tilak, fearing 
his temerity, authorised Kelkar to take it over in 1909, 
after which Khadilkar concentrated on criticising the
1. see R. P. Karandikar"Diary”(Poona), 28 Dec 1907, 
16 Mar to 28 April 1914.
Government through Marathi historical dramas.^
G-angadharrao Deshpande (1870-1962), a lawyer, was Tilak's 
principal lieutenant in the predominantly Kanarese-speaking 
area of the Karnatak in the south of Bombay Presidency, 
though he (like Tilak’s other lieutenants) was a Brahmin 
of Maharashtrian stock. These men felt that, now Tilak 
was back among them, they should recommence agitation.
In this they represented Extremism at its purest and most 
irrational. They saw national politics largely in terms 
of rousing audiences and had little clear idea of relating 
the emotions they kindled to the aim of attaining self- 
government. In this situation a leader like Tilak who 
sought to devise a policy which involved a compromise with 
the Moderates ran the danger of being branded a ’moderate” 
himself: and if men like S. M. Paranjpe did not so brand 
him, others would rise who would.
In 1914 however Tilak had a breathing space, since 
his more fiery co-workers’ audiences had been subdued by 
repression, and the inactivity of Paranjpe and others 
placed them in an awkward position for criticising 
moderation on the part of Tilak.
1. ’’Contribution to Freedom Struggle by S. M. Paranjpye” 
’Contribution to Freedom Struggle by K. P. Khadilkar”; 
interviews with Prof. Phatak, 24 and 25 April 1963.
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Tilak set out to reassure the Moderates that he 
was not a firebrand and to demonstrate that they shared 
common ground. In the Mahratta of 23 August one of his 
associates wrote, no doubt with Tilak's concurrence, that 
Tilak was "no enemy of the British Raj and does not seek 
severance from the British Crown”.1 2 This was calculated 
both to reassure the Moderates and to persuade the Gov­
ernment to relax the strict surveillance which it had 
maintained over Tilak since his release. A few days later 
Tilak took the opportunity provided by the outbreak of War 
to declare that it was the duty of every Indian to assist 
the Government, and continued in a strain of sweet 
reasonableness:
The reforms introduced during Lord Morley's 
and Lord Minto’s administration will show that 
Government is fully alive to the necessity of 
progressive change and desire to associate the 
people more and more in the work of Government.
It can also be claimed, and fairly conceded, 
that this indicates a marked increase of 
confidence between the Rulers and the Ruled, 
and a sustained endeavour to remove popular 
grievances. Considered from the public point 
of view, I think this is a distinct gain;.... 
it is absurd...to speak of my actions or my 
attitude as in any way hostile to His Majesty's 
Government....we are trying in India, as the 
Irish Home-rulers have been doing in Ireland, 
for a reform of the system of administration and 
not for the over-throw of Government.^
1. R. G. Pradhan in Mahratta, 23 Aug 1914, p. 272.
2. statement, 27 Aug 1914, in Mahratta. 30 Aug 1914, pp. 
275-6; cf. Tilak's speech, Poona, 26 Aug 1914 in Bombay 
Police 1914, par. 1446.
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Tilak knew that the "Mehta party" would oppose his read-
mission to Congress hut he hoped, by emphasising the
areas of agreement between Moderates and Extremists, so
to strengthen the movement in favour of rapprochement in
Congress that Mehta would bow before it.^
Tilak’s conciliatoriness and his support for the
G-overnment convinced Mrs Besant that he was trustworthy
and she redoubled her efforts for reunification. In a
series of articles in Bew India, Mrs Besant and a number
of other Congressmen urged the desirability of readmitting 
2the Extremists. The 1914 Congress Session was to be 
held in Madras and, on joining Congress, Mrs Besant had 
been invited to join the Reception Committee. Its 
meetings brought her in contact with the leading Madras 
Congressmen and she succeeded in persuading most of them 
to this point of view. Mrs Besant again urged Gokhale 
to take up the matter, and he replied that he agreed 
"every effort must now be made to close the unfortunate 
divisions of 1907".1 234 He proposed that the Extremists
1. see Tilak to Khaparde, 22 Nov 1914, Khaparde Parers.
2. see New India. 17 Oct 1914, p. 6; 7 Nov 1914, p. 6;
9 Nov 1914, p. 13a; 12 Nov 1914, p. 6d; 18 Nov 1914, p. 5.
3. see V. S. S. Sastri to Gokhale, 20 Dec 1914, G-okhale 
Paperss Mahratta, 26 Sept 1915, p. 317.
4. Gokhale to Mrs Besant, 18 Nov 1914, Adyar Archives.
should be allowed to come in as members of associations,
which accepted the goal and methods laid down in the
Congress Constitution of 1908, but which would not be
required to seek affiliation to the Moderate-dominated
PCCs.1- 2 Early in December Mrs Besant went to Poona and
with Grokhale thrashed the whole matter out with Tilak.
When Mehta was approached however, he opposed
readmission point blank. Tilak was under pressure from
S. M. Paranjpe and his more aggressive followers to
demand unfettered entry to Congress and, partly in a "bid
for quieting his more violent followers who were growing 
2restive", partly out of pique at Mehta’s obduracy,
Tilak exclaimed that
The present programme of the Congress 
was of no value. They were asking for 
small reforms... .Mr Tilak would ask his 
countrymen to have nothing to do with 
these. He would make only one demand, 
namely that for self-government within 
the Empire.... The Irish, by resorting to 
methods, of obstruction had, in the course 
or [i.e. of] 30 years, got Home Rule. They 
must also similarly adopt methods of 
obstruction within the limits of the law
102
1. Gokhale to Mrs Besant, 21 Nov 1914, Adyar Archives.
2. G-okhale to Mrs Besant, 10 Jan 1915, ibid.; cf. 
Tilak to G. S. Khaparde, 22 Nov 1914, Khaparde Pacers.
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and then only would they be able to 
compel the Government to concede their 
demand.1 23
Tilak did not elaborate his ’'methods of obstruction within 
the limits of the law” and indeed he had no clear pro­
gramme of action marked out. Rather he was expressing 
his own highly emotional reaction to the situation, and 
appealing to his more excitable followers, who looked to 
him for an aggressive stance. Tilak went on to say that 
he regarded Gokhale’s proposed amendment "as an instal­
ment only” and that he and his followers aimed at
2capturing control of Congress.
This outburst united the Moderate leaders in 
opposition to Tilak’s re-entry: Gokhale withdrew his 
support and Bhupendranath Basu, the President of the 1914 
Congress Session, did likewise.^
Mrs Besant, on the other hand, was convinced that 
not Tilak but Mehta was responsible for the failure to 
achieve a compromise,^ and felt in any case that it would
1. report of conversation on 8 (?) Dec 1914 between
N. Subba Rao Pantulu, General Secretary of Congress, and 
Tilak, [accepted by Tilak, see Tilak "Diary” (handwritten, 
kept in Kesari-Mahratta Trust Library), 9 Dec 1914], 
Mahratta. 14 Peb 1915, pp. 55-6 (comma after "methods” in 
original).
2. ibid.
3. see Gokhale to Bhupendranath Basu 14 Dec 1914, Adyar 
Archives: V. S. Sastri to Gokhale, 30 Dec 1914, Gokhale 
Papers.
4. see Tilak to Khaparde 7 Dec 1914, Khaparde Papers.
be easier to restrain Tilak and his followers if they 
were inside Congress. She strove to have him elected as 
a delegate to the Madras Congress by the Bengal PCC and 
the Madras Mahajana Sabha, though without success, and at 
the Subjects Committee she brought forward G-okhale's 
amendment for the readmission of the Extremists, even 
though Gokhale himself had withdrawn it.1 For the 
Moderates to have accepted either of these proposals 
would have been to fly in the face of Mehta and Cokhale, 
and this they were not prepared to do.
Mrs Besant therefore tried another tactic and urged
the Subjects Committee to set up a Committee to consider
amending the Constitution so that Tilak might be admitted
This time she was successful. Despite the unwillingness
of most Moderates to flout Mehta’s wishes many of them
were anxious to heal the breach: in this they were encour
aged by Tilak, for, after his outburst of early December
but before the Congress met he returned to his more
reasonable tone, minimising the differences between
Moderates and Extremists. It was admitted, he claimed
2in the Mahratta. ’that the political aims and objects 
1. G-okhale to Mrs Besant, 9 Jan 1915» Adyar Archives.
2. Mahratta, 27 Dec 1914, p. 401; cf. 13 Dec 1914, p. 
385, 20 Dec 1914, p. 393.
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of both the parties are the same, both are willing to 
work for their realisation in a constitutional way”. The 
Bombay Moderates in the Subjects Committee were thus 
pressed to give v/ay in this matter by the other members 
and, in the absence of both Mehta and G-okhale due to 
illness, they did so, probably expecting that they could 
prevent the Constitutional Committee from meeting or 
otherwise browbeat it into shelving the question."^
During the later part of 1914 Mrs Besant had also
taken up a question closely related to the readmission of
the Extremists, that of increasing the activity of 
Congress. In October she wrote in New India:
The younger generation is growing 
impatient while the Congress marks time. 
All are ready to honour... those who... 
created and sustained Congress.... If they 
would lead, the younger men would gladly 
follow. But a leader must not stand 
still.... there are definite functions for 
the Congress to discharge: (l) To educate 
public opinion, in order that it may supp­
ort legislative action in the Councils,
(2) To prepare materials for proposed 
legislation....(3) To formulate and 
proclaim the opinion of educated India on 
all urgent public matters....2
1. see Mahratta, 3 Jan 1915» p. 1; Home Poll B, Dec 
1914, nos 227-9, p. 21; Jan 1915, nos 278-82, pp. 32-3; 
New India. 15 Jan 1915, p. 3a.
2 . New India, 17 Oct 1914, p. 5b-d.
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These functions, she concluded, should be carried out 
by the AIGC and by a network of reconstructed Provincial, 
District and Taluq Committees and by town and village 
meetings organised by them.1 2 The sort of activity she 
had in mind was to '’educate” Indian opinion and to 
"proclaim" that opinion to the rulers; in other words, to 
rouse Indian feeling upon political matters and to bring 
this feeling forcibly to the notice of the British. Such 
activity would give expression to the impatience of the 
younger generation, and also divert that impatience from 
more violent channels. The existing Congress organ­
isation was inadequate to undertake these tasks, and her 
solution, in October 1914» was to expand and revive the 
Congress organisation itself.
She invited Congressmen to comment on her sugges­
tions and in their replies, which she printed as a series
of articles and letters in New India, received consider-
2able support for her suggestions.
The question of reviving and expanding Congress 
organisation was brought up at the Madras Congress by
1. ibid.
2. New India. 24 Oct 1914, p. 6; 31 Oct 1914, p. 6d;
2 Nov 1914, p. 13; 7 Nov 1914, p. 6; 28 Nov 1914, p. 5; 
4 Dec 1914, pp. 5, 6.
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Sir Subramania Aiyer in his Y/elcoming Address as Chairman
of the Reception Committee:x as a Theosophist, Subramania
2Aiyer was a devoted follower of Mrs Besant~ and, being 
also a veteran member of Congress and distinguished ex­
judge, was highly respected by his fellow-Congressmen.
The readmission of the Extremists, however, overshadowed 
all other questions at the Madras Session and the reor- 
ganisation of Congress was not taken up.
By the end of 1914 therefore, Mrs Besant had 
obtained neither the readmission of the Extremists nor 
the reorganisation and revival of Congress. In the 
appointment of the Constitutional Committee, however, 
a step had been taken toward attaining the first of these 
goals, and Moderates who favoured reunification and a 
more active national movement had a leader around whom to 
rally. Mrs Besant moreover now had experience of the 
obstinacy of the Bombay Moderates and a clearer idea of 
the opposition they might offer to her plans for the 
reorganisation of Congress.
1. Congress 1914. Report, pp. 4, 7-9.
2. see ibid., p. 3.
3. Home Poll B, Jan 1915, nos 278-82, pp. 32-3; see 
Commonweal. 1 Jan 1915, pp. 5-6; 15 Jan 1915, p. 41b.
IV
January - April 1915»
Lest it be thought that in pressing for Tilak's
readmission she was condoning the resort to passive
resistance or to "Irish obstruction" v/hich Tilak had
recommended in his outburst of early December, Mrs
Besant published several articles opposing these methods.
She wrote: "while respecting the handful of patriots who
adopt this policy, and hoping that they will join the
Congress, we say quite definitely that passive
resistance cannot be...employed in working for Self-
Government",1 23and that boycott was "an impossibility"
2and "mischievous silliness". Gandhi was on his way back 
from South Africa, and many young Congressmen echoed a 
young Gujarati, Indulal Yajnik, who wrote in a Bombay 
newspaper late in 1914 that he hoped Gandhi would lead a 
passive resistance movement in support of self-government. 
With this in mind, Mrs Besant warned that in India,
1. New India. 4 Jan 1915, p. 6b.
2. ibid., 5 Jan 1915, p. 6a.
3. I. K. Yajnik, Gandhi As I Know Him (Bombay, [1931]), 
pp. 1, 7, 14; see Madras Standard, 21 July 1914, p. 2a.
any concerted action like that of Mr 
G-andhi and his fellow resisters would 
be forcibly broken up and the leaders 
deported, if there were not evidence 
enough to convict and imprison.... The 
conditions of successful passive res­
istance are: a clearly defined grievance, 
deeply felt by the great majority of the 
people; a public, whose sympathy can be 
obtained; a small area, in which prac­
tically all the people concerned exer­
cise such resistance. Vague discontent, 
general dissatisfaction - these are not 
suitable for passive resistance.... In 
India, none of the conditions are rsic] 
present.1
Recalling her hopes for an Indo-British alliance she
concluded: MIndia does not want any Revolution; it wants
Freedom, won by constitutional means by co-operation with
2Great Britain, and not by antagonism to her”. As a step 
toward diverting young Madrasis from these "revolutionary 
paths and providing them with training in constitutional 
procedures, she established a mock "Madras Parliament" 
which held debates on bills for social and political 
reform.
In February G-okhale died. Despite the breakdown 
of negotiations with Tilak and Tilak's reiteration that 
if "we [the Extremists] join the Congress we shall do so
1. Rew India. 4 Jan 1915» p. 6b.
2. ibid., 5 Jan 1915, p. 6b.
for working out our programme by persuading the 
majority... to our side”, ^  G-okhale had still hoped to 
resume these negotiations when Mehta’s and Tilak’s
ptempers cooled. Gokhale’s death removed a link between 
the two groups, but it also reduced the Bombay Moderates’ 
power to resist Tilak's re-entry, since by his intell­
ectual stature coupled with deference to Mehta,Gokhale 
had been a key figure, if an unwilling one, in stiffening 
the Moderates against Tilak’s readmission.
In March Mrs Besant published a scheme for Indian 
self-government and urged Congress Committees to formulate 
schemes for discussion,^ her first attempt to apply her 
own suggestion that Congress should "formulate and proclaim 
the opinion of educated India on all urgent public 
matters". This was indeed an urgent matter. As Mrs 
Besant had pointed out in 1914» plans for the re-definition 
of the relationship of the self-governing Dominions to 
Britain were under discussion. The execution of these
1. Tilak to Mrs Besant, 21 Jan 1915, forwarded to 
G-okhale, Gokhale Papers. Mrs Besant visited Tilak and 
G-okhale again in January, New India. 21 Jan 1915, p. 7a.
2. G-okhale to Mrs Besant, 3 Deb 1915, Adyar Archives.
3. her speech to the Mahajana Sabha, in New India. 13 
Mar 1915, p. 14, 17 Mar 1915, p. 8, reprinted as Self- 
Government for India ("New India" Political Pamphlet No.DY cf. Commonweal. 19 Mar 1915, pp. 209-10.
plans would be accelerated by the War, and unless India
formulated and pressed her own plans she would be left
behind. Mrs Besant called for na full debate” so that
"the wishes of the people of India might be finally laid
down before the War came to a close".'1 2*
Her 1915 scheme was similar to those which she
0had put forward before based on revived panchayats. local 
village councils as the base of a pyramid of power. The 
panchayats were to be elected by universal franchise and 
would deal with local affairs. The panchayats. together 
with older villagers of a certain educational standard, 
would elect the taluq board, and so on to the provincial 
councils, which would elect the national Parliament.
She saw that when Indian politicians "talk of ’democracy* 
they mean the rule of the educated class": she found this 
"a far more rational system of Government" than "counting 
heads, however empty".^ Mrs Besant sought to give self- 
government an Indian form and not merely to imitate
1. New India. 13 Mar 1915, p. 14.
2. e.g. "The Ideals of Theosophy", 1912, in Builder, 
pp. 292-5; Besant, United India, p. 31.
3. Builder, p. 294.
British institutions, but in avoiding a national Parlia­
ment based on direct, universal franchise she was 
influenced by her British experience. As a Fabian she 
had taken over from Shaw a contempt for "one man, one 
vote”, preferring some form of benevolent despotism. In 
her early Indian schemes the apex of her pyramid had been 
occupied by a '’monarch'* - a prince of the British Royal 
Family or, perhaps, even herself^ - but in her 1915 
scheme the monarch was replaced by the indirectly-elected 
oligarchy of "educated men" comprising the national 
Parliament.
Among the Moderates Surendranath Banerjea. agreed 
with Mrs Besant on the "necessity to formulate Indian
ideas on self-government so as to have a scheme ready when
2the War was over",' and the PGGs of Bengal, Madras and the 
UP authorised sub-committees to produce a scheme. The 
two major considerations weighing with the Moderates were 
Mrs Besant's insistence upon the need to agree on a 
scheme, and the effects of the War on British attitudes.
1. see ibid.; Hindu, 2 July 1910, p. 4; editor of Justice 
[T. M. Hair], The Evolution of Mrs Besant, Being the Life 
and Public Activities of Mrs Annie Besant. p. 313;
A. Besant and G. W. Leadbeater, Man: ".Thence, How and 
Whither, passim.
2. A. Besant's report on her meeting with S. Banerjea,
31 Mar 1915, in New India. 8 Apr 1915, p. 9b; cf. S. 
Banerjea's speech, Bengal Provincial Conference, Apr 1915, 
Bengal NP. 1915. p. 819.
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In November 1914, the Under Secretary of State for India,
Charles Roberts, had told the House of Commons that the
"partnership in spirit with us on the battle field could
not but alter the angle from which henceforth we could
regard problems of the government in India".'1 23' Sven the
unsympathetic Times agreed that in future India should
receive a "more ample place in the Councils of the 
2Empire". In April 1915 Wedderbum advised the Moderates
in charge of Congress that these
assurances rightly express the feelings of 
the British people, who..., at the con­
clusion of the war, will be prepared to 
give effect to India’s legitimate aspir­
ations. ...What is now wanted is to come 
to an agreement on a scheme of reforms 
...[W]ithout delay, the Congress author­
ities should take counsel among themselves 
and...draw up a careful note of suggestions.'
In order, however, that the suggestions might be "within 
the scope of practical politics, as understood in" 
Britain, he urged that they should be approved in prin­
ciple by the British and Indian Governments before being 
urged upon the British Government in private by "an 
accredited representative" of Congress, following the
1. quoted in Mahratta, 6 Dec 1914, p. 379«
2. quoted in ibid., 11 Oct 1914, p. 323.
3. "Memorandum of Sir William Wedderburn, adopted by 
the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, 
26 Apr 1915" (printed copy), Adyar Archives.
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example of Gokhale at the time of the Morley-Minto 
Reforms,"
The notion that the Indian national movement should
agree upon a scheme of reform was being generally accepted
and Mrs Besant was on common ground with the Moderates.
While urging the Moderates forward she was careful not to
emphasise the differences between her attitude to the
reforms and theirs. For example, in May she urged the
Madras Provincial Conference to accept the principle of
self-government and to ”leave details aside for the 
2moment”. At the same time it was evident that she envis­
aged far more rapid progress toward self-government than 
did Wedderburn and the Bombay Moderates. As President of 
the UP Provincial Conference in April she put forward her 
pyramidal scheme of self-government but now proposed that 
provincial autonomy should be introduced at the end of the 
War.“ This she said was only Ma step” toward self- 
government/1 23' but it was a very substantial one. From
1. ibid.
2. see New India. 6 May 1915, p. 12.
3. Presidential Address, UP Provincial Conference,
2 April 1915, reprinted as The Political Outlook ("New 
India” Political Pamphlet Nc/ 2), p . 34; see Mahratta, 4 
Apr 1915, p. 114.
4. Besant, Political Outlook, p. 13.
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this time she placed less emphasis on her pyramidal 
system of election, and more on the powers to he granted 
to the national Parliament.
V
April - September 1915.
Mrs Besant did not desire merely the formulation of 
a scheme; nor did she believe that its presentation to 
the Government by Moderate methods of consultation alone 
would ensure success. She wanted to popularise the 
scheme which was agreed upon and to bring it "to the 
front" by demonstrating to the British that all India 
was behind it. This she felt would make its implemen­
tation by the British certain. "British politicians", she 
wrote in July, "...judge the value of claims by the energy 
of those who put them forward, and if they see that India 
is indifferent as to the solution of these problems they 
will leave her out of account".^ Surendranath Banerjea 
had agreed, she claimed, that "the demand [for self- 
government] must come not only from the ’insignificant 
minority’ but from the masses" and that to this end
1. New India. 19 July 1915, p. 10b.
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Congress Committees should undertake propaganda Mso that 
the people should understand that their education, their 
economic position and their prosperity depend on the 
establishment of Self-Government”.^
The British provided Mrs Besant at this time with 
an excellent opportunity to persuade Moderates and 
Extremists of the desirability of agitation. Congress­
men of the UP, as well as other provinces, had repeatedly 
demanded an Executive Council, containing at least one
Indian member, to advise the Lieutenant-Governor of that 
2province. Lord Hardinge’s Government endorsed this 
demand, and to satisfy it the British Government 
produced a proclamation, only to have it rejected in 
March 1915 by the House of Lords, Curzon again at its 
head.^ In her Presidential Address to the UP Provincial 
Conference Mrs Besant kindled Indian resentment against 
the Lords for ’flouting their special object of hatred, 
the educated Indian”,^  and deduced the moral: Indians
1. Hew India. 8 Apr 1915, p. 9b.
2. see e.g. resolutions of 1908, 1909, 1911 Congresses in 
Chakrabarty and Bhattacharyya, Congress in Evolution,
pp. 12, 14; Home Public A, Apr 1915, nos 206-220.
3* Hew India. 20 Mar 1915, p. 10.
4. Besant, Political Outlook, p. 10.
must agitate until the Council was granted. The British,
she pointed out, had denied to India the first concession
suggested since the start of the War. Statements about
the "changed angle of vision" would be reduced to so many
empty words unless India kept Britain up to the mark.'*'
The national politicians of the UP were united in
condemning the decision of the Lords, and they formed a
League, with the Raja of Mahmudabad as Chairman, to
organise meetings and otherwise raise a demand for its 
2revision. India "is organising herself to win her 
Freedom", exclaimed Mrs Besant. "A Ration is fit for 
Freedom when she is determined to have it", and the UP 
Governor-in-Council League was the sign of India's fit­
ness for freedom.-^ The UP agitation was echoed in other 
provinces: the Madras Provincial Conference in May, for 
example, urged the Viceroy to declare that the "small 
body of peers in London...are not fit to reject the 
prayer" for an Executive Council.^ Mrs Besant wrote:
1. ibid., pp. 7-13; New India. 20 Mar 1915, p. 10.
2. see Home Public A, July 1915, nos 75-9, especially 
pp. 9-12.
3. Commonweal, 4 June 1915, p. 422.
4. New India, 6 May 1915, p. 12.
"If only some other questions would arise in the other 
Provinces which would scourge them into action fresh life 
would pour through the Nation*1 23.^
Prom this time Mrs Besant's utterances became 
increasingly sharp, as she brought forward a number of 
issues to "scourge" India to action. In July and August, 
she returned to her major theme of India’s place in the 
Empire at the end of the War. The Government had asked 
for the suspension of discussion during the War of 
controversial matters, which were held to include the re­
examination of India's place in the Empire. Was it 
reasonable, asked Mrs Besant, to expect Indians to stop 
discussing this question when the Colonial Secretary was 
promising that the "white" Dominions would share in 
governing the Empire after the War, while the Secretary 
of State for India remained conspicuously silent? Through 
her newspapers aiid by organising public meetings she 
sided with the students of Madras and their parents, who 
were aghast at the failure rate of 74 per cent in the 
University examinations.^ Learning that the Report of
1. ibid., 1 June 1915, p. 8a; cf. ibid., 26 Apr 1915, p.
2. ibid., 20 July 1915, p. 8b; 10 Aug 1915, p. 8a; 
cf. Commonweal. 25 June 1915, p. 478.
3. Commonweal, 25 June 1915, p. 478; New India. 29 June 
1915, p. H a .  '
the Royal Commission enquiring into the Indian Public 
Services was about to be signed in London and that it 
was likely to be ’’unsatisfactory’*, Mrs Besant warned the 
Government not to publish it and urged Indians, in case 
it did, to criticise it ’frankly, boldly and sharply”."*' 
Similarly she took the lead in denouncing the use of 
the Press Act by the Governments of the Punjab and the 
UP; and she castigated Austen Chamberlain, the newly- 
appointed Secretary of State, whom she called ’’fatuous”, 
for his ’’ignorance of India’s needs” and for rushing 
through Parliament a contentious Bill relating to the 
Indian Civil Service.^
At this time Tilak was trying to infuse life into 
Maharashtrian national politics. The Satara Conference 
of 1014 had broken the drought in political activity, 
but Tilak was under pressure to provide his more excitable 
followers with further outlets for their zeal. At the 
end of 1914 he wrote to G. S. Khaparde (1854-1938), his 
great friend and leading co-worker in Berar, suggesting
1. New India, 3 Aug 1915, p. 8a-b; 9 Aug 1915» p. 8a.
2. ibid., 14 Aug 1915, p. 10c.
3. ibid., 23 Aug 1915, p. 9b; 26 Aug 1915, p. 8c;
24 Nov 1915, p. lb.
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they hold
a small Nationalist [i.e. Extremist]
Conference at Poona...and establish a 
Central Nationalist Association of our 
own, to strengthen our party and facili­
tate work in the future. The holding of 
such a Conference...may satisfy the 
desire for display of the miner [sic] 
members, who seem to be anxious for such 
a thing.1 2
The idea of a Nationalist Association was put to one side,
but in May 1915» the Extremists held a "Bombay Provincial
Conference" at Poona (like that at Satara in 1914»
unauthorised by the Bombay PCC) and a "District Confer-
2ence" in Bombay City a few days later.
Hoping to convince most Moderates (if not the hand­
ful of leaders in Bombay) of his reasonableness and his 
suitability for readmission to Congress, Tilak went out 
of his way to ensure that these Conferences were concil­
iatory in tone. He diverted his more sharp-tongued 
supporters, Khadilkar and S. M. Paranjpe, from the 
Subjects Committee of the "Provincial Conference" by 
deputing the administrative arrangements for the Confer­
ence to them and, with Kelkar, he persuaded the Subjects
1. Tilak to Gr. S. Khaparde, 7 Dec 1914» Khaparde Papers.
2. [Report of so-called] 17th Provincial Conference, 
Poona. 8 to 10 May 1915; Bombay Police 1915. pars 434, 
5^8(a) (b).
Committee to withdraw a resolution asserting India's 
right to Home Rule, lest it be used by the Bombay leaders 
to frighten the more cautious Moderates.1 2*4 As President 
of the "District Conference", Kelkar stated that "the 
statesmanlike and conciliatory policy of the Government 
as symbolised by the abrogation of the Partition [of 
Bengal] has cast the doctrine of Boycott into the limbo 
of oblivion".?
nevertheless the more perceptive Moderates of Bombay 
Presidency saw that the Extremists' activities threatened 
to undermine the authority held by the Bombay PCC. In 
preparing for their Conferences, the Extremists had held 
meetings throughout the Marathi- and Kanarese-speaking 
areas and in parts of Gujarat and by their restraint had 
won support from many who were counted as Moderates.1 
The "Provincial Conference" sanctioned a "paid agency... 
to enlighten the villagers regarding the objects and the 
work of the Congress":^ this "agency" might prove to be a
1. Bombay Police 1915. pars 568(a) (b); Amrita Bazar
Patrika, 14 May 1915, in Bengal HP, p. 1095; Mahratta,
23 May 1915, p. 168.
2. Mahratta. 16 May 1915, p. 159«
3* Bombay Police 1915. pars 435, 472.
4. ibid., par. 568(b).
parallel organisation replacing Congress, The members of
the Servants of India Society, who had hitherto carried
out the organisational functions of Congress, were
particularly impressed with the danger, and persuaded
Pherozeshah Mehta to allow the PCC to authorise a
Provincial Conference. He did so reluctantly on condition
that, in view of the War,
all political controversies will be hushed 
and the Conference will deem its greatest 
function to proclaim solemnly and emphat­
ically the loyalty...of our Province to 
the British Crown.1
Members of the Servants of India Society and other
Moderates set up DCCs and Taluq Committees and revived
those that were defunct in preparation for the Conference,
2which was held at Poona in July. The DCCs, however, 
remained merely formal organisations through which the 
Moderates might control the election of delegates. By 
contrast with the Extremist "Provincial Conference" which 
had preceded it by two months, the authorised Conference 
seemed a "milk and water business" to many of the 
mofussil Moderates and younger men from Bombay who
1. P. M. Mehta to H. N. Apte, Chairman of Reception 
Committee, 15th Provincial Conference, 8 July 1915, Mehta 
Papers.
2. Bombay Police 1915, pars 504, 570(a) (b), 621(a),
647, 677, 704.
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attended it.1 23 ’’This”, they said, echoing Mrs Besant, was
the time Mto make some definite political demands, when
there was a good chance of their being listened to with
greater respect than later on”. Mehta was too sick to
attend but through his lieutenants vetoed resolutions for
the readmission of the Extremists. Some of the delegates
2threatened to defy this, but there was a feeling "that 
among the younger generation there is none capable of 
tackling [such] an experienced dialectician as Sir 
P. Mehta”, though ”Mrs Besant may be able to do it”.^
On the day the Conference opened Mrs Besant called 
the Congress officials to ’’bestir themselves”: they should 
convene the Constitutional Committee set up by the Madras 
Congress to consider the readmission of the Extremists; 
and they should set to work on formulating reform schemes. 
If they did not,
then [she wrote] it will be well for some 
of the younger people to take action....It 
has always been the custom in England to 
supplement the older bodies with new 
organisations for particular purposes. The
1. ibid., par. 705(a).
2. ibid., par. 677.
3. ibid., par. 705(a).
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Reform Club becoming somewhat too 
ponderous and inactive, the National 
Liberal Club was founded by the 
younger and more vigorous workers...; 
then Leagues have been formed for 
special items of the general programme, 
and thus, without any cleavage or lack 
of cordial co-operation with the elders, 
the energies of the younger generation 
have been utilised for the more rapid 
progress of the country.
The Bombay Moderate Conference convinced her that the
2Bombay leaders did not mean to move and she set about 
forming her own organisation, the Home Rule League.
Through the League she planned to utilise the energies of 
the young men, who were dissatisfied with the Congress, 
in publicising her reform scheme and in rousing agitation 
in India to bring the demand for reform before the British. 
She would be able to direct the movement more effectively 
through a League founded by herself. Furthermore the 
League would serve as an instrument to spur and coerce 
the Bombay leaders: if they would not allow her to rouse 
agitation through the Congress, she would do so outside.
As her ultimate goal was to gain control of Congress, 
it was necessary to avoid breaking with Moderate leaders 
and to win the approval of as many Moderates as possible
1 .
2 .
New India. 10 July 1915, p. lOa-b. 
see e.g. ibid., 28 July 1915, p . 9a.
for the League. She had already won the Madras Moderates 
to her side on the question of readmitting Tilak and the 
desirability of reviving the Congress, a task which had 
been facilitated by the fact that several leading Madras 
Moderates, in addition to Sir Subramania Aiyer, were 
Theo sophists, notably L. A. G-ovindaraghava Aiyar, Vice- 
President of the Mahajana Sa.bha. and President of the 
Madras PCC.^ In July the Madras Moderates co-opted her 
onto the Madras PCC, while in private conversations 
Subramania Aiyer accepted the position of President for 
India of the proposed Home Rule League. Her meeting in 
March with Surendranath Banerjea led her to believe that 
she could rely on his support for the League and in Septem-
pber she sought the approval of the Bombay Moderates.
Mehta refused to see her on the grounds of his ill- 
health, and his lieutenants Wacha and Samarth were 
unenthusiastic, though she skilfully avoided giving them 
the opportunity to oppose her point blank. Of the other 
members of Mehta’s circle, some recognised that the scheme
1. born in 1867, lawyer, was elected member of Madras 
Legislative Council,
2. the remainder of this paragraph is based on 
Jamnadas, "Memoire”, pp. 120-6; Hew India, 17 Sept 1915, 
p. 8d; 25 Sept 1915, p. lOa-b; 28 Sept 1915, p. 9a;
29 Sept 1915, p. 9a; Mahratta« 26 Sept 1915, p. 317;Bombay Police 1915, par. 1082.
would be attractive to the younger men and hesitated to
oppose it outright,1 23 while Jinnah was enthusiastic, though
he kept this private for fear of angering Mehta. Mrs
Besant’s major coup consisted however in obtaining
Dadabhai Naoroji’s support for the League: he approved of
the way Mrs Besant proposed to claim self-government as a
right. "England", he said, "understands plain speaking,
and does not resent it....Take it for granted that England
2will do justice, when she understands".
On 25 September Mrs Besant announced the decision to 
establish the Home Rule League,^ which would comprise two 
Divisions, one in India, the other in England. The Indian 
Division was to "educate the people", to "popularise" the 
reform scheme which Mrs Besant hoped would be agreed upon 
at the 1915 Oongress Session and to "give to the demand 
...for Self-G-overnment.. . the strength of a Nation which 
has realised itself". The English Division would "educate 
the English Democracy", both Parliament and the "masses, 
in whose hands power lies", bringing to their notice
1. e.g. Ghimanlal Setalvad.
2. New India, 25 Sept 1915> p • lOa-b.
3. ibid., p. 11; see "The HRL", in "Porrnation of HRL" 
file, Adyar Archives.
India’s demand for self-government.
This announcement marked a turning point in the 
history of the national movement. First, with regard to 
the goal of the movement, the announcement implied the 
adoption of much more rapid progress to self-government 
than had been envisaged hitherto: ’’Home Rule for India" 
would be the League’s "only object’’.1 2 The goal of Home 
Rule had the virtue of simplicity, which would make it a 
good rallying cry. But in its forthrightness and 
simplicity lay the danger that it would arouse large 
expectations among the younger and more impetuous men, 
who would object should Mrs Besant find it desirable to 
accept less than full Home Rule. Secondly, in rousing 
agitation to support the demand for reforms Mrs Besant 
proposed to appeal to Indian "alarm" at "the growing 
poverty of the masses, the decay of industries, and the 
increasing burden of debt", which she traced to the 
unequal relationship between India and Britain. During 
her visit to Bombay in September she accused Britain of
presponsibility for India’s increasing poverty.' Thus
1. she had put forward a similar demand in August and 
September, see New India, 17 Aug 1915» p. 8b; Mahratta, 
12 Sept 1915, p. 310.
2. Mahratta, 12 Sept 1915, p. 310; New India, 14 Sept 
1915, p. 6a; Letter from Government of Bombay to Govern­
ment of Madras, 2 Oct 1915, in Home Poll A, Nov 1915, 
nos 166-8, p. 52.
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she was passing from the mere "popularisation” of a 
reform scheme, to the rousing of Indian animosity toward 
Britain.
Mrs Besant strove nevertheless to reassure more 
cautious Congressmen and to deflect the Bombay Moderates’ 
opposition to the League: it would supplement Congress, 
she assured them, not supplant it; also she would devise 
its organisation in consultation with Congressmen. By 
these means she won a broad consensus of support; on 
the other hand, by trying to please everyone she was res­
tricting her own freedom to organise and to plan her 
strategies.
Tilak had also been considering the setting up 
of a separate organisation, which he had probably dis­
cussed with Mrs Besant when she came to Poona at the 
end of 1914. After the ’’Mehta party” frustrated his re­
entry into Congress, he threatened to set up a ’’separate 
League”,^  and in May the President of the Extremist 
’’Bombay Provincial Conference” suggested the institution 
of a Home Rule League to ’’formulate a reasoned Home Rule 
Scheme suitable for India”. In August and September
1. Mahrattat 14 Peb 1915, p. 56; cf. his letter to 
Khaparde, 7 Bee 1914, quoted on p.120 above.
2. New India, 28 Bee 1915, p. 13a-b.
followers of Tilak in Bombay City and mofussil towns 
established Nationalist Associations to work for colonial 
self-government (echoing the 1908 Congress Constitution) 
by means of public meetings, lectures and pamphlets.^
The Associations actually carried out few of these activ­
ities: they were significant rather in demonstrating the 
strength of the desire for rapprochement with the Congress 
among those of Tilak*s followers who joined them, and as 
portents of his later Home Rule League. Almost the only 
function performed by these Associations was to gather 
and publish suggestions for rapprochement between Extrem­
ists and Moderates, by which means the Extremists hoped to
pconvince Moderates of their reasonableness.
Tilak was impressed by Mrs Besant’s outspoken 
criticism of the Government, by her call for more rapid 
progress to self-government^ and her efforts to ’’scourge” 
Indian nationalists to action. In his papers and his few 
public speeches he echoed her arguments^ and foreshadowed 
the demand for Home Rule: ’’Make a single demand which will
1. Bombay Police 1915. pars 838, 964, 967, 1084, 1260, 
1366, 1367, 1402.
2. see ibid., par. 1083; Mahratta. 10 Oct 1915, p. 336.
3. see e.g. comments on her UP Provincial Conference 
speech, Mahratta, 4 Apr 1915, p. 114*
4. see e.g. ibid., 22 Aug 1915, p. 277.
include all things”, he urged an audience at the time of 
the Extremist "Provincial Conference”. "We must demand 
from the Government that the key of the administration 
should be placed in our hands at least partly,...."'*'
He met Mrs Besant on her visit to Bombay in September and 
they decided to set up separate Home Pule Leagues, Tilak’s
pin Maharashtra, Mrs Besant's to cover the rest of India.
They both wished to avoid provoking the outright 
opposition of the Bombay Moderate leaders, however, and to 
deprive them of any opportunity to stir up the opposition 
of other Moderates by arguing that Mrs Besant and Tilak 
were trying to wreck Congress by setting up a rival to it. 
They therefore called a Conference to consider the 
formation of the Home Rule League [hereafter "HRL"] at the 
time of the 1915 Congress Session in Bombay and invited 
the leading members of the Congress and Muslim League to 
take part.
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October - December 1915.
Between October and December Mrs Besant visited
1. Bombay Police 1915. par. 568(b).
2. ibid., par. 963; Jamnadas, "Memoire", p. 133; Hew 
India, 15 Sept 1915, p. 7d; JSC on ff of I Bill. n. fi?. 
Q 1439. -------------------  -
Calcutta, Bihar, the UP, CP, Bombay and Madras, soliciting
the support of the leading Congressmen for her proposed
League, and discussing its organisation with them.1 2*4 She
addressed large public meetings, urging the need for a
reform scheme and agitation in favour of it, but her main
work was done at private meetings, where she met both
leading national politicians and members of the rank-and-
file, outlining her plans and collecting signatures on an
Invitation to the Bombay Conference Hto decide on the
2establishment” of the League. She also won the support
of Muslim politicians both in the UP and Bihar, notably
Mazharul Haque.J Her conciliatoriness toward the
Moderate leaders was rev/arded by promises of support from
several of them. Banerjea for example agreed that
The Congress is a deliberative rather than 
an executive body. It formulates [the] 
national demand, but it has hardly an 
organisation to inaugurate the measures.
To carry on them, a separate organisation, 
devoted to one object...would be far more 
effective..A
1. Lew India, 9 Oct 1915» p • 11; 18 Oct 1915, p. 9;
30 Oct 1915, p. He; 7 Dec 1915, p. 8a; 8 Dec 1915, p. 7d; 
10 Dec 1915, p. 14c; 16 Dec 1915, p. 10a; Bombav Police 
1915, par. 1125.
2. Invitation to Conference on the Formation of a League 
for Self-Government, 25 Dec 1915, signed by D. Naoroji e_t 
al.; N. P. Higam, Kanpur to A. Besant, 20 Dec 1915, Adyar 
Archives.
3* Hew India, 18 Oct 1915,p. 9c; 30 Dec 1915, p. 8b.
4. ^Bengalee, quoted in Hew India, 9 Oct 1915, p. lOd; 
see Bangali in Bengal UP, 1915. pp. 806, 989.
And in the UP she was supported by Pandit Madan Mohan
Malaviya.1 234 Born in 1861, educationist, editor, orthodox
Hindu and champion of the rights of the UP Hindu community,
Malaviya had been an active member of Congress since its 
2second year. Inclined to caution, he had joined the 
Moderate Convention in 1908, but was to join both Mrs 
Besant’s and Gandhi's movements - rather out of a desire 
to restrain them than out of sympathy with their more 
aggressive aspects.
The foundation of the League was opposed only by the 
Bombay Moderate leaders and the Servants of India Society. 
Mehta still refused to see Mrs Besant, and his lieutenant 
N. M. Samarth^ criticised her bitterly, while Wacha tried 
to persuade Dadabhai Naoroji to withdraw his support for 
the League.^ Srinivasa Sastri, who had taken Gokhale's 
place as Pirst Member of the Servants of India Society, 
approved heartily of the idea of a propaganda organisation 
but was averse to it being in any way separate from Congress
1. see C. Y. Chintamani to Mrs Besant, 13 Dec 1915 
[telegram , Adyar Archives.
2. see The Indian Nation Builders, I, 143-58.
3. a Hindu lawyer, Secretary of the Bombay Presidency 
Association since 1908.
4. R. P. Masani, Dadabhai Uaoroji: the Grand Old Man 
of India, pp. 531, 534.
which he feared would thus be overshadowed: the Congress 
leaders, he urged, should themselves establish the League.
The younger men, needless to say, were attracted 
by Mrs Besant’s promise of activity. Outstanding among 
them was Jamnadas Dwarkadas of Bombay, a Theosophist, 
who was 25 in 1915. After graduating from Bombay Univer­
sity in 1912, he had lectured to the undergraduates of 
Elphinstone College on French literature before turning 
to business, the traditional occupation of his Bhatia 
family. His nationalism had been stirred by Tilak’s 
trial and Gandhi’s exploits in South Africa and now by 
Mrs Besant's writings and speeches; by July 1915 he had
made sufficient money from trade in dyes to offer his
2services to Mrs Besant. Her speeches in Bombay in 
September excited the admiration of other young men of 
Bombay, who joined with Jamnadas in preparing for the 
Conference to discuss the formation of the HRL. Several 
of the more enthusiastic joined him in launching a weekly, 
English-language paper, Young India, which they put at 
Mrs Besant’s service.^ Of Jamnadas’ co-workers the most
1. see New India. 24 Bee 1915» p. 6a-b; Sastri ”Biary”,
2, 18 and 24 Bee 1915.
2. these details and those following are from his 
’’Memoire”, pp. 38, 50, 55, 68-89, 103, 107, 113-31.
3. ibid., pp. 123-32; K. M. Munshi, Autobiography [in 
Gujarati, translated for the writer by the author]; Home 
Poll Bep. Bee 1915, no. 26, ’Bombay’.
outstanding were the Gujaratis, Indulal Yajnik, K. M.
Munshi and Shankarlal Banker. They typified, if in
heightened degree, the enthusiastic response to Mrs
Besant of educated young Indians whose patriotism had
been aroused. Yajnik was an admirer of Gandhi’s passive
resistance and had dedicated himself to national and
social service by joining the Servants of India Society.
Munshi’s patriotism had been stirred by Aurobindo at the
Baroda College: he was now a rising lawyer in Bombay and
the centre of a coterie of Gujarati writers. Unlike the
others, Shankarlal Banker was not a writer but, being the
son of a wealthy man, contributed financially to Young;
India.1 2 He was anxious to serve his poorer fellow-
countrymen and had joined the Depressed Classes Mission
where he had begun to demonstrate the flair for
organisation which he later applied to the national move-
2ment under Mrs Besant and Gandhi.
Whilst Mrs Besant sought the support of older, 
better-known politicians, it was throughout India the 
younger men, who had not yet played a prominent role in 
the national movement and now saw the chance to do so,
1. Jamnadas, ’’Memoire”, p. 132.
2. Bombay Police 1914. par. 489, 1915. par. 213; inter­
views with K. Dwarkadas, 1 June 1963; S. G. Banker,
27 June 1963.
who turned to her most enthusiastically and threw them­
selves into winning support for the Home Rule Conference. 
In many areas the key figure was a Theosophist, like 
Jamnadas Dwarkadas in Bombay, Purnendu Narayan Sinha in 
Patna, Gokaran Nath Misra in Lucknow, Hirendranath Datta 
in Calcutta and Durgdas Adwani in Karachi;1 23but they drew 
around them many others who were not Theosophists, like
Yajnik, Munshi and Banker in Bombay and Jawaharlal Nehru 
2in Allahabad. Whatever the older politicians might say 
to her plans at the Home Rule Conference, the support of 
the younger generation was assured.
Mrs Besant’s proposals for agitation startled the 
Governments, particularly that of Madras which was worried 
by her increasingly sharp criticisms and by her argument 
that India’s decline was due to British rule. The Madras 
G-overnment therefore proposed to deport her.^ Opinion in 
the Viceroy’s Executive Council was divided, several
1. see e.g. letters and telegrams to Mrs Besant from 
Jamnadas Dwarkadas, 24 and 29 Nov 1915; G-okaran Nath Misra 
15 Dec 1915; A. Rangaswami Ayar (Madura), 18 Dec 1915;
P. N. Sinha, 19 Dec 1915; Durgdas Adwani, 17 Dec 1915; 
Jethmal Parsram (Hyderabad, Sind), 6 Dec 1915, Adyar 
Archives.
2. see e.g. letters and telegrams to Mrs Besant from 
N. P. Nigam (Kanpur), 20 Dec 1915; C. Y. Chintamani 
(Allahabad), 13 Dec 1915, ibid.
3. Government of Madras to Government of India, 8 Oct 
1915, in Home Poll A, Nov 1915, nos 166-8.
members warning that if she were deported to England, she 
would rouse agitation there which would come echoing back. 
The argument that carried the day was Craddock’s: he 
could not believe that ”Indian politicians will much 
relish being tied to the apron strings of an elderly 
European lady”, and the G-overnment of India vetoed 
deportation on the ground that Congress and the Muslim
pLeague were unlikely to authorise her HRL. They knew 
that Wedderburn had fortified the Bombay Moderates’ 
opposition to Mrs Besant by rejecting her invitation to 
preside over the English Division of her League and by 
arguing in a published Note that ’’public action”, 
agitation and even public debate were ’’inexpedient” 
during the War.^ ’’The Congress was invited to Bombay to 
checkmate her [Mrs Besant]”, an Indian member of the 
Viceroy’s Council told his colleagues, ’’and, if Sir 
Pherozeshah is able to guide the Congress it will
1. '.inutes by H. Wheeler, Home Secretary, 26 Oct 1915, 
and Sir A. Imam, 3 Nov 1915, in ibid.
2. G-overnment of India to G-overnment of Madras, 15 
Nov 1915, in ibid.
3. Sir W. Wedderburn and Sir K. (G. (Gupta, Joint Note
No. 1 , 5 Oct 1915- (printed), Adyar Archives: see his
letter to D. Naoroji, 27 Oct 1915, in Masani, Dadabhai 
Naoro.ii, p. 533.
dissociate itself finally from her. Sir S. P. Sinha^ who
2is elected President, is likely to do the same”.
The Bombay Moderates received a stunning blow in 
November, however, from the death of Mehta. Not only 
were they deprived of his guidance and heartbroken 
(particularly in Wacha's case) by his loss, but any threat 
to walk out as a means of dissuading Congress from reach­
ing unwelcome decisions would carry less weight without 
him.
Nevertheless they succeeded in thwarting Mrs 
Besant's plan to found the League at the time of the 
Congress. Mrs Besant and Tilak had originally planned 
that Extremists, as well as Moderates and members of the 
Muslim League, should attend the Home Rule Conference on 
December 25 and 27;^ but, as a further concession to the 
Moderate leaders and assurance to the Moderate rank-and- 
file, they agreed - despite Extremist protests - that
1. born 1863, joined Lincoln's Inn 1881, called to the 
Bar 1886; Advocate-G-eneral of Bengal 1906; Law Member, 
Viceroy's Executive Council 1909; 1917, Under-Secretary 
of State for India, raised to the peerage; was relatively 
inactive member of Congress.
2. Minute by Sir C. Sankaran Hair, 4 Nov 1915; for 
Mehta’s choice of Sinha, see Mody, Mehta, II, 657.
3. see Khaparde "Diary" (Poona), 13 Oct 1915.
only members of Congress and the Muslim League should
attend it.x Mrs Besant promised that she would not
launch the League unless "great majorities" of the Congress
and Muslim League approved of it, though she hinted that
she was prepared to ignore "a reactionary minority within
2the Congress", meaning no doubt the "Mehta party".“ As 
a further gesture to Moderates from outside Bombay, she 
invited Banerjea to chair the Conference. Imagine then 
her chagrin on finding that the Bombay Moderates and 
Sastri had persuaded Banerjea and Malaviya to urge that 
the question of founding the League be handed over to 
Congress.“ Wacha and Sastri doubtless appealed to the 
concern of Banerjea and Malaviya to preserve Congress 
from the threat of its proposed rival, and to their 
jealousy of Mrs Besant and her rising influence. Mrs 
Besant insisted that the Conference meet again to reach
1. Moti Lall Chose, B. Chahravarty, A. Rasul, B. K. 
Lahiri, et al. to Mrs Besant, 10 and 20 Dec 1915, in 
"Formation of HRL" file, Adyar Archives; quotations from 
newspapers in New India. 29 Sept 1915, p. 3a-d; 1 Oct 
1915, p. 3a-d; 9 Oct 1915, p. 10a; Jamnadas, "Memoire", 
p. 135.
New India. 18 Oct 1915, p. 9c-d: cf. ibid., 24 Dec 
1915, p. llc-d.
3. ibid., 27 Dec 1915, pp. 8c, lla-b.
a final decision on December 29» after the Congress
Session but before the delegates dispersed.^* On December
28, however, the Congress Subjects Committee authorised
the AICC to "frame...a programme of continuous work,
educative and propagandist" in support of a scheme of 
2reform, thereby acknowledging - however vaguely - the 
desirability of agitation. The AICC in turn authorised 
the PCCs to "carry out educative and propagandist work"
Mrs Besant accepted this limited victory with grace: 
"exactly the proposal made by me for the Home Rule League, 
taken up by the AICC", she claimed, and at the meeting on 
the 29th, despite the presence of a majority in favour of 
founding the League, she avoided a clash with her 
Moderate opponents by suspending its formation.^ She 
recognised however that the Bombay Moderates had accepted 
the Congress Resolution for "continuous work" in the 
hope of shelving it, and warned that if the AICC did not
1. ibid., 29 Dec 1915, p. lla-b.
2. Resolution XIX, Congress 1915. Report, pp. f and g.
3. Resolution 6, AICC Minutes. 30 Dec 1915« N. M. 
Samarth opposed even this much.
4* Hew India, 31 Dec 1915, p. 11c; 1 Jan 1916, p. lla-b; 
cf. Home Poll B, Jan 1916, nos 541-4, pp. 12-3.
undertake such work when a scheme of reforms had been 
agreed upon she would launch the League.1
The acceptance of the principle of agitation by 
the Subjects Committee was due in part to the MMehta 
party*sM wish to remove the raison d’etre of Mrs Besant’s 
proposed League. But equally important was the increasing 
belief, except among the Bombay leaders, in the desirab­
ility of such agitation and the general feeling that a 
more active policy was required. Banerjea and Sastri had 
been convinced by Mrs Besant of the need for agitation; 
the Madras Moderates demonstrated their approval of her 
by electing her to the AICC in December 1915; and she was 
supported by many of the members of the Subjects Committee 
from the UP, Bihar, CP and Berar, and Bengal. Finally, 
the young men and the mofussil Moderates of Bombay 
Presidency who had chafed under the dominance of the 
Bombay leaders during Mehta's lifetime now revolted.
Some of Mehta's less obscurantist followers - notably 
Jinnah - had invited Jamnadas Dwarkadas and the other 
young men to join the Bombay Presidency Association, 
partly out of sympathy with their youthful enthusiasm,
1* lew India, 1 Jan 1916, p. lla-b; 3 Jan 1916, p. llb-d; 6 Jan 1916, p. lOc-d.
2. and also Chimanlal Setalvad: Jamnadas, "Memoire", p. 
122; cf. Jayakar, I, 89-90.
partly, no doubt, to keep them in check, and the Presid­
ency Association elected these young men as delegates to 
the 1915 Congress.“ Many mofussil Moderates were angered 
by the high-handed way in which the Bombay PCC had 
debarred delegates (some of them Extremists) elected at
ppublic meetings held by DCCs. In addition from Sind 
(which was part of Bombay Presidency) came a strong 
contingent of delegates who favoured a more active pro­
gramme than that envisaged by the Bombay Moderates.^
Thus, when Samarth on behalf of the ”Mehta. party” tried 
to impose a list of names on the meeting held by the 
Bombay delegates to elect their 25 members for the Sub­
jects Committee, these groups shouted him down and 
replaced 10 of his nominees with men of their own choos­
ing. Had they been better organised, their revolt might 
have been even more successful.^ The Subjects Committee,
1. Bombay Presidency Association, Council Minutes. 14 
Dec 1915.
2. under Art. XX of the Constitution as amended at the 
1912 Session; see Bombay Police 1916. par. 39(i)-
3* Hew India. 24 Bee 1915, p. llc-d.
4. Bombay Police 1916. pars 39(i) (j); Home Poll Bep. 
Jan 1916, no. 36; Congress 1915j> Report, p. 172; Young 
India, quoted in Hew India, 30 Bee 1915, p. 5d.
1*2
wrote Mrs Besant, was "far more representative of forward
opinion than might have "been expected”.^
As a further result of this representation of
"forward opinion” in the Subjects Committee, Mrs Besant
won a limited victory on the question of a reform scheme
and the speed at which India might progress to self-
government. Banerjea in Bengal and Mrs Besant in Madras
had produced schemes demanding provincial autonomy and
the power of the purse for fully- or partly-elected 
2legislatures. Banerjea*s scheme was not presented in 
the Subjects Committee. Mrs Besant*s scheme was presented 
but was ruled out of order by the President, S. P. Sinha, 
on the ground that in proposing rapid advance to self- 
government it contravened the 1908 Congress Constitution, 
which prescribed "a steady reform of the existing system 
of administration”."' Sinha himself put forward a scheme 
with the warning that the path to self-government ”is 
long and devious.... The end will not come by impatience”
1. Hew, India. 30 Dec 1915, p. lla-b.
2. for Banerjea*s scheme, see J. H. Broomfield, op. cit. 
p. 125.
3. Home Poll B, Jan 1916, nos 541-4, p. 12.
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and that ”no true friend of India” - he did not mention 
Mrs Besant by name - ’’will place the ideal of Self- 
Government before us without this necessary 
qualification”.1 23 In response to Mrs Besant’s opposition 
to Sinha’s scheme, the Subjects Committee decided to 
refer the matter to the AICC for consideration, in con­
sultation with the Muslim League, before September 1. 
With the help of the more ’forward” members of the 
Committee, Mrs Besant fought the wording of the Committ­
ee’s instructions to the AICC phrase by phrase and in 
their final form they directed the AICC to demand
popular control over the executive, which had been the
odistinctive feature of Mrs Besant’s scheme. ’’...the
time has arrived”, said the instructions,
to introduce further and substantial 
measures of reform...amongst others,...
(a) The introduction of Provincial 
Autonomy including financial indepen­
dence;
(b) Expansion and reform of the Legis­
lative Councils so as to make them truly 
...representative of all sections of the 
people and to give them an effective 
control over the acts of the Executive 
Government;...3
1. Congress Presidential AddressesT II, 193-4; Home
2. Home Poll B, Jan 1916, nos 541-4, p. 12; Hew India. 
30 Dec 1915, p. lla-b; 31 Dec 1915, p. llb-d; 11 Jan 1916, p. 7d.
3. Resolution XIX, Congress 1915* Report, pp. f and g.
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Finally, Mrs Besant now succeeded in having Tilak 
readmitted to Congress. She had refused to allow the 
Constitutional Committee appointed at the 1914 Congress 
to be forgotten;1 23thanks largely to her it met when its 
members were gathered for the 1915 Congress. By avoid­
ing controversy with the Moderates, Tilak had reassured 
many of them, as had been demonstrated in November in 
CP and Berar where, for the first time since Surat, the
Moderates and Extremists joined to hold the Provincial 
2Conference. Before Mehta's death it was clear that a 
majority of the members of the Constitutional Committee 
was in favour of readmission, but hesitated to press for 
it in the face of opposition from Bombay.1 Mehta's death 
in November weakened this opposition, and Mrs Besant and 
the Deccan Extremists pressed their advantage: during 
her tour gathering support for the HRL, she urged re­
admission, while in December Kelkar toured central and 
northern India assuring Moderates that the Extremists did
1. see e.g. New India. 10 July 1915, p. 10a.
2. ibid., 24 Sept 1915, p. 13d; Mahratta. 26 Dec 1915, 
p. 417; "History of the Freedom Movement in Madhya 
Pradesh/CP, 1885-19X9" (HFM Delhi, Region II, 19/2), p.8.
3. Home Poll B, Aug 1915, nos 552-6, w.e. 31 Aug 1915.
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not contemplate advocating boycott or passive resistance.''"
When the Constitutional Committee met, the Bombay
Moderates, finding themselves hard pressed, retreated.
They surrendered their ground stubbornly, however, and
the Committee recommended only that the AICC allow the
right of electing Congress delegates to public meetings
convened by associations of two years' standing, which
applied to Congress for recognition, each association to
2elect no more than 15 delegates. This fell far short of 
Tilak's demand that the right of electing delegates in 
unlimited numbers be granted to any public meeting or at 
least to any association. No doubt the Bombay Moderates 
hoped by this grudging concession to force him to reject 
it.
Tilak's first reaction was, indeed, to declare that 
Congress had not opened the door to the Extremists.^ He 
said this, at least partly, with an eye to his more fiery 
lieutenants: at a meeting of his co-workers on 16 January 
1916, S. M. Paranjpe, Khadilkar and others opposed
1* Bombay Police 1915. par. 1257* New India 15 Pec 1915, 
p. 18b; Khaparde "Diary'1 23 (Bombay), 12 and 13 Oct 1915.
2. Bombay Police 1916. par. 39(j); New India. 28 Dec 
1915» p. lOc-d; AICC Minutes. 26 Dec 1915.
3. Home Poll B, Jan 1916, nos 541-4, p. 24.
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re-entering Congress while each Extremist association 
was limited to 15 delegates, and the meeting resolved 
that the Congress offer was "highly unsatisfactory".1 2
Tilak however was anxious to re-enter Congress, in 
anticipation of thereby shielding himself from the atten­
tions of the British and of being able to win a majority 
in Congress by appealing to the "vague but honest pat-
priotism" of the majority of Congressmen. Mrs Besant 
would be his ally in achieving this goal: she clearly 
preferred his friendship and co-operation to his enmity 
and was pressing him to accept the Congress offer.
"In India", she urged, "we should all present a united 
front".1 But he hesitated to give a firm lead on this 
question since, by their denunciations of the Moderates' 
offer, Paranjpe and Khadilkar might well rouse the indig­
nation of his other lieutenants and the Extremist rank- 
and-file against him if he should accept it.
The final decision was to be reached at the
1. Bombay Police 1916. pars 103(a), 123(b).
2. see ibid., pars 66(a), 103(a), 530(c); Deshpande, 
Autobiography, p. 256.
3* New India. 28 Dec 1915» p. lOc-d.
Extremists’ 1916 ’’Bombay Provincial Conference" at 
Belgaum in April; meanwhile Tilak strove (with Kelkar) 
to convince a majority of his followers that they should 
accept the Congress offer. Kelkar resuscitated the Poona 
Sarvajanik Sabha to provide a convenient electoral 
association,1 23and, to ensure the support of the Extrem­
ists from CP and Berar, Tilak invited Khaparde to 
2preside. After a tussle between Tilak’s more fiery 
lieutenants and those v/ho approved of re-entry, the 
Conference Subjects Committee sent to the plenary session 
a resolution that "under the present circumstances" the 
Congress offer should be accepted. Paranjpe threatened 
to oppose this in the open session but Tilak, judging 
correctly that Paranjpe would not oppose him directly, 
threw his weight behind the resolution, which was passed. 
Tilak and his followers would thus attend the Congress 
at Lucknow at the end of 1916.
The Bombay Congress Session at the end of 1915
1. Quarterly Journal of the Poona Sarva.ianik Sabha 
new Series Vol. I, no. 1, April 19l£Y Mahratta, 16 
Jan 1916, p. 34; 20 Jan 1916, p. 95; interview with 
K. N. Kelkar, son of N. C. Kelkar, 19 May 1963.
2. Deshpande, Autobiography. pp. 255-6; Tilak to 
Khaparde, 29 M a r 1916, Khaparde Papers.
3. M_ahratta, 30 May 1916, p. 205; 7 May 1916, p. 217;
14 May 1916, p. 231; Bombay Police 1916. par. 610(b);Home Poll B, May 1916, nos 577-80.
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foreshadowed significant developments in the programme, 
organisation and leadership of the national movement. The 
victories which Mrs Besant won were not clear-cut but 
they signalled a shift in the balance of forces in her 
favour. Her plans for a separate organisation under her 
own control to rouse agitation had been thwarted - for 
the time being - but the desirability of agitation had 
been accepted by Congress itself. When the time came 
for her to set up such an agitational organisation she 
could claim Congress authority for it. The older Con­
gressmen were plainly jealous of her, but she had avoided 
an open break with them and could continue to seek the 
leadership of Congress. Her scheme for self-government 
had not been accepted but the principle underlying it - 
the demand for the control of the internal government 
of India - had. Finally, while the doors of Congress 
had not been thrown open to the Extremists, they had 
been opened sufficiently wide for the Extremists to come 
in and link hands with the impetuous young men, who were 
already members, under the joint leadership of Mrs 
Besant and Tilak. From its ensuing Lucknow Session, 
Congress would "present a united front",1 to which
1 . New India. 28 Dec 1915, p. lOc-d.
(so Mrs Besant hoped) the Extremists and young men 
would impart greater vigour but in which they would be 
restrained by the Moderates.
While these developments were talcing place 
within Congress, equally important ones were occurring 
in the relationship between it and the Muslim League*
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Chapter III
THE CONGBESS/MUSLIM LEAGUE RAPPROCHEMENT
I
January 1914 - December 1915«
Up to 1914 moves for rapprochement between Congress 
and the Muslim League had come from Gokhale on the one 
side and from the ’‘nationalists1 * and Pan-Islamists on the 
other. Luring 1914 there was a lull since G-okhale was 
in England, as were Jinnah and other leading ’’nationalist” 
Muslims: Jinnah and Mazharul Haque were members of the 
Congress deputation on the Secretary of State's Council.
In the Muslim League the ’conservatives” prevailed and, 
as a token of loyalty to the Government following the 
outbreak of War, they prevented the League from meeting 
in 1914.
The Pan-Islamists continued to stir up anti-British 
feeling, chiefly over the approach of war between Britain 
and Turkey and its outbreak in November.'5' In their
1. also e.g. over the demolition of semi-derelict
mosques for extensions to the Kidderpore Locks near
Calcutta, see Home Poll B, May 1914, nos 137-40, pp. 4,
12; Bengal NPt 1915. p. 603.
newspapers Mohamed Ali and Azad wrote as openly as they
dared in favour of the Turks. "At last God is going to
avenge her [Turkey] on the Christian powers", wrote
Mohamed Ali,^ and his Urdu paper, Hamdard, published
correspondence between his spiritual preceptor, Abdul
2Bari, and another alim. suggesting that Turkey v/as 
fighting a jihad or holy war.^ Early in 1915 the Ali 
Brothers and Azad joined local Pan-Islamic leaders in 
the Punjab where they urged students to cross into tribal 
areas and incite Muslims to attack the British.^- The 
Punjab Government was the first to act: it interned the 
leading Punjabi Pan-Islamists in October 1914 and pressed 
the Government of India to pass the Defence of India Act 
under which persons hampering the War effort could be 
interned without trial. In 1915 the Ali Brothers and
1. Hamdard. 28 July 1914, translated in Home Poll A,
Jan 1915, nos 180-182; cf. quotation from Comrade.
12 Aug 1914, in Pak. HFM. pp. 159-60.
2. one specially trained in Islamic religion and law, 
regarded by Muslims as an authority on these matters.
3. Home Poll B, Feb 1914, nos 777-80, pp. 7-8.
4. Home Poll B, April 1915, nos 416-19, w.e. 6 Apr 1915; 
cf. C. Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, pp. 30-31.
For their attacks on the Government at the Muhammadan 
Educational Conference, Rawalpindi, Dec 1914, see Home 
Poll B, Jan 1915, nos 278-82.
Azad were interned under this Act."1 23*
This display of determination by the Government 
cowed the remaining Pan-Islamists, and emphasis in Muslim 
politics shifted back from the rousing of widespread 
agitation over the international affairs of the Khilafat 
to the ordering of the Muslims' relations with their co­
inhabitants of India.
In April 1915 Jinnah persuaded a number of Bombay
Muslims, mainly fellow-Khojas, to invite the Muslim
League to hold a 1915 Session in Bombay at the same time
2as the Congress. In doing so, Jinnah had the support 
of the President of the League, the Aga Khan who, while 
inclined to favour the suspension of both Congress and 
the League during the War, wrote that "if the Congress 
meets in Bombay, I think the League should come to Bombay 
also". Jinnah was also supported by the Headquarters of
1. ibid., Dec 1914, nos 218-22, w.e. 20 Oct 1914;Bengal NP. 1915. pp. 1127-8, 1144-66.
2. Jinnah and 28 others to W. HAsan, Hon. Sec., All- 
India Muslim League, 12 Apr 1915, in Home Poll A, Feb 1916, nos 425-8, Enclosure A.
3. Aga Khan to Sir Pazulbhoy Currimbhoy, 14 July 1915, 
extracts in Bombay Police 1915. par. 801; and [?] Apr 1915 
quoted in L. Robertson, Government of Bombay to Government 
of India, 19 Jan 1916, in Home Poll A, Feb 1916, nos 425- 
8; Aga Khan to Mehta, telegram, [?] Hov 1915, in Home 
Poll B, Dec 1915, nos 709-11, w.e. 11 Dec 1915.
the League, the Secretary, Wazir Hasan, working 
indefatigably for the success of the Session.
Jinnah and Wazir Hasan planned that, in meeting 
concurrently, the League and Congress should arrange to 
co-ordinate their activities and, in particular, to draw 
up a mutually-acceptable scheme of reform. A start had 
been made in this direction by the Aga Khan who had been 
drafting a reform scheme with G-okhale at the time of the 
latter’s death,^ and Mrs Besant hastened the process when, 
as President of the UP Provincial Conference, she met 
Muslim League officials and urged the need for agreement 
on a scheme.
In working for the Congress/League rapprochement, 
Jinnah was probably aiming at leadership of the united 
national movement, if not immediately, at least after 
sharing it initially with Mrs Besant and Tilak. His 
contacts were as much with Congress as with the Muslim 
League; while he was associated with the Bombay Moder­
ates, he saw much of Jamnadas Dwarkadas and the rising 
young men of Bombay who were being attracted to Mrs 
Besant, and he brought them into the Congress organisation 
in 1915. Furthermore, as a member of the "Mehta party"
1. see Aga Khan, Memoirs, pp. 147-8; Home Poll Pep.
Mar 1915, no. 56, ’UP’.
he sought to find some basis of readmitting the Extrem­
ists to Congress, first at the Moderate Provincial 
Conference in July, then later in that month and in 
September when Tilak came to Bombay, and again at the 
time of the Congress and Muslim League Sessions in 
December.^
The ’nationalists'" plan to hold a League Session
in Bombay met determined opposition from "conservative”
Muslims, from the Sunnis and some Khojas of Bombay and
from the Government. Among "conservatives" the most
resolute opponent was Maulvi Rafi-ud-din Ahmed of Poona,
a staunch ally of the Government and President of the
2Bombay branch of the Muslim League: this branch was
practically defunct,-^ but he continued to act in its 
name. The Sunnis had to concede educational, economic 
and social eminence in the Bombay Muslim community to the 
Khojas and other minority sects but, being the largest 
group in that community, did so with a bad grace.^
1. Sastri "Diary", 11 July 1915; Home Poll B, Aug 1915, 
nos 552-6, w.e. 10 Aug 1915; Bombay Police 1915. par. 963; 
AICC Minutes. 26 Dec 1915.
2. see Home Poll Dep. Dec 1914, no. 31, p. 2
3. see New India. 4 Dec 1914, p. 8c; 8 Dec 1915, p. 7c.
4. see Bombay Police 1915. par. 601.
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Prominent Bombay Sunnis therefore resented the attempt
by Jinnah and his fellow-Khojas to lead the Muslim
community into alliance with Congress. Even within the
Khoja community Jinnah1 2s pretensions to leadership were
challenged.^ The G-overnment was anxious not only to
concentrate its energies on the War but to prevent the
union of the League and Congress in opposition to itself,
and the Bombay Commissioner of Police encouraged Jinnah*s
opponents to frustrate the holding of the League Session 
2in Bombay.
Wazir Hasan visited Bombay twice in August and 
November to win support for the Session, but failed to 
make much headway against the combined opposition. This 
Gordian knot was cut in November when the League Council 
met in Lucknow and decided to accept Jinnah's invitation.
The voting at this meeting demonstrated how the 
Muslims of the UP and (to a lesser extent) of Bihar 
dominated the affairs of the League. Of 64 votes cast 
(including postal votes), 22 were from the UP and 8 from 
Bihar. Bengal and the Punjab, with by far the greatest
1. Sir Ibrahim Rahimtulla, Pazulbhoy Chinoy and Sir 
Pazulbhoy Currimbhoy were contenders, see Wacha to Mehta 
18 Dec 1897? Mehta Papers; Bombay Police 1915. pars 505, 
601, 1340(b).
2. Bombay Police 1915. pars 801, 1258; cf. Governor of 
Bombay’s conversation with Wazir Hasan, Aug 1915, Home 
Poll Dep. Sept 1915, no. 57, 'Bombay'.
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concentration of Muslims, registered only 5 votes each.
Of the votes cast for the UP, 17 were in favour of hold­
ing the Session, 5 against; for Bihar 6 in favour, 2 
against; Bombay and the Punjab each registered 2 in favour 
and 3 against; while the 24 from Bengal, Madras and other 
provinces were all in favour.^ Among the UP and Bihar 
members of the Council, ’nationalists” favouring co­
operation with Congress, clearly predominated. The 
Punjab vote against holding the Session, although small, 
indicated the strength of ’conservatism” among Muslims 
there and their doubt about the possibility of 
reconciliation with the Hindus, born in part of Hindu 
aggressiveness inculcated by the Arya Samaj. The unan­
imous vote in favour of the Session from Bengal reflected
the disillusionment of Bengali Muslims with the British
2as the result of the Repartition of the province. In 
addition, ’’conservative” Muslims in Bengal had been 
weakened by the death earlier in 1915 of the Nawab of 
Dacca.^ A new type of Muslim politician was rising in
1. Hew India. 11 Nov 1915» p. 8a.
2. see P. Huq, Presidential Speech, Bengal Provincial 
Muslim League Conference, 13 Apr 1914, in Home Poll B,
May 1914, nos 137-40.
3. Bengal NP, 1915. pp. 59, 70, 132-3.
Bengal, typified by Fazlul Huq (1873-1962), the Secretary 
of the provincial branch of the Muslim League, who voted 
for the Bombay Session. He has been characterised as a 
"nationalist communal Muslim"his aim was to further 
the interests of the Muslim community, and at this time 
he believed this was possible by alliance with the Hindu 
national politicians, many of whose values, as a Western-
peducated lawyer, he shared. The League Council's 
decision to accept the Bombay invitation marked the 
triumph of Jinnah and the "nationalists" in the affairs 
of the League.
In view of the League*s decision, the Governor of 
Bombay brought Jinnah and Y/azir Hasan and their opponents 
together in order to reach an agreed agenda, and so avoid 
disturbances. They agreed that the Session would appoint 
a committee to frame a scheme of reforms in consultation 
with Congress.^ The Session met in an atmosphere of 
mutual suspicion for, in distributing the agenda, Wazir 
Hasan had tried to enlarge its terms so as to commit the
1. J. H. Broomfield, op. cit., p. 91«
2. ibid., pp. 89-91; see New India. 11 Nov 1915» p. 8a.
3« Bombay Police 1915, par. 1447; Home Poll Lep, Jan 
1916, no. 35» 'Bombay*.
League to a more sweeping reform scheme closer to the 
one Mrs Besant was urging upon Congress, prescribing, in 
particular, that the Legislative Councils "should have 
the pov/er to exercise effective control over the executive 
and that "'Provincial Autonomy' should be granted to all 
the provinces".^
The Muslim opponents of rapprochement now appealed 
to the sense of communal solidarity among Muslims both 
outside and inside the Session. They held a meeting, at 
which the religious leaders of the Sunni and other 
communities were present and attracted an audience of
p10,000, to denounce the holding of the Session. At 
the Session itself they raised the shout that the 
President, Mazharul Hague, was no true Muslim since he 
was clean shaven, wore Western clothes and spoke English 
instead of Urdu.^ When this resulted in pandemonium, 
Mazharul Haque adjourned the proceedings to a small 
meeting at the Taj Hotel, from v/hich all but members of 
the League were excluded, and here the League authorised
1. Wazir Hasan, Circular to Members of the AIML Council, 
18 Dec 1915, in Home Poll A, Feb 1916, nos 425-8,
Enclosure H.
2. Bombay Police 1915. par. 1404.
3 . see HFH Bombay. II, 870, 881.
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a Committee to draw up a scheme of reforms with Congress.1
Jinnah and the ’nationalists” thus got their way.
But their success was qualified by the smallness of the 
numbers who had assented to it. The tactics of their 
opponents had demonstrated that it was a relatively easy 
matter to inflame Muslims’ tempers by appealing to their 
sense of community and to turn these feelings against 
Hindu-Muslim unity, though in this case they were not 
turned against Hindus personally.
There had been some danger that Tilak and Mrs 
Besant might seek support by appealing to Hindu communal 
feeling and thus set back the movement for rapprochement 
between the Muslim League and Congress. During Tilak's 
imprisonment the Shivaji and G-anpati Festivals had 
declined with a consequent relaxation in tension between 
the two communities in western India, and on his release 
Tilak had recognised that unity between the two communities 
would strengthen the voice with which the national movement 
could speak. The Hahratta, for example, assumed a 
conciliatory tone in 1914: "A considerable section of the 
educated Mahomedans have begun to perceive...the necessity 
of political agitation on the Congress lines and it would
1 . Home Poll B, Jan 1916, nos 541-4, p. 17
16G
be a fault of the Congress if it does not meet them half­
way .... suitable concessions [must be] made”.'*'
Mrs Besant had encouraged the 1914 Congress to
condemn separate representation for the Muslims in the 
2legislatures, but in 1915 she realised that such 
statements frightened most articulate Muslims who relied 
on safeguards for their community. She continued to 
deplore ’’favouritism” on the grounds of religion but, in 
her Presidential Address to the UP Provincial Conference 
in April, agreed that ”it would probably cause too much 
friction to withdraw them [’separate electorates for 
Musalmans'] at present”. She put forward her HRL as a 
body in which Hindus and Muslims could combine for 
national work,^ " and in her tour of northern and western 
India preparing for its formation she sought and received 
enthusiastic support from the "nationalist” Muslims. 
Jinnah, Mazharul Haque and others supported the formation
1. Mahratta. 25 Oct 1914, p. 329.
2. see Commonweal. 8 Jan 1915, pp. 19-20.
3. Besant, Political Outlook, p. 17.
4. New India, 20 Oct 1915, p. 9a-b.
5. see ibid., 18 Oct 1915, p. 9b-d; 8 Dec 1915, p. 7c; 
14 Dec 1915, p. 17b.
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of the HRL vigorously though unsuccessfully at the 
Conference at the end of 1915,^ while she in turn was 
largely responsible for the Congress decision to prepare 
a Joint Scheme of Reforms with the Muslim League.
II
January - December 1916,
In July 1916, Wazir Hasan circulated for discussion
to the Muslim League branches a draft reform scheme, in
the preparation of which he had been influenced by the
deliberations of the Congress Reforms Committee, which
had met in April to discuss Mrs Besant's scheme among 
2others. The general principles of his scheme were 
similar to those of Mrs Besant's scheme and of the final 
Scheme agreed on by Congress and the Muslim League: all 
three envisaged large elected majorities in both central 
and provincial legislatures, which would control all 
legislation except foreign and military affairs, subject
1* New India. 27 Dec 1915, p. 8c; 30 Lee 1915, p.8b.
2. Home Poll Lep. May 1917, no. 17• the Congress Comm­
ittee comprised 36 members of the AICC. Cf. New India.
10 Apr 1916, p. 8. Much of this and following paragraphs 
is based on B & 0 Police 1917. pars 142-3« Mazharul 
Haque and a UP "nationalist” Muslim, Samiulla Beg, were 
members of the Congress Committee; Sapru was said to have 
sent the schemes discussed at the AICC Committee meeting 
to Wazir Hasan, UP Police 1916. par. 1849.
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only to the veto of the Viceroy or provincial Governor.1 23
Hasan1s scheme differed only in its incorporation of the
principle of separate representation. Of the 65 elected
members of the central Council of 100, 15 (about 23 per
cent), and of the 75 elected members of the provincial
legislatures 20 (about 24 per cent), should be elected by
Muslims alone. Muslims would also vote in general elec- 
2torates. At meetings of the League Reforms Committee 
in August and October Bengal and the Punjab, the provinces 
with larger Muslim populations, demanded separate repres­
entation more closely proportional to their share of the 
population, in return for which they would forego 
participation in the general electorates.1
It was clear that for the bulk of Muslims who were 
concerned with the reforms, separate representation was an 
essential safeguard for the community against the 
possibility of being swamped electorally by the Hindu
1. W. Hasan to provincial Muslim Leagues, 26 July 1916, 
and attached draft scheme, Sections III, par. 7; V, 3-5»
in Home Poll Dep. May 1917, no. 17; see Congress and Muslim 
League*s Scheme of Reforms, in India*s Claim for Home Rule 
(Ganesh), pp. 478-85.
2. though not stated specifically this may be inferred, 
since otherwise Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal would have 
been severely under-represented: see Home Poll Dep. May 
1917, no. 17.
3. UP Police 1916. pars 1849, 1992, 2227.
majority. Jinnah had formerly opposed separate represen­
tation,1 2but as President of the Bombay Provincial 
Conference at Ahmedabad in October 1916 he said:
rightly or wrongly the Muslim community 
is absolutely determined for the present 
to insist upon separate electorates....
I would, therefore, appeal to my Hindu 
brethren that in the present state of 
[the]position they should try to win... 
the trust of the Muslims....If they are 
determined to have separate electorates, 
no resistance should be shown to their
demands.2
At the end of 1916 Jinnah assured the Congress Subjects 
Committee that if it accepted separate representation, 
Muslim trust in Congress would so increase that he would 
in time be able to persuade the League to accept joint 
electorates.1
The Congress Reforms Committee tacitly accepted 
separate Muslim representation. Once this had been done, 
the main points at issue between the two Committees 
concerned the proportion of seats to be reserved for 
Muslims in each province. The bargaining over these 
proportions was quite bitter and, while recalcitrant
1. see e.g. Congress 1906. Report, p. 120.
2. quoted in M. H. Saiyid, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (A 
Political Study), p. 126.
3 . Jamnadas, ’’Memoire”, pp. 179-80.
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provincial representatives on either side were brought 
into line by the majority of the Congress or the League 
Committee as appropriate, bitterness and tensions remained 
which weakened the ensuing Entente.
Joint meetings of these Committees were held at 
Calcutta in November, and at Lucknow in December. The 
November meeting agreed to give the Muslims over­
representation in the central legislature, where they 
were to have 33 1/3 per cent of the seats (their pro­
portion of the population being about 20 per cent), and in 
the provincial legislatures of Bihar, Bombay, Madras and 
CP.1 2
In return for these concessions to Muslim minorities 
by the Congress, the League agreed to reduce Muslim 
representation in the Punjab (where Muslims constituted 
55 per cent of the population) to 50 per cent. Hindu 
Congressmen from the Punjab resented the Congress Committ­
ee’s acceptance of these terms, which they regarded as an 
altogether ungracious concession by the Muslims, while 
many Punjabi Muslims were equally resentful that the
QLeague had surrendered their majority.
1. Home Poll B, Nov 1916, nos 452-3, w.e. 25 Nov 1916; 
Khaliquzzaman, p. 37. Muslim percentage of seats (and, in 
parentheses, of the provincial population) was: Bihar,
30 (13); Bombay, 33 [originally 20] (20); Madras, 15 (7) and CP 10 (4).
2. Home Poll B, Nov 1916, nos 452-3; cf. Modern Review 
eb 1914, p. 225; see Ch. V below.
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The UP Muslims demanded 40 per cent of the UP 
seats, which was out of all proportion to their 14 per 
cent of the population: the UP Hindus responded by offer­
ing them 20 per cent. Being anxious for agreement and 
bearing in mind that the UP Muslims dominated the League, 
Mrs Besant urged generosity upon the UP Hindus and, 
supported by the votes of the Bengal Congressmen (who, 
as the meeting was in Calcutta, were somewhat over­
represented) gave the UP Muslims 33 per cent of the seats. 
One can then imagine the indignation of the UP Congressmen 
when the Bengal Hindus refused point-blank to accede to 
the Bengal Muslims1 2 demand for 50 per cent of the seats, 
which was slightly less than their proportion (52.6 per 
cent) of the population. ’’Almost a split over Bengal 
and UP”, recorded Sastri in his diary: ”In my judgment 
Bengal leaders were unwilling to give much, while they 
asked UP to give too much”.^
The decision on Bengal representation was deferred
1. Home Poll B, Uov 1916, nos 452-3*
2. the Bengal Hindus offered the Bengal Muslims only 
33 per cent: B & 0 Police 1917. par. 142.
3* Sastri ’’Diary”, 18 Nov 1916; see J. H. Broomfield, op. cit., p. 166.
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to the December meeting at Lucknow. There it was the 
turn of Fazlul Huq and the Bengal Muslims to sacrifice 
their interests for the sake of overall unity. Under 
pressure from the UP members of the Muslim Reforms 
Committee, they agreed to accept only 40 per cent of the 
Bengal representation, a concession which was to be 
unpopular with many of their fellow Bengali Muslims.^
At this meeting some of the UP Hindus led by Malaviya 
reopened the question of representation in their province. 
They tried to reduce the representation of the UP Muslims 
from the 33 per cent given to them at Calcutta to 25 per 
cent. To Malaviya, as an orthodox Brahmin, the idea of 
making concessions to the Muslims was repugnant. He 
typified the strain in UP Hinduism which resented the 
traditional dominance in that area of the Muslim elite, 
as opposed to the strain in UP Hinduism which shared the 
Persian culture of that elite. Mrs Besant, the Bengali 
Congressmen and Tilak (who joined the deliberations for 
the first time) urged magnanimity upon the UP Hindus. At 
last after four meetings, Jinnah and Wazir Hasan per­
suaded the UP Muslims to accept 30 per cent and the
I. Fazlul Huq probably recognised this before the pour­
parlers were over, see B & 0 Police 1917. par. 142; also
J. H. Broomfield, op. cit., pp. 165-93; see Ch. VIbelow.
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Congress Committee outvoted Malaviya to accept this.^
On the Congress side therefore there were hints of
communal feeling, particularly among the Hindus of the UP
and the Punjab, which threatened the attempts to ally the
two major communities. Por the time being these threats
were checked by the votes of the Congressmen of other
provinces, but should the Hindus in the Punjab and the UP
continue to feel that they had been unfairly dealt with
these threats would re-emerge.
Both Mrs Besant and Tilak had adopted conciliatory
attitudes to the Muslims, but in arguing for an united
front between Hindus and Muslims until self-government
might be won, they hinted that the terms of the Lucknow
Pact were not the final answer. "Once the [sic] Home Rule
was gained", said Mrs Besant, "the minor internal
differences could be easily adjusted", and Tilak echoed
2these words at the Lucknow Congress.
On the Muslim side there were also reservations 
about the Pact in the Punjab and Bengal where Muslims 
had surrendered the majority representation they might
1.  ^ B & 0 Police 1917. par. 14Z; see S. V. Bapat, 
Reminiscences and Anecdotes of Lokamanva Tilak. II,
564-5; S. L. Karandikar, Lokamanva Bal Qangadhar Tilak. pp. 438-9.
2. New India. 28 Dec 1916, p. 9a; Congress 1916, Report,p. 84. ----- ---
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have claimed, in the interests of an overall agreement. 
Furthermore the "nationalist” Muslims who had reached this 
agreement were a minute fragment of the Muslim community, 
and their opponents had shown how easy it was to rouse 
the fears of Muslims and their sense of solidarity 
against Hindu-Muslim unity.
The "nationalist” Muslims, however, buoyed up by 
the prospect of sharing in the leadership of the national 
movement, ignored or discounted these difficulties and 
Jinnah, as President of the 1916 League Session, set the 
seal on the Entente.1 Muslims and Hindus joined hands, 
and British opponents of Indian advance to self- 
government could no longer point to the Muslim League’s 
opposition to the demands of Congress to justify their 
case.
Speaking for both organisations, at the 1916
Congress, Mazharul Haque said:
The time for action has come (Applause). 
Remember, you are demanding Self- 
Government and Home Rule for India. Do 
you for a moment believe that you will 
get it by asking? (Cries of ’no, no’) 
....Machinery [is wanted] which you 
could work up for the attainment of 
Self-Government. We must have a propa­
ganda throughout the Country and let our
1 . see his speech in Saiyid, Jinnah. pp. 872-80.
rulers see for themselves that every 
man...of India is determined to have 
Self-Government.1
But while they had formulated a reform scheme, neither 
Congress nor the Muslim League had created ’’machinery1 
for rousing agitation. Bor this, an auxiliary organisation 
to both was required and Mrs Besant had set up such an 
auxiliary during their pourparlers for rapprochement in 
1916.
1. Congress 1916. Report, p. 85.
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Chapter IV
AGITATION AND ORGANISATION: THE HOME RULE LEAGUES.
The Course of Agitation, January 1916 - June 1917.
While Mrs Besant suspended the formation of her 
HRL at the end of 1915, she did not drop her plans for 
agitation. Pointing to the AICC Resolution authorising 
the PCCs to "carry out educative and propagandist work", 
she persuaded the Madras PCC to arrange a series of lec­
tures, which would be printed as pamphlets."^ She add­
ressed meetings and Conferences and in her Presidential 
address to a District Conference in March, said that "on 
the ground of her white skin she was allowed to say things 
which might be dangerous for Indians to say" but "she was 
not going to modify her language until she was silenced
pby force". Her young admirers, who were dissatisfied 
with the inactivity of Congress, were disappointed with 
the suspension of the HRL and, encouraged by them, Mrs 
Besant established an All-India Propaganda Fund to publish 
pamphlets in English and Indian regional languages.^ The
1. New India. 6 Jan 1916, p. lOd; 10 Jan 1916, p. lOa-b; 1 Feb 191Ö, p. 8d.
2. Home Poll Dep. April 1916, no. 19, “Madras".
3* New India. 4 Jan 1916, p. lOd; 6 Jan 1916, p. lOd;
10 Feb 1916, p. 3b; Bombay Police 1916. pars 255, 529; Jamnadas, "Memoire", p. ijö.
first pamphlet, Why Not Home Rule? in Gujarati by
Yajnik, was produced by her young Bombay supporters and 
other pamphlets followed from the UP, Sind and Madras.1 234
Tilak was not bound by Mrs Besant's decision to 
suspend formation of her League and, in consultation with 
his lieutenants, he established his Indian Home Rule 
League on 28 April 1916. They followed this up with 
speeches demanding swara.i in a number of Maharashtrian 
towns.^ At Tilak*s invitation, Mrs Besant visited Poona, 
where she discussed arrangements for the two Leagues and
5addressed audiences of over 5000.
The launching of Tilak's League and agitation pro­
voked Mrs Besant to renewed activity: just before going to 
Poona she had attended the Madras Provincial Conference, 
where she identified herself with the impetuous young men 
of the province by demanding fully-elected Legislative
1. Bombay Police 1916. pars 519» 779(a), Accompaniment 
C; New India. 4 Sept 1916, pp. 8c, 11.
2. this will be referred to simply as "HRL" except where 
it is necessary to distinguish it from Mrs Besant's League, when it will be referred to as "IHRL"*
3. Mahratta. 7 May 1916, p. 223; see ibid., 26 Dec 1915, 
p. 413; Bombay Police 1916. pars 122, 609.
4. see Bal Gangadhar Tilak: His Writings and Speeches.pp. 104-200.
5« Bombay Police 1916. pars 779(a) and Accompaniment A; 
New India. 23 May 1916, p. 6; Khaparde "Diary" (Bombay),22 May 1916.
Councils as part of the provincial reform scheme, in oppos­
ition to those who proposed that one-fifth of the Councill­
ors should be nominated by the Governor.1 234 As President of 
a District Conference - also in May - she urged the 
delegates to start propaganda organisations throughout the 
district, and on her return to Madras from Poona she 
authorised her supporters to form Home Eule "Groups", 
which were in effect branches of her "suspended" HRL, 
thinly disguised.1 The tone of New India became increas­
ingly shrill, culminating in the justification of the 1916 
Irish rebellion, and in May the Madras Government demanded 
a security of Rs 2000 from Mrs Besant under the Press Act, 
while the Bombay Government book the opportunity to 
extern her from the Bombay Presidency.^"
Moderates joined Extremists throughout India in 
public meetings protesting against this Government re­
pression and newspapers deplored the imposition of the
1. Report of 22nd Madras Provincial Conference held at 
Madura. May 1916, pp. 115» 135-69. 182-99; cf. New India. 
17 May 1916, p. 3; 18 May 1916, p. 5; 19 May 1916, pp. 8a- 
b, 11-12; 20 May 1916, p. 8.
2. New India. 8 May 1916, pp. 5c, 14-15; 15 May 1916, 
p. 12a.
3. ibid., 24 May 1916, p. 11a.
4. section 7(a.) in Region VIII, file 12/2, pp. 41-3 at 
the office of the History of the Freedom Movement, Delhi 
[hereafter HFM Delhi]; New India. 18 Jan 1916, p. 8a-b;
27 May 1916, p. 9b; Home Poll Dep. June 1916, no. 25, 
’Bombay*; ibid., July 1916, no. 25, ’Bombay’.
security. Prom the Press Association, which Mrs Besant 
had helped to form, a deputation of her fellow-editors 
waited on the Viceroy: the deputation included Moderates 
like Banerjea and Malaviya and Extremists like Horniman 
of the Bombay Chronicle and Kasturiranga Iyengar of the 
Hindu.1 Nov/, she claimed, her identity with her fellow- 
Indians had been sealed: ”my Indian colleagues”, she 
wrote, “will never again be able to tell me good-humouredly 
that I am protected by my white skin, for the Colour Bar 
for me is broken and I am treated as Indians are treated
pfor which I thank God”. She did not moderate her tone.
In New India she warned: ”1 fear we are in for an era 
of repression....under bureaucratic Government...there 
is no security for liberty or property”.1 Editorials 
accused the Government of favouring the British community 
and Christian missionaries; denounced the reservation of 
railway compartments for Europeans (whereupon riots 
occurred on Madras stations); and championed Indian stud­
ents, who were ”in the grip of foreigners, who impose
1. Home Poll Dep. July 1916, no. 25» Bombay*; ibid., 
no. 26, ’Bombay1; HPM Delhi, section 7(b), Region VIII, 
file 12/2; New India, e.g. 29 May 1916, p. 5; 30 May 1916, 
p. 4.
2 .
3 .
New India. 5 May 1916, p. 9a-b. 
ibid., 27 May 1916, p. 9.
upon them a crushing curriculum” In August the Govern­
ment forfeited the Rs 2000 security and demanded Rs 10,000. 
Mrs Besant now appealed to the courts, thereby parrying 
further Government action temporarily and, more important, 
gaining much favourable publicity. Public meetings flour­
ished in protest against the forfeiture, as they did again 
in November against her externment from the CP and Berar.^ 
The failure of the Congress (save in Madras) to 
implement its resolution to launch educative propaganda 
gave Mrs Besant the opportunity to found her Home Rule 
for India League (usually known by its later name of All- 
India Home Rule League).^ In mid-1916 her Theosophical 
and Socialist associates in Britain formed an Auxiliary 
HRL, and in India at the same time she appointed her
1. all these editorials reprinted in ibid., 29 Aug 1916, 
p. 4.
2. Home Poll Dep. Sept 1916, no. 18, Madras*; HFM 
Delhit section 7(b), Region VIII, file 12/2, pp. 83ff;
New India. 29 Aug 1916, p. 4.
3. HPM Delhi, section 7(d), Region VIII, file 12/2, 
p. 10a; Home Poll B, Sept 1916, nos 652-6, w.e. 16 Sept 
1916; ibid. Dep. Jan 1917, no. 42, 'CP*; A. Besant, India. 
Bond or Free? A World Problem, pp. 170-3.
4. this will also be referred to simply as ”HRL”, 
except when necessary to distinguish it from Tilak's 
League, when it will be referred to as ”AIHRL”.
5. New India. 2 Aug 1916, p. 5d; Home Poll B, July 1916, 
nos 441-5, w.e. 1, 8 and 29 July 1916.
staunch Theosophical follower, George Arundale,^ as
Organising Secretary pro tem for the establishment of her
HRL. The League was formally inaugurated on 3 September
2with ten branches and 500 members.
In Maharashtra, the Government brought pressure to 
bear upon Tilak to desist from Home Rule agitation: in 
July, bonds of Rs 40,000 were demanded from him on the 
grounds that his speeches were seditious, and local 
officials warned people against supporting his HRL.^
Tilak cautiously stopped delivering speeches and appealed. 
In November the Bombay High Court ruled that the demand 
for swaraj was not seditious.^" Tilak's HRL now embarked 
on a successful recruiting drive: from 1000 in November, 
its membership rose to 3000 in January 1917 and 14,000 in 
April.1 23*5
1. B.A. (Moral Science) 1898 and LL.B. 1899 (Cantab.), 
he arrived in India in 1903 to teach English at the TS 
Central Hindu College, Banaras; became headmaster. Mrs 
Besant recalled him from England 1916 to help her run the 
HRL and edit New India; Later became President of TS.
2. New India. 24 May 1916, p. 11a; 21 June 1916, p. 3d; 
Home Poll B, July 1916, nos 441-5, w.e. 1, 8 and 29 July,
1916, p. 3.
3. HPM Bombay. II, 243; Mahratta. 5 Nov 1916, p. 540.
4* Mahratta, 12 Nov 1916, pp. 559-60.
5. ibid., 5 Nov 1916, p. 540; 4 Feb 1917, p. 58; 20 May
1917, p. 250; Bombay Police 1916. pax. 1480(d); 1917. 
e.g. pars 55(a), 156(d), 182(b) (c), 203(d).
Some Moderates, fearful lest they be overshadowed 
by the Home Rule agitation, set out to match the activ­
ities of the HRLs. Sastri, the President of the Servants 
of India Society, told the members of the Society that 
they could not ignore the "new political spiritM and that 
"if they let slip the opportunity now they would only be 
dragged into the current eventually” While refusing to 
allow its members to join the HRLs, the Society decided 
to support the demand for Home Rule in the name of Con­
gress and its members embarked on speech-making tours and
the publication of pamphlets in the UP, Bombay City and 
2Maharashtra.
The Moderates were drawn into increasingly close 
alliance with the Home Rulers (as the members of the HRLs 
were known) by the Government*s failure to make any 
favourable, public response to the demand for reforms at 
the end of the War. In a despatch to the Secretary of 
State in November 1916, the Covernment of India did 
propose the enunciation of the goal of British policy for 
India, which they expressed as "the endowment of British
1. Yajnik, 1st ed., p. 14.
2. Yajnik, 1943, pp. 16-19; UP Police 1916. e.g. pars 
1424, 2050, 2445, 2613; H. N. Kunzru to Vaze, 12 Apr 1917 
SIS Papers, Poona; Bombay Police 1916. pars 194, 779(c); 
interview with H. N. Kunzru, 27 July 1963.
India as an integral part of the Empire, with self-
government". In pursuit of this goal, they recommended
the expansion of the elected Indian membership of the
Legislative Councils into a majority, and the broadening
of the franchise, but they felt unable to publish these
proposals until the British Government had pronounced
upon them."1 23" Even if they had, few Indians would have
been satisfied, for the despatch explicitly excluded "any
immediate expansion of...the constitutional powers of 
2the Councils". As early as September the unofficial, 
Indian members of the central legislature got word that 
the Viceroy was sending home a "reactionary despatch",^ 
and in October, 19 of them (including Wacha and Bhupen- 
dranath from among the Moderates) produced as a "counter 
blast" a Memorandum proposing that at the end of the War 
the Councils should have a "substantial majority of 
elected representatives" with power to legislate on all 
domestic matters and from whom half of the Executive
1. Government of India to Secretary of State for India, 
24 Nov 1916, pars 1, 10, 30-35, 43» in Home Poll A, Dec 1916, no. 358.
2. ibid., par. 43»
3. V. S. S. Sastri to Hanumanta Bao, 26 Sept 1916, in 
SIS Papers. Madras; cf. Sastri "Diary", 3 Sept to 2 Oct 1916>.
Councils should be elected .^  These sweeping demands
showed the influence of Mrs Besant’s scheme which was
currently under consideration by the Congress and Muslim
League Reforms Committees. The demands were spelt out
in greater detail in the Reforms Scheme accepted by the
Moderates and Extremists of Congress and by the Muslim
2League at Lucknow in December.
The Lucknow Congress called on the HRLs to continue 
their agitation but the Moderates opposed the Home Rule 
leaders’ suggestion that Congress should itself undertake 
agitation. The Moderates also resisted Mrs Besant’s 
attempt to commit Congress to the goal of Home Rule 
(pointing out that this was inconsistent with the Congress- 
League Scheme, which demanded less than complete internal 
self-government) and, rather than clash openly with the 
Moderates, Tilak and Mrs Besant acceded to their wishes.^
After the Lucknow Congress, the Home Rule agitation 
was carried on with renewed vigour, with both Tilak and 
Mrs Besant making triumphal tours, addressing meetings
1. India’s Claim for Home Rule, Appendix E, pp. 491-3*
2. ibid., Appendices C, D, pp. 476-85; ef. B & 0 Police. 
1917. pars 142, 143*
3* Bombay Police 1917. par.21(b).
through northern, east and central India.^ They seized 
upon issues which appealed to all shades of Indian 
political opinion, such as the indenturing of Indian 
labour for overseas. In February the Governments of 
the Punjab and Delhi forbade Tilak and B. C. Pal to enter 
their provinces, and this set off another series of 
protest meetings.^ The demand for self-government was 
stimulated by events outside India, notably the March 
Revolution in Russia, and President Wilson*s message to 
Congress justifying the entry of the USA into the World 
War on the grounds of defending the liberties of small 
nations.^
Seeing that the agitation was discrediting them and 
raising hopes v/hich were bound to be disappointed, the 
provincial Governments asked the Government of India to
1. see e.g. Home Poll A, Mar 1918, no. 247, p. 34;
New India. 6 Jan 1917, p. 6b; 8 Jan 1917, p. 6c; 10 Jan 
1917, p. 5a; Khaparde ‘’Diary** (Poona), 1 Jan to 9 Feb 
1917; Bombay Police 1917. pars 109(f) (h), 133(d), 156(d) 
(e) (fT
2. V. S. S. Sastri to Hanumantrao, 26 Sept 1916, SIS 
Papers. Madras; Yajnik, 1st ed., pp. 18-19; New India.
17 Jan 1917, p. 6; Bombay Presidency Association, Council 
Minutes. 25 Jan 1917; Home Poll B, Feb 1917, nos 552-5, 
w.e. 17 Feb 1917.
3. Home Poll B, Feb 1917, nos 552-5, w.e. 17 Feb 1917; 
Dep. Mar 1917, no. 33 *Bombay*; Bengal NP. pp. 64, 302,339
4. see Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 19 Mar 1917, and Sir J 
Meston to Chelmsford, 7 July 1917, in Home Poll A, July 
1917, nos 299-313; The Indian Demands, p. 31; Home Poll 
Dep. Apr 1917, no. £l, passim; ibid. May 1917, no. 70, 
'Bombay'.
provide
some guidance as to what their attitude 
should be towards a movement which they 
know is exciting sedition among the young, 
undermining the influence of moderate men, 
and steadily creating an atmosphere of hatred.i
In its reply of 20 March, the central Government urged
the provincial Governments to "point out to all Indians
who are likely to listen to reason that any thought of
early Home Rule should be put entirely out of mind", and
authorised them to prohibit students from attending HRL
meetings and to curb the leaders by use of the Defence
pof India Act. Bombay, Madras and OP banned under­
'sgraduates from meetings forthwith, and in April and May 
the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the Governors 
of Bombay and Madras publicly deplored the Home Rule 
agitation in terms which suggested that they might prohibit 
it.^ Mrs Besant’s lieutenants responded with talk of
1. R. H. Craddock, Minute, 17 Jan 1917, Home Poll A, July 
1917, nos 299-313.
2. Government of India to all Local Governments and 
Administrations 20 Mar 1917, in ibid.
3. Home Poll A, Mar 1918, no. 247, p. 35; B, May 1917, 
nos 445-48, w.e. 19 May 1917; Dep. June 1917, no. 68, 
’Madras’.
4. ibid. B, April 1917, nos 700-2, w.e. 7 Apr 1917;
Dep. May 1917, no. 70, ’Punjab*; quoted by M. Nehru, 
Presidential Address to the Special Provincial Congress, 
Lucknow. 10 August 1917. p. 17.
passively resisting any attempts to proscribe the 
agitation, which Mrs Besant echoed in New India«1 23where­
upon the Government of Madras interned her and Arundale 
at a Madras hill-station.
This was the signal for a nation-wide outcry:
prominent men, including Moderates, who had held aloof
from Mrs Besant’s HRL now joined it, and its membership
2more than doubled. Of those Moderates who did not 
become members of the League, Banerjea, Sastri and Wacha 
joined with the more impetuous in denouncing the intern­
ments.-^
The internments did not crush the agitation, as the 
Governments hoped - quite the reverse. Mrs Besant's 
young lieutenants in Bombay set out to rouse the Gujarat 
towns and mofussil. while in Madras Arundale's place as 
Organising Secretary of the HRL was taken by a member of
1. see New India. 4 June 1917» p. 8a-c; J. Lwarkadas to 
A. Besant, 27 Feb 1919, Advar Archives.
2. HRL (Bombay Branch): Report for the Year ended 30 
June 1917. p. 1; Hindu. 20 June 1917, P« 4; 2.6 June 1917, 
p. 5; Mahratta. 12 Aug 1917, p. 382; 26 Aug 1917, p. 403; 
Jamnadas, "Memoire", pp. 281-3« Those who joined the HRL 
included Jinnah, H. A. Wadia (a leading Bombay Moderate), 
Motilal Nehru, T. B. Sapru, G. Y. Chintamani, M. R. 
Jayakar, B. G. Horniman.
3. Home Poll Lep. Aug 1917, no. 3, 'Bihar and Orissa'; 
Hindu, 20 June 1917, p. 5; Bombay Presidency Association, 
Council Minutes. 23 June 1917«
the Viceroy’s Legislative Council1 23and the empty editorial
chairs at the New India office were filled by Kelkar,
2Horniman and others.
II
Home Rule Leagues: Organisation
Tilak confined the operations of his HRL to the 
Maharashtrian and Karnatak areas of the Bombay Presidency, 
CP and Berar, where he had an assured following. His 
League pre-empted these areas as his field of operations, 
leaving the rest of India to Annie Besant, as had been 
agreed between them in the previous year.1
At the inaugural meeting of the IHRL, Tilak and his 
ten lieutenants who decided to establish it appointed 
themselves and six others as its executive Central 
Committee.^
1. K. V. Rangaswami Ayyangar.
2. A. Besant, ”Internment Diary”, p. 14, Advar Archives.
3. Jamnadas, ’’Memoire”, p. 133; see Ch. II, p.130 above.
4* Mahratta. 30 Apr 1916, p. 216; 7 May 1916, p. 223*
Those comprising the Committee which set up the IHRL were 
Khaparde, Tilak and Baptista (from Bombay), Dr B. S. Moonje 
(Nagpur), M. S. Aney (Yeotmal), R. P. Karandikar (Satara), 
C. B. Phansalkar (Satara), S. K. Altekar (Karad), C. M. 
Desai (Bombay),D. V. Belvi (Belgaum), and Kelkar; those 
added to form the Central Committee were Dr D. D. Sathaye 
(Bombay), Dr R. G-. Vaze, C. V. Vaidya (Kalyan), V. R. 
Patwardhan (Poona), N. R. Alekar (Nagpur), and V. R. Lele 
(Sholapur).
At the first annual Conference of its members in 
April 1917 a more ’'democratic” Constitution was adopted 
providing for plebiscitory approval of office bearers by 
the Conference: needless to say, the "slate" put forward 
by Tilak's lieutenants was approved.^ Thereafter these 
office bearers formed the League's Executive Committee by 
co-opting a representative from each of the League's six 
branches. Tilak carefully ensured that each major town 
and area covered by the League had representatives on
pthese committees, thus avoiding jealousies. The day-to- 
day working of the IHRL was supervised from the office of 
Tilak's newspaper, Kesari, in Poona, by Tilak and Kelkar 
with the help of the League's Executive Assistant, a young 
Chitpavan Brahmin, D. V. Gokhale. Early in 1917 the area 
of the League’s operations was divided into six branches - 
Central Maharashtra, Berar (two branches), CP, the Karnatak 
and Bombay City - and branch offices were set up in the 
principal city in each, to organise the work throughout 
the branch.^ This was done as part of the drive to
1. Mahratta, 20 May 1917, p. 239; 27 May 1917, p. 255;S. M. Paranjpe was included in the "slate" as a Treasurer.
2. Mahratta, 4 Peb 1917, p. 58; 11 Feb 1917, p. 69; see n. 4, p.182above.
3. Mahratta. 4 Feb 1917, p . 58; 11 Feb 1917, p. 69.
increase membership following the successful outcome of 
Tilak's appeal to the High Court in November 1916. Prom 
1000 in that month, membership rose to 14,000 in April 
1917, and to 32,000 early in 1918.1 This result was 
achieved by dropping the entry fee of Rs 2 which each 
member had paid hitherto (though the annual subscription 
of Re 1 was retained), by setting up recruiting centres 
in the offices of professional men among Tilak’s support­
ers and by recruiting tours on the part of Tilak’s 
2followers.
As in his earlier activities, Tilak’s most active 
co-workers were Maharashtrian Brahmins, mainly professional 
men in the cities and towns, where they were well-situated 
for influencing their fellow-Brahmins and members of other 
communities by personal contact or public meetings. They 
made determined efforts, with some success, to enlist the 
support of the moneylending and trading communities - 
flattering Marwaris, for instance, by appointing them to
1. Uahratta. 5 Nov 1916, p. 540; 20 May 1917, pp. 238, 
240; 10 Mar 1918, p. 111. In August 1917, 20,635 members 
were claimed, see Kesari. 4 Sept 1917 in Bombay Police 
1917. par. 949(m).
2. Mahratta, 3 Dec 1916, p. 588; 20 May 1917? p. 240; Bombay Police I0 , 7,  1916. pars 954(b), 1903(d), 1480(d);yrriogd), 182(b) (C), 203(d), 225(c),1917, pars 55(a.. .... .......251(a) (d), 227(b), 300(f) (g), 320(b).
official positions at Conferences.1 234 But, despite their 
claims that a quarter of members of the IHRL were agri­
culturists, they had little success in winning support
2from landed groups.
The Council of Mrs Besant’s HRL consisted initially 
of seven office bearers of the League elected in September 
1916 for three years by the 34 ’’founding branches”. As 
in the case of the Maharashtrian League, the names put 
forward by Mrs Besant were returned unopposed, Mrs Besant 
being confirmed as President, Arundale as Organising 
Secretary and C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar as one of the General 
Secretaries.1 The Council held few official meetings, 
the League’s business being conducted informally from 
Mrs Besant’s Adyar headquarters by Arundale, B. P. Wadia,^ 
Ramaswami Aiyar and Mrs Besant herself. Any three persons 
might form a branch, so that each branch of Mrs Besant’s 
HRL was formed for a town or a village rather than a region.
1. Bombay Police 1916. par. 758; 1917. pars 55, 81(b), 
109(ö), 225(c), 351(g), 731(g); Mahratta. 4 June 1916, 
p.273.
2. ibid.; Mahratta. 20 May 1917, p. 240.
3. B. P. Y/adia was confirmed as Treasurer; P. K. Telang 
and A. Rasul as General Secretaries for Bombay and Bengal 
respectively; Gokaran Nath Misra was added later as General 
Secretary for the UP; Wadia and Ratansi Morarji were 
elected as Provincial Secretaries. All except ’C.P.* and 
Rasul were stalwart Theosophists. New India. 29 Aug 1916, 
p. 3d; 4 Sept 1916, p. 11; HRL Council Minutes. 8 Oct 1916.
4. member of wealthy Bombay Parsee family; managed the 
Theosophical Publishing House and New India, which he helped to edit.
The branches were arranged into provinces by linguistic 
areas, each with a Provincial Secretary.
No uniform pattern of organisation was laid down for 
the branches; indeed, in view of the variation in their 
size - between three and 2600 members - it would have been 
difficult to do so. Mrs Besant merely suggested that each 
branch should elect a secretary, who would devote himself 
to arranging the propaganda activities of the branch, 
and that each other member should undertake to assist in 
at least one of these activities.1
The constitutional links between the headquarters 
of the League and its branches were most tenuous: the 
Organising Secretary simply sanctioned the formation of 
branches, which remitted an entry fee of one Rupee from 
each member to the HR1 Council. Mrs Besant’s links with 
the branches were maintained by informal contact with 
individuals who were active in each branch or who, as in 
the case of the Provincial Secretaries and the leading 
members of the Bombay branch, were in touch with a number 
of branches. Instructions were transmitted through these 
informal channels, or through New India, in which Arundale 
edited a page of Home Rule news and advice from the
1. see New India. 5 July 1916, p. 8c-d; 25 Sept 1916, p. 3e-d.
beginning of 1916.
The membership of Mrs Besant*s HRL grew more slowly 
than Tilak's until her internment: from 7000 in March 
1917, it rose to 27,000 in December.^ Unlike the IHRL 
which opened its membership to those over 21, Mrs 
Besant’s League was open to anyone over 18, except under­
graduates. Undergraduates might attend meetings as
2•’Associates*' but could not vote - an insignificant 
limitation on their participation.
In the formation of the AIHRL and its branches Mrs 
Besant drew on the personal loyalty of Theosophists 
towards herself. Some Theosophists objected to her 
mixing of politics with Theosophy but the more ardent 
believed that in launching the HRL she was carrying out 
the behests of those who control the affairs of the 
world. Of course, the HRL was supported by many who were 
not Theosophists: by December 1917 the League1 23s membership 
was five times that of the Indian Section of the
1. New India. 31 Mar 1917, p. 5c; "Addresses Presented 
in India to his Excellency the Viceroy and the Rt. Hon. 
the Secretary of State for India", Commons Papers, 1918, 
XVIII, Cd. 9178, p. 17.
2. Mahratta. 27 May 1917, p. 255; New India. 4 Sept 1916p. 12b.
3. interview with Ramchandra Shukla, 8 Aug 1963; New 
India. 19 Aug 1916, p. 8a-b; 16 Sept 1916, p. 11c; A. 
Besant in Theosophist. Nov 1916, quoted in Home Poll B,
Apr 1917, nos 700-2, p. 8.
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Theosophical Society.1 23 But Theosophists often provided 
the initial impetus for the formation of HRL branches and 
the strength of the League, area by area, generally 
reflected the local strength of the Theosophical Society. 
The Society, for example, had more members and a more
2elaborate network of "lodges'* in the Madras Presidency 
than elsewhere in India (largely, one suspects, because 
the south had not experienced a revival of Hinduism when 
the Theosophical Society began its work there, unlike, say, 
Bengal) and this was reflected in the AIHRL. After Mrs 
Besant's internment, the League had 132 branches in the 
Madras Presidency, which was more than all those in the 
rest of India.1 And in this area the Theosophical officers
1. TS Indian membership (including Ceylon and Persian 
Grulf) in 1917: 5649. TS, Indian Section, Annual Report, 
1917, in Proceedings.
2. which embraced the Tamil-speaking area, Telugu- 
speaking Andhra, Malayalam-speaking Malabar and parts of 
the Kannada-speaking area.
3. New India. 11 Sept 1917, p. 3; the figures for Madras
were: G>3 in Tamil-, 48 in Telugu-, 12 in Kannada-speaking
areas, 9 in Malabar; I estimate the numbers of other 
branches of Mrs Besant's HRL as 6 in Sind, 25 in Grujarat, 
20 in the rest of Bombay and CP, 8 in the UP, 8 in Bihar,
3 in Punjab, 1 in Delhi, 1 in Bengal; total 204. Over 
40$ of Indian TS members were residents of Madras Presid­
ency, 20$ of Bombay Presidency and 7$ each of the UP and 
Bengal; over 56$ of the TS lodges were in the Madras 
Presidency and there was hardly a township without its 
handful of Theosophists: TS, Indian Section, Annual
Report, 1913» in Proceedings; cf. Annual Report, 1914.
of the HRL were legion: Manjeri Rainier, for example, was 
an office bearer in the Calicut Theosophical Lodge and 
President of the Malabar HRL and there were similar dup­
lications of function at Vijayawada (Bezwada) in Andhra 
and at Madura and Tiruchchirappalli (Trichy) in Tamilnad.1
The number of branches was not an entirely adequate 
indication of the strength of the HRL, however. While 
some of the Madras branches were quite small or relatively 
inactive, the Bombay City branch had over 2600 members by 
September 1917. Here again the League reflected the 
strength of the Theosophical Society for, in addition to 
Jamnadas Dwarkadas, its officers included Theosophists like 
P. K. Telang (who edited Young India from November 1916) 
and the young businessman, Ratansi Morarji. Although there 
were only eight branches in the UP, the four in the main 
cities were very active in the mofussil as well as in the 
cities themselves, and in these leading roles were played 
by Theosophists of Lucknow and the staffs of the Theosoph­
ical Colleges at Banaras, Kanpur and Allahabad. Similarly 
in Delhi the initial impetus for the foundation of a 
branch of the HRL came from the headmistress of the
1. see file A 31/2, HFM Delhi: A. R. Ayar to A. Besant,
18 Dec 1915, Advar Archives: Home Poll Dep. Oct 1916, no. 
28, »Madras'; Dep. Nov 1916, no. 50, »Madras'; New India 4 Oct 1916, p. 6; 8 Nov 1916, p. 11.
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Theosophical Girls * College.^
There were considerable regional variations in the 
strength of the Home Rule movement. In Punjab, for 
instances, branches of the HRL and Home Rule agitation 
were almost entirely lacking. This was due largely to 
the continuation of Government repression from the 1908- 
1914 period, reinforced by application of the Defence of 
India Act to threaten politicians with internment. In 
addition, the strength of the Arya Samaj had inhibited the 
spread of Theosophy in the province, and there were thus 
few followers on whom Mrs Besant might call to build a 
political organisation.
The relative meagreness of the response in Bengal 
may again be traced in part to the weakness of the Theos­
ophical Society in that province. Besides, Congress 
politics in Bengal were still dominated by Surendranath 
and the Moderates (who had withdrawn their early support 
for the HRL) and the Extremists were still disorganised 
as the result of their period in the wilderness since 
1907; it was only with the emergence of C. R. Das later 
in 1917 that the Extremists and young Congressmen organised 
to challenge the Moderates. Furthermore many of the young
1. Home Poll Dep. Mar 1917» no. 33» *Delhi*; Dep. April 
1917, no. 70, ’Delhi’; Dep. July 1917, no. 35, ’Delhi';
Hew India. 17 Mar 1917, p. 9a.
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members of the Bengali bhadralok, whose patriotism had 
been aroused, had been drawn into the terrorist movement
between 1908 and 1915, and the Government had employed 
the Defence of India Act to intern 2000 terrorists 
suspects thus depriving the Home Rule movement of many 
of those who might have joined it.1 2 Such Home Rule 
activity as there was in Bengal may, however, be traced 
to Theosophists. The Bengal Extremists, following Tilak’s 
lead, first proposed to set up their own HRL organisation, 
but Hirendranath Datta, a Theosophist who had been prom­
inent in the Partition agitation, gathered a number of 
young Calcutta men around him and formed a branch of Mrs 
Besant’s League. This was joined by the leading Extremists
pafter Mrs Besant’s internment.
The greatest strength of Mrs Besant’s HRL lay in 
the south, in Bombay and Gujarat, in Sind and in the UP.
In Madras, Theosophy had renewed the Hindu faith of 
Western-educated men, mainly Brahmins, and it was these 
men who predominated in the HRL. In Andhra the Telugu 
Brahmins also saw in the HRL a vehicle for their agitation
1. see Home Poll B, Jan 1918, nos 487-90, p. 10.
2. see Bombay Police 1916. par. 122; New India. 21 Dec 
1916, p. 3b; Home Poll Dep. Sept 1917, no. 6, p. 8.
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in favour of a separate province, in which they hoped to 
replace the Tamil Brahmins who had received a head-start 
in education under the British and had acquired a 
dominant place in administration and the professions 
throughout the Presidency
Mrs Besant’s supporters in Bombay City were drawn 
from the business community, as well as the professional 
groups, and particularly from those who had uprooted 
themselves from their native Gujarat to seek their fortune 
in the capital of the Presidency. Most prominent among 
the Bombay Theosophists (and, in turn, in the HRL there) 
were the members of the Bhatia and other Gujarati trading 
castes, who were engaged in the cotton, and ancillary, 
industries. Young Bhatias formed the nucleus of the 
Bombay HRL and through their business and social contacts 
drew other industrial and professional men in the city 
into it, as well as enlisting workers from the cloth mills 
and markets for their meetings and demonstrations. They 
were active not only in the city but also in Gujarat, 
which they visited repeatedly from the time of Mrs 
Besan^s internment, encouraging the formation of branches 
and addressing meetings in towns and villages. Here they
1. see HRL Council Minutes, 8 Oct 1916.
won support for the League from their fellow-members of 
the trading castes and from professional and administrative 
men drawn from both. Brahmin and from rising, wealthy 
peasant groups.'*'
In Sind the Theosophical Society, and with it the
HRL, attracted the support of the Western-educated Hindu
group which dominated the professions and administration,
in this case the Amils. The Amils v/ere a minority among
the Hindu community, which was in turn outnumbered five
times by the Muslim population. A handful of "nationalist"
Muslims joined the Home Rule movement but most of the
Muslims of Sind were peasants who, under the guidance of
their landlords and their pirs (religious leaders),
2refused to have anything to do with the movement.
In the UP and Bihar members of the HRL came from 
the same groups that already dominated Congress and the 
Muslim League in this area, the Western-educated pro­
fessional elite. At first, it was mainly the "nationalist" 
Muslims and the younger and more impetuous Congressmen
1. see Bombay Police 1916, pars 1093(e). 1491(b), 1480(b) 
1516(a); 1917/pars 841(f) (g) (h) (j) (o;, 859(e) (k), 
899(r) (s)(u; (v) (y), 970(f) (j); Census of India, 1911, 
VII Part I, 240, 280, 307.
2. see Home Poll B, May 1917, nos 445-8, p. 5; Bombay 
Police 1917. e.g. pars 513(a), 815(d), 841(e), 859(a); cf. par. 841(b).
who joined the HRL.1 Under the influence of Malaviya, 
the older Congressmen, like Motilal Nehru, supported the 
Home Rule agitation but held aloof from the League itself, 
and joined it only after Mrs Besant's internment.
Ill
The Aims and Methods of Agitation.
Mrs Besant's inspiration in launching her Home Rule 
agitation came from the Whig and Radical tradition of 
agitation in British politics, and from her own English 
political experience in the 1870s and '80s in the company 
of Charles Bradlaugh and the Fabians. In the manner of 
the organisers of the anti-Slavery agitation of the 
1820s and the anti-Corn Law agitation of the 1830s and 
'40s, she relied on public meetings, newspapers and pam­
phlets to awaken the public conscience. First, she 
believed, it was necessary to educate Indians, both those 
who were Western-educated and the “masses" who only spoke 
the vernaculars: to shake their dependence on the Govern­
ment, by convincing them that India's poverty was due to 
the Government's economic policy; and to rouse their
1 . see UP Police 1916. pars 1653, 1933, 2195, 2516.
"pride in the Motherland" and increase their self- 
confidence, by convincing them of India's greatness prior 
to the arrival of the British.1 2 This, she wrote, would 
"lay a solid foundation for our propagandists", who would 
then go on to raise a wave of criticism against the 
Government. She probably did not set out deliberately 
to provoke Government repression, but criticism of the 
Government had its ov/n momentum and her tone became in­
creasingly defiant. When the Government tried to silence 
her by applying its repressive legislation she again 
turned to her English experience and appealed to the 
courts. She later acknowledged her debt to Bradlaugh in 
this regard. His advice had been: "In fighting a bad law 
never give way, but utilise every opportunity of delay 
which the law gives you. For time is on the side of a 
just agitation and stirs up the people".1
Such agitation would, she believed, bring the 
question of Home Rule "to the front", that is to the 
attention of the British, so that it would "enter the
1. A. Besant, article in Young India, reprinted in New 
India, 10 Jan 1916, p. 3; cf. A. Besant, India: A Nation 
[first published Nov 1915], pp. 13-19.
2. ibid.
3* Besant, Bond or Free?, p. 171.
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sphere of practical politics'*. ^ The sound and fury of 
the agitation would move liberal-minded men in the admin­
istration, like Lord Hardinge the Viceroy, to recommend the
2Home Government to grant reform; and it would echo to 
England, where it would stir the conscience of the elec­
torate and persuade the Government to grant India's 
demands.^ "British politicians", she wrote, "...judge 
the value of claims by the energy of those who put them 
forward".^
In joining Mrs Besant, Tilak was probably less 
optimistic than she about the possibility of moving the 
British to grant self-government by a press and platform 
agitation: certainly he was less optimistic about the time 
it might take to do so. Soon after the foundation of his 
HRL he said: "The petition [for Home Rule] is to be made 
to the English Parliament....If you carry on such an 
effort for 5 or 25 years, you will never fail to obtain 
its fruit". In his outburst at the end of 1914 he had
1. see her article on "Federation", in Birth, pp. 70-1, quoted in Gh. II, p. 90 above.
2. for her view of Hardinge, see New India. 9 Oct 1915, 
p. 10a; for her view of Lord Carmichael, then Governor of 
Bengal, see ibid., 18 Oct 1915, p. 9b-d.
3. see G. P. Ramaswami Aiyar "Foreword" in A. Besant, India: A Nation, p. iii.
4. New India. 10 July 1915, p. 10b.
5. "Home Rule Speech at Belgaum", 1 May 1916, in Tilak, Writings & Speeches, pp. 135-6.
spoken of using "methods of obstruction" similar to those 
employed by the Irish but he had no alternative programme 
to the agitation marked out by Mrs Besant. His contrib­
ution to the national movement in this period was thus 
subsidiary to Mrs Besant’s.
Tilak grasped at agitation as providing a programme 
which would satisfy the temper of his more fiery lieuten­
ants and, as he said, the "desire for display" of the 
minor members. Here he resembled Mrs Besant who believed 
that through agitation she could satisfy the younger 
generation, whom she feared might otherwise turn to 
terrorism or to passive resistance.
The function of the HRLs was to contribute to the 
rousing of this agitation in India, and to provide it 
with a sounding-board in Britain. Mrs Besant and Tilak 
did not rely entirely on the Leagues, for they had their 
newspapers and Mrs Besant had helped to form a Press 
Association to encourage other newspapers to co-ordinate 
their editorial policy with hers.1 Also, through their 
court actions they won attention in the press and con­
tributed to the rousing of agination. The HRLs were only 
a part, therefore, of Mrs Besant's and Tilak*s arsenal,
1. for her attempt to co-ordinate New India. Hindu. 
Swadeshamitran. Andhra Patrika. see e.g. New India. 22 Jan 1916, p. 11a. ---------
; li/8
though an extremely important part.
The closest precedent for the organisation and 
methods of the HRLs is probably in the British Anti- 
Slavery Society of 1823* This Society roused public opin­
ion through public meetings held by its branches, through 
the personal contacts of its members and through the 
newspapers and pamphlets which it published.^" The HRLs' 
namesake in Ireland, on the other hand, provided a sorry 
example of disorganisation and failure while, of other 
models, the Home Rule Confederation of Great Britain and
the Anti-Corn Law League were well-organised electoral
2machines as well as agitational bodies.
Mrs Besant and Tilak never seriously tried to make 
their HRLs machines for the election of members to the 
House of Commons or to the Indian legislatures. True, 
they had little opportunity to influence elections during 
this period. In Britain elections were not held until 
after the War, while in India elections to the Legislative 
Councils were so indirect as to be difficult to influence 
from outside the electoral bodies themselves. But again,
1. R. Coupland, The British Anti-Slavery Movement, pp. 
120-2, 134-40.
2. see C. C. O’Brien, Parnell and His Party, 1889-90» 
pp. 122-5; N. McCord, The Anti-Corn Law League, no. 163- 
203.
Mrs Besant was influenced by her British experience. 
Although she had helped Bradlaugh in his electioneering, 
her experience was that of a public orator and propagandist 
rather than a member of a party organised as an electoral 
machine.
Only in one regard did Tilak and Mrs Besant attempt 
to use the HRLs as other than agitational bodies. At the 
time of the annual Congress sessions, they used them to 
bring a majority of delegates to the session committed to 
support the demand for Home Rule, in an effort to gain 
control of Congress and to link its functions with those 
of the HRLs.
In rousing agitation, Arundale, as Organising 
Secretary of the AIHRL, first concentrated on what Mrs 
Besant had called its "educative" aspect. After her 
decision to found the League in the middle of 1916, he 
advised the branches through his Home Rule page in Hew 
India on the sort of activities they should undertake.
Their members, he said, should argue the case for Home 
Rule with their friends, and urge them to join the League; 
they should collect political facts and opinions and dis­
cuss them regularly; set up classes to lecture to students 
on political matters; establish a library, containing 
printed speeches of Indian nationalists, newspapers and
2üG
works by J. S. Mill, Seeley - and, of course, Mrs 
Besant. Also they should circulate Home Rule pamphlets; 
undertake constructive work in their local area; partic­
ipate in local councils; collect funds; and give public 
lectures and hold meetings.^
Of the 200-odd branches of the AIHRL, some doubtless
existed in little more than name, while others were
2active but fitfully. But most did carry out a number of 
the functions suggested by Arundale. Some held regular 
discussion groups for their members and for students, 
notably in larger cities like Karachi, Bombay and Madras, 
but also in smaller places. These groups discussed such 
problems as those of Indian Finance or Local Self- 
Government - or even discussed Tagore*s poetry - but the 
desirability of Home Rule formed the basis of each 
discussion. Libraries were established by branches in 
larger towns, and even those in quite small places (in 
the Madras mofussil. for instance) subscribed to the
1. New India. 7 July 1916, p. 3b-d; 5 Sept 1916, p. 8;
25 Sept 1916, p. 3
2. see e.g. New India. 15 Jan 1917, p. 12b; 26 Feb 1917,
p. 3.
3. see ibid., 10 Oct 1916, p. 12; 17 Oct 1916, p. 13; 4 
Nov 1916, p. 13; 9 Nov 1916, p. 8d; Bombay Police 1917. pars 
351(c), 841(g); HRL Bombay 1917 Report, p. 6; interview with I. N. Gurtu, 7 Aug 1963.

201
current nationalist newspapers (and, for contrast, one or 
two of those produced for the British community in India, 
which deplored the Home Rule movement), and provided a 
place, perhaps in a member’s home, for members to read 
and discuss them.1 234 As for Home Rule literature, when 
her HRL was founded Mrs Besant’s Propaganda Fund had 
already sold over 300,000 copies of 26 pamphlets in 
English, which discussed the machinery of government in 
India and the arguments for self-government. Some of 
these reproduced the speeches of prominent Congressmen, 
but more often they comprised speeches or essays by Mrs 
Besant or her young followers. Branches now republished 
these, and published new pamphlets in the Indian 
languages1 and (in the larger towns) opened bookshops for 
their sale.^
1. e.g. there were libraries at Bombay, Hyderabad (Sind), 
Karachi, Allahabad, Sitapur (UP), Madras, Tiruchchirapp- 
alli, see New India. 3 Nov 1916, p. 3b-d; 9 Nov 1916, p.
8d; 18 Nov 1916, p. 4; 29 Nov 1916, p. 3d; Home Poll Dep. 
Mar 1917, no. 32 and KW; reading rooms at Negapatam, 
Kumbakhonam, Banaras, New India, 10 Oct 1916, p. 12c; 23 Oct 1916, p. 3.
2. see e.g. the ’New India” Political Pamphlet Series; 
Bombay Police 1916. par. 779, Accompaniment G.
3. e.g. in Malayalam, Tamil and Telugu, see New India.
28 Aug 1916, p. 8d; 12 Oct 1916, p. 12; 11 Nov 1916, p. 5c; 
in Sindi, Home Poll B, July 1917, nos 426-30, p. 25; in 
Marathi, Gujarati and Hindi, see HRL Bombay 1917 Report.pp. 1-2.
4. e.g. Karachi, Madras and mofussil towns: New India,
28 Aug 1916, p. 9a; 17 Jan 1917, p. 12a; Bombay Police 1917 par. 603(e).
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Few of the branches took up constructive work or
local political matters. Several did set up schools for
children of the depressed classes, while in industrial
centres two night-schools were established for coolies.^
And at Kancheepuram, for example, the League took up the
grievances of the local potters and urged the removal of
2an unpopular official. But few branches were active on 
such local questions and none (as far as can be told) 
sought to influence candidates for election to local 
bodies until January 1919 when the Bombay branches con­
tested the municipal elections.*^
The League's activities were almost entirely directed 
at Indians who were Western-educated or literate in 
Indian languages, and many of the speeches delivered by 
members of the League reached the same audience. Although 
the meetings at which these speeches were given were 
described as "public", they were often held in a Theosoph- 
ical Hall or a large private home, where the uneducated 
members of society would not penetrate.^ In the UP, for
1. New India. 17 Oct 1916, p. 3; 16 Jan 1917, p. 9c.
2. ibid., 14 Nov 1916, p. 3b; 24 Nov 1916, p. 3b.
3. Jayakar, I, 260; Home Poll Dep. Feb 1919, no. 42, 'Bombay', par. 1.
4. e.g. Bombay Police 1917. pars 251(c), 70l(p) (r);New India. 16 Sent 1916. n.lib.
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example, Home Rule speakers from the branches in the 
cities undertook speech-making tours into the surrounding 
districts. They went by train, stopping off at each town of 
any size along the way; on arrival they addressed the 
members of the bar library, who would have arranged a pub­
lic meeting. Such meetings were attended by professional 
people, students, and by a few business people.1 2 The 
speakers’ arguments (which were usually put in Hindi) 
appealed to an educated audience, and followed those 
which had been put forward by Mrs Besant and incorporated 
in pamphlets like Yajnik’s Why Not Home Rule?. They 
outlined European movements for national independence, 
extolled the glories of India in pre-British times and 
contrasted these with her current poverty and degradation.
If [they said] peace and tranquillity have 
been established, economical prosperity and 
the glory of manhood have departed....[the 
Government] has taken away our arms....such 
severe restraints are placed upon the tongue 
and pen of the people,...that the entire 
Government assumes the shape of an obstacle 
to the development of the life of the Indians 
....prosperity and happiness will again spread 
in the country only by our getting Swara.iva 
similar to that of the colonies of the British Empire.2
1. this is based on interviews with Harkaran Nath Misra,
5 Aug 1963, R. Shukla, 8 Aug 1963; UP Police 1916. pars 
2046, 2047, 2130, 2194, 2273.
2. Yajnik, Why Bo We Want Swara.jya? in Bombay Police 1916, 
par. 779j Accompaniment C; cf. speeches at Allahabad by 
Samiullah Beg, Gokaran Nath Misra, UP Police 1916. par.
2515.
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Many of the speeches were on sober subjects, such as 
education or finance, which lent themselves to less 
emotional treatment than this.1 234 The audiences numbered 
20 to 60 in smaller places and two to five hundred in the 
cities.^
While the HRL branches were envisaged by Mrs Besant 
as loudspeakers carrying the agitation out into the towns 
and countryside, they were also to act as sounding boards 
to send the agitation echoing back to Britain. In 
November 1916, for example, Arundale urged the branches to 
hold public meetings in protest at Mrs Besant*s extern- 
ment from CP and to send resolutions to the Viceroy and 
the Secretary of State. Most branches appear to have 
complied,1 and to have held similar meetings on Tilak's 
externment from the Punjab in February 1917 and, a fortiori, 
on Mrs Besant*s internment in June.^ These protest 
meetings, like those protesting at the indenturing of 
Indian labourers for overseas, were held in large meeting
1. see e.g. C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar on **Indian FinanceM,
New India. 1 Feb 1916, p. 8d; cf. ibid., 21 Oct 1916, p.l5a.
2. see ibid., 12 Oct 1916, p. 3c; HRL Bombay 1917 Report 
P* 5
3. New India. 10 Nov 1916, p. 3; and e.g. 16 Nov 1916, 
p. 3; 21 Nov 1916, p. 3; 4 Bee 1916, p. 3c; 21 Bee 1916, 
p. 3b.
4. see e.g. Hindu. 19 June 1917, p. 5; 20 June 1917, p. 5; 
21 June 1917, p. 5; 22 June 1917, p. 5; Bombay Police 1917. par. 701.
places and attracted larger audiences than had attended
the rather more 'EducativeM lectures. In Bombay, for
instance, the Home Rulers commandeered a large open
space known as Shantaram's Chawl, near the area inhabited
by millworkers and Maharashtrian government-employees,
for meetings attended by ten to twelve thousand.^- On
their tours into Gujarat after Mrs Besant's internment,
Jamnadas Dwarkadas and his fellow Home Rulers from Bombay
addressed audiences composed of peasant-proprietors, as
2well as merchants and professional men, and in the UP 
the Home Rule movement encouraged the members of the 
Servants of India Society to go into the villages where 
they told audiences including cultivators, that under 
Home Rule the Government would tackle the questions of 
high land rents and rural indebtedness.^
Tilak’s HRL used much the same techniques although, 
lacking offices in the smaller towns it relied more 
heavily on public speeches and on word-of-mouth propaganda 
by its members than upon the provision of reading rooms
1. HRL Bombay 1917 Report, pp. 3-4; Home Poll Dep. Mar 
1917, no. 32, ’Bombay*; Bombay Police 1917. par. 1014(t).
2. e.g. Bombay Police 1917. pars 841(g) (h) (j) (o), 
899(m) Is) tv) (y), 930(k) (x), 949(g).
3. interview with H. N. Kunzru, 27 July 1963.
206
and other facilities. During its first year, the IHRL
published six Marathi and two English pamphlets, of which
47,000 copies were sold, together with one in Gujarati and
one in Kannada.1 Tilak himself undertook a number of speech-
tours, as did his leading lieutenants from the six branch
headquarters, addressing meetings in towns but also in
quite small places: usually their audiences comprised
’’mostly Brahmins and shopkeepers”, but as the agitation
became more intense and especially if Tilak himself spoke,
large audiences embracing ’’members of all castes” were 
2attracted. Tilak and his fellow speakers echoed the 
arguments put forward by Mrs Besant, while assuring their 
audiences that they might safely join the League as 
courts had pronounced the demand for swara.i not to be 
seditious.1 A device used by Tilak and his fellow 
speakers to shield themselves against charges of sedition, 
was the reiteration of loyalty while criticising the 
Government and its policies. Adapting to Indian conditions 
an argument used by Carson in defending Ulster's threat to
1» Mahratta, 20 May 1917, p. 241; Bombay Police 1917. 
par. 251(a).
2. e.g. Bombay Police 1917. pars 351(g), 731(g) (k),
785(a), 930(u) (x), 949(g).
see ibid., pars 109(f) (h), 156(d) (f).3.
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rebel against the imposition of Irish Home Rule,'*' Tilak 
likened the King-Emperor to brahma, "without attributes 
and without form", and the administration to maya, or 
illusion, and argued that to demand a change in the 
latter from bureaucratic to Indian rule involved no
pdisloyalty to the King. And in the Karnatak, for 
instance, Gangadharrao Leshpande, while ostensibly supp­
orting the Government's call for Army volunteers, argued 
that volunteering would be of no use to India unless she 
got swara.i. ^
In an effort to reach a wider audience both Leagues 
appealed to religious sentiments, although, wishing to 
avoid alienating Muslims or Hindus by identifying them­
selves with the other community, they did so cautiously.
In Bombay City, for instance, the branches of the two HRLs 
joined to celebrate the Hindu festival, Lassehra Lay, as 
a national day.^ Throughout Maharashtra and the Karnatak 
meetings of Tilak's HRL were held in temples or before
1. see Mahratta, 25 Jan 1914, p. 31»
2. Tilak, Writings & Speeches, pp. 104-137.
3. Bombay Police 1917, pars 351(g), 513(c).
4. ibid., 1916, par. 1352.
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shrines1 while, after Mrs Besant's internment in
particular, meetings of her League were held in temples
and, in regions such as Bihar, processions were taken both
2to mosques and temples.
IV
The Results of the Movement.
Mrs Besant clearly had considerable success in 
•’educating’1 Indians, in the sense of convincing them of 
India’s readiness for self-government. The Western- 
educated classes had been persuaded that they should demand 
self-government and not only demand it but expect it after 
the War. The ’masses” had barely been touched, but a 
beginning had been made: labouring groups in Bombay, 
Ahmedabad and other cities and agriculturists in some 
districts of Gujarat and UP had heard the British Govern­
ment criticised and blamed for their troubles. Admittedly 
the two Leagues never claimed to have more than 60,000
1. ibid., 1917. pars 583(a) (b), 637(c), 930(f), 1039
( u ) .
2. B & 0 Police 1917. pars 965, 1128, 1129; Bombay 
Police 1917. pars 5l!Tc). 583(a) (b), 70l(c3;Home Poll Dep. 
July 1917, no. 35, p. 6; ibid., Aug 1917, no. 2, p. 20; 
Besant, ’’Internment Diary”, 17 July 1917; New India.
31 July 1917, pp. 6b, 8b-c.
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members between them and so were small, compared to what 
was to follow under Gandhi. These numbers, however, were 
not an adequate indication of the Leagues’ effectiveness, 
since their propaganda and that of the Servants of India 
Society, which they provoked into similar activity, 
reached many who were not HRL members. Even in Bengal, 
for example, where the HRL was relatively inactive, the 
press took up Mrs Besant’s arguments and encouraged 
criticism of the Government by publicising the restric­
tions placed on Mrs Besant and Tilak and their court 
actions.^
Mrs Besant had asserted that a loud and reiterated 
demand would move the British Government to remedy injus­
tices, and Dadabhai Haoroji had endorsed this assertion. 
Their faith was justified by the results of many 
agitational campaigns, from that for the abolition of 
slavery through Bradlaugh’s on behalf of the rights of 
atheists to that for Irish Home Rule. But each of these 
campaigns had been carried out in England and had 
protagonists in Parliament. The British Auxiliary of
1. see e.g. Bengal NP, 1916. pp. 1527, 1559, 1575,
1563; 1317, pp. 23, 134, 173, 192, 211, 231, 783.
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Mrs Besant's HBL was inactive and Mrs Besant was too busy- 
in India to go to England to infuse life into it. Further­
more Britain was distracted by the War and, while Tilak’s 
HRL paid Rs 25,000 for a representative to put the Home 
Rule case in England after Mrs Besant’s internment, he 
received scant attention.^*
Nevertheless Mrs Besant and Tilak were partly 
successful in moving British statesmen to grant self- 
government. The desire to reward India for her great 
contribution to the War and the hope of lessening the 
impact of the Home Rule agitation in India prompted 
Chelmsford (who succeeded Hardinge as Viceroy in 1916) 
and his Council to send home the despatch of November 1916, 
suggesting the enlargement of the Indian legislatures and 
the enunciation of self-government as the goal of British
ppolicy in India. The intensity of the Home Rule agitation 
however convinced the Secretary of State, Austen 
Chamberlain, that this was an inadequate response. ”It 
is obvious from the papers you send me”, he wrote to 
Chelmsford,
that the opinion of the vocal classes in
1. Mahratta. 10 Mar 1918, p. 111.
2. Government of India to Secretary of State for India,
24 Nov 1916, in Home Poll A, Dec 1916, no. 358.
India is moving very fast....The politicians 
of India have found out how to agitate....I 
doubt whether a mere pronouncement ex 
cathedra by either you or me would be accep­
ted by any of these gentlemen in India, or 
would prevent even the wildest of their prop­
osals from receiving a large measure of 
support at home.
Chamberlain was anxious not only to expand the Councils,
«2but also to increase their ’’authority and responsibility.
He moved slowly however, and in response to the pleas of 
the Governors, the Viceroy urged on him the need for 
speed in making an announcement of forthcoming reforms,
in order to ’’stay the agitation” and to draw Moderates
3away from it.
Mrs Besant and Dadabhai and Tilak were clearly on 
the right path. But in demanding ’’Home Rule not by 
instalments, but Home Rule complete and immediately after 
the War”^ they had set their sights, and those of the 
national movement too high. While Chamberlain was moving 
toward reforms, he intended that ’’rash and dangerous
1. Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 29 Mar 1917, par. 2 in 
Home Poll A, July 1917, nos 299-313»
2. Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 2 May 1917, par. 11 in 
ibid.
3. Chelmsford to Chamberlain, Telegrams nos 497 and 509, 
18 May 1917 in ibid.; see S. R. Mehrotra, ’’The Politics 
behind the Montagu Declaration of 1917”, in C. H. Philips 
(ed), Politics and Society in India, pp. 84-5, 88-92.
4. New India, 9 May 1917, p. 8.
changes" should be avoided.1 2 India would only get an
instalment of Home Rule. That it would, however, was
largely due to the agitation.
Up to the time of Mrs Besant's internment there was
no hint that India would obtain even so much. On the
contrary, the Governors deprecated the demands for self-
government contained in the Congress-League Scheme and
seem to have decided on repression instead of reform.
This made the Moderates draw toward the Home Rulers in
criticism of the Government. In protesting at Mrs
Besant’s internment, the Bombay Moderates said that
this policy of repression is being construed 
as an attempt on the part of the authorities 
in India to force the Indian public to 
accept without demur such post-war reforms 
of a minor character as the Government of 
India are believed to have formulated, without 
giving effect to the essential features of the 
scheme of reforms which the Indian National 
Congress and the All-India Muslim League have conjointly framed.2
Mrs Besant had hoped that her programme of agitating while 
avoiding passive resistance would be accepted by the 
Moderates and, with the help of British repression and 
British obduracy, she had succeeded. If, however, the
1. Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 29 Mar 1917, loc. cit.
2. Bombay Presidency Association Minutes, 23 June 1917.
Government could convince the Moderates that it intended 
to grant reforms increasing the power of Indian legislators, 
it was clear that it could detach many Moderates from 
alliance with Mrs Besant.
While the Moderates might join her in elaborating 
the Congress-League Scheme of Reforms and defending it, 
they were not willing to allow her and Tilak to obtain 
control of Congress. This Mrs Besant and Tilak had hoped 
to do at the 1916 Congress Session with the help of their 
HRLs. At the inauguration of the AIHRL in September 1916, 
Arundale laid down that every member of the League Hshould 
find out what DCC he can belong to and should immediately 
join it....get himself elected as a delegate to Lucknow" 
and ensure that this Congress was "committed far more 
definitely to Home Rule than its immediate predecessor".1 2
The officers of the Bombay City branch of Tilak1s HRL 
organised the first "Congress Special" trains to take HRL 
delegates to Lucknow from western India; in the elections 
to the Congress Subjects Committee, the Bombay Presidency 
delegates under Tilak’s guidance elected the HRL slate 
in toto. Other provinces were less ruthless, but the Home
1. New India. 4 Sept 1916, p. 11; 16 Sept 1916, p. 3d; 
cf. Mrs Besant in ibid., 5 July 1916, p. 8c.
2. D. D. Sathaye, My Recollections about the Congress 
and Lokamanva Tilak.
Rulers were in a decided majority, both in the open session 
and in the Subjects Committee.^
Nevertheless the Moderates still controlled the 
Bombay and Bengal PGGs; through them they held a large 
number of places on the AIGG and had elected a Bengal 
Moderate, A. C. Mazumdar, President of the Session; and
2they held ex-officio positions on the Subjects Committee. 
The Moderates used their positions, and played upon Mrs 
Besant's and Tilak’s desire for unity, to prevent the 
Home Rule leaders getting their way in the Subjects Comm­
ittee. The Committee passed by a large majority Mrs 
Besant's resolution claiming Home Rule at the end of the 
War but when the Moderates threatened to oppose this in 
the open session and reveal disunity in Congress, she 
withdrew it.^
More important, Tilak proposed that a compact 
Working Committee be set up to take over the day-to-day 
executive work from the AICC and to direct agitation. He 
no doubt calculated that the Home Rule majority would 
elect a majority of Home Rulers to the new Committee, which
1. Bombay Police 1917. par. 21(b); New India. 29 Pec 1916, p. 5a-b.
2. see Congress 1916, Report, pp. 133-7; AICC Minutes.
30 Dec 1916; New India. 1 Dec 1916, p. 5d.
3* Bombay Police 1917. par. 21(b); Government of Bombay 
file 3074/H/l, Police Commissioner’s Office, in HFM 
Bombay, II, 246.
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he and Mrs Besant would more easily dominate than the
unwieldy AICC,1 2and that by carrying out agitation the
Committee would assimilate the work of the HRL. ”1-
cannot adequately tell you”, wrote Kelkar to a Moderate,
”how anxious Mr Tilak is that there should be a central
agency to initiate, organise and carry out the agitation
2recommended and sanctioned by the National Congress.”
But Moderates wished neither to give Tilak and Mrs Besant 
this chance to consolidate their leadership nor to become 
responsible through Congress for rousing agitation. ”[T]he 
Congress was a mere deliberative body”, said the President, 
and ruled Tilak’s proposal out of order.^
With this evidence of Moderate obstructiveness 
before her, Mrs Besant decided that it was not yet time 
for the HRLs to be amalgamated with Congress. She opposed 
the suggestion of one Moderate that the HRL branches should 
affiliate themselves with Congress. She said she ”had no 
objection to affiliation but this should not mean control 
by the Provincial [Congress] Committee. If every pamphlet
1. the 1908 Constitution amended in 1915 provided for an 
AICC of 107 elected members plus ex-Presidents and General 
Secretaries.
2. N. C. Kelkar to V. S. S. Sastri n.d. [early 1917],
SIS Papers. Poona: cf. N. C. Kelkar to V. S. S. Sastri,
25 Jan 1917, in ibid.
3« Bombay Police 1917. par. 21(b); cf. Home Poll B, Feb 
1917, nos 552-5, w.e. 20 Jan 1917; New India 30 Dec 1916, 
p. 7d; cf. Banerjea in ibid., 9 Oct 1915, p. 10a.
and speech needed the approval of the Committee, work 
would he impossible”.1 23 Mrs Besant and Tilak were anxious 
that Congress should adopt their programme, but only under 
their leadership.
Through the Home Rule agitation Tilak and Mrs Besant 
succeeded in providing an outlet for their more fiery 
supporters and for the energies of the young men who were 
dissatisfied with the inactivity of Congress. S. M. 
Paranjpe and Khadilkar, for instance, toured Maharashtra 
delivering speeches and assisting the branches to enlist 
members while Cangadharrao Deshpande directed the active
pKarnatak branch of the IHRL. Tilak's League provided 
the new generation of Maharashtrian Brahmins with active 
roles in rousing agitation. Among them, D. V. G-okhale, 
who was a lawyer in Bombay and then aged 30, eagerly 
responded to Tilak's call in 1915 to take editorial work 
in Poona, to prepare for the establishment of his League 
and to assume its administration.1 And in Bombay City
1. Bombay Police 1917. par. 21(b).
2. see e.g. ibid., pars 300(f), 351(g), 454(f), 637(c), 
670(c) (e) (g) (i).
3. ibid. 1915« pars 1260, 1367; 1916, pars 497, 563(c).
D. V. Grokhale was Editor, Sarva.ianik Sabha Quarterly, from 
1916; Chief Editor, Mahratta. 1918-30; imprisoned in 
Gandhi's NC0 movement, 1921.
the activities of Til ah ’ s League v;e re organised and co­
ordinated with those of Mrs Besant's League by a number 
of young Brahmin professional men, typical of whom was 
the doctor, D. D. Sathaye. He had attended the Extremists1 23
meeting at Surat and heard Aurobindo speak in Bombay 
and in 1916-17 spoke at many public meetings, which he 
helped to organise, recruited delegates for conferences
and organised the special trains for the Lucknow Congress.^ 
At the Conference called to discuss the formation 
of Mrs Besant’s League at the end of 1915, the young men 
had been most disappointed with her decision to suspend 
it and encouraged her to go ahead with the informal prepar­
ations for the League. While not all the Theosophists who 
formed the nuclei of the branches were themselves 
young, it was to the younger generation that the League 
first appealed. The Bombay branch was run almost entirely 
by men in their twenties, non-Theosophists like ShankarlalpBanker and the Muslim millowner Umar Sobhani, as well as 
the Theosophists. The same v/as true for the branches in 
Sind, where most of the leading figures were young 
professional men, Theosophist and non-Theosophist.  ^ In
1. see e.g. Bombay Police 1916. pars 530(c), 1352; 1917 
par. 182(c).
2. 1890-1926, Director of Bombay Chronicle, which he 
helped to finance; helped Jinnah organise 1915 Muslim 
League Session; confidant of Ali Brothers; Sec. AIHRL, 
Bombay branch 1916-17; Cen. Sec. AIHRL 1918-20.
3. e.g. for Hyderabad branch see Bombay Police 1917. 
pars 182(h), 482(a), 731(b), 841(b); for Karachi branch 
see ibid., par. 603(e).
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the UP it was the young men, like Jawaharlal Nehru and 
his contemporary at Cambridge, Harkaran Nath Misra, who 
first joined the League and who, even after Jawaharlal’s 
father and the older men joined it in mid-1917, continued 
to be its most active workers.
While the Home Rule agitation satisfied the young 
men’s demands for a more active and aggressive policy, 
there was the possibility that it would not continue to 
do so. As Mrs Besant denounced the British with increasing 
vehemence, her young followers became more excited, and 
at the time of her internment they began to talk of 
passive resistance. Mrs Besant had rejected passive 
resistance as a weapon in the Home Rule campaign; if she 
was still unwilling to embark on passive resistance she 
would have to find some means of restraining her young 
followers.
Her HRL was not designed for such a purpose. The 
formal links between her headquarters at Adyar and the 
branches were most tenuous; indeed later she was to say 
that ’there is not available for my use even a register, 
giving the names of all branches and their Secretaries”.^  
Like Tilak, of course, she had close informal contact with
1. A. Besant to A-IHRL Council, 19 June 1918, Adyar Archives.
her lieutenants - even when she was externed from Bombay, 
for instance, Jamnadas Dwarkadas visited her at Adyar, and 
she in turn used messengers to inform her of the state 
of feeling among the members and to relay instructions to 
them.^ She had thus substituted informal contact and 
personal loyalty for elaborate organisation. But the 
agitation attracted many young men who felt no personal 
loyalty to Mrs Besant. Among them were a number of 
Madrasis, including C. Rajagopalachariar ("Rajaji") and 
S. Satyamurti, who were both admirers of Tilak and Gandhi 
and hoped that the national movement would adopt passive 
resistance. Mrs Besant was thus to be confronted with 
the problem of devising either a programme which would 
continue to satisfy those she had helped to rouse, or 
a means of restraining them from paths which she saw were 
potentially violent.
The League had begun to reach labouring groups in 
the cities and peasants in Gujarat and the UP. As yet, 
however, it had no trade unions, peasant associations or 
other organisations which would enable it to control mass 
action, such as the refusal to pay taxes. In teaching
1. e.g. interview with B. Shiva Rao, 21 Feb 1963; J. 
Dwarkadas to A. Besant, 27 Feb 1919» Adyar Archives.
2. see New India. 22 Feb 1916, p. 9b; 1 Feb 1917, p. 3c.
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these groups to criticise the British there lay the danger 
of provoking violent outbursts which the League was quite 
inadequate to control. If the young members of the HRL 
themselves insisted on launching passive resistance this 
danger would be greatly increased.
Despite these shortcomings the HRLs marked an 
important stage in the development of the national movement.
The HRLs introduced a new form of organisation and 
new methods to the national movement. Dor the first time 
a network of local political committees covered much of 
India. Congress had failed to construct the network of 
DCCs and District Associations foreshadowed in its 1908 
Constitution and, since Hume *s agitation of 1888, those 
provincial and district Congress organisations which 
existed had not aimed to rouse a widespread or continuing 
agitation. The Extremist agitations in Maharashtra in 
the 1890s and the Bengal Partition agitation were closer 
precedents, but these were not roused through local 
branches nor were they more than provincial in scope.
The wave of protest meetings and demonstrations 
over Mrs Besant’s internment in mid-1917 marked the first 
occasion on which a nation-wide agitation had been roused. 
The Home Rule movement awakened areas which had been 
practically inactive in national politics - Gujarat, Sind,
the UP, Bihar and the four language areas of the Madras 
mofussil.
The HRLs had also provided rising young nationalists 
with the opportunity of working together and of collabor­
ating with workers in the districts they visited. Tilak's 
and Mrs Besant’s lieutenants in Bombay City, for example, 
had co-operated in arranging meetings both in the city 
and in Maharashtra and Gujarat. Despite the modest 
articulation of the HRLs, they had created informal 
channels of communication which would be useful in future 
political work.
Many men who later became leading figures in the 
national movement had their first experience of addressing 
and moving audiences in the course of the Home Rule 
agitation. Jawaharlal Nehru in the UP and Satyamurti in 
Madras, for example, received training that the old 
Congress would never have provided.
But while Mrs Besant and Tilak had established the 
HRLs they had no desire to cut themselves off from Congress. 
Indeed, by their alliance with the Moderates in that body 
they hoped to claim Home Rule on behalf of all of India,
At Lucknow they failed to capture control of Congress and 
gave up - at least temporarily - their idea of amalgamating 
the HRLs with Congress. Nevertheless they had brought into
Congress a majority of Extremists and young men, who were 
committed to the goal of Home Rule or, in G-okhale’s 
phrase, "filled with an honest but vague longing for the 
emancipation of the country". Encouraged by the agitation 
of 1917, these Home Rulers became increasingly censorious 
of the British. Prom now on Congress took its tone and 
its temper more and more from them.
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PART 2: THE DECLINE OF MRS BESAHT AND TILAK
Chapter V
THE NON-BRAHMIN CHALLENGE
I
The anti-Home Rule Movements,
In the previous chapters we have seen that Mrs 
Besant and Tilak had produced an India-wide agitation 
through their HRLs and, exploiting the British refusal to 
grant concessions, they had brought together the Congress 
Moderates and Extremists behind this agitation. Working 
with the Muslim League leaders, they had brought Congress 
and the League together on the programme of attaining 
self-government with an agreed sharing of power between 
the two major communities.
Even before this unity was proclaimed at the end 
of 1916 it was challenged, and the agitation for Home Rule 
opposed, by organisations representing new social groups 
from among non-Brahmin Hindu castes, who claimed power 
and privilege in the political system.
This threatened to disrupt the united front, which 
Besant and Tilak had tried to present to the British, and 
in the immediate sense to delay the advance to Home Rule
by persuading the British to make a smaller devolution 
of power to India. Furthermore it threatened to introduce 
permanent divisions between different sectors of the Hindu 
community and thus to divide and weaken the national move­
ment. The challenge to the existing leadership was 
considerable: they had to neutralize the non-Brahmin 
movements’ opposition to Home Rule in some way and, at 
the same time, to deal with the threat to the cohesion of 
the national movement. By and large as will be seen, they 
had only limited success in solving these problems.
From its inception, Congress had consisted primarily 
of men from groups in Indian society which had been 
traditionally associated with learning and administration 
under the pre-British rulers of the sub-continent, the 
Brahmins in western India and Madras, the bhadralok 
(comprised of Brahmins, Vaidyas and Kayasthas) in Bengal 
and the Brahmins, Kayasthas and Muslims traditionally 
associated with administration in the United Provinces and 
Bihar. In addition, the Parsee minority had been prom­
inent in western Indian nationalist politics while in 
the Punjab, where an influential cadre of Brahmins 
associated with learning and administration was lacking,
the Hindu moneylending castes had achieved a similar 
position.1 23
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries the non-Brahmin castes, which were not trad­
itionally associated with administration hut with agri­
culture, business and soldiery, produced a relatively 
small number of educated and professional men who
identified themselves with the nationalist elite and
2joined Congress. An increasing proportion of men 
associated with business was participating in Congress 
by the second decade of the twentieth century.^
But during this decade some of the educated members 
of these non-Brahmin castes realised that they might 
acquire increased power and status for themselves and 
for the castes from which they came by drawing back from 
Congress and forming their own organisations. These 
organisations opposed the granting of Home Rule and 
demanded that in any Reforms introduced in the Indian 
legislatures seats should be reserved in separate
1. see Charts in P. C. Chosh, Indian national Congress, * 
1892-1909. pp. 23-6.
2. e.g. P. Kesava Pillai, C. Sankaran Hair, P. Theagaraya 
Chetti in the south; V. R. Shinde in Maharashtra.
3. see Appendices B and C.
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electorates for the non-Brahmin community in approxim­
ately the same ratio as their proportion of the popul­
ation. Since the Brahmins were in a minority everywhere - 
they were about 4 per cent of the Madras population, for 
example - this programme would deprive the Brahmins of 
power and reserve it for the non-Brahmins.
This rapid increase in the self-assertiveness of 
the non-Brahmin elite in the second decade of the 
twentieth century may be traced in part to the increase 
in the wealth of the agricultural and trading castes 
among the non-Brahmins due to high prices during World 
War I ,^  which enabled them to undertake the costs of organ 
isation. Of much greater importance, however, as an incen 
tive to organise was the Home Rule agitation of 1915-17.
The demand for Home Rule at the end of the War 
was tantamount to demanding power for the existing 
nationalist elite, which still consisted largely of
Brahmins, Kayasthas and other non-agricultural and non- 
2trading castes. By implication the national leadership
1. see "Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material 
Progress and Condition of India,” House of Commons Papers, 
vol. XVIII, 1918, Cd. 9162, e.g. pp. 13, 14, 25.
2. some indications of the numerical dominance of 
Congress by these castes is provided by Appendices B 
and C: clearly it was not as overwhelming as the non- 
Brahmins claimed; furthermore it was declining.
thus ignored the aspirations of the rising non-Brahmin 
groups. The non-3rahmins must organise themselves if 
they would not be swamped by the Brahmins.
They were also encouraged to organise by the adher­
ence of the Moderates to the Congress-League Scheme. 
Hitherto the Moderates, who had controlled Congress, had 
been committed to gradual progress to self-government 
accompanied by social reform and the extension of educ­
ation to all levels of Indian society. Such a gradualist 
doctrine was not incompatible v/ith the acquisition of 
power by the emerging non-Brahmins. But v/ith the 
Moderates’ adherence to the demand for rapid progress to 
self-government in 1916, the non-Brahmins could no longer 
rely on the Moderates to state the case for them and were 
thus further encouraged to organise to speak for them­
selves. ^ When the Moderates left Congress in 1918, the 
non-Brahmins re-established contact with them and joined
them in opposing the demands of Congress for larger 
2Reforms.
There had been indications since the outbreak of
1. see A. B. Latthe, Memoirs of His Highness Shri Shahu 
Chhatranati, Ilahara.ia of Kolhapur. TTl 505.
2. see e.g. Bombay Police 1920. pars 522, 590, 591, 
641(a).
the War that the Government was moving toward a favour­
able response to the demands for reform at the end of the 
War. At the end of 1916 the rumour spread that the Gov­
ernment was sending home a despatch, inadequate from the 
Home Rulers’ point of view to be sure, but embodying 
suggestions for reforms nevertheless. Then in August 
1917 the Secretary of State, Edwin Montagu, announced that 
Britain would allow India to take "substantial steps" in 
the direction of responsible government, and that he 
would visit India to receive representations on how 
substantial these steps should be and to whom the res­
ponsible government should be devolved.1 2 Clearly, if the 
non-Brahmins wished to protect and advance their inter­
ests as a group they had to organise quickly. Montagu’s 
Announcement and visit proved to be the principal cata­
lysts in the precipitation of organisations representing
groups wishing to promote their own interests and the
0non-Brahmins were no exception. Not only did organ­
isations and deputations from among the richer peasant 
and trading groups submit representations to Montagu but
1. House of Commons Debates, 20 Aug 1917, XCVII, cols 1695-6.
2. see e.g. the organisations formed in the months 
between the Announcement and the visit to present 
addresses: Montagu Addresses.
organisations of poorer peasant and agricultural- 
labourer castes, of tenant groups and the depressed and 
outcastes1 2 did likewise, urging that the granting of 
Home Rule be delayed and that in any reforms that were 
made, their interests should be safeguarded through the 
reservation of seats for their community in the legis­
latures.
In this regard the Muslim demand for separate elec­
torates, to which Minto and Morley had acceded in the 1909 
Reforms, had shown the way. A non-Brahmin paper in the 
south had noted in 1914 that
...the Muhammadans have lost nothing 
through their separatist activities. On 
the other hand it is becoming clearer 
every day that, because the Muslim League 
got all that it wanted, its spokesmen are 
now ready to fraternise with their Hindu 
fellow subjects and pursue common objects 
in concert.
The lesson was driven home when the Congress agreed to 
accept separate representation for the Muslims in its 
1916 pact with the Muslim League.
In their opposition to the demand for Home Rule the 
non-Brahmins were encouraged directly and indirectly by
1. see e.g. addresses of Ahirs; Tenantry of the UP; the 
Naxnasudras of Bengal; Adi-Dravidians; Dheds and other out- 
caste groups, Montagu Addresses, pp. 11, 87, 89, 92.
2. Malavali, 1 Aug 1914 in HPM Delhi, Region VIII, file14/2.
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Government officials and by the British community in
1 2 India. A prominent official of the Madras G-overnment,
for instance, constituted himself spokesman for the non- 
Brahmins and provided them with much of their indictment 
of the Brahmins and their arguments against Home Rule.
And in western India the Maharaja of Kolhapur encouraged 
the anti-Horne Rule non-Brahmin movement and was under no 
delusion in believing that he would ingratiate himself 
with the British by doing so. The non-Brahmins indeed 
could reasonably expect to further their interests more 
by such a de facto alliance with the G-overnment in oppos­
ition to the Home Rule movement than by attempting to 
come to terms with the Home Rule movement itself. In the 
short term they might hope to receive the loaves and 
fishes that the Government had at its disposal and in the 
longer term they might delay Home Rule at least until they 
could speak from a position of greater equality with the 
Brahmins in the national movement.
Recent research has linked the rise of non-Brahmin
1. for the European community's encouragement of 
organisations opposed to Home Rule among the lowcaste 
Hamasudras, see e.g. Bengal NP, 1917. pp. 299, 300, 1077, 1182.
2. Sir Alexander Cardew, Member of the Governor's Exec­
utive Council, Madras, 1914-29; see Swadesamitran. 10 Jan 
1913 in HFLI Delhi, Region VIII, file 14/2; JSC on G of I 
Bill, Evidence, pp. 333-41.
movements to the rise of affluent socio-economic groups 
among the non-Brahmin castes in the later part of the 
nineteenth and in the twentieth centuries.^ The two most 
important of these groups were the wealthy peasant- 
proprietors and the trader-moneylenders. As these groups 
acquired wealth so they began to educate their sons, 
some of whom sought admittance to professional and admin­
istrative positions outside the occupations traditionally 
prescribed for their caste. In this they followed far 
behind the Brahmins and Kayasthas and bha.dra.lok, and in 
areas where the latter had entrenched themselves in the 
professions, administrative jobs and national politics, 
the rising economic groups found entry into these avenues 
difficult. For this they blamed the "Brahmin oligarchy" 
which they found already in charge of these posts and 
whom they suspected, rightly or wrongly, of a "conspiracy" 
against all who were not Brahmins. With their rise to 
affluence and their entry into the professions, these
1. R. Kumar, "State and Society in Maharashtra in the 
Nineteenth Century", pp. 484-94; 504-9 summarises his 
thesis that the ryotwari system and its modifications gave 
rise to wealthy moneylenders and to an affluent stratum 
of peasants in Maharashtra, and, further traces the rise 
of anti-Brahminism in this region to the growth of a non- 
Brahmin professional elite; to the "rise of a rich peas­
antry anxious to find for itself a place in the sun"; and 
to the spread of the idea that "progress and prosperity 
and social mobility were desirable and attainable"."
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non-Brahmin groups sought not only power and positions 
but also prestige and status, and this, in the areas where 
they were dominant, the Brahmins were loath to give.
The non-Brahmin movements would therefore be strong­
est in areas where there were specially vigorous, rising 
socio-economic groups among the non-Brahmins, who found 
their ambitions for place, power and prestige frustrated 
by a dominant, Brahmin group. Such a confrontation 
occurred in a particularly marked degree in the Deccan 
and in the south. In the Deccan Brahmin dominance stem­
med not only from ritual superiority but also from the 
exercise of political power by the Peshwa, who as a 
Chitpavan Brahmin had placed his fellow-castemen in 
landowning and administrative positions from which they 
could dominate Deccan society.1 In Madras the Brahmins 
had relegated all other castes to the status of Sudras - 
fourth in the fourfold varna scale - or below. The 
HRLs highlighted the virtual monopolisation of positions 
in the nationalist elite in these two areas by Brahmins, 
for Tilak’s lieutenants were (with few exceptions) like 
him, members of the Chitpavan sub-caste, while in 
Madras Mrs Besant's closest associates were Aiyar Brahmins.
1 . R. Kumar, op. cit., p. 62.
The way was prepared for the emergence of a rich 
peasantry in south and western India by the conscious 
attempt on the part of the British during the nineteenth 
century to base their power in those areas on a. stable 
and contented peasantry.'*' In much of Madras and in the 
Deccan and Gujarat the peasant was given ownership of the 
land under the ryotwari system. By improving their land 
and buying more and by lending money to their less 
thrifty or fortunate fellows, the more enterprising 
became wealthy. In the Punjab, although the mahalwari 
system theoretically made the village responsible coll­
ectively for the land revenue, the members of the village 
were in fact confirmed in possession of the land; there
pwere, in addition, numbers of hereditary landholders.
In east and north-eastern India, on the other hand, 
the British had made zamindari or taluqdari land-settle­
ment with the large landowners, the zamindars or 
taluqdars, who were thus placed on possession of the 
land, with the mass of peasants as their tenants or as 
landless labourers. In this situation no class of 
peasant-proprietors, rich or otherwise, could emerge.
1. see R. Kumar, op. cit., passim.
2. P. van den Düngen, "Note on Punjab Rural Society 
before 1900" (unpublished paper, Australian National 
University).
British social engineering in the ryotwari and 
mahalwari areas also had results which were neither 
intended nor desired. Chief among these was the acquis­
ition of land by moneylenders who had no intention of 
working or improving the soil but who grew wealthy on 
the income from their debtor-tenants. This was especially
the case in large parts of the Punjab where Hindu money-
1lenders expropriated large numbers of peasants. Further­
more the introduction of m o d e m  industry and the growth 
of commerce gave the moneylending and trading groups oppor­
tunity for the acquisition of wealth in the ports and 
cities.
In the Deccan, the wealthy peasant-proprietors of 
the Karnatak were either Lingayats or Chaturth Jains, 
those of Maharashtra Marathas. The moneylenders and 
traders were predominantly Jains or Lingayats.^ From 
among these groups emerged the non-Brahmin professional, 
administrative and business elite which was to lead the 
non-Brahmin movement in the Deccan. The Jains and
1. P. van den Düngen, "Note on Punjab Rural Society 
before 1900"; "Land Transfers and Revenue Administration 
in the Nineteenth-Century Punjab"; R. Kumar, op. cit.,
pp. 226-42.
2. Census of India, 1901. IX, part 1, 183; 1211, XII,
part 1, 184.
3. Census, 1911, VIII, part 1, 251; part 2, 260-1.
Lingayats each formed a religious group with its own 
priesthood distinct from the Brahmins, and as such had 
a strong sense of identity and separateness. In addition 
the Lingayats, as Kannada-speakers were marked off hy 
language from the Maharashtrian Brahmins who dominated 
the professions and administration in the Karnatak.1 2
The Marathas were not divided from the Brahmins of Maha­
rashtra by language or adherence to different religious 
beliefs, but the leading families among them traced their 
descent from the Maratha rulers who had predated the 
Peshwas, and they claimed a status above that of Sudra
which had been ascribed to them as agriculturists by the 
2Brahmins.
In Madras, the most prominent among the rich 
peasants were the Vellalars (often known by their title 
of Pillai), the largest of the Tamil peasant-proprietor 
castes, which predominated in the Tamil-speaking area 
of the Presidency from Tanjore northward and had spread 
into the southern Telugu-speaking area and into Malabar
1. Deshpande, Autobiography« pp. 294» 333*
2. M. L. Patterson, "Caste and Political Leadership in 
Maharashtra: A Review and Current Appraisal" in Economic 
Weekly, VI, no. 39 (25 Sept 1954), 1065-7; S. Harrison, 
India: The Most Dangerous Decades, p. 114.
to the west.'1 234' There was strong competition between the 
Vellalars and the Brahmins for the acquisition of land: 
by entering into the business of lending money to poorer 
peasants the richer members of the Vellalar community 
increased their hold on the land in the late nineteenth
pcentury. A similarly affluent stratum had emerged 
among the Nairs of Malabar, traditionally a warrior caste 
and formerly the rulers of that area, who had striven 
(in competition, again, with the Brahmins) for control 
of the land in Malabar under the British. The emergence 
of a rich peasant stratum was inhibited in the deltaic 
areas of the Telugu country (the modern Andhra) and in 
small portions of Tamilnad, notably the far south, by 
the existence of landlords with whom the British had 
made permanent settlements.^ However these landlords 
were again non-Brahmins and a number of them supported 
the non-Brahmin movement. Of the trading castes, the
1. B. H. Baden-Powell, Land-Systems of British India,
III, 112, no. 3, 113-7, 157,“ 164-57" 171; Census 1911, XII, 
part 1, 184; cf. Harrison, Dangerous Decades, p. 123.
2. see ’’Note on Land Transfer and Agricultural Indebted­
ness” (by E. D. Maclagan, 18 Mar 1895;, Government of 
India, Department of Revenue and Agriculture, Land Rev­
enue (Branch), Oct 1895, A Pros. nos. 72 and 73.
3. Baden-Powell, III, 156-80.
4. Baden-Powell, III, 24; in the Rayalaseema and deltas 
of Andhra the two great peasant- proprietor castes were 
the Kapus (or Reddis) and Kammas, but they emerged into 
politics somewhat later than did the Vellalars: Census,
1911, loc. cit., p. 184; Harrison, Dangerous Decades, p.110.
9 ' • 7Cj * * i
most advanced were the Chettis and the Mudaliars - some 
of them very wealthy -, the Komatis and the Naidus.^
While, as we shall see, these non-Brahmins claimed to 
speak on behalf of all who were not Brahmins, including 
the outcastes, they were themselves a minority - they 
comprised no more than 16 per cent of the population of 
the Madras Presidency - and regarded themselves as a 
superior minority: the Vellalars, for instance, looked 
upon their inferior Sudra brethren and the outcastes with 
as much hauteur as did the Brahmins and were reliant upon 
a docile agricultural-labour force.
In Gujarat the ryotwari land-settlement had led to 
the emergence of wealthy peasant-proprietors, the Anavlas 
and Patidars, and the cotton industry had given rise to 
wealthy trading groups, the Vanis and Bhatias.^  The 
Brahmins of this area, however, did not possess the 
social dominance of those of the Deccan and Madras and did 
not bar the rising groups' way to place or prestige. This
1. see the Non-Brahmin Manifesto, published in the 
Hindu. 20 Dec 1916, p. 8.
2. Baden-Powell, III, 121, n. 3; Desabhaktan. 13 Dec 
1917, in HPM Delhi, file 16/2; Home Poll Dep. Dec 1918, 
no. 23; Census. 1911. loc. cit., p. 184; see JSC on 0 
of I Bill, Evidence, QQ 3142-9, 6109, pp. 188, 339.
3. Census. 1911. VII, Part I, 240, 280, 307.
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was reflected in the Home Rule movement, in which, as 
we have seen, some of Mrs Besant’s most prominent lieu­
tenants in Bombay were Bhatias and they, in turn, in 
their forays into Gujarat, called on the wealthy peasant 
and trading castes to form branches of the HRL.
In the Punjab, the situation was more complicated, 
and is still awaiting thorough investigation.1 It is 
clear however that the Hindu moneylending castes had 
appropriated much of the arable land and were entrenched 
in the professions and the national movement, and that 
their economic and political dominance was deeply 
resented by the peasants and hereditary land-holding 
castes and tribes. The Government had stifled nation­
alist politics in the Punjab between 1907 and 1917 and 
had thus inhibited the rise both of Home Rule agitation 
and of agitation among the peasantry opposing it, but in 
view of Montagu’s visit to discuss Reforms in 1917, 
land-owning elements, other than the Hindu moneylenders, 
organised to protect and further their interests vis-a- 
vis the moneylenders. Two Associations claimed to speak 
on behalf of the agriculturists. One, speaking for the
1. particularly for the period after 1900: P. van den 
Dungen, ’Rote on Punjab Rural Society before 1900”.
Sikh and Hindu peasants, urged that "the rural population 
should have a preponderating share of the elected seats" 
in the reformed Councils. The other, speaking for the 
Muslim "zemindars" (probably hereditary landholders 
rather than peasants) claimed a similar share of seats 
and requested enfranchisement for those paying over Rs 50 
land-revenue or income-tax, that is for the relatively 
well-to-do.1 The agriculturists of the Punjab were 
divided among the three religious communities, Hindu,
Sikh and Muslim, but their defence of their interests in 
1917 foreshadowed their co-ordination in the Unionist 
Party of the 1920s in opposition to the Hindu moneylenders 
and the national movement.
The UP, Bihar and Bengal on the other hand were 
areas of landlord-settlement. Here the peasantry were 
tenants or labourers who had less opportunity than the 
proprietors of the west and south for the acquisition of 
wealth and hence education that would fit them for 
professional or administrative jobs. By the second 
decade of the twentieth century, however, a few members 
of these groups had secured education and organised
1. ibid.; Address of the Punjab Muslim Association, 
Montagu Addresses, pp. 4-5; Address of the Punjab Zamin- 
dar Central Association, ibid., pp. 12-13.
sabhas to represent their caste fellows. Montagu’s visit 
in 1917 provoked representations from tenants and agri­
cultural labourers in these areas opposing rapid advance 
to Home Rule and requesting separate representation for 
these groups.x
In the UP and Bihar the resentment of the tenants
2and labourers toward their landlords was growing. The 
professional classes from which the nationalist elite 
was drawn in these provinces had links with the landlords, 
who had been their chief employers, and they were thus 
in danger of being identified with an economic elite 
whom the tenants were coming to regard as oppressors.
The members of the nationalist elite were not themselves 
landlords, however, and from 1917 onward, increasing 
numbers of them, inspired by Gandhi* s example, championed 
the grievances of the tenants against the landlords.^
In Bengal the lines were drawn sharply between the 
agriculturists and the bhadralok, who were dominant in 
land-holding as well as in the professions and national
1. Addresses of Joint Deputation of Ahir Mahasabhas, and 
of Bengal Namasudra Association, Montagu Addresses, pp. 11 
92; Montagu, Diary, p. 48.
2. see Addresses of the Ahir Mahasabhas and UP Tenantry, 
Montagu Addresses, pp. 11, 92.
3. interview of writer with H. N. Kunzru, 27 July 1963; 
J. Nehru to Vijiaraghavachariar, 17 Dec 1918, Vij. Papers; 
J. Nehru, Toward Freedom, pp. 56-64.
politics and whose traditions led them to regard agri­
cultural work as defiling.1 The articulate Hindu agri­
culturists, especially the Namasudras, were resentful 
of hhadralok dominance and, as in the case of the Hindu 
peasantry in the Punjab, were in the 1920s to join with
the Muslim peasantry under Muslim leadership in opposing
2the Hindu national politicians.
Thus the absence of a.nti-Home Rule, non-Brahmin 
movements in the north of India comparable to those in the 
south and west did not mean that the national leadership 
was not confronted there also by demands for a share of 
power from rising socio-economic groups or by opposition 
to the rapid granting of Home Rule from depressed groups. 
The stability of the national movement was least threat­
ened in G-ujarat, where the aspirations of the rising 
peasant and trading-caste groups were not thwarted by a 
dominant Brahmin-professional elite, and in the UP and 
Bihar, where rising socio-economic groups were lacking 
and the national elite identified itself with the 
dissatisfaction of the larger, depressed groups. In
1. this is discussed at length in J. H. Broomfield, op. 
cit., pp. 237-42; see N. K. Bose, ’’Some Aspects of Caste 
in Bengal”, in Man in India. XXXVIII, no. 2 (June 1958), 
88.
2. see e.g. J. IT. Mandat, ’’Pledges & Assurances”, Times 
of India, 9 Oct 1950, pp. 10-11.
the Punjab and Bengal there were indications that the 
dominance of the Hindu, moneylending castes and the 
bhadralok in the national movement would be threatened, 
and with it the stability of the national movement itself 
in those areas. The immediate and most vigorous challenge, 
however, came from the non-Brahmin movements in the 
Deccan and Madras.
The awakening resentment of the Maharashtrian agri­
culturists toward Brahmin dominance was first expressed 
in the founding in 1873 of the Satya Shodhak Samaj 
(Society for the Propagation of Truth) by an educated 
member of the agricultural community.1 This Samaj was 
intended to enlighten non-Brahmin agriculturists of 
their exploitation by Brahmin lawyers, officials and 
village accountants and to dissuade them from employing 
Brahmin priests. During the first decade of the twen­
tieth century, the Brahmins angered the leading Maratha 
families by refusing to recognise the Kshatriya status 
(second in the varna hierarchy) claimed by them. A 
native ruler, the Maharaja of Kolhapur, who stood first
1. Jotirao Pule, 1827-73» Mali (gardening) caste, educ­
ated by Christian missionaries, published OulamA’eri 
("Slavery”) in 1873» charging Brahmins with oppressing 
agriculturists; extracts in English from Gulamgeri held 
at HPK Bombay, II; cf. Latthe, I ,  322-4;  I I ,  373-6*
among these families, retaliated by installing non-
Brahmin advisers and, v/ith them, reviving the Satya
Shodhak Samaj in his domains and in the surrounding
areas of Maharashtra and the Karnatak in British India.^
The launching of the Home Rule agitation provoked the
Maharaja and his advisers to launch a counter-agitation
through the Samaj. The Maharaja helped to finance
2several newspapers, and a number of Maratha, Jain and 
Lingayat lecturers, of whom the most outstanding was 
A. B. Latthe. The lecturers toured Maharashtra and the 
Karnatak, denouncing the Home Rule agitation as part of 
a Brahmin conspiracy to continue their dominance of the 
agriculturists; they matched Home Rule and Congress Con­
ferences with rival Shodhak Samaj Conferences, and estab­
lished branches of the Samaj. Montagu’s Announcement 
foreshadowing progress toward self-government caused a 
redoubling of these efforts. The Samajists held meetings 
in the name of the outcastes; and they established
1. Latthe, II, 371-8.
2. Deccan Ryot. English weekly, publ. in Poona, ed. by
A. B. Latthe; Yibhakar. Anglo-Kanarese weekly, publ. in 
Belgaum, ed. by P. R. Chikodi; Jagaruk, Anglo-Marathi 
weekly, publ. in Poona, ed. by V. R. Kothari: Latthe, II 
575; Bombay NP, 1917. Index.
3. born 1887, Jain, a lawyer; adviser to the Maharaja 
since 1912; other lecturers included Marathas, B. Yadav,
B. Jadhav, C. D. Naik; a Jain, B. Patil; Lingayats, R. B. 
Artal, P. G-. Holkathi; see e.g. Bombay Police 1918. pars 
578, 664(a), (b), (c).
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Associations to make representations to Montagu on behalf 
of the Marathas, the Lingayats and other agricultural 
castes, as well as the outcastes, each of which requested 
that, if advance were made toward responsible government, 
they should receive separate communal representation.'1 23'
The first open expression of resentment at the 
Brahmin monopolisation of administrative positions in 
Madras was made by members of the non-Brahmin professional 
and business elite in their evidence before the Public 
Services Commission in 1912. This elite received its 
main impetus to organise in furtherance of its interests 
in response to the Home Rule agitation under Mrs Besant.
In her Theosophical preaching and in her call for the 
rebuilding of a "new India" she continually invoked the 
greatness of Brahmanical Hinduism and philosophical 
systems, notably Advaita.~ But, as has been pointed
1. Bombay Police 1915. par. 569; 1916, pars 610(d): 
cf. 530(e), "563(f)i 610(c); 1917. pars 760(f), 930(f), 
1058, 1081, 1224(u), 1245(j)TTk), 1288; cf. for 1918 
developments, 1918. par. 578; Home Poll Dep. Mar 1918, 
no. 41, p. 6; May 1918, no. 22, ’Bombay1; May 1918, no. 
64, p. 4; Mahratta. 7 May 1916, p. 219; Matthew, Patil. 
p. 119; Addresses of Deccan Ryots’ Association, Mar­
athas, Lingayats, Backward Classes in Montagu Addresses, 
pp. 68-70, 89-90; Montagu, Diary, p. 148; R. Kumar, op. cit., p. 508.
2. 6wadesamitran. 10 Jan 1913; Madras Standard. 17 Jan 
1913; cf. Kistna Patrika. 22 Peb 1913, in T O  Delhi. Region VIII, file 14/2.
3. see Chapter II above.
out recently,1 23most caste non-Brahmins in the south were
adherents of Saiva Siddhantism, which was distinct from
the systems of thought adhered to by Tamil Brahmins, and
were angered by Mrs Besant's equation of Hindu with
Brahmanical values. Her association with Brahmins and
2her eulogies of their intellectual eminence led the 
non-Brahmins to regard her as ’’the Irish Brahmani'1 
working for the benefit of the Brahmins.^ This impression 
appeared to be confirmed at the 1916 Madras Provincial 
Conference when, in an effort to identify herself with 
the impetuous young men of Madras politics, she vigor­
ously opposed the provision in the Conference reforms 
resolution that one-fifth of the seats in the Madras 
legislature should be reserved for nomination by the 
Governor, even though the non-Brahmins present pointed 
out to her it was intended that the Governor should 
ensure the representation of the politically-backward
1. E. Irschick, ”A Preliminary Note on the Intellectual 
Background to Tamil Separatism, 1900-29” (unpublished 
paper, University of Chicago), pp. 8-9, n. 25.
2. see, e.g., A. Besant, ”The Necessity for Social 
Reform”, Sept 1914, in The Birth of New India, p. 225.
3. Non-Brahman. 28 Jan 1917 in HEM Delhi, Region VIII, 
file 16/2.
non-Brahmins. ~L Furthermore there was deep personal 
enmity between Mrs Besant and T. M. Bair, a doctor and 
medical journalist who was to become one of the non- 
Brahmin leaders, and she had exacerbated this by helping 
to defeat him in the election to the Imperial Legislative
pCouncil in 1916. In December 1916, three months after 
the inauguration of Mrs Besant’s HRL and at the time the 
Government was rumoured to have sent home its Reforms 
despatch, the non-Brahmin South Indian Liberal 
Federation (or "Association”) was founded, which issued 
a Manifesto opposing the attempt to ’undermine the 
influence and authority of the British Rulers who alone 
in the present circumstances of India are able to hold 
the scales even between creed and class’.^
The South Indian Liberal Federation comprised a 
portion of the non-Brahmin professional and business 
elite of Madras City and a number of large landowners, 
gamindars as well as peasant proprietors, under the
1• Report of the 22nd Madras Provincial Conference held 
at Madura. Ma.v 191£", pp. 182-199«
2. see I. Irschick, "Politics and Social Conflict in 
South India: The Non-Brahmin Movement and Tamil Separatism 
1916 to 1929”, Ch. II, pp. 30-1; the Editor of Justice. 
Madras [i.e. T. M. Hair], Evolution of Mrs Besant. being 
the Life and Public Activities of Mrs Annie Besant. pp*321 
333, 336; A. Besant, ”Dr Nair and Annie Besant”, pp.ii-iv.
3« Hindu, 20 Dec 1916, p. 8; New India. 21 Dec 1916, p.8 
Home Poll Dep. Jan 1917, no. 45, ’Madras’.
leadership of P. Theagaraya Chetti, a leading Madras 
merchant, and Dr T. M. Hair.1 2*56 The elitist nature of the 
Federation was demonstrated by the fact that it had only 
300 members in October 1917.^ While the Federation’s 
promise to found branches in the mofussil was fulfilled 
in but a perfunctory manner, it published newspapers in 
English, Tamil and Telugu,^ and matched Home Rule meet­
ings and conferences with anti-Horne Rule meetings and
angry demonstrations.^ Following Montagu’s Announcement
5these activities increased, and the Federation also held 
meetings claiming to represent outcastes.^ In their 
Address to Montagu, the Federation deprecated any rapid 
advance to self-government and demanded separate 
representation which would have placed Brahmins in a
1. Home Poll Dep. Jan 1917, no. 45; P. T. Chetti was 
President of the South India Chamber of Commerce.
2. Leader. 24 Oct 1917, p. 9.
3« Non-Brahman. English weekly; Justice, English daily; 
Dravidan. Tamil daily; Andraprakasika. Telugu daily;
Home Poll Dep. Mar 1917, no. 33; June 1917, no. 69.
4* New India. 24 May 1917, p. 9c-d; Home Poll Dep. Apr
1917, no. 60; June 1917, no. 69; Sept 1917, no. 6; Mar
1918, no. 40.
5. ibid., Nov 1917, no. 30; Jan 1918, no. 59.
6. see Address of the Non-Brahman Communities of Madras 
Presidency, Montagu Addresses, p. 59.
permanent minority in the Madras Councils.'*'
These non-Brahmin and low-caste movements threatened
to delay the advance to Home Rule. The addresses presented 
to Montagu, demanding safeguards for politically-backward 
and economically-depressed groups and opposing the rapid 
devolution of power to the "articulate classes", prov­
ided welcome propaganda for the British opponents of 
reform and gave a hollow ring to the claim of Congress
and the Muslim League to speak for "all creeds, classes
2and communities". They threatened to divide and weaken 
the national movement, more immediately in Madras and 
the Deccan and prospectively in the Punjab and Bengal.
II
The Home-Rule Leaders* Response.
Mrs Besant and Tilak recognised that they must 
counter these threats. They had to demonstrate their own 
representative character and the unrepresentative char­
acter of the non-Brahmin movements and they had to 
resolve in some way the conflict between the old nat­
ional elite and the rising non-Brahmin elite. They might 
try to weaken their opponents by counter-propaganda; try
1* see Montagu Addresses, pp. 58-9; JSC on G- of I Bill, 
Evidence, K. V. Reddi on behalf of South Indian Liberal 
Federation, pp. 175-8 and QQ 3202-4, p. 190.
2. see Addresses of the AICC and the Council of the AIML, Montagu Addresses, p. 15.
to distract them from their special interests, by 
invoking shared religious interests or the wider interest 
of patriotism; or attempt to undermine the new elite, by 
setting up rival organisations; or try to come to terms 
with them, by accepting some of their demands and oblig­
ing the old elite groups to give up some of their special 
claims.
It seems certain that sooner or later the leaders 
of the national movement would have to come to terms with 
the non-Brahmin groups, and prevail upon the old elite 
to share power with them. Tilak, however, had identif­
ied himself with the conservative majority of his 
Ghitpavan Brahmin community and wished without doubt to 
preserve its social and political dominance in Maharash­
tra. Mrs Besant was not committed in the same way to the 
preservation of the Brahmin position. She had warned the 
Madras Brahmins that they must prepare to share their 
position with others or face an equivalent of the French 
Revolution,1 and in Bombay and northern India she had 
worked with non-Brahmins and Muslims, nevertheless in 
Madras she had identified herself closely with the 
Brahmins and was neither willing nor, if she wished to
1 . A. Besant, Wake Up . India, pp. 292-3*
retain her leadership of the Congress there, able to 
dissociate herself from that community. She and Tilak 
therefore made little straightforward attempt to come to 
terms with the new elites, but they used every other 
weapon in their armoury to avert the threats to the 
national movement.
They began by trying to ignore the non-Brahmin 
movements. In their newspapers they gave them as little 
publicity as possible: after deploring the lack of 
patriotism revealed in the non-Brahmin Manifesto, ITew 
India announced that its columns were closed to corres­
pondence on the matter.1 23 Like the Hindu and Tilak's 
papers it rarely mentioned non-Brahmin meetings or
pdemonstrations, except to dismiss them as "packed-up”.
But silence in the press was matched by more vigor­
ous counter-attacks from the platform. At meetings and 
conferences in Maharashtra and the Karnatak, Tilak and 
his lieutenants argued that the Home Rule movement did 
not aim at Brahmin oligarchy.1 In Madras Mrs Besant very
1. New India. 21 Dec 1916, p. 8.
2. see e.g. Mahratta, 7 May 1916, p. 219.
3. see Bombay Police 1917. pars 1080 (m), (n).
wisely left the task of denying that the Home Rule
movement was aiming at a Brahmin oligarchy to an honoured
non-Brahmin Congressman, P. Kesava Pillai.^ Although
Mrs Besant’s most prominent co-workers in Madras were
Brahmins she had contacts and supporters among the
wealthy landowning and Chetti commercial families, and
while the non-Brahmin movement was in its initial stages
she was able to call on them to preside at conferences
to give an appearance of reality to such denials.
Positions of honour at nationalist conferences remained
as a bait to be offered to important non-Brahmins who
were wavering between the Home Rule and non-Brahmin 
2movements. Tilak also used this device; early in 1918, 
for example, he asked the young M. R. Jayakar, a Pathare 
Prabhu, to preside at the Poona District Conference.^ 
Tilak’s staunchest non-Brahmin supporter was V. R. Shinde 
a Maratha, who had joined Ranade’s Prarthana Samaj and 
had devoted himself to the betterment of the outcastes
1. see. e.g. Home Poll Dep. Jan 1917, no. 45; Mar 1917, 
nos 27j 32 and 33; Apr 1917, no. 61, ’Madras’; Hew India 
1 Jan 1917, p. 7(b).
2. among these was C. Karunakara Menon, the editor of 
Indian Patriot, see Home Poll B, May 1917, nos 445-8.
3« Bombay Police 1918, par. 169; Jayakar, I, 176.
through the Depressed Classes M i s s i o n I n  both these 
institutions he was associated with Brahmins who were 
working for social reform and for social harmony. 
Tilak’s lieutenants also had friends and political co­
workers among educated non-Brahmins who took a similar
attitude and who supported the Home Rule movement on
2grounds of patriotism.
Mrs Besant and Tilak appealed to Hindu religious 
sentiment as a means of uniting lower-caste Hindus with 
Brahmins in support of Home Rule. After Mrs Besant1 234s 
interment in 1917 particularly, her lieutenants organ­
ised meetings and worship in temples in Madras and 
throughout India.^ It was necessary of course to avoid 
giving the impression that the Home Rule movement was 
purely Hindu in Muslim areas: in Bihar, for example, 
Home Rule processions were taken to both temples and 
mosques.'1' Mrs Besant was unaware, apparently, of the
1. interview with Prof. Phatak, 22 June 1963; Bombay 
Police 1917. par. 59; Matthew, Patil, pp. 120ff.
2. e.g. Malji and Karguppi, Lingayat supporters of G-. 
Deshpande at Belgaum: see Bombay Police 1917. pars 899(l), 
1080li); cf. pars 1014(i), 1039(o).
3. New India, 2 June 1917, p. 5b; 16 July 1917, p. 7c;
24 July 1917, p. 6a; 27 July 1917, p. 6a; 31 July 1917, 
p. 6b; Hindu, 19 June 1917, p. 5; A. Besant, “Interment 
Diary“, 17 July 1917, p. 45: HI am very glad that archanas 
in temples are being performed for us; that will move the 
people as nothing else will“.
4. 3 & 0 Police 1917. pars 1128, 1129.
danger that in the south appeals to Hindu religious 
sentiments could have divisive rather than unifying 
effects, since, as we have seen, non-Brahmins and Brah­
mins were adherents of different doctrines. Such 
dangers were less in Maharashtra, with its traditions 
of religious, intellectual consensus based on the 
sharing of bhakti values by all castes.1 2345 At a Home Rule 
lecture given in the Maruti temple at Poona in June 1917, 
Kelkar said:
There are about 250 temples in this city 
and if speeches on Swaraj are made in 
them I am sure our propaganda will spread 
with the utmost rapidity and reap a rich harvest.^
Home Rule meetings were held in temples and before shrines
in towns throughout Maharashtra and the Karnatak;^
speakers used religious imagery and parables;^ and 
5kirtankars gave recitals in which swara.i was extolled.
1. see R. Kumar, op. cit., e.g. p. 536.
2. Bombay Police 1917. par. 701(c).
3. Bombay Police 1917« pars 156(d), 513(d), 670(e), 
1014(h), (i), (1),1057(11), 1058, 1080(i); Home Poll Dep. 
July 1917, no. 35, p. 6; Aug 1917, no. 2, p. 20.
4. e.g. Khaparde, see Bombay Police 1917. pars 637(c), (d).
5. singers of kirtans. religious songs.
Remembering the Hindu-Muslim riots following his 
G-anpati and Shivaji Festivals in the 1890s, Tilak was 
careful in 1917-19 to avoid giving offence to the 
Muslims.'1 2' Some of his lieutenants however were less 
cautious and in later years were to encourage anti- 
Muslim feeling as a means of diverting the non-Brahmin 
castes from their antipathy toward the Brahmins. The 
Arya Samaj was to play a similar game in northern India 
as a means of wooing the Hindu peasantry from its 
alliance with the Muslims in the Punjab.
The impetus given to the non-Brahmin movements by 
Montagu's Announcement of August 1917 and his promised 
visit prompted the nationalist leadership to step up 
its attempts to woo support from the non-Brahmin groups.
A number of non-Brahmins remained supporters of Congress 
and in September 1917 Mrs Besant's lieutenants encour­
aged the pro-Horne Rule non-Brahmins of Madras to form the
Madras Presidency Association, with P. Kesava Pillai as 
2President. The Association held meetings endorsing the
1. During the 1917 Baqr Id riots in Bihar he joined 
Jinnah in a pacificatory mission to the CP and joined a 
Moharram procession in Poona; Home Poll Dep. Nov 1917, 
no. 29, p. 24; Jan 1918, no. 1, p. 7.
2. Home Poll Dep. Nov 1917, no. 7; Madras Presidency 
Association: Rules and Office Bearers 1917; Leader,
24 Oct 1917, p. 9. —  ' ----
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Congress-League Scheme in Madras and the mofussil,1 234 and
under its auspices V. 0. Chidambaram Pillai and other
non-Brahmins toured the Presidency lecturing in Tamil
2and Telugu in support of Home Rule. The Association 
published a. Tamil-, and an English-language newspaper, 
at a loss made good by Mrs Besant’s Chetti supporters.^ 
In Maharashtra Tilak encouraged V. R. Shinde to estab­
lish Maratha Leagues in Bombay, Poona and other towns. 
These Leagues held meetings and Provincial Conferences 
which were attended by Maratha agriculturists and work­
men and addressed by Tilak’s Brahmin lieutenants in 
addition to Shinde himself, and ’’passed” appropriate 
resolutions supporting the Congress-League Scheme.^
The Home Rulers in Madras sought to undermine 
potential low-caste support for the anti-Home Rule 
movement. They were not, however, tempted to follow the
1. see e.g. Madras Presidency Association: Presidential 
Address delivered at the i.ladura./Ramnad/Tinnevellv Group 
Conferencef 10 Lee IQ17, by G-enrge Jneeph, Bpy-at-L^w.
2. Home Poll Dep. Mar 1918» no. 41, ’Madras’, par. 9; 
May 1918, no. 21, p. 3; no. 22, p. 3; no. 65, p. 2; Aug 
1918, no. 31, p. 4; other lecturers included P. Vara- 
darajalu Uaidu, Andinarayana. Chetti.
3. Home Poll Dep. Jan 1918, no. 60, p. 2; B, Dec 1917, 
nos 225-28, pp. 13-14; Dep. Mar 1918, no. 41; the Tamil 
paper was the Desabhaktan. the English paper, the Indian 
Patriot.
4. Bombay Police 1917. pars 1224(s), (t), 1245(l), 1288; 
Home Poll Dep. Jan 1918, no. 60, pp. 4-5.
example of the younger politicians in the UP in espousing 
the discontents of the low-caste agricultural labourers 
against the non-Brahmin landowners, since many Brahmins 
themselves owned land and were unwilling to rouse a 
socio-economic revolution which would affect their own 
labourers. In Maharashtra the non-Brahmin movement had 
permeated the mass of peasants far more thoroughly than 
in Madras, thanks to the continued efforts of the Satya 
Shodhak Samaj,1 2and such tactics would have been commen- 
surately more difficult. Here also the Brahmins feared to 
precipitate social revolution.
The Home Rulers of Madras and Bombay City there­
fore sought to undermine the potential support for the 
non-Brahmin movement in the urban proletariat which was 
small and more easily-controllable than the rural 
masses. The rise in food prices during the War brought 
great hardship to Indian workers and from the middle of 
1917 strikes occurred in the railways and post-offices 
which the Home Rulers and Madras Presidency Associationpassisted with funds and organisational advice. This
1. see Matthew, Patil, pp. 115-8, 129ff.
2. see Home Poll Dep. Nov 1917, no. 7, ’Madras’, par.
13; Mar 1918, no. 41, ’Madras', par. 9.
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gave them the idea of organising trade unions among the
workers in the railway workshops of Madras and Hegapatam
and the mills of Madras and Madura.'*' They forestalled
the South Indian Liberal Federation in acquiring support
among the urban proletariat: indeed it was not until
April 1918 that the Federation started a trade-union
2organisation opposed to Home Rule. In Bombay City the 
Home Rulers helped the railwaymen and post-office workers 
to organise, and Shinde’s Maratha League held meetings in 
areas inhabited by working men who were attracted by the 
tamasha (or ”show").^
In founding pro-Horne-Rule non-Brahmin organisations 
and in working among the urban proletariat, the Home 
Rulers were not only trying to weaken the non-Brahmin 
movement. They were also hoping to convince Montagu and 
the British Government of their right to speak on behalf 
of all "classes and communities", and to convince the 
British Labour Party, on whom they were to rely
1. see Home Poll Dep. Mar 1918, no. 40, p. 2; May 1918, 
no. 64, p. 3; no. 65, p. 2; Aug 1918, no. 29? ’Madras’, 
par. 9; Sept 1918, no. 41? p. 3«
2. Home Poll Lep. May 1918, no. 64.
3. see Home Poll B, Jan 1918, nos 487-90, p. 5; Dep. 
Sept 1917? no. 5? p. 6; B, Sept 1917? nos 139-43;
Bombay Police 1917. par. 1245tl).
increasingly for support, of their concern for the 
masses. They succeeded in the second of these tasks; 
as to the first, Montagu was not sympathetic to the non- 
Brahmins1 2 claims for separate representation and did 
not water down his Reforms in response to the anti-Horne 
Rule agitation.1
The encouragement given by Tilak and Mrs Besant to 
the formation of pro-Home-Rule, non-Brahmin organisations 
marked a step towards coming to terms with the rising 
groups. If these organisations wished to compete for 
non-Brahmin support with the organisations opposing Home 
Rule, they had to further and protect non-Brahmin inter­
ests, and, therefore, also demanded safeguards and oppor­
tunities for the acquisition of power by the non-Brahmins. 
In their Addresses to Montagu and Chelmsford, the Madras 
Presidency Association, the All-India Maratha Conference 
and the Bombay Depressed Classes Mission all demanded 
separate electorates or reserved places in the reformed 
Councils for non-Brahmins. The reform scheme submitted 
by the Madras Presidency Association, for example, would
1. see JSC on G- of I Bill, Evidence, passim.
2. Montagu Addresses, pp. 48-9, 74, 90.
have made it impossible for Brahmins to stand for more 
than 35 out of a total of 100 seats open for election to 
the Madras legislature and, although 45 members (15 
Brahmin and 30 non-Brahmin) would have been elected by 
general constituencies, at least another seven would have 
been elected by separate non-Brahmin electorates.1 23
While condemning Brahmins to a minority in the legis­
lature this scheme would have still allowed Brahmins to 
influence voting results through their membership of the 
general constituencies and was therefore less detrimental 
to Brahmin influence than the scheme of the South Indian 
Liberal Federation which demanded a majority of separate
non-Brahmin electorates in which Brahmins would be ex-
2eluded from voting.
Indeed in response to the upsurge of anti-Home Rule 
propaganda following Montagu1s Announcement, Tilak's 
Mahratta "heartily supported" the demand for special 
electorates for Lingayats, Marathas and Jains and sugg­
ested a round-table conference of caste leaders to work 
out the details.1 Mrs Besant remained non-committal on
1. Montagu Addresses, p. 49.
2. ibid., pp. 58-9-
3. Mahratta. 7 Oct 1917, p. 478.
this point1 and the Mahratta did not repeat its offer.
Why did Tilak and Mrs Besant not make a more deter­
mined effort to come to terms with the non-Brahmins on 
the basis of separate electorates? Several reasons may be 
adduced. In the short run, at least, it must have seemed 
that the movements led by Latthe, Theagaraya Ghetti and 
Dr Bair were unlikely to support Home Rule at any price: 
their attitude to the national leadership was too 
embittered; furthermore they believed that the non- 
Brahmins had more to gain from alliance with the British 
than with the Home Rule movement. Secondly the national 
leadership believed that communal representation would 
have a permanently divisive effect on Hindu society.
While the Congress had agreed to separate representation 
for the Muslims, it had done so on the understanding that 
this arrangement would be temporary only. Moreover the 
non-Brahmins demanded too much; the arrangement with the 
Muslims left the Hindus with a majority (or, at the 
least, parity) in every legislature whereas the non- 
Brahmins of the Deccan and Madras envisaged a permanent 
swamping of the Brahmins by non-Brahmins. The Brahmins 
of Maharashtra and Madras were quite unwilling to acquiesce
1 . see e.g. Home Poll Dep. Nov 1917, no. 30, p. 7.
in such a position and it is hardly surprising that the 
Mahratta dropped its "hearty support” for separate 
electorates. Finally, even assuming that Tilak and 
Besant could have got the Brahmins of these two areas to 
accept communal representation for the non-Brahmins, it 
was most unlikely that they could have persuaded the 
dominant Hindu elements in Bengal and the rest of India 
to agree to such a move, for it would have encouraged 
similar demands which were as yet weak or inchoate in 
areas outside western and southern India.
Thus while Besant and Tilak did succeed in winning 
the support of a considerable number of non-Brahmins for 
the Home Rule movement and the Congress-League Scheme, 
they failed either to crush the anti-IIome Rule movement 
or to come to terms with it. The South Indian Liberal 
Federation remained to become the basis of the Justice 
Party which achieved the dominant position in the reformed 
Madras legislature in the 1920s, while in the Deccan the 
anti-Congress movement among the non-Brahmins gathered in 
strength and achieved a similar position in the Bombay 
legislature in alliance with the Moderate Brahmins,who 
broke away from the Congress in 1916. In both of these 
areas therefore the national movement was distracted and 
weakened at a time when new areas, notably the UP and 
Gujarat, were being drawn into it.
Chapter VI
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MRS BESAHT * S AND TILAIC* S LOSS OF LEADERSHIP:
JUNE 1917 - DECEMBER 1918
Mrs Besant, in conjunction with Tillak and Jinnah 
had succeeded in re-uniting the Extremists with the 
Congress Moderates, and in uniting the Congress and 
the Muslim League in support of the Congress-League 
Scheme of Reforms at the end of 1916.^
The Congress-League entente was arrived at by the 
Hindu and Muslim elites which were active in those two 
bodies but, as we shall see in this chapter, this 
reconciliation did not reach to the masses of the 
two communities. Even among the elite a considerable 
proportion was dissatisfied with the terms of the 
Scheme. This was particularly true of the Muslims, a 
number of whom established organisations to further 
the objects of Muslims alone, which opposed the 
Congress-League Scheme - a dangerous portent for the 
development of communal loyalties which in a later 
period were to wreck efforts to reconcile the two 
communities. Furthermore, the younger members of the
1. see Chapters II, III and IV above.
Muslim League, who had been attracted by the Pan- 
Islamic propaganda of the Ali Brothers, Ansari and 
others before 1914, became increasingly assertive 
and critical of the moderation of Jinnah and the 
other leaders of the Muslim League in 1917-18, thus 
introducing instability into the League.
Severe strains also appeared within the Congress 
between the Moderates on the one hand and the Extrem­
ists and young men (who, together, referred to them­
selves as "Nationalists") on the other. In yoking 
these two groups together in Congress, Mrs Besant had 
two aims. First, this "united front" would speak with 
one voice and would, she hoped, convince the British 
that it spoke for the whole of India and that its 
demand for self-government was irresistible. She hoped 
secondly that the Extremists, once inside Congress, 
would impart fresh vigour to its demands for self- 
government, which might satisfy the impetuosity of the 
young men; and that association with the Moderates 
would restrain both Extremists and young men. The 
balance attained between the Moderates and Nationalists 
in this united front was most precarious and, indeed, 
it is difficult to see how it could have been main­
tained for long. On the one hand, the Moderates
(especially those of Bombay) resented Mrs Besant’s 
ascendancy in the national movement and Tilak's read­
mission to it, and were fearful lest Mrs Besant’s and 
Tilak’s criticism of the Government bring down the 
Government's wrath on the movement as a whole. 
Dissatisfaction with the Government's obduracy in the 
face of Indian demands for advance to self-government 
prompted the Moderates of other provinces to override 
their Bombay colleagues in agreeing to the formation 
of Mrs Besant's united front, but it was clear that 
if the British obduracy softened the Moderates might 
be wooed away from the united front. On the other 
hand the Extremists had advocated the resort to passive 
resistance as a means of coercing the Government into 
granting concessions and many of the young men had been 
attracted by this political method. To the Moderates 
resort to such sanctions was anathema.
The united front could only have been maintained 
if Mrs Besant could have mollified her Moderate critics 
(by reserving places in the Congress leadership for 
them, for instance); if the British maintained their 
obduracy; and if Mrs Besant had been able to devise a 
programme which satisfied both Moderates and 
Nationalists. We shall see that none of these
conditions was fulfilled.
It seemed at first as if she had been able to devise 
a programme satisfactory to both groups in her Home Rule 
agitation, which was taken up by Tilak. In this they 
renounced recourse to sanctions, such as passive resis­
tance, but at the same time provided the young men with 
a more aggressive programme than had been provided by 
the Moderates and one which, Mrs Besant assured them, 
promised rapid progress to self-government. This pro­
gramme of agitation without sanctions only served, however 
to increase the instability of the united front. Not 
only did it frighten the more timid Moderates but it 
increased the impetuosity of the young men, so that they 
demanded some more active outlet for their feelings, and 
turned to passive resistance.
The proposals to launch passive resistance con­
vinced the Moderates that they could not trust Mrs 
Besant or her moderation, and made the young men 
unwilling to return to the straightjacket of agitation 
without sanctions. The balance inside the united 
front had thus been upset and, while the form of the 
united front might continue, the balance would 
have been very difficult to re-establish. The best
course for Mrs Besant and Tilak to take in order to 
retain their leadership, would probably have been to 
accept the alienation of the Moderates as a fact and 
to identify themselves with the young men’s demand for 
passive resistance, or at least to hold it up as a 
threat to encourage the British to grant a larger 
devolution of power. Left to himself, Tilak might 
have done this. Mrs Besant, however, had no programme 
of passive resistance and feared that, in any case, 
her organisation of HRLs and lieutenants was inadequate 
for the conduct of a passive-resistance campaign. She 
therefore returned to her aim of restraining, rather 
than of giving expression to, the young men and called 
upon the Moderates in the yet united AICC to help in 
this task.
Mrs Besant and Tilak were both anxious to devise 
a strategy to extract the maximum of concessions from 
the British. But both found that their attempts to do 
so were crippled by the legacy of their earlier activ­
ities. Mrs Besant, believing that her Home Rule 
agitation had done its job of making the British 
responsive to India’s demands, proposed to call off 
the agitation and parley with Montagu, in the fashion 
of Grokhale with Morley: but the temper and the
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expectations she had aroused by agitation made it 
impossible for her to simply give up agitation alto­
gether and concentrate on parleying. Tilak on the 
other hand would have liked to bring pressure upon 
the British to grant more generous Reforms by getting 
Congress to reject the British Government's initial 
proposals as inadequate, but he found that this could 
not be done if the united front with the Moderates was 
to be retained. Tilak expressed this dilemma in a 
letter to his Madras supporter, Vijiaraghavachariar:
"....Our main difficulty at present is to get 
as many Moderates with us as possible with­
out giving up our principles. These principles 
are - (l) we must not accept the scheme as it 
is; and (2) the modifications we insist upon 
should be such as would bring Montagu's scheme 
as near as possible to the Congress-League 
scheme. I for myself would have preferred if 
Montagu's scheme is rejected altogether. But 
you can [?] get a majority for it in the 
Congress and it is not advisable, especially 
at this time, to cause a split in the Congress.
A few Moderates will keep out do what you can. 
But, excepting these few, we must try to get 
all the others in our fold. That is what we 
have decided to do after many a long discussion. 
Still it is desirable that [the] total rejection 
view should be put before the Subjects Comm­
ittee. I would have done it myself, if I had 
not been an organiser of the Special Congress 
session and had not during the course of that 
organisation explained both privately and 
publicly the minimum that we should insist 
upon. I therefore request you to do that work 
for me in the Subjects Committee. Some friends 
from Bombay will support you. Eventually 
however we may [sic!] accept a compromise on
the lines stated above.
The Congressmen don't care as to what 
happens after the Session is over. But the 
home rulers mean to work in England; and for 
that purpose we must resolve clearly that the 
Montagu scheme is unsatisfactory and not 
acceptable to us unless and until certain 
vital modifications are made therein. The 
deputation will then work on these lines in 
England. I know that this [is] equivalent 
to practically rejecting the Montagu scheme.
But if this form will please many - if not 
all - Moderates I think we should accept 
this formal compromise after putting our view 
before the Subjects Committee.
I have fully explained my position to 
Mr Rajagopalacharya and Mr Chidambaram Pillay 
and they will be able to give you further 
explanations if necessary...M1
As this letter also illustrates, in order to maintain
organisational unity Mrs Besant and Tilak posed as the
champions of compromise between the views of the
Moderates and those of the Extremists and young men.
They thus surrendered their identification with their
followers among the latter. Tilak was more cautious
than Mrs Besant in trying to impose restraint upon the
more impetuous and therefore severed his identity with
them less thoroughly. But as another South Indian
supporter of Tilak, Rajaji, wrote:
Besant and Tilak have become mediators between 
Nationalists and seceding Moderates. Their
1. B. Gr. Tilak to Vijiaraghavachariar, 8 Aug 1918, 
Vi.i. Pacers.
position [is thus] incompatible [with] 
leadership of full Nationalists1 claim.
Tilak definitely says [he] cannot now 
consequently lead [the] party 
representing by [sic] his own principles. 
Therefore other strenuous leaders must 
take charge of full Nationalist demands.
As this suggests, the young men were starting to look
for other ’’strenuous leaders” who would express their
temper more accurately than either Mrs Besant or
Tilak. At the end of this period we shall see that
they thought they had found such a spokesman in
0. R. Das.
I
June - September 1917.
The Bombay Moderates had been accustomed to order­
ing the affairs of Congress and resented Mrs Besant*s 
rise to popularity and her threat with Tilak, to usurp 
their control; at the same time, while mollified by the 
avoidance of passive resistance by Mrs Besant and Tilak,
1. telegram, Rajaji to Vijiaraghavachariar, 19 Aug 
1918, Vij. Papers.
they feared that the Home Rule agitation would rouse
the young politicians and mass groups to uncontrollable
violence and provoke the British to fierce repression.
Their attitude to Mrs Besant and to Tilak's readmission
to Congress was revealed in a letter written by Wacha
just before Mrs Besant’s internment in mid-1917:
Touching Mrs Besant I may frankly tell you 
that she has never impressed me....I have 
not disguised my opinion...that the Madras 
Provincial Congress Committee committed a 
grave error when they admitted her....I 
stood alone, with only 3 or 4 other Bombay 
men for 4 years [against the readmission 
of the Tilakites]....At Bombay we firmly 
resisted her from [sic]establishing the 
Home Rule League.... our progress in Self 
Government would have been accelerated if 
she had never joined the Congress. It is 
her propaganda that has frightened our 
rulers who have therefore held us up and 
kept us at arm's length.1
In Bengal too the old Moderate leaders were jealous 
of Mrs Besant’s rise to leadership: unlike some Moder­
ates in other parts of India Banerjea and Bhupendranath
2Basu did not join the HRL at the time of her internment.
Temporarily at least, most Moderates put aside 
their criticisms of Besant and Tilak in the face of
1. cf. Ch. IV above. D. E. Wacha to Vijiaraghavachariar 
11 June 1917, Vij. Papers.
2. Navak. 15 June 1917, in Bengal NP. 1917. pp. 772-3; 
cf. P. C. Ray’s letter to the Leader. 4 Oct 1917, p. 8.
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the Governors* censure of the demand for self- government 
and the internment of Mrs Besant in April-June 1917. At 
the Bombay Provincial Conference, over which he presided 
in May 1917, Srinivasa Sastri stood shoulder-to-shoulder 
with his Extremist fellow-delegates in chiding the Gov­
ernors for the ”undiscriminating dislike of all political 
agitation” and in asserting: ”We want political power; let 
there be no mistake about it. We want the right to rule 
ourselves”.1 23 After the internment, the Moderates of the
pDeccan Sabha in Poona joined the Moderates and National­
ists of the Indian Association in Calcutta and the Bombay 
Presidency Association in protesting at the Governors* 
condemnation of the demand for Home Rule and at the intern­
ments.1 With Malaviya many a Moderate might have said
As for Mrs Besant, I have had some very sharp 
differences with her in the past. But I 
cannot but admire her and feel grateful to her 
for the splendid manner in which she has been 
sacrificing herself at her age in the cause of 
Indian progress and reform.*..If she is 
exposed to suffering in that cause, thousands 
of Indians who have not been able to see eye
1. New India* 14 May 1917, p. 3, emphasis in original; 
cf. Mahratta. 13 May 1917, pp. 224-6.
2. The Poona Moderate Association, founded in 1896 by 
Ranade (to replace the Sarvajanik Sabha, captured by 
TilakJ and revived in 1909 by Gokhale.
3. Representation from the Deccan Sabha to the Viceroy 
[1917], undated copy held among Deccan Sabha Papers* SIS, 
Poona; Indian Association Minutes 7 July 1917; Bombay 
Presidency Association Minutes* 12, 15, 18 and 23 June 
1917; cf. Bengalee* 31 May 1917, in Bengal NP, 1917.
pp. 173, 728. --- ----- 1--
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to eye with her in all things, will 
think it their duty to stand by her and 
to follow her.l
But, no sooner had this unity been proclaimed than 
the adherence of the Moderates to the united front 
was subjected to strains both from inside and outside 
the Congress. The strains from inside arose from two 
proposals put forward by the young men and assented to 
by Tilak and Besant: first that the movement undertake 
a campaign of passive resistance; and secondly that 
Mrs Besant should preside over the ensuing annual 
Session of the Congress. Those from outside resulted 
from the appointment of Montagu as Secretary of State 
for India and his Announcement of 20 August 1917 on 
the question of self-government for India.
With the first rumours that the Home Rule leaders 
were to be interned, the young men's minds turned to 
passive resistance: the agitation which Mrs Besant and 
Tilak had carried on in the press and from the platform 
im support of the demand for Home Rule had induced a 
sense of defiance of the British among their young 
followers and had roused great enthusiasm among them. 
They turned to passive resistance more out of anger at
1. Hindu. 20 June 1917, p. 4; cf. ibid., 28 June 1917,
p. 3.
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the British than as part of any plan of political
action.1 234 Passive resistance had been given a new lease
of life in 1917 by G-andhi ' s refusal to comply with
2Government orders in Champaran, Bihar, and it was to 
Gandhi that the young men now turned for a programme of 
passive resistance and for leadership in putting it 
into action.^ The lead in approaching Gandhi was 
taken by Mrs Besant’s Bombay lieutenants, Jamnadas 
Dwarkadas and Shankarlal Banker; and Sir Subramania 
Aiyer and Mrs Besant’s other staunch followers took 
up the idea. Gandhi visited Bombay and Madras briefly 
from Champaran and, while he was too busy at Champaran 
to lead the campaign, he suggested that the young men 
should march from Bombay to Mrs Besantfs place of 
internment - about 500 miles! - and that she should
1. Rangaswamiaiyer [A. Rangaswami Iyengar?] to 
Vijiaraghavachariar, 10 June 1917, Vi.i. Papers.
2. Gandhi, Experiments, pp. 497-507; for his passive 
resistance campaign in South Africa, 1906-14, see next 
chapter.
3. Yajnik, Autobiography, pp. 25-6; Jamnadas, ’’Memoire”, 
pp. 281-3.
4. B & 0 Police 1917. pars 803, 825-6, 862, 968;
Mahratta. 15 May 1917, p. 333; Bombay Police 1917. par.
783(n); Besant, ’Internment Diary”, 7 July 1917; Home Poll 
Dep. Sept 1917, no. 5, pp. 11-12; ibid., no. 6, p. 11; 
ibid., B, Aug 1917, nos 195-8, p. 21; interview with S. G. 
Banker, 27 June 1963 ; Gandhi to A. Besant, 10 May 1919, 
no. S 6605, Gandhi Papers Sabarmati.
then defy her internment orders, presumably by 
marching out of Ootacaraund at their head, Jamnadas 
and his young associates accepted Gandhi’s advice 
eagerly and collected the signatures of over 1000 
young Bombay men who were prepared to offer passive 
resistance.1 2
Mrs Besant and Tilak both endorsed the young 
men’s demand for passive resistance. Besant seems to 
have been thoroughly aroused by her own propaganda and 
by the enthusiasm of her young followers. She had 
foreshadowed the possibility of resisting Government
porders before her internment, and now set to work, in 
her own words, ”to think out methods, so as to adapt 
P. R. to Indian conditions....Meetings at which people 
cheer, go home to their suppers and then to bed, and 
to business next morning as usual, will never convince 
the Government that they are in earnest”, she wrote.
1. Home Poll B. July 1917, nos 426-30, p. 21; 250
of these were TS members, interview with Mr Hazare,
18 May 1963; for Gandhi’s visit to Madras, see Gandhi 
to A. Besant, 10 May 1919, loc. cit.; interview with 
Rajaji, 20 March 1963.
2. editorial, ’The Coming Storm*, New India. 4 June 
1917, p. 8a-c; Jamnadas Dwarkadas to A. Besant, 27 Peb 
1919, Advar Archives: ’That *[P. R.] pledge’ included 
even the non payment of taxes after a certain date if 
you were not released. You yourself instructed me to 
include that when we were talking on the verandah out­
side your Adyar room”.
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MI hope that they [the Congress and the Muslim League] 
will decide to lead the P. K. movement”.^
Tilak was more cautious: he was too wily to be 
caught up in the young men’s enthusiasm for long 
walks, and was more sceptical than formerly of the 
preparedness of the people for a programme of thorough- 
going non-co-operation with the Government. Neverthe­
less he did not wish to stand in the way of the young 
men whom he had helped to rouse: even if a passive- 
resistance campaign could not be successfully imple­
mented, approval of the principle might serve to fright­
en the British. Through his newspapers therefore, after 
some initial hesitation, he launched a vigorous campaign 
urging its adoption on the Congress and the Muslim 
League.^
1. A. Besant, ’’Internment Diary”, 7, 8, 18 July,
3 Aug 1917; emphasis in the original. Apologists for, 
and critics of, Mrs Besant have generally agreed that 
she consistently opposed passive resistance: the evid­
ence in her own hand plainly shows this is not true.
Her latest biographer, A. H. Nethercot, has ignored 
this question, see his vol. II, 259-66.
2. Home Poll B, Aug 1917, nos 195-8, pp. 11-12; inter­
view with B. Shiva Rao, Delhi, 21 Feb, 1 Aug 1963; 
Jamnadas, ’’Memoire”, p. 283.
3* Mahratta. 26 Aug 1917, p. 403• "It is immaterial 
what particular forms of P. R. are specially commended. 
What matters most is the decision of the Joint Confer­
ence [AICC/AIML Council] in regard to the adoption of 
the principle of P. R. in the existing circumstances”, 
cf. ibid., 12 Aug 1917, p. 382, 19 Aug 1917, p. 390.
The endorsement of the young men's demand for
passive resistance by Mrs Besant and Tilak confirmed
the Bombay Moderates' suspicion of the two leaders.
Tilak and Mrs Besant themselves had upset the balance
in their programme between the Moderate and Extremist
elements. Wacha wrote sarcastically:
'Passive resistance' is an excellent phrase 
but many who cry out the shibboleth will 
never be able to give you a correct con­
ception of it....the [Home Rule] Leaguers 
have become absurdly impatient. Who can 
counsel such a clientele whose leaders under­
stand little about it [p.r.] and have no 
original thinking. The few standard bearers 
raise the cry and the mobocracy of the new 
fangled Leaguers lustily echo it. With 
passive resistance campaign and action, my 
fear is that there would be a political earth­
quake which will engulf the campaigners 
besides doing irreparable injury to the true 
progress of the country....^
Of the Bengal Moderates, Surendranath and his
circle, at least, were less fearful of the passive
resistance proposals than were Wacha and the Bombay
Moderates, or certainly less willing than were the
2latter to break with the young men over this matter. 
And at a Joint Meeting of the AICG and the Council of
1. Wacha to Vi jiaraghavachariar, 7 Aug 1917, Vi.i. 
Parers.
2. see Wacha to Vi jiaraghavachariar, 8 July 1917, Vi.1. 
Papers: "Such men like Surendranath Banarji cannot be 
wholly relied upon...."; cf. Banerjea's paper, Bangali. 
20 Aug 1917 in Bengal HP. 1917. p. 951.
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the AIML held at Bombay on 28-29 July to consider
the adoption of passive resistance, Surendranath
both presided and moved the consideration of passive
resistance, whereupon Wacha walked out in indignation,
followed by Samarth after the latter had expressed his
’’strong disapproval of the actions of Mrs Besant and
the Home Rule League”.'1' ’’There must”, wrote Wacha,
”be a parting of the ways. This is the result of a
’United' Congress. So much of disintegration and
disruption owing to the machinations of a marplot 
2alien”. In fact the voice of caution prevailed: 
the AICC-AIML Meeting referred the question of adopt­
ing passive resistance to the PCCs and the Muslim 
League Council for their recommendation, to be made 
within six weeks.
Surendranath, however, soon found himself in agree­
ment with Wacha - over the proposal that Mrs Besant 
should preside over the forthcoming annual Session of 
the Congress at Calcutta. This was first mooted in 
Mrs Besant’s own New India during her internment, and
!• Bombay Police. 1917. pars 841(w), (I); Wacha to 
Vijiaraghavachariar 3, 7 and 8 Aug 1917, Vi.1. Papers: 
Khaparde ’Diary” (Poona), 26, 27, 28, 29 July 1917.
2. Wacha to Vi jiaraghavachariar, 8 Aug 1917, Vi.i.Papers.
was enthusiastically taken up by the Nationalists.
The Moderates had proposed the Raja of Mahmudabad for
the position as the outstanding representative of
Hindu-Muslim amity, but in the PCG nomination-meetings
Mrs Besant's supporters triumphed, even in Bombay:"1 23*
not in Bengal however, at least not at first. Baner-
jea and the Moderates resented Mrs Besant's rise to
national pre-eminence, which threatened to eclipse the
2years of hard work they had devoted to the Congress.
To make matters worse, the young men in Bengal politics 
(like Datta, B. K. Lahiri, I. B. Sen, Jitendralal 
Bannerjee and Fazlul Huq) and the older Extremists 
(e.g. B. Chakravarti, Moti Lall Chose and Pal), led by 
the rising star, C. R. Das, used this issue to chall­
enge the Moderates' leadership of national politics in 
Bengal.^ Surendranath foiled a bid for the Chairman­
ship of the Reception Committee of the forthcoming 
Congress by Chakravarti, the President of the Calcutta
1. Home Poll B, July 1917, nos 426-30, w.e. 14 July 
1917; ibid. Dep. Sept 1917, no. 5, p. 6; ibid., no. 6, 
'Madras', par. 11; for Bombay Moderates' attempts to 
thwart Mrs Besant's election see Bengal NP, 1917. p. 1033.
2. see P. C. Ray's letter to the Leader♦ 4 Oct 1917, p. 8a-c.
3. for those involved, see e.g. Navak. 11 Sept 1917,
in Bengal NP, 1917. p. 1031; P. C. Ray, Life and Times of 
C. R. Das: The Story of Bengal's Self-Expression, pp.
138, 191.
branch of Mrs Besant’s HRL, and also his proposal to 
replace Mahmudabad *s name with Besant’s in the 
presidential nomination at a meeting of the Bengal 
POC on 29 August.1 23 But, with the aid of liberal 
expenditure from Chakravarti*s pocket, the Extremists 
and young Bengalis were able to pack the Reception 
Committee which met the following day: amidst uproar, 
Surendranath and 100 Moderates walked out, whereupon 
the Extremist ’’rump1' reversed the decision of the PCC.
The proposals for passive resistance and Mrs 
Besant’s election had plainly shaken the Moderates’ 
faith in the united front. They were also alienated 
by the appeal to religious sentiment by Mrs Besant's 
and Tilak's lieutenants during and after her intern­
ment. They were repelled by the confused invocations 
of ”Besant Mata” and ’’Bharat Mata” ^Mother India”) 
in temple ceremonies, and also by the discipular 
adoration lavished on Mrs Besant by her Theosophical 
followers.1
1. Home Poll Dep. Sept 1917, no. 6, pp. 8-9; Dainik 
Basumati, 31 Aug 1917 in Bengal NP. 1917. p. 995.
2. ibid., Bengal NP. 1917. pp. 247, 991.
3. see Chapter III above; cf. P. C. Ray, letter to 
the Leader. 4 Oct 1917, p. 8.
The Moderates were further enticed away from 
the united front by Montagu’s appointment to the India 
Office in July 1917. This gave Wacha, Surendranath and 
other Moderates hope that ’’better days” were in store 
for India."1 23 As Under Secretary of State for India, 
Montagu had visited India in 1911-12, and was known
2to be sympathetic to Indian aspirations for reform.
On August 20, Montagu made his famous Announce­
ment: the British intended to take ’’substantial steps” 
in introducing ’’responsible government in India”; and 
he would visit India to discuss these steps with the 
Government and representative Indian bodies.^ This 
revived the Moderates* faith in the possibility of 
gradual advance to self-government in co-operation with 
the British. They urged that agitation should cease 
and threats of passive resistance be withdrawn, so
1. Wacha to Vijiaraghavachariar, 17 July 1917, Vi.i. 
Papers; Bengal NP, 1917. pp. 863-5; Indian Association 
Minutes. 20 July 1917.
2. Just prior to his appointment he had castigated 
the Government of India in the Mesopotamia Debate and 
demanded it be thoroughly reformed: House of Gommnmq 
Debates, 12 July 1917, XCV, cols 2202-2212; The Rt 
Hon. E. S. Montagu on Indian Affairs. Ganesh, pp. 
397-417; Sir S. Subramania Aiyar’s foreword to the 
latter volume, especially pp. vii-xi.
3. House of Commons Debates. 20 Aug 1917, XCVII, cols 
1695-6; reprinted in full in [Montagu-Chelmsfordl Report 
on Indian Constitutional Reforms. I, and in part, e.g. 
in R. 0. Majumdar: History of the Freedom Movement in India. II, 498.
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that a ”calm atmosphere*1 23could he created for the
discussion of reforms during Montagu’s visit.^
While the Moderates pinned their faith on Montagu
and feared that agitation would strengthen the hands
of British opponents of reform, Tilak and Jamnadas
Dwarkadas took the opposite view. They claimed that
any good in Montagu’s Announcement was ’more the
result of our agitation culminating in the P. R.
resolution of the Joint Conference, than of anything 
2else”. Montagu, they argued, was coming to discover 
just how determined they were: a ’fictitious ’calm*’1 
would only mislead him.^ Furthermore, Montagu would 
he able to extract a greater measure of reform from 
his Cabinet colleagues if he could point to unrest in 
India: turning to Ireland, Tilak and Jamnadas asserted 
that Britain was agreeing to reforms for that un­
happy country, not because Irishmen were giving ’’over- 
enthusiastic co-operation but because they were giving
1. see Sastri et al.. ’Manifesto against P. R.’,
New India. 24 Aug 1917, p. 6a-b.
2. Mahratta, 2 Sept 1917, p. 415; ibid., 26 Aug 1917, 
p. 403; J. Dwarkadas: Minute, 28 Aug 1917, to resolution 
of Sub-Committee on Passive Resistance of the Bombay 
PCC, in Deccan Sabha Papers.
3. Mahratta, 2 Sept 1917, p. 415.
trouble”. ^
Montagu’s Announcement thus had the effect of
2wooing the Moderates from the united front. The 
Viceroy and members of his Council such as Sir 
Reginald Craddock, had certainly intended to achieve 
this effect when, during the rising Home Rule agitation 
of 1917, they pressed the Secretary of State, with 
increasing urgency, to declare that reforms were under 
consideration.^
There was at this time no open split between the 
Moderates and the other members of the united Congress. 
As for passive resistance, the AICC-AIML meeting on 
28 July had referred it to the PCCs; these discussed
1. Mahratta. 26 Aug 1917, p. 403.
2. Dainik Bharat Mitra. 6 Sept 1917, Bengal NP, 1917. 
p. 1013: ’...now with Montagu’s announcement, they 
[public leaders] have divided into parties....”.
3. e.g. R. H. Craddock, Note, 17 Jan 1917, in Home 
Poll A, July 1917, nos 299-313 and KW; telegram P, 
Viceroy to Secretary of State, 18 May 1917, pars 4 
and 5, in ibid.: ”....in order to arrest the further 
defection of moderate opinion, we think it very des­
irable to make the position of the Government clear 
as far as this is possible”; emphasis in original; 
cf. Minutes of members of Council on Memo by Sir J. 
Meston, in Home Poll Dep. May 1917, no. 3; S. R. 
Mehrotra, ’’The Politics Behind the Montagu Declaration 
of 1917” in Politics & Society in India, pp. 71-96, es­
pecially pp. 91-4.
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it and called Special Provincial Conferences to do
likewise. Protagonists of passive resistance were
generally vague as to how they meant to implement
it,1 234but three sorts of schemes were put forward
envisaging, first, resignation by elected members of
the legislatures; secondly, the taking of the vow to
use only Indian-made goods, or ’swadeshi”; and thirdly,
the continuation of Home Rule agitation in the face of
2possible Government prohibition. Before Montagu’s 
announcement, the PCCs of Madras and Bihar had adopted 
the last of these, and the CP PCC had approved passive 
resistance in principle.^ At the UP Special Provin­
cial Conference, the older men, like Jagat Narayan, 
and Sapru resisted so staunchly those, like Ansari 
(who came down from Delhi), Gokaran Nath Misra and 
Ranga Iyer, who favoured passive resistance that the 
Subjects Committee ruled that it should not be dis­
cussed in the open session; instead, individuals would 
be urged to make ’’all sacrifices” in promoting agi­
tation for self-government!^ The major trial of
1. see Wacha to Vijiaraghavachariar, 7 Aug 1917,
Vi.1. Papers.
2. Home Poll B. Aug 1917, nos 195-8, w/e 25 Aug 1917, 
paras 6, 7, 8.
3. ibid.; Mahratta, 2 Sept 1917, p. *13.
4. Home Poll B, Aug 1917, nos 195-8, p. 14; ibid. Dep. 
Sept 1917, no. 5, p. 115 Mahratta. 19 Aug 1917, p. 393;
2 Sept 1917, p. 413.
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strength occurred in Bombay. Wacha, Samarth and 
Setalvad had walked out of the AIGG there, but since 
other Moderates had stayed to ’’fight out the issue” and 
had prevailed on the AICC-AIM1 meeting to desist from 
committing itself to passive resistance, Wacha and the 
others attended the BCG meeting.1 2 They put up such 
determined opposition again that the Bombay PCC also 
avoided coming to a decision by referring the matter 
to a sub-committee! This sub-committee reflected the 
balance of numerical strength in the PCC, a majority 
of its members being followers of Tilak or young Home
Rulers, who could be expected to favour passive resist-
2ance. Montagu’s Announcement fortified the Moderates’ 
opposition to passive resistance and threw the Nation­
alists into dissaray. When the sub-committee met on 
26 August the Moderates were able to convince the 
latter to recommend the suspension of consideration of 
passive resistance ”in view of... Mr Montagu’s forth­
coming visit to India”. Only Jamnadas objected that,
1. Bombay Police 1917. par. 859(n); [Sir] Ibrahim 
Rahimtoola to Vijiaraghavachariar, 6 Oct 1917, Vi.1 .Papers.
2. Home Poll B, Aug 1917» nos 195-8, w/e 25 Aug 1917, 
par. 6; ’Report & Record of the Proceedings of the Sub­
committee appointed at the Meeting of the Bombay PCC on 
12 Aug 1917’, Bombay PCC Papers, in Deccan Sabha Papers: 
members of the sub-committee were B. G. Horniman, N. C. 
Kelkar, Jamnadas Dwarkadas, S. G. Banker, Umar Sobhani,
R. G r .  Pradhan, V. J. Patel, G. Devadhar, K. Natarajan, and 
the Secretaries Samarth, Ü. Trivedi and N. M. Joshi.
until Mrs Besant was released, passive resistance was
still desirable.1 2345 At the POC meeting on 2 September
he and Tilak took this stand but, when the Moderates
threatened to secede altogether if it were adopted,
they accepted a resolution similar to that recommended
2by the sub-committee. Conferences in CP and Bihar 
avoided any mention of passive resistance and in Bengal 
no Special Conference was held.1 Only in Madras was 
the commitment to passive resistance confirmed (at a 
Special Conference) after Montagu's Announcement.^
Thus, except in Madras, the Bombay Moderates' attitude 
to passive resistance prevailed.
The incipient split over Mrs Besant's election as 
President of the 1917 Congress was also healed, but 
less to the Moderates' advantage. Samarth, on behalf 
of the Bombay Moderates, tried to have the Congress 
venue changed to Madras, Mrs Besant's home province,
5where by convention she could not preside. But in
1. Bombay PCC Papers, loc. cit.
2. Bombay Police 1917* par. 949(1); HFM Bombay. II, p. ix.
3. Home Poll Dep. Sept 1917, no. 6, pp. 11, 18, 19; 
Mahratta, 2 Sept 1917* P. 413; B & 0 Police 1917. par. 
1004.
4. Home Poll Dep. Sept 1917, no. 6, 'Madras', par. 8.
5. Bengal NP. 1917. p. 1033.
Bengal young Congressmen canvassed for her among 
Congress Committees in the mofussil, pressing (with 
unwonted sagacity) for a compromise whereby Mrs Besant 
would become President and a nominee of Surendranath 
Chairman of the Reception Committee. Plainly Mrs 
Besant was the popular candidate, and her young cham­
pions were more vigorous and more numerous in the 
Reception Committee and the AICC (the final arbiter) 
than their opponents.1 234 "Samarth is a strong, brave 
fighter”, wrote Sastri,
but the forces against him are too strong. Mrs 
Besant must be accepted as President. We 
[the Moderates] shall vote and counsel 
against it and so save our consciences....
Surendra Nath and Vaikunta Nath Sen2 and 
their party must bend their heads to the 
storm.3
Like Sastri most Moderates probably feared that a split 
was inevitable but believed that they should try to 
avoid provoking it. After much acrimonious debate the 
Moderates accepted the compromise offered by their 
opponents:^ Surendranath would even propose Annie
1. Bengal Police 1917. pars 4121, 4220, 4221, 4223»
4327, 4337, 4466, 4849; Home Poll Dep. Nov 1917» no. 6, 
’Bengal', pars 3 and 6.
2. Surendranath's nominee for Chairman of the Recep­
tion Committee.
3. V. S. Sastri to (?), 17 Sept 1917, Deccan Sabha Papers
4. Bengal NP, 1917. pp. 1012, 1031; Bombay Police 1917. 
par. 987(q); Home Poll B, Nov 1917, nos 43-5, p. 6;
but cf. P. C. Ray in Leader. 4 Oct 1917, p. 8a-e.
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Besant for her high office and move the self-government 
resolution as usual! The Moderates were further con­
vinced of Montagu's intention to heed India's demands 
when in September he had Mrs Besant released. But 
how many of them shared the perceptiveness of Sastri, 
who prophesied that "when Mrs Besant comes out and 
presides she will herself be a sobering force"?'1'
Mrs Besant was to be an increasingly sobering 
force in Indian national politics. This endeared her 
to Sastri and the Madras Moderates but not to her 
younger, more impetuous followers.
II
September - December 1917.
Por Annie Besant, the time of her release was one 
of disorientation. Her internment had provided her with 
an opportunity to reappraise the political situation 
and to reconsider her programme. Had she not, she 
must have wondered, been carried away by her feelings 
for India, and indeed by her own Home Rule propaganda? 
Might not a "raging, tearing" agitation, such as she
1. V. S. S. Sastri to (?), 17 Sept 1917, Deccan 
Sabha Papers.
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had led, embitter feelings between India and Britain?
On her release therefore she gave the Viceroy an under­
taking that she would co-operate with the Government 
in obtaining calmness during Montagu's visit. Some of 
her followers denied that she had accepted any conditions
for her release,1 2but there is no doubt that the
2Government considered that she had. As for passive 
resistance, internment had given her time to recall 
that in 1915 she had inveighed against resort to this 
form of political activity,1 and that the Masters had 
warned her against being "provocative”. She had no 
campaign of passive resistance worked out: it was 
rather pathetic that in her internment she set to 
"to think out methods”. But then, supposing she 
devised a campaign, how could she direct it through 
her loosely-organised HRL? She recalled her fear lest 
passive resistance pass over into mass violence^- - a 
nightmare which was to haunt her increasingly. Further­
more, her young followers, in thinking of passive
1. see speech 23 Sept 1917 in S. Subramania Aiyer, 
Speeches and Writings. Murthy, p. 182.
2. see Home Poll Dep. Nov 1917, no. 2; Bengal NP. 1917
p. 276.
3* New India, 4 Jan 1915, p. 6a-b; 5 Jan 1915, p. 6a; 
see Chapter II above.
4« She had seen something similar happen in England, 
see Nethercot, op. cit., I, 255-9.
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resistance, had turned to Gandhi for guidance: how 
could she agree, without pangs of jealousy and 
mortification, to share leadership with one who, she 
had said, was ’not a politician”?"** Some of her co­
workers had opposed passive resistance, notably C. P. 
Ramaswami Aiyar and (among Madras Moderates) L. A. 
Govindaraghava Iyer, a Theosophist and the President 
of the PCC, who no doubt pointed out to her the strain
that her advocacy of it had placed on the adherence
2of the Moderates to the united front. In any case, 
Montagu’s Announcement and her release seemed to have 
removed the reasons for passive resistance. Soon after 
her release, therefore, at a Joint Meeting of the AICC 
and the AIML Council, on 6 October, she joined the 
Moderates in rejecting passive resistance ’’for the 
present”.^  This removed the likelihood of a Moderate 
exodus from the united front, at least for the immediate 
future.
But, while Mrs Besant might agree with the 
Moderates that this was a wise and logical course to
1. New India. 19 Mar 1915, p. 9a.
2. re C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, see ibid., 10 Aug 1917, 
p. 4a-b; re Govindaraghava Iyer, ibid., 25 Aug 1917, 
pp. 7, 10a.
3. Bombay Police 1917. par. 1109(C).
take, there is no evidence that she considered the 
mood of her young followers; or how she would be 
frustrating them by asking them, in effect, to turn 
off those feelings which she had helped to arouse among 
them; or that she was aware that if she wished her 
followers to alter course, it was necessary to tell 
them so and prepare them for it. The young men's 
enthusiasm had been aroused by the Home Rule agitation 
and by the campaign in support of passive resistance.^ 
Home Rulers all over India were collecting signatures 
for a Monster Petition in support of the Congress-
pLeague Scheme which had been suggested by Gandhi; 
those of Bombay were still setting up branches of her 
HRL in Gujarat and addressing public meetings in 
support of Home Rule; and the young men of Madras had 
continued to press for passive resistance at the 
Special Conference."^ Soon after Besant's vote against 
passive resistance at the Joiht Conference, V. 0.
1. see, e.g., Bombay Police 1917. pars 880(d), (i); 
899(1); 930(f), (j); Home Poll Lep. Nov 1917, no. 6, 
'Madras', par. 7; Rahimtoola to Vijiaraghavachariar,
6 Oct 1917, Vi.i. Papers.
2. Bengal Police 1917. pars 4726-7, 4731, 4846, 4850-1; 
B & 0 Police 1917. par. 1272; Bombay Police 1917. pars 
987(p), 1014(f), 1039(o), (s), (x) [in which the text of 
the Petition is quoted],
3. see p. 285 above.
Chidambaram Pillai wrote: "she is a fraud”, and like
others condemned her as unfit to preside over the
Congress.1 23 Having confirmed the Moderates’ suspicion
that she was an Extremist, Mrs Besant was now beginning
to alienate the young men by her moderation.
Liaison between her and Tilak broke down on this
issue, for he continued to suggest passive resistance
2for some time after the Joint Conference.
But they agreed at least in public on the response 
to be given to Montagu’s promise of reforms. Tilak was 
suspicious of the British (not least when they came 
bearing gifts) and, like Jamnadas Lwarkadas, he noted 
that the Announcement hedged its promises about with 
warnings that Indian advance to self-government could 
only be gradual and at a pace set by the British.-^ 
Believing that the British might be hustled into en­
larging the reforms by a united demand from India and 
hoping to bolster the united front, all the elements 
of which had supported the Congress-League Scheme,
1. quoted in P. Kesava Pillai to Vijiaraghavachariar, 
23 Oct 1917, Vi.i. Papers.
2. Mahratta. 14 Oct 1917, p. 489*
3. J. Lwarkadas, Minute, 28 Aug 1917, to resolution of 
Sub-Committee on P. R. of Bombay P0C, loc. cit.: ’’...the 
declaration...is of a very vague...character”.
2<)2Lj e>
Tilak and Mrs Besant announced that this Scheme
constituted the ’’irreducible minimum of political
reforms which must be immediately granted to India”.^
Many Moderates at first agreed with the position -
Banerjea, for instance, took his stand on it at his
2first interview with Montagu. But others, like Sapru, 
who were perhaps more perceptive, were ’furious” at 
this attempt to force a posture on the national movement 
from which bargaining would be difficult.^ On this 
question the split between the Moderates and the Nation­
alists was to be re-opened.
The later part of 1917 was a period of great 
stress in relations between Muslims and Hindus and 
within the Muslim community and the Muslim League.
These stresses resulted from outbreaks of rioting 
between mass groups of the Hindu and Muslim communities; 
from opposition to the Congress-League Scheme among 
members of the Muslim elite; and from the increasing 
assertiveness and rising Pan-Islamic feeling among the
1. Bombay Police 1917, par. 1080(m); Sastri ’Diary”,
9 Sept 1917; both HRLs were stated to have agreed to 
this formula: N. C. Kelkar, The Case for Indian Home Rule, p. i.
2. Montagu, Diary, p. 57: 26 Nov 1917.
3. Sastri ’Diary”, 9 Sept 1917.
younger members of the Muslim League.
The worst riots occurred in western Bihar at the
time of the Baqr Id in September, in the course of
which over a hundred Muslim villages were looted and
burned and many Muslims killed.^ Until 1914 the Hindus
of this area had participated amicably in Muslim
festivals but from that year the Arya Samaj had striven
only too effectively to give them a sense of their
separate identity, encouraging them to hold processions
of their own and promoting Hindu opposition to the
2slaughter of cows. As qurbani. or cow-sacrifice, was 
part of the Id observance this had become a time of 
tension between the two communities. The Baqr Id 
riots set many Muslims who had been tolerant of, or 
neutral toward, the Muslim-Congress entente against it.^ 
Among Pan-Islamists, even Abdul Bari was so carried 
away that he forgot his advocacy of Hindu-Muslim all­
iance against the arch-foe, the British, and proclaimed
1. B & 0 Police 1917. par. 1249; lesser riots occurred 
in eastern UP: Home Poll Pep. Nov 1917, no. 7, pp. 10-11.
2* B & 0 Police 1917. pars 161, 192, 542; cf. V.
Lovett, A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement, 
pp. 143-50. Of. Home Poll A, Lee 1913, nos 1-4.
3. Home Poll B, Nov 1917, nos 471-4, p. 14; Home Poll 
Lep. Jan 1918, no. 1, p. 19.
.jihad, or holy war, against the Hindus (for which he 
subsequently apologised!). Even some '‘nationalist” 
Muslims who supported the entente with the Congress, 
like Fazlul Huq, almost despaired of the possibility 
of real alliance between the two communities.^
Opposition to the Congress-League Scheme had come 
from two groups of Muslims: the "conservatives",^ and 
those in Muslim-majority provinces who were dissatis­
fied with the terms granted to them under the Scheme. 
Leading "conservatives” in the Muslim League had 
opposed the rise to dominance in the League's affairs 
of "nationalist” Muslims like Jinnah and the Raja of 
Mahmudabad, and the replacement by the latter of the 
League's old policy of reliance on the British with 
that of alliance with the Congress.
A number of Muslims in the two Muslim-majority 
provinces, the Punjab and Bengal, were dissatisfied with
1. Home Poll Lep. Jan 1918, no. 1, p. 14.
2. see Chapter I above: "nationalist" as opposed to 
"communalist"; to be differentiated from Nationalist, 
as applied to the Extremists and young men of Congress, 
meaning "aggressively nationalistic", as opposed to 
"Moderate".
3. Bengal Police 1917. pars 4605, 4735, 4852(a), 4959; 
Bengal NP, 1917. pp. 1090,1105, 1106, 1124-8, 1167;
B_ & 0 Police 1917. pars 15, 1350; Home Poll B,
Dec 1917, nos 225-8, p. 4.
4. see Chapter I above.
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the terms granted to them under the Congress-League Scheme. 
In the Punjab, where the Muslims comprised 55 per cent 
of the population, they were to have 50 per cent of the 
elected seats in the proposed provincial legislature 
and in Bengal, where they were 52.6 per cent of the pop­
ulation, they were to have only 40 per cent of the seats.^ 
The Punjab Muslim League under Sir Muhammad Shafi refused 
to accept anything less than representation "commensurate
not only with their numerical strength but also with their
2political importance”. Jinnah was already a ruthless 
foe and at the meeting of the Council of the League at 
the time of the 1916 annual Session he insisted that 
the Punjab League be disaffiliated and a new "Punjab 
Provincial Muslim League", consisting of Pazl-i-Husain, 
alone from among the older Muslims of the province, and 
a few Pan-Islamists and young editors (financed by 
Mahmudabad), recognised in its stead.^ Similarly in 
Bengal one of the leaders of the attack on the terms 
granted to the Muslims of the province in the Scheme
1. see Chapter III above.
2. see addresses of Punjab Provincial Muslim League 
and Punjab Muslim League, in Montagu Addresses, pp. 1,
3-4.
3. B & 0 Police 1917. par. 143; Home Poll Dep. Jan 
1917, no. 43; ibid., Mar 1917, no. 26, *Punjab*; July 
1917, no. 35, p. 12; Montagu, Diary, p. 46.
was the President of the provincial Muslim League,
Nawab Syed Ali Choudhuri. At the end of 1916 he had 
refused to sign the Reforms Memorandum of the 19 
members of the Imperial Legislative Council as being 
insufficiently explicit in safeguarding Muslim inter­
ests, and in May 1917 he resigned from the Muslim
League.'1 234' In October a number of Bengali Muslims,
2’’mostly big Nalchoda Muhammadan merchants”, who 
believed that the ’policy of the joint committees of 
the AIML and Congress were suicidal to Muhammadan 
interests”, formed the Indian Moslem Association, of 
which Choudhuri became a Vice-President.^ Montagu’s 
Announcement, foreshadowing the devolution of some 
power, had encouraged Muslims who were apathetic to 
the entente with Congress to join those who were 
actively opposed to it in organisations aimed at safe­
guarding Muslim interests.^- In Madras some leading
1. J. H. Broomfield, op. cit., p. 187; Memorandum of 
the 19, in Montagu Addresses, 97; Bengal Police 1917. 
par. 1685; Home Poll B, May 1917, nos 445-8 , p. 24;
cf. Bombay Police 1917. par. 139.
2. the great mosque of Calcutta near which many leading 
Muslim merchants had their premises.
3. Bengal Police 1917. pars 4337, 4593; Bengal HP, 1917 
p. 1165. Por detailed analysis, see J. H. Broomfield,
op. cit., pp. 168-9, 173-4.
4. Home Poll Dep. Nov 1917, no. 6, ’CP’, par. 2; no. 7, 
pp. 11-2; Jan 1918, no. 1; cf. ibid., Aug 1917, no. 3,p. 
10; Nov 1917, no. 30, p. 13; Bengal Police 1917. par.4465; 
Montagu, Diary, p. 45; Montagu Addresses, o. 1*0.
members of the Muslim League resigned and formed the 
South India Isiamia League, which in turn joined with 
the Bengal Moslem Association and Shafi’s Punjab League 
to form the All-India Muslim Association."^ This 
Association was not large, but it marked both a drain 
of older, more cautious members from the Muslim League 
and the re-emergence of the Muslim community's tradition 
of seeking salvation in opposition to, as opposed to 
alliance with, the Hindus.
The "nationalist" leaders of the Muslim League 
also came under attack from young Muslims and Pan- 
Islamists, who felt that the Congress-League entente 
was being inadequately exploited for Muslim ends; that 
the League leaders were too closely associated with 
the Congress Moderates and should be taking a more
paggressive line against the British. At an AIML- 
Council meeting in November they criticised the inac­
tivity of the leaders and denounced the failure of the 
British to observe the sanctity of Muslim Holy Places
1. Home Poll Dep. Jan 1918, no. 2, 'Madras', par. 7;
B, Jan 1918, nos 487-90, p. 15; March 1918, no. 38, p.2; 
Montagu Addresses, pp. 62-3.
2. Home Poll B, May 1917, nos 445-8, p. 16; June 1917, 
nos. 438-41, w/e 9 June 1917, pars 9, 10.
in military operations.^" In order to counter these 
charges, the League leaders took up the cause of the 
interned Pan-Islamic leaders, the Ali Brothers, demand­
ing that the British make the charges against them
2specific or else release them. ' The League leaders were 
joined in this agitation by Mrs Besant (following her 
release) and Tilak, who hoped thereby to bolster the 
Congress-League entente.^
While agitating on behalf of the Brothers, the 
"nationalist" Muslims were critical and somewhat fear­
ful of them:^ they recognised the great source of power 
that might be tapped by appealing to Muslim religious 
feeling but v/ere also aware that such feeling once 
aroused could easily pass over into fanaticism, which 
might sweep away the Hindu-Muslim entente and with it 
all ordered progress to self-government for India. A
1. Home Poll Dep. Jan 1918, no. 1, p. 15; no. 2, p. 15.
2. see Montagu, Diary, pp. 4, 140, 142-3; Home Poll 
Dep. Jan 1918, no. 59, p. 13; cf. resolution 2, Muslim 
League proceedings, 1916 in B & 0 Police 1917. par. 143.
3. Home Poll Dep. Nov 1917, no. 29, pp. 3, 4; B, Nov 
1917, nos 43-5, pp. 23-4; no. 29, pp. 6, 10; B & 0 
Police 1917. pars 1201, 1240; Bengal Police 1917. par. 
4598; Mahratta. 14 Oct 1917, p. 489; cf. A. Besant, 
"Internment Diary", 30 July 1917.
4. see, e.g., Montagu, Diary, loc. cit.; Sastri to 
’Ramaswamy', 26 Sept 1917, Madras SIS Papers; Bombay 
Police 1917. par. 1109(B); Home Poll Dep. Nov 1917, 
no. 29, p. 13.
reminder of these dangers was given at the annual
Session of the Muslim League at the end of 1917, where
the Ali Brothers’ mother was present. Each mention of
the Brothers in the Raja of Mahmudabad *s Presidential
address and in their mother’s message aroused wild
excitement. Speakers on the resolution condemning
their internment exhorted the audience to ’’sacrifice”
and even to bloodshed, and ’’turned the scene of
confusion into pandemonium”.1 23In addition the resolution
on the Bihar riots roused great illwill towards the
Hindus: so much so that the Muslim leaders thought it
2discreet to stay away from the Congress.
But, while allowing a lot of explosive feeling to 
escape, Mahmudabad and Jinnah restrained the session 
in other directions. In conformity with a pledge given 
to the Government, Mahmudabad expunged or forbade all 
mention of the Khilafat and of Indian Muslims’ loyalty 
to Muslim institutions outside India.^ In the AIML
1. Home Poll B, Jan 1918, nos 4-87-90, pp. 23-4.
2. ibid, pp. 9, 24.
3. ibid., p. 13; cf. All-India Moslem League. 10th 
Annual Session: Speech by the Hon. Ra.ia Sir Mhd.
Ali Mhd. Khan, K. B., of Mahmudabad. on 30 December 
1917. pp. 12-13.
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Council, which produced the resolutions for the 
Session and where the "nationalists” had a majority, 
Mahmudabad prevented any modification of the previous 
year’s Congress-League Scheme in the direction of a 
demand for more rapid progress to Home Rule.^
Although Mahmudabad thus had a strong inclin­
ation toward moderation and was aware of the danger 
that an agitation based on Muslim religious feelings 
might get out of hand, he and his fellow "nationalists” 
dared not discontinue the Ali Brothers’ agitation once
begun, for fear of alienating the Pan-Islamists in
2the Muslim League. During 1918 they were to find the 
young Muslims increasingly difficult to restrain.
The 1917 annual Congress Session was held at 
Calcutta concurrently with that of the League. Here 
Mrs Besant played a role comparable to that of Mahmud­
abad at the League, in v/hich indeed she was assisted 
by him. In the preparation of the resolutions for the 
open session in the Subjects Committee, the young men 
pressed for a resolution demanding immediate internal
1. Home Poll B, Jan 1918, nos 487-90, p. 10.
2. ibid. Dep. Jan 1918, no. 60, ’UP', par. 2;
B, Peb 1918, nos 214-7, p. 17; Bengal NP. 1917. pp. 
1234, 1281.
self-government.1 234 This was demanded by the young men
of Bengal in particular, led by G. R. Das and Pal:
they had successfully challenged the Bengal Moderates
over Mrs Besant’s Presidentship.; furthermore they were
incensed against the British by the internment of some
22000 young bhadralok under the Defence of India Act.
Mrs Besant, however, was now seeking to restrain 
the young men. Backed up by the Moderates, who 
opposed any demand for immediate Home Rule, she con­
vinced Tilak that they should not go beyond the 
Congress-League Scheme, since it formed the basis of 
their representations to Montagu who was now in India, 
and that he should urge the young Bengalis to reduce 
their demand to ’self-government in ten years’’.^  Here 
Mahmudabad and the Muslim League acted as a further 
brake on the young Congressmen: they refused to set any 
time-limit for the attainment of self-government and 
the latter agreed to substitute ”at an early date” for 
’ten years’.^
1. Home Poll B, Jan 1918, nos 487-90, p. 10.
2. Bengal KP. 1917. pp. 1066-7, 1089, 1114, 1138; 
letters to Mrs Besant from Calcutta, ’’Congress” Piles, Adyar Archives.
3. Mahratta. 20 Jan 1918, p. 32; Home Poll B, Jan 
1918, nos 487-90, pp. 10, 12.
4. ibid.; Leader. 6 Jan 1918, p. 3a; cf. HBM Bombay. II 
p. 693.
Mrs Besant seemed to expect that her election to 
the Presidentship of Congress would enable her, almost 
in a mystical way, to carry the national movement with 
her. "Up till now...I have claimed no authority of 
leadership", she said. "Now by your election, I take 
the place you have given..."1 She appointed C. P. 
Ramaswami Aiyar as principal Congress General Secret­
ary, and, with Tilak, replaced Moderates on the AICC 
by members of the HRL, but otherwise took no steps to 
ensure her control of Congress or to improve it as a
pmedium of communication. She did re-organise her HRL. 
But while, on paper, she set up a more elaborate 
organisation of Provincial Councils to act as inter­
mediaries between the headquarters and the branches, 
in fact she allowed the League to be partly dismantled: 
the position of Organising Secretary was abolished as 
no longer necessary and *0. P.* vacated the position of 
General Secretary. She regarded the agitational 
function of the HRLs as largely concluded; but as a 
means of controlling and of rousing support, she was
1. Congress Presidential Addresses. II, 376-7.
2* New India, 19 Jan 1918, p. 3a-b; Congress 1917. 
Report, p, 1U.
to regret its decline.^
Mrs Besant was preparing to change her strategy.
As we have seen, she had not only drawn back from
threatening the British with passive resistance but
had promised to work for calmness during Montagu’s
visit, which marked a retreat even from agitation
without sanctions. Just before the 1917 Congress she
wrote to Montagu offering ”to modify her policy 
2within limits”. He saw her and seems to have given 
her hope that she could accelerate India’s advance 
more effectively through parleying with him in the 
manner of a G-okhale than by agitation. In her Congress 
address she foreshadowed increasing moderation: ”1
cannot promise to please you always”, she said. But 
while this strategy might promise success in the 
direction of improved reforms (a promise which, in the 
event, was hardly fulfilled), it took little account of 
the spirit Mrs Besant had roused among the young men by
1. see A. Besant to members of the AIHRL Council,
19 June 1918, Advar Archives.
2. Montagu, Diary, p. 117.
3. Congress 1917. Report, p. 59; Congress Presid- 
ential Addresses, II, 376.
CO
her Home Rule agitation.
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January - September 1918.
Although the different temperaments within the 
national movement were reconciled at the 1917 Congress 
and Muslim League Sessions, the alienation of the 
Moderates from other Congressmen became more pronounced 
from this time on.
This was partly due to the provocative grasping 
for places of power by the young men, which Tilak and 
Mrs Besant were unwilling or unable to prevent. Though 
they retained their ex-officio places on the AICC and 
PCCs, the Moderates were swept out of the elective 
positions.1 2 Moderate newspapers interpreted the 
Congress Presidential speech as a declaration of
pdictatorship by Mrs Besant. In Bengal Das and his
1. llahratta, 20 Jan 1918, pp. 31-2; Leader. 6 Jan 
1918, p. 3a; 12 Jan 1918, p. 7b; 16 Jan 1918, p. 5b;
26 Aug 1918, p. 3; Bombay Police 1918. pars 382, 414; 
Home Poll B, Dec 1917, nos 225-8, w.e. 15 Dec 1917, 
par. 7.
2. e.g. Leader. 28 Dec 1917, p. 3; cf. Home Poll Dep. 
Mar 1918, no. 41, pp. 12-13.
young colleagues pressed their attacks on the Moderate 
dominance of political institutions - successfully in 
the case of the PCC, unsuccessfully in that of the 
Indian Association.^
Montagu’s visit from November 1917 until April 
1918 played a major role in the defection of the 
Moderates. While Banerjea was supporting the demand 
for the Congress-League Scheme at the 1917 Congress, 
Wacha and the Bombay and Poona Moderates were telling 
Montagu that India was not ready for responsible
pgovernment. Montagu convinced the Moderates of Ben­
gal and the UP that to try to run the country along 
the lines of the Congress-League Scheme, with an 
elected legislature having the power of the purse but 
no power to dismiss the executive, would lead to 
hopeless deadlocks.^ The Moderates were flattered by
1. Indian Association, Council Minutes. 4 and 10 Jan
1918, General Meeting Minutes. 31 Jan 1918; Amrita 
Bazar Patrika. 18 Jan 1918, p. 6; 1 Peb 1918, p. 6;5 Peb 1918, p. 6.
2. Montagu, Diary, p. 147; Congress 1917. Report, pp. iv, 90-5.
3. Montagu, Diary, p. 91, passim; Kunzru to Vaze,
8 July 1918, SIS Poona Papers; cf. Pal’s speech, Congress 1917. Report, p. 98.
Montagu's attentions.1 2345 Most of them avoided giving 
him a firm pledge to support any scheme he offered in
pplace of the Congress-league Scheme, but they led him 
to expect that he could rely on them to give general 
support.1 Montagu even went to the length of dis­
cussing the formation of a separate Moderate party, 
with the Moderates, notably Sastri.“^
Montagu also encouraged Mrs Besant to adopt an 
increasingly moderate position: he saw both her and 
"the attractive Ramaswami Aiyar", and by the end of 
February he felt that "she means to support [the
Montagu scheme] in principle, although she will
5suggest all sorts of amendments".
Mrs Besant's decision to accept less than the 
Congress Scheme was painfully "surprising" to Tilak’s 
supporters to whom she had said that she would not do
1. e.g. Sastri to Ramaswami, 1 Feb 1918, SIS Madras 
Papers.
2. C. Y. Chintamani to Vijiaraghavachariar, 1 Aug 
1918, Vij. Papers; Montagu, Diary, p. 236.
3. e.g. ibid., pp. 336, 338.
4. mainly through Basu, Sinha, Willingdon: see Montagu, 
Diary, p. 217; Sastri to Venkatasubbiah, 26 Jan 1918, 
and to Ramaswami, 1 Feb 1918, SIS Madras Papers.
5. Montagu, Diary, pp. 117-9, 128, 274, 278; Sastri 
to Ramaswami, 24 Feb 1918, SIS Madras Papers: "Mrs 
Besant and C. P. Ramaswamy both...[said] they would 
accept the Secretary of State's proposals on nearly the 
same conditions as I....Perhaps Montagu's personal influ­
ence, perhaps Sir Sankaran Nair's [Education Member], 
perhaps both must have been the cause".
n . a r7O'j ,
so "except in very minor matters".1 23 They were equally 
"disappointed” when at the AIGC meeting on 23 February 
she changed her mind about sending a Congress-League 
deputation to England to agitate for large reforms,
pand voted with the Moderates in rejecting it. She 
gave various reasons for her action, such as shortage 
of funds, but it was widely believed that her volte 
face was in response to a request from Montagu,-^ and 
she was much criticised by the Extremists and young 
men.^ She may have been hoping to ingratiate herself 
with the Moderates. Certainly she was hoping to 
increase her control over the national movement: 
simultaneously with vetoing the Congress deputation 
she was arranging a deputation to England, the members 
of which she selected from lists drawn up by the
1. Khaparde "Diary” (Bombay), 25 Feb 1918.
2. the AICC met this time at Delhi, from which Tilak 
was still externed; AICC Minutes, 23 Feb 1918, resolution 
no. 9; Khaparde "Diary" (Bombay), 23 Feb 1918; Dnyan 
Prakash, 2 Mar 1918 in Bombay NP, 1918. p. 145«
3. ibid.; Sastri to Ramaswamy, 24 Feb 1918, SIS Madras 
Papers; the Montagu Diary does not confirm this, see
pp. 278-9; though cf. Sastri to Ramaswamy, 1 Feb 1918, 
SIS Madras Papers.
4. see Mahratta, 17 Mar 1918, p. 125*
AIHRL Council.1 234 To their criticism of her on the 
grounds of inconsistency and moderation, Mrs Besant’s 
young critics therefore added the suspicion that she 
wished to work only through those who were subservient 
to her.
Mrs Besant was taking less care to work closely 
with Tilak at this time. She clearly had not consulted 
him about her tactics in the AICC on the question of 
the deputation. Lack of co-ordination was also evident 
in their reactions to the Government’s urgent call for 
money and men at the time of the great German offensive 
of March 1918. Tilak’s response was ’’grant us Home 
Rule and we shall help you. Otherwise your Empire is 
in danger”.J This firm stance proved popular and at 
first Mrs Besant joined Tilak and others, in signing a 
Manifesto that ”a definite promise of Home Rule should 
precede any appeal for help or money”. ^  But again she
1. Khaparde ’’Diary” (Bombay), 24 Mar 1918; Home Poll
B, Mar 1918, nos 399-402, p. 10: she selected Manjeri
Rainier, George Joseph, Jitendralal Bannerjee, Syed 
Hussein, Iqbal Narain Gurtu, Sarojini Naidu.
2. see Mahratta, 17 Mar 1918, p. 125«
3. Home Poll B, May 1918, nos 23-6, p. 12; ibid. Dep. 
May 1918 no. 65, p. 4; cf. Tilak, Speeches & Writings, 
pp. 320-366, especially 335-6, 350, 357; cf. Bombay NP, 
1918. pp. 255-9.
4. New India. 22 Apr 1918; see Home Poll Dep. May 1918, 
no. 65, p. 3.
executed an about-turn. At the AICG meeting on 3 May»
she and her lieutenants swung over to an attitude
which was, again, more acceptable to the Moderates,
and persuaded Tilak to agree to a resolution calling
on ’all patriotic organisations to aid in recruiting
for Home and Imperial defence”.^  Tilak and Khaparde
only gave in after much wrangling, and Mrs Besant's
popularity suffered grievously. Among the young
Home Rulers of Bombay, for instance, it was openly
said that she had been ’’bought over” by the Government
and only her Theosophical followers remained loyal,
while in Sind for example seceders from her HRL set
up branches of Tilak*s League as an expression of
2their disapproval.
The young men's defiance had already been roused 
against the Government. Tilak had repeatedly asserted 
that the Congress-League Scheme was a minimum and that 
a promise of Home Rule must precede help with recruitment. 
The young men also had before them the example of the
1. AICC Minutes 3 May 1918, resolution no. 8;
Bombay Police 1918. par. 577; Home Poll Pep. Aug 1918, 
no. 28, p. 6.
2. ibid., pp. 6-7; cf. ibid. B, May 1918, nos 581-4, 
p. 23.
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passive resistance campaign which Gandhi had been leading 
in Kaira.1 234 Furthermore Subramania Aiyer, Jamnadas 
Dwarkadas and others had been advocating passive resis­
tance in case Montagu's Reforms should prove inadequate 
and in an effort to retain a semblance of identification 
with the young rank-and-file even Mrs Besant had argued
pin favour of passive resistance again! The Government 
had provided fuel for the flame of agitation by turning 
back the Home Rule deputations, Mrs Besant's from 
Gibraltar, and Tilak's (comprising Tilak, some of his 
lieutenants and Pal) from Colombo,^ and by failing to 
invite Tilak or Mrs Besant to the War Conference at Delhi 
to discuss ways of raising men and money.^
The temper of the young men exploded against 
Mrs Besant's increasing moderation at the Madras 
Provincial Conference, just a week after the AICC 
meeting which advocated recruitment. Here in the open 
session, Satyamurti, V. 0. Chidambaram Pillal, Rajaji
1. see Subramania Aiyer, Speeches, p. 399; Bombay NP, 1918. pp. 307-10.
2. see Young India. 10 Apr 1918 in Bombay NP, 1918. 
p. 263; Home Poll Dep. May 1918, no. 65, p. 35 ibid. B, 
May 1918, nos 581-4, p. 2.
3. Home Poll Dep. May 1918, no. 64, 'UP', par. 1; ibid, 
no. 65, 'Bengal', par. 3; B, May 1918, nos 581-4, p. 10; 
Bombay Police 1918. par. 577; Bombay HP, 1918. p. 440.
4. see Khaparde "Diary" (Bombay), 22-28 April 1918.
and Kasturi Ranga Iyengar, led them in an attack on 
Mrs Besant’s resolution which urged recruitment in 
terms identical with those passed by the AICC.^ She 
managed to pass her resolution intact by 122 votes to 
121, but only after a careful recount and by the casting 
vote of the sympathetic President, Sarojini Naidu. Prom 
this time Mrs Besant was subjected to caustic criticism 
in Kasturi’s Hindu and to vitriolic attacks in Tamil
2from the platform by young men such as Varadarajalu Naidu. 
She tried to re-establish her identification with the 
young men by rousing agitation on such issues as the 
turning back of the HRL deputations and Montagu’s 
denunciation of Sir Subramania Aiyer for writing to 
President Wilson for help in gaining Home Rule, but 
with little success.
In July 1918 Montagu’s proposals for reform were
1. New India. 13 May 1918, pp. 3-4; Home Poll B, May 
1918, nos 581-4, pp. 20-1; Dep. Aug 1918, no. 28, pp. 3-4; 
ibid., no. 29, pp. 2-3; the Bombay Provincial Conference 
had passed a resolution in Mrs Besant’s words: Mahratta.
12 May 1918, p. 227.
2. Home Poll Dep. Aug 1918, no. 29, pp. 2-3; P. Kesava 
Pillai to Vijiaraghavachariar, 11 July 1918, 15 July 
1918, Vi.i. Papers.
3. Home Poll Dep. Aug 1918, no. 29, p. 3; ibid., no. 31, 
p. 3; Subramania Aiyer, Speeches, pp. 389-94, 401-24. As
a mark of defiance Sir Subramania renounced his knighthood.
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published as the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. The provin­
cial legislatures and the lower house at the centre 
were to have elected majorities, but an element of 
responsibility was to be introduced only in the 
provincial governments: there a limited number of sub­
jects were to be transferred to ministers responsible 
to the legislature; the legislature would have the 
power of the purse in regard to these subjects only; 
and this arrangement would be reviewed after four 
years.1 2
The Moderates were alienated by the reception 
given to the Reforms by Mrs Besant and Tilak. Montagu 
had convinced the Moderates that if they did not 
support his scheme it would be thrown out by Cabinet 
or Parliament. During the second quarter of 1918, 
the Moderates had come to believe that Tilak and Annie
pBesant were bent on ’’wrecking" Montagu's scheme.
This, they felt, was confirmed when Mrs Besant, in a 
further attempt to identify her feelings with those
1. Muslims were to receive disproportionately large 
representation at the centre and in provinces where 
they were in a minority, but no communal representation 
in provinces where they were in a majority.
2. Banerjea to Vijiaraghavachariar, 11 May 1918,
Vi.i. Papers; Kunzru to Vaze, 13 July 1918, SIS Poona. Papers.
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of her young followers, greeted the Montagu-Chelmsford 
scheme as ’’unworthy of Britain to offer”, and Tilak said 
that he had ’nothing to do but to reject it” since it 
failed to come up to the ideal of political advance set 
forth in the Congress-League Scheme.^
The Moderates were even more thoroughly alienated 
by the conduct of the young Congressmen. In February 
the AICC had decided to hold a Special Congress to discuss
pMontagu’s proposals soon after their publication; 
not only were the Moderates clearly in a minority 
in the Congress and likely to be outvoted at the Special 
Session^ but the younger members of the majority were 
becoming increasingly unruly. At the Madras Provincial 
Conference, for instance, when Sastri was announced as 
a member of the Subjects Committee, there were cries of 
”no, no” from the young men, who appeared ’half naked to 
'demonstrate national spirit*, headed by Satyamurti in 
a s h i r t . . . A f t e r  the publication of the Montagu-
1. Mahratta, 14 July 1918, p. 328; Home Poll Pep. Sept 
1918, no. 19, p. 3.
2. AICC Minutes. 23 Feb 1918; see Congress 1917.
Report, p. 97.
3. Kunzru to Vaze, 1 Apr 1917 [1918?], SIS Poona Papers.
4. P. Kesava Pillai to Vijiaraghavachariar, 26 July 
1918, VI j. Papers; see New India. 11 May 1918, p. 8;
Home Poll Dep. Sept 1918, no. 40, p. 6.
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Chelmsford Report, Special Provincial Conferences were 
held to ’’consider'1 2345it: at the Bengal Conference the 
majority shouted the Moderates down and passed a resolution 
moved by Pal that the Report ’’does not present any real 
steps towards responsible government” ;^ much the same
phappened in Berar; Pazl-i-Husain and the Moderates left 
the Punjab Conference unobtrusively;^ and in the UP,
Motilal Nehru as President of the PCC by-passed his 
fellow Committee-members and organised a Special 
"Congress” to denounce the Reforms.^- Satyamurti and 
Rajaji continued their vendetta against Mrs Besant and 
she was howled down at the Madras Special Conference in 
August.
Just before the publication of the Montagu-Chelms- 
ford Report, the Government of Bombay had called a War 
Conference to which the nationalist leaders were invited, 
but when the Governor refused to allow Tilak to mention
1. Home Poll Dep. Sept 1918, no. 19, pp. 11-12; 
no. 40, p. 11.
2. Dnyan Prakash, 21 Aug 1918, in Bombay UP, 1918, w.e. 
24 Aug 1918, p. 5.
3. Home Poll Dep. Sept 1918, no. 40, pp. 16-17.
4. Leader. 14 Aug 1918, p. 5a-b; 24 Aug 1918, p. 5; 
Kunzru to Vaze, 15 and 19 Aug 1918, SIS Poona Papers.
5. New India. 3 Aug 1918, pp. 3-6, 10; 5 Aug 1918, p. 6; 
Mahratta. 11 Aug 1918, p. 382; Bombay NP. 1918. II, 151.
Home Rule he and his colleagues walked out. In a part­
icularly inept piece of mis-timing, the Government of 
India published the Report of the Rowlatt Committee, which 
suggested new repressive legislation, immediately after
Tilak's walk-out and the Rowlatt Report received, turned 
the young men’s defiance of the Government to anger.
Believing that she could only restrain them and 
fend off the young Madrasis’ attacks by maintaining the 
united front, Mrs Besant fought to save it by finding a 
posture in relation to the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms 
which would be acceptable to both Moderates and Nation­
alists. She consulted with Mahmudabad and Sastri and
together they persuaded Tilak to refrain from rejecting
2the Reforms outright but to urge modifications in them . 
The salient modifications envisaged Muslim representation
1. Young India. 19 June 1918; Vibhakar, 24 June 1918, 
Sudhakar, 23 June 1918, in Bombay NP, 1918, pp. 459-60, 
476, 477; cf. e.g. Jayakar, op. cit., I, 192;
Government of Bombay, Home Department Rile no. 398-J, 
1918, p. 259; Home Department Special File no. 3989, 
quoted in HFM Bombay. II, 698-708; Sedition P ’Rowlatt”] 
Committee Report.
2. Reforms proposals accepted by Tilak ”on the under­
standing that they are needed in the interest of unity of 
moderates and nationalists in the Special Congress”, 17 
July 1918, in ’’Reforms Congress” File, Adyar Archives; 
Tilak to Khaparde, 18 July, and A. Besant to Khaparde,
1918, Khaparde Papers; Bombay Police 1918. par.
the Montagu-Chelmsford Report.1 2 The publicity, which
along the lines of the Congress-League Scheme; 
in the provinces the transfer to elected ministers 
of all subjects, with the exception only of police, law 
and justice, which would be reserved to the British 
executive for five years; in the provinces complete 
responsible government after five years; in the central 
government, transfer to elected ministers of all powers 
other than those affecting peace, internal tranquillity and 
safety; and the power of the purse for the elected 
legislatures over all powers not reserved to the exec­
utive. Through their newspapers Mrs Besant and Tilak 
argued that, although they had said that if the Reforms 
were ’’inadequate” they would not ’accept” them, neverthe­
less they would ’’utilise every advantage or advance they 
contain”; they would work any Reforms, although those out­
lined were ’unacceptable unless modified”.1 But the modif­
ications agreed to by Tilak and Mrs Besant were too close 
to rejection of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms for most
1. Commonweal. 24 May 1918, quoted in Mahratta. 2
June 1918, p. 255; Mahratta. 14 July 1918, p. 328;
21 July 1918, pp. 341-2. Between ’’acceptance” and 
’’rejection”, Mrs Besant distinguished a third 
alternative: ’non-acceptance, with constructive 
proposals for improvement as a first step”, New India,
3 Aug 1918, p. 6; Kesari, 30 July 1918, Mahratta. 11 Aug 
1918 in Bombay NPt 1918. II, 113, 136.
Moderates; Mrs Besant, Tilak and their followers had
spoken too often of the Congress-League Scheme as the
"irreducible minimum" for the Bombay Moderates and those
like the Bengal Moderate P. C. Ray (who had started to
organise a Moderate Party in 1917)» to believe that any
genuine compromise could be found.'*' The Moderates of
Bombay, CP, Bengal, the UP and in the Servants of India
Society seceded from Congress, and the Raja of Mahmud-
abad refused to preside over the Bombay Special 
2Session.
Nevertheless, Mrs Besant persuaded the Special 
Congress to refrain from rejecting the Reforms and to 
accept the modifications agreed to by Tilak. She was 
able to do so because a number of Moderates did attend, 
including those from Madras and - since she prevailed 
on Hasan Imam of Bihar to preside - those of Bihar: 
she, Malaviya and Imam convinced Tilak and, with him, 
they convinced the more headstrong members of the 
Subjects Committee that they should adhere to the terms
1. see B & 0 Police 1918. par. 406; Dnyan Prakash,
16 Aug 1918, in Bombay NP, 1918. II, 170; Leader. 15 Aug 
1918, p. 3; Circular Manifesto from P. C. Ray, 10 Nov
1917, Deccan Sabha Papers.
2. see Butler/Chelmsford correspondence, 31 July, 1 Aug
1918, in Home Public (Reforms) Dep. Sept 1919, no. 64 and 
KWs; cf. Home Poll B, Aug 1918, nos 208-13. They offered 
Wacha the Chairmanship of the Reception Committee: Bombay 
Police 1918. pars 983, 1096, 1230, 1132(m).
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agreed to with Mahmudabad and Sastri.^" Despite
Mahmudabad's refusal of the Presidentship, he did
exert a restraining influence, since he presided over
the Special Session of the Muslim League, the Council
of which met jointly with the Congress Subjects
Committee to consider the Reforms resolutions of the
2two organisations.
At the Muslim League Session, those like Mahmud­
abad and Jinnah who wished to welcome Montagu's 
Reforms (while demanding the proportional franchise 
laid down for the Muslims in the Congress-League 
Scheme), exerted an uneasy control over the younger 
Muslims, like Syed Husain, and Pan-Islamists, like 
Dr Ansari, who wished to reject them.^ The Muslim 
League "welcomed" the Montagu-Chelmsford Report and 
did not imitate the Congress in demanding a 15-year 
time limit for the grant of full responsible govern­
ment, but its resolutions were otherwise very similar
1. see Special Congress 1918. Report, pp. 79-108;
Home Poll B, Oct 1918, nos 191-4, pp. 14-15*
2. Special Congress 1918. Report. Appendices, p. ix; 
Home Poll Dep. Sept 1918, no. 41, p. 5*
3. ibid., no. 20, p. 13; Butler to Chelmsford 31 July 
1918, loc. cit.; for Jinnah's reaction to the Reforms, 
see Saiyid, Jinnah. pp. 222-30, e.g. p. 224: "the... 
Proposals cannot be rejected summarily"; K. Dwarkadas, 
G-andhi.ii: Through My Diary Leaves. 1915-48. p. 14.
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to those passed by the Congress.^ Conservative Muslims
outside the League alleged that it was unrepresentative
2of the Muslims and dominated by Hindu Congressmen.
The ’’younger Muhammadans in the League”, on the other 
hand, ”did not like the excessive spirit of accommo­
dation shown by some of the elders to some of the... 
proposals in Mr Montagu’s scheme”,^  and once again 
they criticised the ’’nationalists’” conduct of the 
League’s business.^-
India was about to make a major political advance 
under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. The leaders of 
her nationalist organisations were anxious to carry 
the fight for more generous Reforms to England, Annie 
Besant and Jinnah to parley with Montagu, Tilak to 
threaten Montagu with the rejection of ’’inadequate” 
Reforms. But at this critical moment their leadership 
in India was revealed as unstable at the Congress and 
Muslim League Special Sessions. In the League, the
1. Special Congress 1918. Report, pp. ix-xiii; Indian 
Annual Register. 1919. Part v, pp. 83, 86.
2. Bombay NP. 1918. w/e 7 Sept 1918, p. 10.
3. Mahratta. 8 Sept 1918, p. 429.
4* Bombay Police 1918. par. 1230; cf. Home Poll B,
Dec 1918, nos 158-9, pp. 6-7.
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"nationalist" Muslims would have to come to terms with 
the strengthening current of Pan-Islamist feeling if 
they would retain their leadership. In Congress,
Mrs Besant had barely retained hers. In her efforts 
to preserve the united front she had alienated both the 
Moderates by her aggressive postures and many of the 
young men by her attempts to restrain their enthusiasm. 
She had restrained them, with Tilak’s help, by arguing 
from the desirability of maintaining the united front, 
but now that the front had broken down this argument 
had been removed. The young men had no clear idea of 
the strategy that they or their leaders should employ 
to enlarge the Reforms: rather they demanded expression 
for their frustration and for their anger against the 
British. Unless Mrs Besant could re-establish the 
united front, she must either bow to the young Congress­
men’s demand that the Reforms be rejected - which meant 
that she must threaten Montagu, rather than parley - or 
prepare to have her leadership rejected altogether by 
the young men.
j<J fk X
IV
September - December 1918.
Immediately after the Special Sessions the 
Congress-League entente was again shaken by riots at 
the Baqr Id, this time in Calcutta, instigated by 
Muslims as a retaliation for the previous year1 2s att­
acks by Hindus on Muslims in Bihar.^ Bengal Congress­
men headed by C. R. Das set up an Investigation
2Committee to smooth relations between the communities, 
but the Hindu-Muslim entente suffered another severe 
blow.
The Government finally permitted Tilak to go to 
England. He went to clear his name in the Courts of 
Sir Valentine Chirol's charges that he had incited to 
murder and terrorism: by so doing he probably hoped 
to make himself a more acceptable spokesman for India 
to the British public and a more acceptable colleague 
to the Moderates. He also planned to launch a campaign 
in England demanding modifications in the Montagu scheme
1. Home Poll B, Oct 1918, nos 191-4, pp. 16-18.
2. ibid. Dep. Dec 1918, no. 23, p. 8; Das to Vijia- 
raghavachariar, telegram 22 Oct 1918, Vij. Papers.
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as soon as the Government lifted its ban on Indian 
deputations to England. Tilak, who had formerly 
denounced deputations to Britain as mendicancy, now 
believed that "The real work for some years lies...in 
England".1 2
There was certainly work to do in urging wider
reforms in England, but Tilak's leadership of the
Extremists and his imprisonment for sedition reduced
his standing with the British Government, and thus his
2ability to influence it. Furthermore this was a most 
dangerous time for a leader to leave India: direction
and restraint had never been more needed by the rank- 
and-file of the national movement. By going to England 
at this critical time Tilak virtually turned his back 
on the young men of Congress and abdicated his leadership 
of them.
Tilak sailed in September. In the three months 
between then and the Delhi Congress the young men's 
bitterness and defiance toward the British intensified.
1. V. J. Patel to Vijiaraghavachariar, 17 Oct 1918, 
Vi.i. Papers.
2. see Montagu, Diary, pp. 43, 59; cf. JSC on G of I 
Bill, Evidence, p. 131.
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In Bombay Jinnah, Jamnadas Dwarkadas and others wrecked
a meeting held by some of the city fathers to present a
memorial of appreciation to the retiring Governor, Lord
Willingdon.1 234 Even in the Punjab, where nationalist
politics had been virtually non-existent from 1907 to
1917, the Government’s ban on political discussion had
been lifted at Montagu’s insistence and young agitators,
both Muslim and Hindu, like Kitchiu and Dunichand, made
2’’wild speeches” advocating Home Rule,
Among tenants and landless labourers in many parts 
of the country there was great economic distress owing 
to famine and the high price of food and other necessities 
which expressed itself in rioting.^ Politicians with 
ideas of organising labour movements began to channel 
the distress existing in densely-populated industrial
4areas.
1. Home Poll Dep. Jan 1919» no. 41, p. 6; Jamnadas, 
’’Memoire”, p. 379; Bombay Police 1918. pars 1758, 1799; 
HIM Bombay. II, 715-24; K. Dwarkadas, Ruttie Jinnah. 
pp. 13-4.
2. Home Poll Dep. Oct 1918, no. 31, p. 14.
3. Rushbrook Williams, India.f1917-18] pp. 86-90, 
[1919], pp. 63-9.
4. Home Poll Dep. Oct 1918, no. 31, p. 32; Hov. 1918, 
no. 23, passim.
In November the Moderates held a separate 
Conference in Bombay which set the seal on their 
secession from Congress. This released the young men 
from the restraint imposed on them at the Special Congress 
in the name of finding a ’’compromise” with the Moderates.1 2
The end of the Great War gave a sense of urgency
to the demand for responsible government. President
Wilson and Lloyd G-eorge spoke of ’’self-determination”
for subject peoples. The War - so it had been said -
had been India’s opportunity: if India allowed the War
to pass without winning responsible government, when
2might the chance come again?
A leader was needed, therefore, who would give 
forcible expression to the feelings of those who re­
mained in the Congress. But Mrs Besant now only 
thought of finding some way to restrain the young men 
from passing more outspoken resolutions at the Delhi 
Congress than those passed at the Special Session. She 
provoked more Antipathy by seeking a President for the
1. Home Poll B, Dec 1918, nos 158-9, pp. 4—6; Indian 
Annual Register 1919. part v, pp. 47-65; C. Y. Chintamani 
to Vijiaraghavachariar, 12 Oct 1918, Vij. Papers;
Khaparde ’’Diary” (Bombay), 1 Jan 1919.
2. see Malaviya to Vijiaraghavachariar, 14 Nov 1918,
T. V. Venkatarama Aiyar to Vijiaraghavachariar, 5 Nov 
1918, Vij. Papers; Congress 1918, Report, p. 4; S. H. 
Bomanji to N. C. Kelkar, 15 Oct 1918, Kelkar Papers.
forthcoming Congress who would help her to hold it in
check.1 2345 In supporting Malaviya for the position she
angered both the young Madrasis and Tilak’s followers,
2for they had nominated Vijiaraghavachariar. Malaviya
was elected. "There was certainly some danger of his 
giving in to the Moderates if the latter had agreed to 
come"1 but, without a Moderate contingent to stand firm 
against the young men in the Subjects Committee, 
Malaviya was not in a position to play the role of 
conciliator, for which he was noted, and he gave Mrs 
Besant little help in restraining them.^
At the time of Malaviya's election it seemed to 
the young Congressmen that he and Mrs Besant might 
succeed in re-uniting a large number of Moderates with 
the Congress and, with a majority in the Subjects 
Committee, go back on the Special Congress resolution 
demanding provincial self-government in five years.
1. see A. Rangaswami Iyengar to Vijiaraghavachariar,
25 Oct 1918, Vi.i. Papers.
2. Khaparde "Diary" (Bombay), 30 Aug, 8 Nov 1918; 
Mahratta, 27 Oct 1918, p. 509; K. V. Rangaswami Ayyangar 
to Vijiaraghavachariar, 29 Oct 1918, Vii. Bauers; Moti 
Lall Ghose to Kelkar, 25 Oct 1918, and A. Besant to 
Kelkar, 4 Nov 1918, Kelkar Bauers.
3. Jawaharlal Nehru to Vijiaraghavachariar, 17 Dec 1918, Vi.i. Parers.
4. ibid.; A. Rangaswami Iyengar, 10 Nov 1918, ibid.
5. Motilal Nehru to Vijiaraghavachariar, 18 Dec 1918, ibid.
The young men and their mentors in the several prov­
inces therefore co-ordinated their plans to ensure that 
they should have a majority at the Delhi Session. Had 
Tilak still been in India he would doubtless have made 
arrangements for the Session with Mrs Besant as before; 
but now the initiative passed to the second rank of 
leadership. Rajaji, A. Rangaswami Iyengar, Vijia­
raghavachariar and others in the south arranged with 
D. V. Grokhale, Khaparde and Tilak’s other lieutenants 
in the west, Das and his Bengal friends and the Nehrus 
in the UP to bring numbers of delegates pledged to 
vote against any retreat from the Special Congress 
Reforms resolution.^- ”1 have just returned from Delhi” 
wrote Jawaharlal Nehru. MThere is no question of going 
back on the resolution passed by the Special Congress. 
Any attempt to do so would be strongly opposed by the 
Delhi people. In fact most of them are of opinion that 
we ought to take up a stronger attitude now that the 
war is ended”. This manoeuvring, combined with Mrs 
Besant’s inability to bring any but the Madras and
1. A. Rangaswami Iyengar to Vijiaraghavachariar, 10 
and 29 Nov 1918; Motilal Nehru, telegram, to Vijiaragha 
vachariar, 17 Dec 1918, Vi,i. Papers.
2. J. Nehru to Vijiaraghavachariar, 17 Dec 1918,
Vi.i. Pacers.
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Bihar Moderates to the Session, resulted in the young
men having a considerable majority over Mrs Besant*s
forces in the Subjects Committee.
The parting of the ways came over the self-
government resolution. Mrs Besant urged Congress to
reaffirm the resolution passed at the Bombay Special
Congress, which reserved police, law and justice to
the official executive in the provinces for five years
with complete provincial autonomy thereafter, on the
ground that this resolution was reached by compromise
with the Moderates and thus provided a basis for the
re-entry of the Moderates to Congress.'*' It was now clear,
however, that she could not bring the Moderates back into
Congress, and in any case the young men were unwilling to
be yoked to them once again. Under the leadership of
C. R. Das the young Congressmen - who "showered abuse"
on those who opposed them - used their majority in the
Subjects Committee to produce a resolution demanding
immediate provincial autonomy. Only Mrs Besant and her
most devoted Theosophical lieutenants, and Jinnah and
2the Madras Moderates opposed them.
1. Congress 1918. Report, pp. 70-2.
2. Home Poll B, Jan 1919, nos 160-3, pp. 11-12; Bombay 
Police 1919. par. 216(b).
Needless to say, the difference over whether to 
demand provincial autonomy immediately or in five years 
was a symbol of the issue at stake, rather than the 
issue itself. Fundamentally the difference was a 
matter of temperament: those for whom Das spoke wished 
vaguely to go forward, to find some means of expressing 
their impatience and petulance against the British, 
whereas Mrs Besant wanted to hold them back.
Why, one may ask, did she not bow to the storm 
and accept Das' resolution? First, she still clung to 
the hope that organisational unity with the Moderates 
could be re-established. Secondly, she had changed her 
strategy: in the changed situation after the Montagu 
Announcement she believed that agitation was no longer 
adequate to win rapid progress to self-government and 
must be supplemented by parleying with the British 
Government. She explained that since she planned to go 
to England, she wanted to be free to accept as much as 
could be won by bargaining and not to be committed to 
rejecting anything less than full provincial autonomy.1 
Thirdly, her leadership had been clearly rejected in the
1. A. Besant to N. G. Kelkar, 24 Jan 1919, Kelkar 
Papers.
Delhi Subjects Committee: Das had become the young men’s 
spokesman; he had moved their resolutions successfully 
and had replaced her nominees for the General Secretary­
ships.1 2345 Her identification with the young men was
shattered and she was mortified at her inability to in-
2fluence them. She complained bitterly at their ingratit­
ude for her work on their behalf and accused ’’all Tilakites” 
and Malaviya of being ’’against” her.1 Indeed some of 
Tilak’s followers probably did resent her: Khaparde 
didn’t disguise his glee at her discomfiture, while 
D. V. Grokhale, as Secretary of Tilak’s HRL, arranged 
for Chidambaram Pillai, Vijiaraghavachariar and others 
to set up branches of Tilak's League in competition to 
hers.^ Mrs Besant took the enmity of the followers 
for the enmity of the leader himself and sealed her 
unpopularity by denouncing Tilak. In this she was 
misled by her followers: ’’...one of the greatest
1. Bombay Police 1919. par. 216(b).
2. see Home Poll D, Feb 1919, no. 41, p. 2.
3. ibid. B, Jan 1919, nos 93-5, p. 7; Khaparde ’’Diary” 
(Bombay), 30 and 31 Dec 1918.
4. D. V. Grokhale to Vi jiaraghava chari ar, 5, 12 and 24 
Jan 1919, Vi.i. Papers.
5. Khaparde ’’Diary” (Bombay), 29 Dec 1918.
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disservices that G. P. [Ramaswami Aiyar] has done to 
A. B[esant]", wrote one of her followers wistfully,
M...is that he has created in his [i.e. her] mind a 
very strong prejudice against Tilak personally by 
telling her what I look upon as positive lies about 
his revolutionary tendencies and attempts to join hands 
with Sinn Fein".1
Tilak was most anxious to retain Mrs Besant's 
association with the Congress and himself, for the sake 
both of unity in India and of Mrs Besant's contacts in 
England. "It is idle to talk of fundamental differences 
between us", he wrote to Khaparde. "Five years more or 
less for complete provincial autonomy is no fundamental 
difference".2 Had Tilak been in India he might well 
have prevented the rupture between her and the 
Rationalists.
The Muslim League Session in Delhi at the end of 
1918 was likewise rowdy and also marked a great turning 
point. As with the young Congressmen, young Muslims' 
feelings had been aroused. Pan-Islamists were
1. P. K. Telang to K. Dwarkadas, 17 Sept 1919» K . Dwar- kadas Papers.
2. Tilak, London, to Khaparde, 28 Feb 1919; also
6 Feb, 5 Mar 1919; Tilak to D. Y. Gokhale, 23 Jan and 
6 Feb 1919, Khaparde Papers.
greatly agitated by the end of the War which signalled 
Turkey’s defeat: not only was it a great blow to their 
pride as Muslims, but it raised the whole question of 
the integrity of the Khilafat and its hegemony over 
the Holy Places.1 2 With the end of the War, most of the 
Pan-Islamists who had been interned (though not the 
Ali Brothers or Azad) were released, especially in 
the Punjab. Pan-Islamic feeling was thus running high 
and nowhere higher than in Delhi, a Pan-Islamic centre.
Pan-Islamist feeling affected both the Congress 
and the League Sessions, for the Chairman of the 
Reception Committee of the former was Hakim Ajmal 
Khan and, of the latter, Dr Ansari, both Pan-Islamists. 
The Reception Committee of the League had invited the 
Muslim ulema to its sessions, despite warnings, even 
from Pan-Islamists like Khaliquzzaman that they ’’were 
playing with fire” and ’’would either be swept off their
1. Home Poll Dep. Jan 1919, no. 41, ’Delhi’, par. 2; 
ibid., no. 42, ’Madras’, par. 5«
2. Home Poll Dep. Dec 1918, no. 23, p. 14* The Gov­
ernment of the Punjab said somewhat prematurely: ’’the 
collapse of Turkey involves the collapse of the whole 
Pan-Islamic propaganda rendering those connected with 
it comparatively harmless”. Ibid., p. 27, Viceroy to 
Secretary of State, Telegram, 16 Dec 1918.
feet or carry the whole of Muslim India with them".'1'
As doctors of Islamic law the ulema were highly respected 
by Muslims, religious and lay, and formed the top rank of 
a hierarchy of authority among Muslims. If, however, 
their religious zeal were fired by the cry of "Islam in 
danger" they might direct Muslims into dangerous, even 
violent paths. The speech of the President of the Muslim 
League Session, Fazlul Huq, was in English, and evoked 
little enthusiasm, but Ansari's Urdu speech roused the 
anger of his hearers at the threats to the Khalif's 
authority from British support for the rebellious Sharif 
of Mecca and the rumoured British intention of dismember­
ing the Ottoman Empire: this set the tone of the Session. 
Mahmudabad, Wazir Hasan and Jinnah opposed the raising 
of the Khilafat question, querying the League’s constit­
utional competence to discuss other than domestic matters, 
but they were outvoted. Mahmudabad and Wazir Hasan 
resigned the offices of President and Secretary in res­
ponse to renewed attacks from young Muslims, but were 
pressed to withdraw these resignations. A new spirit, 
however, had clearly entered Muslim politics.
1. Home Poll A, Mar 1919, nos 251-9, and KW; this para­
graph is also based on ibid. Dep. Jan 1919, no. 42, p. 20; 
B, Jan 1919, nos 160-3, pp. 12, 17-19; Bombay Police 
1919. par. 217; B & 0 Police 1919. par. 2^3; UP Police 
1919. pars 161, 199, 261; cf. Khaliquzzaman, op. cit., 
pp. 43-4.
Conclusion:
At the end of 1918 Annie Besant and Tilak had 
lost the leadership both of the Moderates and of the 
Extremists and young men of Congress, while the "national­
ist" Muslims who had controlled the Muslim League, were 
being compelled to follow new and unwelcome paths by 
the Pan-Islamists and young Muslims in the League. Mrs 
Besant’s and Tilak’s strategy of the united front had 
broken down and with the departure of the Moderates from 
Congress they found themselves without a programme to 
satisfy the Nationalists who remained.
The breakdown of the united front can be traced 
to the earlier conduct of the programme of agitation 
without sanctions. The Home Rule agitation which Mrs 
Besant and Tilak roused in 1916 and the first half of 
1917 had the effect of encouraging their younger and 
more impetuous followers’ bitterness and defiance toward 
the British and of confirming the suspicions of the 
Moderates, particularly those of Bombay, that the two 
Home Rule leaders were not genuine in relinquishing 
passive resistance. Mrs Besant and Tilak thus exacer­
bated the distinctions within the united front instead 
of reconciling them.
Up to August 1917, the Moderates were held in 
harness with the Extremists and the young men as the
result of British repression of those who demanded self- 
government and British failure to make any response to 
this demand. But as soon as the British started to 
modify this policy by promising reforms, the Moderates’ 
faith in the possibility of gradual advance to self- 
government in co-operation with the British was revived, 
and they began to turn away from the united front. Mrs 
Besant returned to her opposition to passive resistance 
and persuaded Tilak to join her in conciliating the 
Moderates.
But once the latter had begun to separate from 
the Congress it proved impossible to halt the process 
except temporarily. With their faith in the possibility 
of advance in co-operation with the British restored, they 
agreed with Montagu that they should give up the position, 
which they shared with the rest of the national movement, 
that the Congress-League Scheme of Reforms was the 
minimum India would accept. Being rational men they 
agreed that it was necessary to consider the situation 
in terms of what was possible - the Congress-League 
Scheme had clearly been rejected by the British. Montagu, 
moreover, convinced them that if they did not support his
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scheme, it might he rejected by Cabinet or Parliament.
Tilak and Mrs Besant focussed attention on the Congress- 
League Scheme as the "irreducible minimum", hoping to re­
cement the united front, and (in Tilak*s case especially) 
to use this large demand as a tactical basis for gaining 
more from the British. In fact, however, it was round 
this question that differences between the member groups 
of the united front crystallised after Mrs Besant and 
Tilak had abandoned passive resistance. The Moderates 
convinced themselves that Tilak and the young men wanted 
to wreck the Reforms. Tilak summed up the differences 
between them thus:
There are men of different temperaments all 
over the world. There are men who think that 
they should make easy terms with the rulers.
There are others who think that the people are  ^
entitled to have something from their rulers...
Earlier his paper had written: "The Britishers cannot
be moved by anything but strength....Rot a ’calm’, but
a ’storm’, is the proper atmosphere for the British
2intellect and emotion to grasp the realities fully...".
Tilak thus identified himself with the emotionalism
1. speech "The Present Situation", 21 Apr 1918, at 
Madras, Tilak, Writings and Speeches, p. 363; of. Mahratta 
27 Dec 1914, p. 401.
2. Mahratta. 2 Sept 1917, p. 415.
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of the young men, which prompted them to approach G-andhi 
for a programme of passive resistance. The emotional 
and irrational frame of mind in which they turned to 
this form of political expression was conveyed by 
the Mahratta:
P.R. [i.e. passive resistance] has on its side 
the brilliant recommendation of being a highly 
spiritual, manly measure, which the other 
[i.e. the Moderate or "anti-P.R. programme"] 
has not....When we realise that Passive Resis­
tance is not a matter of option with us, but 
clearly a matter of moral "compulsion", we 
shall refuse to be over-calculating in the 
matter of "results" and leave to G-od the shaping 
of our efforts to theend He may deem proper.
What Mrs Besant said in 1915 January [sicj 
as regards "the conditions of successful passive 
resistance" we shall understand as applying only 
very partially to the Rational case of the Day, 
seeing that not material success but the safe­
guarding of Rational Honour is our first and ^
foremost requirement in the present circumstances.
This emotionalism among her followers, which Mrs
Besant had helped to rouse, limited her room for manoeuvre
vis-a-vis the British. The Reforms offered by Montagu
constituted a partial response to her demands. She
recognised that the situation had changed and believed
that by parleying with him she had a strategy which was
more likely to bring further concessions than continued
agitation. Such a strategy however was patently incapable
1. Mahratta, 19 Aug 1917, p. 390, emphasis in original.
of satisfying the young men. Prom the time of her 
release Mrs Besant’s policy became increasingly ambi­
valent*. on the one hand she strove to maintain her 
identity with the more impetuous Congressmen by denun­
ciatory and inflammatory speeches, but on the other she 
joined with the Moderates in the yet united AICC to keep 
them in check.
Like Besant, Tilak was also committed to the 
maintenance of the united front, and she was thus able to 
persuade him to help her in restraining the young men.
On a succession of issues from September 1917 until the 
end of 1918 Mrs Besant and Tilak adopted an aggressive 
attitude toward the British, but on each occasion Mrs 
Besant drew back from these positions and, willingly or 
unwillingly, Tilak followed suit. These constant 
reversals of policy imposed strains on the loyalty of 
their young followers. This in turn deepened the 
strategic dilemma of the leaders who were anxious not 
only to retain this loyalty but also to maintain the 
united front and to gain the greatest reform from the 
British. Tilak revealed the strain that this imposed 
on him when he wrote just before the Special Congress:
Cur main difficulty at present is to get as many• • •
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Moderates with us as possible without giving up our
principles....” but that "Still it is desirable that
[the] total rejection view should be put before the
Subjects Committee”.1 23 But as Rajaji who had followed
him hitherto put it, Mrs Besant's and Tilak's positions
as "mediators between nationalists and seceding moderates”
2were "incompatible” with leadership of the Nationalists.
Why did Mrs Besant and Tilak impose this crippling 
restriction on their leadership? Why did they try to 
maintain the united front, when plainly it inhibited the 
fashioning of a programme which would satisfy the 
Nationalists, who formed the bulk of their supporters?
First, as Tilak1s letter suggests, they did not 
recognise how deeply the Moderates disliked and distrusted 
them. Secondly, in order to legitimise the demands they 
made of their British audience they wanted to claim to 
speak on behalf of all India: for this reason, one can 
say that they were more concerned about the effect of their 
actions on the British than on those who followed them.^
1. Tilak to Vijiaraghavachariar, 8 Aug 1918, quoted on p. 268 above.
2. see telegram, Rajaji to Vijiaraghavachariar, 19 Aug 1918, quoted on p.269 above.
3. for a discussion of the "audience” to whom politicians 
address their action, see H. Tinker, Ballot Box and Bayonet: 
People and Government in Emergent Asian Countries, pp.
102ff.
Thirdly, Mrs Besant was anxious to restrain the young 
men of Indian politics, and for a year from September 
1917 she was able to use the necessity for compromise, 
in order to keep the Moderates in the united front, as 
a restraint upon them. In this she differed fundamen­
tally from Tilak for, although he had become doubtful 
of the possibility of rousing and controlling an 
effective mass, passive-resistance campaign and therefore 
agreed that the young hotheads should be restrained, he 
did not regard restraint as one of the ends of his policy. 
Mrs Besant had entered the national movement in order to 
provide the young men with an alternative to passive 
resistance and terrorism, to which, she feared, Tilak 
if left to himself would lead them.1 She refused to 
recognise that by her programme of agitation she was 
helping to defeat this purpose, and that by encouraging 
agitation and then calling it off she was adding to the 
degree of frustration among the young men that demanded 
an outlet.
Having failed to provide a programme which both 
satisfied and enabled her to control her followers, Mrs 
Besant might have retained control through organisation.
1. P. K. Telang to K. Dwarkadas, 17 Sept 1919,K. Dwarkadas Papers.
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But while the HRL provided an excellent hortatory 
mechanism for the rousing of agitation, it was deficient 
as a means of control. The activity of the branches de­
pended on the quality of the local leaders, who were left 
free to draw up their own rules; machinery was almost non­
existent to enforce obedience to any decisions taken by 
the plenary sessions or office bearers of the League; and 
the articulation between the headquarters and the branches 
was minimal. At the end of 1917 Mrs Besant allowed this 
organisation to decline even further: the office of 
Organising Secretary (who, if anybody, was in a position 
to exact obedience from the branches) was abolished and 
the vigorous Ramaswami Aiyar left the position of General 
Secretary for the equivalent position in Congress. Mrs 
Besant*s aim was in part to mollify the Moderates, who 
had objected to the HRL as a rival to the Congress; but 
her primary reason in allowing the League to decline was 
probably her belief that, as President of Congress, she 
would be able to demand obedience from members of the 
national movement a3 Congressmen. As she put it in her 
Presidential Address:
I cannot promise to agree with and to 
follow you always; the duty of a leader 
is to lead....A general should see 
further than his officers and his army, 
and cannot explain, while battles are
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going on, every move in a campaign....Up 
till now...I have claimed no authority 
of leadership....Now, by your election, ^
I take the place which you have given...
Congress was inadequately developed or articulated to 
act as an effective means of communication between the 
leadership and the rank-and-file and Mrs Besant and 
Tilak failed to reorganise it at the 1917 or 1918 
Sessions. Mrs Besant did place her lieutenants and Home 
Rulers in important positions and might have made some 
use of Congress, but by alienating all but the most 
devoted Theosophists among them she rendered her leader­
ship of Congress nugatory. By the middle of 1918 when 
she was trying to hold the united front together, she 
regretted that she had allowed the HRL organisation, 
already inadequate for purposes of controlling her foll­
owers, to decline. She wrote:
Bombay Presidency alone is sufficiently 
well organised to make an appeal to 
all the Branch Leagues effective, 
when a sudden need arises. There is 
not available for my use even a register, 
giving the names of all branches and 
their Secretaries.
1. The Besant Spirit. IV, 147.
2. A. Besant to members of the All-India HRL Council 
19 June 1918, A-IHRL Pile no. 3> Adyar Archives.
She urged that the organisation be revived and Arundale 
re-appointed Organising Secretary. But it was too late 
to build an organisation: the young men of Madras were 
already in revolt. Her failure to provide them with a 
consistent, satisfactory programme and her attempts to 
mollify their enthusiasm had alienated them. A few of 
them, notably Satyamurti and Rajaji, had never accepted 
her leadership unreservedly: they resented her attacks 
on Tilak and Gandhi, and believed these showed that one 
day she would ’compromise with the Government”. They 
seduced others, like Varadarajalu Naidu, who at first 
had not doubted her nationalism.'1 2' Her desire to dominate 
made enemies of men like Vijiaraghavachariar; her position 
at the head of the Theosophical Society made her over­
bearing; and even the superior airs of her Theosophical
Society followers and their resentment of any criticism
2of her won her enemies. Indeed what is surprising is 
that, with all her obvious disadvantages, she had 
succeeded in identifying herself so well with the young 
men of Indian nationalism.
1. interview with Rajaji, 29 Mar 1963.
2. P. K. Telang to K. Dwarkadas, 4 Sept 1919»
K. Dwarkadas Papers.
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Tilak, of course, started with none of these 
disadvantages. His championing of an aggressive line 
toward the British and his suffering for the national 
cause had made him the hero of the young Nationalists.
In his association with Mrs Besant in 1917-18 he was 
clearly less anxious to restrain them than she was. But 
he too failed to give the young men leadership. By 
committing himself to the united front and allying him­
self with Mrs Besant, he was unable to give them a firm 
lead in putting into effect a programme which would ex­
press their feelings. His increasing caution made him 
unwilling to give more than verbal support to passive 
resistance. And, at the end of 1918, with his eyes 
on the audience in Britain, he left India.
The way was thus prepared for one who would give 
expression to the feelings of the young Congressmen.
The articulate members of the Muslim community 
were, like their Congress counterparts, men of disparate 
tendencies: as we have seen, there were ’conservative”
Muslims, who objected to rapprochement with Congress; 
Muslims in Muslim-majority provinces who were dissatis­
fied with the terms given to them under the Congress- 
League Scheme; the ’’nationalist” Muslims, at this time in
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charge of the Muslim League, who looked forward to the 
evolution of a secular state in India; and the young 
Muslims and Pan-Islamists who were dissatisfied with the 
inactivity of the Muslim League, and wished to make more 
use of the control they might expect to gain over the 
Muslim masses by appealing to Islamic religious sentiment.
It was plainly impossible to find a programme which 
would satisfy all these shades of opinion. The Muslim 
League organisation was much more tightly controlled by 
its executive than was Congress: those who objected to 
the entente with Congress were ejected, or retired, from 
the League. But this made Jinnah, Mahmudabad and the 
small group of "nationalist” Muslims who controlled the 
League more vulnerable to attack from the side of the 
young Muslims and Pan-Islamists, who wanted them to take 
up a more aggressive policy vis-a-vis the British in 
demanding self-government for India and in defence of the 
integrity of the Khilafat. With the visit of Montagu and 
his promise of reforms, Jinnah and Mahmudabad were inclined 
to take up a more moderate position toward the British in 
whose bona fides their confidence had been somewhat 
restored. And Jinnah and Mahmudabad were wisely averse 
to rousing Muslim feeling over the Khilafat since, though 
this might temporarily unite the Muslims more closely
with the Hindus of Congress in opposition to the British, 
to do so threatened to rouse Muslim fanaticism which 
might prove uncontrollable. This would inhibit the 
advance to secularism; and might well be turned against 
the Hindus and wreck the Muslim League-Congress entente.
The Muslim League, as it had existed heretofore, 
obviously could not control the Muslim masses, as had 
been demonstrated by the anti-Hindu Muslim riots in 
Calcutta. Here, clearly, was a threat to the continuance 
of the Hindu-Muslim entente. The best chance of con­
trolling the masses was through the hierarchy of the 
ulema and Muslim divines; but they, in turn, were not 
readily controllable, since their religious zeal was 
easily aroused.
In order to assuage the Pan-Islamists the "nation­
alist” Muslim leaders did take up the agitation over the 
internment of the Ali Brothers; but even this served to 
rouse the Pan-Islamic tempers. At the end of the year 
the Pan-Islamists swept aside the warnings of Mahmudabad, 
Jinnah and the other "nationalist" leaders and used the 
League Session as the amplifier of Pan-Islamic feelings.
The field had been left clear in India for a 
leader who would utilise, and give expression to, the
feelings of the young Congressmen and the Pan-Islamists,
and who would also try to overcome threats to the 
Muslim-Hindu entente from communal violence. It was 
Gandhi who emerged to fill this role.
PART 3: GARDHI ’S RISE TO LEADERSHIP
Chapter VII
THE EMERGENCE OP GANDHI, JANUARY - APRIL, 1919.
Introduction:
After the excitement of the 1918 Sessions of the 
Indian Rational Congress and the Muslim League at 
Delhi, the leading men in these organisations turned 
their attention to the selection of suitable deputations 
to press India’s claims at Westminster and before the 
British public for as wide a devolution of power as 
possible under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.^ But 
these preparations were soon to be overshadowed by more 
spectacular political events. The Report of the Sedition, 
or ’’Rowlatt”, Committee, which the Government of India
had published contemporaneously with the Montagu-Chelmsford
1. see letters and telegrams to Vijiaraghavachariar 
from N. C. Kelkar, 15 Jan and 28 Peb 1919; Hakim Ajmal 
Khan, 18 Jan 1919, V. J. Patel, 20 Jan 1919» Malaviya 
24 Jan 1919» G. S. Khaparde, 27 Jan 1919, Vi.i. Papers; 
Tilak to Khaparde, 28 Peb and 5 Mar 1919, Khaparde 
Papers; Bombay Police 1919. pars 325, 475(b), 542, 502.
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Report, had recommended that legislation should be 
passed to enable the Government to retain the powers 
of arbitrary arrest and detention, which it had held during 
the War under the Defence of India Act (due to lapse 
six months after Peace was declared) and which it had 
used to detain some thousands of anarchist and terrorist 
suspects.'1' It suggested that trials for sedition might 
be by special "courts”, without juries, and in camera 
if the "court” so decided; that confessions be admitted 
as evidence; and that the right of appeal be abolished. 
Early in 1919 the Government of India introduced two 
Bills to implement the suggestions of this Report, 
the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill and the 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, known as the Rov/latt 
Bills or, more commonly among Indians, as the "Black 
Bills".2
1. Rowlatt Report, especially pp. 197-212.
2. the Bills were gazetted on 18 Jan 1919, see 
Indian Leg. Co.. LVII (Apr 1918 - Mar 1919), 470; 
and introduced in the central legislature on 6 and 19 
Peb respectively, ibid., pp. 450-551, 553-76.
Gandhi announced in March that if the Bills were 
passed he would lead a satyagraha campaign, inaugurated 
by a 24-hour hartal or cessation of business, in the 
course of which Indians would be urged to disobey the 
new legislation and other laws. The Government dropped 
one Bill but forced the other through the legislature 
against the opposition of all- the non-official Indian 
members. The hartal was widely observed throughout 
India: trading and transport came to a halt in the 
large cities and towns, and even in villages; crowds 
joined processions to rivers or to the sea, and took 
purificatory baths; Muslims joined Hindus in prayer at 
temples, Hindus addressed crowds in mosques; and laws 
were broken by the sale of unregistered or prohibited 
literature. Political demonstrations had never been 
so widespread in India before and, it is safe to say, 
had never before involved so many Indians drawn from 
such wide social backgrounds; no Indian leader had 
demonstrated his ability to sway and direct large numbers 
as did Gandhi on this occasion. And yet he had hardly 
taken part in Indian national politics during the six 
months since the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms proposals 
had appeared. How, then, was he able to assume the 
leadership of the Indian national movement?
The answer to this question is to be found partly 
in the policy of the British, partly in the state of 
mind of the young men of the Congress and the Muslim 
League who became his most devoted followers and exec­
utives, and partly in Gandhi’s preparation for 
leadership.
By their hasty enactment of the Rowlatt legislation 
the British provided the immediate occasion for Gandhi’s 
rise to leadership. The Bills provoked unanimous 
opposition from every shade of Indian political opin­
ion, for it was seen that they could be used to muzzle 
or detain politicians of whatever hue and ”to deal with 
ordinary political offences”.1 The British also con­
tributed to Gandhi’s rise by permitting him to public­
ise and organise his satyagraha campaign. As the 
result of their experience of his methods in South 
Africa and in India since 1914 and of Mrs Besant’s 
internment, the British - notably Sir George Lloyd, who 
had recently arrived as Governor of Bombay - trusted 
Gandhi to keep his movement non-violent, and believed 
that the best way to deal with the movement was to 
aliov/ it to run its course, rather than to restrain
1. Indian Leg. Co.. LVII, 457, 1188; cf. pp. 464, etc.
its leaders and thus to give them martyrdom and popul­
arity. It is unlikely, for instance, that they would 
have allowed Tilak to go so far.
The key to G-andhi's success at this time, however, 
lies in the young Congressmen and Muslims, whose temper 
was high at the end of 1918 and who became his most 
devoted lieutenants and followers. The young men of 
Congress were looking for a programme of action which 
would enable them to strike at the British: some of them 
were prepared to employ terrorism and acts of violence1 
but most regarded armed rebellion as unpractical, for the 
immediate future at least, if only because the country 
was disarmed by the Arms Act. In any case, there was a 
weapon nearer to hand which had not been used, passive 
resistance. This had been urged as a means of bringing
ppressure to bear upon the British since 1906 but on the 
only occasion when it had appeared likely to be put into 
effect on a national scale - over Mrs Besant's internment 
the leaders had dropped it, thus adding to the young men's 
sense of frustration. Many of the young men saw passive 
resistance, in which they included refusal to pay land 
taxes, as a means of involving mass groups, notably the
1. see K. M. Munshi, I Follow the Mahatma, pp. 1-3.
2 . see Chapter I above.
peasants. Some of them expected the British to reply with 
coercion, thus alienating these mass groups and leading 
to mob violence: to a number of Gandhi's lieutenants, when 
they joined him, such a result would not have been 
altogether unwelcome.'1'
The young Muslims and Pan-Islamists had been simil­
arly aroused by Turkey’s defeat at the end of 1918 and 
the threats by Britain and the other Allies to dismember 
the Ottoman Empire and thus to divest the Khalif of 
suzerainty over the Holy Places of Islam.
Gandhi had been preparing a method of political 
action which appealed to these young men as a means of 
expression for their pent-up feelings; he promised too 
to mobilise mass groups in support of action taken by 
them, and from both the young politicians and mass groups 
he had been securing admirers and followers who would 
do his bidding and act as a chain of command to others.
1. Deshpande, Autobiography, pp. 280-1, 295; Yajnik, 
1943, pp. 89-90; Munshi, I Follow the Mahatma, p. 9, and 
Gujarati autobiography, translated for the writer by 
the author; interview with Br S. Kitchlu, 19 Feb 19&3.
Gandhi Evolves His Doctrine in Action.
Mohandas Karamchand G-andhi was born in 1869 in 
one of the Native States of Gujarat.1 2 Although his 
family was of the Bania caste, third in the fourfold 
varna. hierarchy and traditionally traders, his grand­
father, uncle and father had all risen to the position 
of dewan, or prime minister, of a Native State. Gandhi 
trained as a lawyer in London, and it was in order to 
take part in a court case that he first went to South 
Africa in 1893 (the year, it will be remembered, that 
Annie Besant arrived in India). Within a few days of 
his arrival he had performed several acts of personal 
passive resistance: he refused to vacate voluntarily 
his seat, first in a first-class railway compartment 
(from which by convention non-whites were excluded in 
South Africa), and then on a stage-coach. In the first
1. for biographical details, see M. K. Gandhi, An 
Autobiography, or The Story of My Experiments with Truth.
2. for Gandhi’s South African experiences, see ibid., 
pp. 127-455; M. K. Gandhi, Satyagraha in South Africa, 
especially pp. 96-339; W. K. Hancock, Survey of British 
Commonwealth Affairs, I, iv, part 2, 187-202; W. K. 
Hancock, Four Studies of War and Peace in This Century, 
pp. 59-92; M. K. Gandhi, Speeches and Writings, pp. 
1-101; D. G. Tendulkar, Mahatma, Life of Mohandas 
Karamchand Gandhi, I .
instance he failed, for the guard ejected him bodily, 
but in the second the white attendant beat him so 
brutally that his white fellow-passengers interposed. 
During the thirteen years from 1893 to 1906 he led the 
Indians of South Africa in presenting their hardships 
to the governments and pressing for their rights. This 
convinced him of the need to increase Indians’ self- 
respect, at home and abroad, as well as giving him 
experience of organisation and leadership and teaching 
him the value of communications and publicity.1 2
It was only during his last eight years in South 
Africa, from 1906 to 1914, that he put passive resist­
ance, which he had shown to the stage-coach attendant 
at a personal level, into practice at the political 
level in a series of satyagraha campaigns. He led the
South African Indian community in offering civil 
2disobedience and in protesting against a Transvaal law 
that all Indians must be registered and carry passes, 
the aim of which was to make life so unpleasant for
1. Gandhi, Experiments, p. 348; cf.his Satyagraha. in South Africa, p. 142.
2. ’’Civil” in contradistinction to ’criminal” law­
breaking, which would involve violence.
Indians in the Transvaal that they would leave, and 
against other laws which restricted Indian immigration, 
imposed poll taxes on Indians and invalidated Indian 
marriages. They refused to register; marched across 
state boundaries as "illegal immigrants”; struck 
against the poll taxes; and suffered imprisonment, 
deportation and forced labour for these offences. 
Labourers and merchants, Muslims, Hindus and Parsees, 
men and women strove and suffered together. Their 
staunchness in the face of suffering won the approval of 
the Viceroy of India for their struggle and the admir­
ation and support of their compatriots at home. Fur­
thermore it wrought a change of heart in Smuts: the 
Union Government capitulated - at least for the time 
being - on most of the issues over which satyagraha 
had been launched and, though Gandhi confessed himself 
not completely satisfied, he returned to India in 1915 
a hero.
Sir Pherozeshah Mehta and his Moderate associates 
of Bombay had applauded Gandhi’s work while making it 
clear that they had little hope of his success; but as 
Gandhi demonstrated his determination and his ability 
to carry the Indians in South Africa with him, so their
support, financial as well as moral, grew.^ Among the
Moderates Gandhi won a staunch advocate in Gokhale:
doubtless they were drawn to each other by their mutual
belief in non-violence and in the necessity for self-
sacrifice in the service of their country. Gandhi
seems to have felt a complete lack of rapport with
Tilak, who was known for the enmity which he had stirred
up between Muslims and Hindus in western India and had
been convicted of encouraging young nationalists to
crimes of violence. On Gandhi’s return to India, at
the beginning of 1915, therefore, he put himself in the
hands of Gokhale, who advised him to abstain from
active participatinn in politics for a year, during
2which he should observe Indian political life.
Gandhi embarked on several extended tours of India, 
observing, and speaking on South Africa,^ but he had 
made up his mind to apply the political method he had 
evolved in South Africa to his homeland. In May 1915,
1. Gandhi, Experiments, p. 273; letters from Gandhi to 
Gokhale, 6 Dec 1909, no. 4111, Gandhi Papers Nidhi;
Gokhale to Natesan, 9 Nov 1913, Gokhale Papers; J. 3. 
Petit to Gandhi 31 July and 11 Oct 1915, no. S 6199,
Gandhi Papers Sabarmati.
2. Gandhi to Gokhale, 27 Feb 1914, no. 1224, Gandhi 
Papers Nidhi.
3. Gandhi, Speeches and Writings, pp. 102-12; Sastri, 
’Diary”, 8 Peb, 18 Apr, 7 May and 10 July 1915; Bombay 
Provincial Conference, 10 and 11 July 1915. Poona. Report, 
pp. 56-8; Congress 1915, Report, p. 173*
three months after the death of Gokhale, he set up an
ashram1 23in Ahmedabad. "I wanted to acquaint India with
the method I had tried in South Africa”, he wrote later,
"and I desired to test in India the extent to which its
application might be possible. So my companions and I
2selected [for it] the name 'Satyagraha Ashram'...M. 
Although Gandhi set up his headquarters in his native 
province of Gujarat, he strove to establish contact 
with as many of the groups in Indian society as 
possible: the inmates of the ashram included Tamils 
and soon, to the perturbation of some of Gandhi's more 
orthodox caste followers, untouchables. In addition 
he "searched out" the Muslim leaders and met Dr Ansari 
and also the Ali Brothers, and their spiritual adviser 
Abdul Bari.^
Gandhi had hoped to join Gokhale's Servants of 
India Society (SIS), but after Gokhale's death the 
members of the Society decided against his admission:
1. an "abode", the home of a religious teacher and his 
disciples.
2. Gandhi, Experiments, pp. 482-3; C. F. Andrews, 
Mahatma. Gandhi's Ideas, p. 200.
3. Young India, 14 May 1919, p. 6; Bombay Police 
1915i par. 408; Hailey to Government of India, 1 May 
1915 in Home Poll Dep. May 1915, no. 36, p. 3; Gandhi, Experiments, pp. 339-40.
his South African reputation would place him in a domin­
ant position in the Society and, while its members 
agreed with him in foregoing the pursuit of wealth in 
order to serve India socially and politically, they did 
not insist on some of the other conditions he laid down 
for service, notably celibacy, nor did they like his 
dietetic and other fads; moreover, as Moderates, the 
older members were unwilling to be dragged into cam­
paigns of passive resistance.*** Nevertheless Gandhi 
continued to associate himself with the Moderates rather 
than the Extremists. In July 1915 he attended the Bombay 
Provincial Conference in Poona, organised by the 
Moderate-dominated PCC, where he urged Tilak to accept 
unconditionally the Moderates' terms for readmission to 
the Congress, and told Tilak that India would not be 
"prepared for the latter's propaganda" - presumably 
the demand for complete self-government and nation-wide
agitation in support of that demand - "for at least 20
2years to come". At the Extremists’ Bombay "Provincial
1. see A. V. Patwardhan, V. H. Barve and D. V. Ambekar 
to [?], 10 Jan 1916; Y. Yenkatasubbayya and D. Hanuman- 
trao to A. Y. Patwardhan, 11 Jan 1919, SIS Papers Madras; 
Sastri "Diary", 22-28 Feb, 11-13 June, 1915; Yajnik, 1943, 
p. 14.
2. Bombay Police 1915. par. 700; Karandikar "Diary" 
(Poona), 11 July 1915; Yajnik, 1943, p. 8; for the ineff­
ectiveness of Gandhi's intervention, see Chapter II above.
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ConferenceM at Belgaum in April of the following year,
where Tilak and his followers decided to re-enter the
Congress (under terms more favourable than those
offered the year before), Gandhi urged Tilak to rejoin
the Congress only if he was genuinely prepared for a
compromise with the Moderates.'*'
G-andhi was out of sympathy with the Home Rule
agitation roused by Mrs Besant and Tilak, although he
2did not actively oppose it. He wrote:
I myself do not much like Mrs Besant’s 
methods. I have not liked the idea of 
the political propaganda being carried 
on during the war. In my opinion our 
restraint will have been the best propa­
ganda. But the whole country was against me. 3
Gandhi considered that it was unchivalrous to take ad­
vantage of Britain’s difficulties during the War to 
put forward India’s demand for self-government: logic­
ally, indeed was not India thereby using German violence 
in an attempt to gain her ends?^ Above all, he feared
1. Deshpande, Autobiography, pp. 259-60; Bombay Police 
1916. par. 610; cf. Hew India. 15 Mar 1916, p. 9b.
2. Jamnadas, ’Memoire”, p. 20; Yajnik, 1943, pp. 14, 16-18.
3. Gandhi to Maffey [P.S. to Viceroy], 10 July 1917, 
no. S 6372, Gandhi Papers Sabarmati; cf. his letter to 
Viceroy, 29 Apr 1918, in Experiments. p. 547, and in Speeches and Writings, pp. 436-40.
4. cf. his application of similar reasoning to sit­
uations in South Africa, Gandhi, Satyagraha in South 
Africa, pp. 71-4, 325-6.
that the Home Rule agitation would he superficial, 
that it would affect only the upper, Western-educated 
stratum of society and win power, if at all, for that 
stratum: he, on the contrary, wanted to involve mass 
groups in satyagraha and to ameliorate their lot through 
it.^ And, of course, as the "expert” in satyagraha, 
he intended to direct its introduction himself. He 
was as unwilling to share leadership with Mrs Besant as 
she to share it with him: "one scabbard cannot hold two 
swords", he told her Bombay lieutenants who urged him 
to join the HRL.^
While Gandhi would not utilise Britain’s diffic­
ulties to press the general demand for a devolution of 
power, he was still anxious to test satyagraha in 
Indian conditions and to use it to right particular 
wrongs. He launched several satyagraha campaigns, which 
he rationalised as attempts to reconcile the Indian 
people to the Government by making the latter amenable 
to public opinion: these campaigns, he said, were his 
"direct and special contribution to the War".^ But
1. see R. Prasad, Mahatma G-andhi & Bihar, p. 19«
2. Yajnik, 1943, p. 33; see Mrs Besant's letter to him 
7 June 1917, no. S 6361, Gandhi Papers Sabarmati.
3. Gandhi to Viceroy, 29 Apr 1918, loc. cit.
they provided testing grounds for the application of 
satyagraha on a much wider scale after the War.
Gandhi’s first use of satyagraha in India - or 
threat to use it - was over the system of indentured 
labour, which reduced Indians to near-slavery in Ratal, 
in Fiji and elsewhere. In 1915 C. F. Andrews, an 
Anglican priest with unorthodox, pro-Hindu notions 
who had worked with Gandhi in South Africa, came back 
from an inspection of Fiji with harrowing tales of 
the conditions of the indentured labourers."^ Andrews 
persuaded Mrs Besant and Tilak to launch an agitation 
on this question, which distressed Indians of all 
shades of political opinion: when it became clear in 
early 1917 that the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, was 
prepared to make soothing and vague promises of 
Heventual abolition” but not to allow legislation for 
an immediate ban, Gandhi joined the agitation. He set 
31st July as the deadline for abolition and hinted that 
if it were not abolished by then he would call on
1. see letters from C. F. Andrews to Tagore, 23 Jan
1914» 7 May, (?) Oct and 28 Oct 1915» C. F. Andrews 
Papers. This paragraph is also based on Yajnik, 1943, 
pp. 18-23; Gandhi, Experiments, pp. 489-93; Gandhi, 
Speeches & Writings, pp. 113-6; New India. 24 Oct 
1916, p. 5b-d; 29 Jan 1917, p. 6b; 2 Feb 1917, p. 9e;
3 Feb 1917, p. 3c; Home Poll B, Feb 1917, nos 552-5, w/ 
10 Feb 1917, par. 5; w/e 17 Feb 1917, par. 7; Dep.
Mar 1917, no. 32, 'Madras’, par. 11, 'Bombay’, par. 2.
Indians to Hbe prepared to suffer, to go to prison or 
even to die”. Rather than face a growing agitation, 
Chelmsford capitulated.
Immediately after this Gandhi took up the case of
the peasants of the Champaran area in northern Bihar.1 2
Here the tenant-peasants suffered virtual serfdom:
forced labour, a multitude of customary but illegal dues
exacted by the ingenious landlords and, above all, the
tinkathia system under which three-twentieths of the
tenants’ land was put under indigo for the landlords.
Furthermore, most of the landlords were British. Gandhi
came to investigate and refused to leave when ordered
to do so by the local government officials who were
friends of the planters. This was Gandhi’s first act
of civil disobedience in India. Word of this soon spread:
Gandhi had been invited to Champaran by one of the
leading Bihari politicians, Braj Kishore Prasad, and on
his way through Patna had sought out the others; in
addition, Gandhi made sure that his actions were well
2publicised by telegrams to friends and the press. The
1. this paragraph is based on Gandhi, Experiments. pp. 
494-519; R. Prasad, Autobiography, pp. 82-100; R. Prasad, 
Mahatma Gandhi & Bihar, pp. 1-37; B. B. Misra (ed),
Select Documents on Mahatma Gandhi’s Movement in Champar­
an. passim; B & 0 Police 1917. notably pars 440, 479,
531, 592, 641.
2. Gandhi, Experiments, p. 506; B & 0 Police 1917. 
par. 592.
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Lieutenant-Governor of the province, fearing a cause 
celebre. withdrew the orders against Gandhi, who ad­
vised his followers that "no public agitation [would be] 
necessary* and proceeded with his enquiry.1 2 Realising 
no doubt that Gandhi would not be satisfied merely to 
enquire and leave things as they were, the Lieutenant- 
Governor set up an official enquiry, in which Gandhi 
was included, and on its recommendation allowed the
passing of the Champaran Agrarian Act, which ended the
2planters * extortions.
Gandhi carefully avoided relating the Champaran 
satyagraha to the Home Rule agitation then in progress 
in the country, but on Mrs Besant’s internment he 
slipped away to Bombay and, in response to requests for 
guidance from her young, HRL followers there he sugg­
ested that they should demonstrate their disapproval of 
the internment by offering passive resistance against 
it, marching the 500-odd miles to her place of intern­
ment and asking her to march out at their head.1 Her
1. see telegram from Government of Bihar to Commiss­
ioner, Muzaffarpur, 19 Apr 1917, in Champaran Documents, 
p. 73; B & 0 Police 1917. par. 529.
2. much of this was due to the advice of Sir William 
Vincent (1866-1941), Home Member, Government of India, 
1917-20; had been member of the Lt.-Governor*s Executive 
Council, Bihar and Orissa., 1915-17; see Champaran Docu­
ments . especially pp. 164, 190-1.
see Chapter VI above.3 .
followers were so excited that they set to work to put 
this somewhat bizarre proposal into effect, collecting 
signatures on a pledge drawn up by Gandhi from those who 
were prepared to participate. They also acted upon his 
suggestions that they should take the Home Rule demand 
to the villages, instead of concentrating solely on add­
ressing audiences in the Ghawls and Markets of Bombay, 
and that they should draw up a Petition to the Secretary 
of State in support of the Congress-League Scheme, to 
be signed by thousands of peasants after the Scheme had 
been explained to them. The young men of Bombay, in 
company with those of the rest of India, pressed the 
Congress Committees to adopt passive resistance in 
protest at Mrs Besant*s internment: this not only prov­
oked the determined opposition of the Moderates in the 
Congress but also gave rise to a debate on the meaning 
of passive resistance and how it was to be put into 
effect. Gandhi (although not a member of the PCC) was 
called in to advise the Bombay PCC on this question: he 
was reported to have said - somewhat surprisingly in 
view of his South African campaigns and his later 
leadership of the Congress - that passive resistance 
f,was purely a matter of individual conscience and that
being so, the Congress as a body should not adopt [it]M. ^  
Presumably he meant that his sort of passive resistance 
(which will be examined in more detail below) could not 
be carried out without proper preparation nor, indeed, 
without his guidance which, due to the Champaran cam­
paign and the fact that he did not control the Congress, 
he could not give.
Prom the end of 1917 Gandhi transferred most of 
his activity to his native region of Gujarat. His 
advice to the young men of Bombay - many of them Gujar­
atis - to take politics to the countryside had borne 
fruit in a crop of HRLs in the towns and villages of 
Gujarat. The awakening in this hitherto politically- 
backward region expressed itself in the Pirst Gujarat 
Provincial Conference at Godhra in November, the 
organisers of which asked Gandhi to preside. He 
expounded his notion of satyagraha, and mentioned that 
he had applied it again with success: he had told the 
Government that, if a customs barrier, recently 
imposed between the Gujarat Native States and British 
India at Viramgam was not removed, he and the people of
1. Minutes of the Sub-Committee of the Bombay PCC 
appointed to consider Passive Resistance, 26 Aug 1917, 
in Bombay PCC Papers, kept in Deccan Sabha Papers.
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the area might ignore the barrier and court imprison­
ment; the Government had again acquiesced.^ His next 
two satyagraha campaigns were carried out in Gujarat, one
among the millworkers of Ahmedabad, the other among the
2peasants of the Kaira District. Gandhi undertook to 
lead a strike of the Ahmedabad weavers if they would 
reduce their demand and accept a number of harsh con­
ditions, e.g. to accept no alms and not to picket. The 
workers had no savings and suffered grievously during 
the strike, which was eventually settled on their 
(reduced) terms but only after Gandhi had stiffened their 
will (and frightened the mill-owners) by fasting - the 
first occasion on which he employed the fast. In Kaira, 
the Government had allowed a number of suspensions in 
the payment of land revenue, due to heavy damage to 
crops by rain and pests. The peasants claimed that as 
the crop was less than a third of the normal the whole 
of the revenue should be suspended; Gandhi persuaded
1. Yajnik, 1943, pp. 33-5; Gandhi Presidential Speech, 
First Gujarat Provincial Conference, 3 Nov 1917, in 
Speeches & Writings, pp. 400-22; Bombay Police 1917. 
par. 1247; Gandhi presents the story somewhat differ­
ently, Experiments, pp. 460-3; though cf. Speeches & 
Writings, pp. 201-2.
2. re former, see M. H. Desai, A Righteous Struggle (A
Chronicle of the Ahmedabad Textile Labourers1 2 Fight for 
JusticeT. passim; N. D. Parikh, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, 
I, 90-7; HFM Bombay, II, 729-36; Gandhi, Experiments. pp. 
520-2, 526-30: re latter, see ibid., pp. 531-8; Parikh,
Vallabhbhai Patel, I, 48-89; G. K. Devadhar et al. Report 
of an Inquiry into the Agricultural Situation in...Kaira.
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them to demand the suspension of half the revenue and 
to pledge themselves to refuse to pay any revenue, and to 
suffer seizure of property and imprisonment, until the 
Government agreed. But forfeiture of their property 
worked such hardship on the peasantry that Gandhi went 
back on the pledge and agreed that the richer peasants 
would pay up if remissions were granted to the poor - 
whose identity was to be decided by the Government.
Gandhi was dejected at this partial surrender but the 
result was celebrated as another triumph for satyagraha.
This brings us to April 1918 when, as we have 
seen,^the Government’s urgent plea for men and money to 
meet the German offensive on the Western Front res­
ulted in a division of opinion between Mrs Besant, who 
wished India to support Britain in this emergency, and 
Tilak and the young men of the national movement, who 
saw this as an opportunity to press their demands for a 
definite promise of Home Rule at the end of the War. 
Gandhi found himself in an awkward position. His aver­
sion to taking advantage of Britain’s difficulties made 
him decide to assist the Government in its recruiting
1. Chapter VI above.
campaign. He had intended to support the Government 
at its War Conferences, but seeing how unpopular this 
stand would be and in view of the Government's snub to 
the national movement by refusing to invite Mrs Besant, 
Tilak and the Ali Brothers, he merely offered general 
support at the Delhi Conference, and wrote to the 
Viceroy, deploring the absence of the leaders, saying 
that he could not forswear the use of satyagraha even 
during the War, and asking for assurances that the Gov­
ernment would respect the Indians' desire for Home Rule.^ 
At the Bombay War Conference he refused to support a 
resolution and, after the Conference, presided at a
meeting to protest at the Governor's refusal to allow
2Tilak to demand Home Rule at the Conference. During the 
rest of 1918, while the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms were 
eagerly debated, Gandhi was withdrawn from the general 
stream of politics by his recruiting campaign in 
Gujarat. Sastri visited him and convinced Gandhi that 
the Reforms would be of benefit to India and that he
1. Gandhi, Experiments, pp. 546-50; Gandhi to Viceroy, 
(draft), 29 Apr 1918, no. 5237, Gandhi Papers Hidhi.
2. Jayakar, I, 192; Indian Annual Register. 1919. 
part 4, pp. 97-100.
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should welcome them,1 but Gandhi was too busy recruit­
ing to attend the 1918 Special Congress, and too sick 
to attend the annual Congress at the end of the year, 
having worn himself out in recruiting and by his dietetic 
fads.
Having brought the narrative to the eve of 
Gandhi's emergence as the leader of the Indian national 
movement, let us consider in greater detail the 
political technique he had evolved, his doctrinal out­
look and the following he had acquired in India.
II
Gandhian Technique, Doctrine and Organisation.
What, first of all, did Gandhi mean by satyagraha? 
The word literally translated means "truth-force", 
though Gandhi referred to it more frequently as "soul- 
force". Gandhi expressed what he meant by the term in 
countless articles, through parables and in his actions, 
and developed the idea over a long life: to follow him 
would be to enter a vast metaphysical territory. It
1 . Yajnik, 1943, pp. 65-6.
may suffice to indicate the religious nature of Gandhifs
concept of "truth-force" to recall his oft-repeated
assertion that, for him, "Truth is God".^ Gandhi used
the term satyagraha to mean the practice of truth in 
2general, hut usually applied it in a more limited 
sense in conflict situations to signify "passive 
resistance" or "civil disobedience". In some of his 
writings he differentiated strictly between passive 
resistance and satyagraha: the former he defined as non­
violent resistance to unwelcome or unrighteous laws or 
authority out of a sense of weakness - if the passive 
resister got the chance he would resort to violence to 
achieve his ends satyagraha was non-violent resist­
ance undertaken on the principle that violence was wrong 
and that evil should be met by non-violence, or ahimsa.^  
Gandhi believed that if India could be persuaded to 
adopt non-violent resistance out of a sense of 
conviction in her struggle against the British, this 
technique could then be used for the conflict situations
1. see N. K. Bose (ed), Selections from Gandhi, pp. 
3-15, 19.
2. "When is Satyagraha Going to be Resumed?", in 
Youn^; India. 7 [should be 10] May, 1919, p. 6b.
3. Gandhi, Satyagraha in South Africa, pp. 112-3.
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which were bound to arise between Hindus and Muslims,
between Brahmins and non-Brahmins and between economic
groups within Indian society. To some it seemed that
Gandhi became obsessed with satyagraha in itself. Indeed,
Rabindranath Tagore felt it necessary to warn him:
Passive resistance [i.e. satyagraha] is 
a force which is not necessarily moral in 
itself; it can be used against truth as 
well as for it....I know your teaching is 
to fight against evil by the help of the 
good. But such a fight is for heroes and 
not for men led by the impulses of the 
moment.
Nevertheless Gandhi was able to enlist large numbers of
Indians from mass groups in his satyagraha campaigns.
That he was able to do so was largely due to their
acquaintance with and reverence for the religious con-
2cepts which he used, and for him as a man of God.
The sources from which Gandhi drew these ideas 
were partly Western (or Western-mediated): Christianity 
above all, and Tolstoy, later fortified by Thoreau.^
1. R. Tagore to Gandhi, 12 Apr 1919» no. 4583» Gandhi 
Papers Nidhi.
2. see Gandhi, Speeches & Writings, p. 315*
3. see Gandhi’s testimony in C. P. Andrews, Mahatma 
Gandhi’s Ideas, pp. 191-200; cf. N. K. Bose (ed), 
Selections, p. 40; H. Thoreau, ’Civil Disobedience” and 
”A Plea for Captain John Brown” in H. S. Canby (ed),
The Works of Thoreau, pp. 789-808, 832-45; Gandhi, 
Speeches & Writings, p. 310.
But much of his inspiration came from Indian traditions. 
He had been brought up in a Vaishnava family, and 
ahimsa, "non-injury" or "non-violence", was strongly 
entrenched in Vaishnava, or bhakti (devotional), 
Hinduism.^ Prom Hindu sources too came his conviction 
that, in order to serve his fellow-men and to offer 
satyagraha, he must purify himself by committing himself 
to celibacy and restraint of the senses (brahmacharya)
pand poverty: this was the first step on the way to
asceticism. Here Gandhi was tapping sources of "soul- 
force" in a somewhat different sense, for the ascetic 
in Indian tradition has been regarded as the possessor 
of extraordinary, super-physical power.^ Satyagraha 
itself was an application by Gandhi at the political 
level of the tradition of inflicting or inviting suffer­
ing upon oneself (tapasya) as a means of purifying one­
self and of changing the heart of an oppressor or 
opponent. One such form of tapasya was known as
1. H. K. Bose (ed), Selections, p. 7; see K. Shrid- 
harani, War without Violence: A Study of Gandhifs 
Method and its Accomplishments, pp. 164-5; Gandhi, 
"Ahimsa". Oct 1916/ in Speeches & Writings. pp. 345-8;
M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 23,167.
2. Gandhi, Satyagraha in South Africa, p. 98; Experi­
ments . pp. 252-61.
3. see A. 1. Basham, The Wonder that Was India, pp. 
244-6.
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’’sitting dharna”: in order to move the heart of an
oppressor or creditor, the sufferer would sit at his
door and fast.1 While in theory satyagraha and dharna
were supposed to work a change of heart in the oppressor
entirely through the sight of the self-suffering of the
performer, both did involve an element of coercion
upon the oppressor: dharna might pass over into social
boycott, and in the Kaira satyagraha, for instance, the
refusal to pay land revenue did "hurt” the Government.
Later during the Rowlatt satyagraha Gandhi was to speak
2of ’’bending' the 'Government to the national will”: he
seems to have recognised that the Government was more 
likely to change its mind through fear of losing its 
authority than because of the sufferings of the satya- 
grahis.
Gandhi laid more stress on the desirability of 
his technique of satyagraha and its adoption, than on 
the political goals which he envisaged for India. Never­
theless, while in South Africa, he had outlined the sort
1. see N. K. Bose, 1 Conflict and Its Resolution in 
Hindu Civilization”, in his Studies in Gandhism, pp.
80-8; Gandhi actually opposed ’’sitting dharna.”« see 
Young India. 2 Feb 1922, Ganesan, pp. 298-9.
2 . Young India. 30 Mar 1919» Ganesan, p. 1190.
of society toward which he wanted India to work. This 
was the traditional, if somewhat idealised, peasant 
society of the past, centred on the village, where men 
might work with pre-industrial implements and strive to 
fulfill their duty, or dharma, without the temptations 
of modern civilisation.^
His view of the British and their role in India 
was an ambivalent one. He rejected the Western civili­
sation which British rule had brought to India, and 
denounced its devices and institutions: hospitals, 
parliamentary institutions of the Westminster type, 
law courts, means of communication and Western education. 
At the same time he admired what he regarded as the 
British ethos: honesty, uprightness, respect for the 
worth of the individual, even godliness. Furthermore 
he recognised that government under the British gave 
the largest possible scope for the exercise of the indiv­
idual conscience, and thus for the practice of satya- 
graha: he was "governed least under the British Empire.
1. M. K. Gandhi, Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule, pp. 
44-5.
2. ibid., pp. 22-7, 32-4, 39-43, 64-70; speech, 27 
Apr 1915, in Gandhi, Speeches & Writings, pp. 312-3; 
Gandhi, Ruskin: Unto This Last, A Paraphrase, pp. 66-7.
Hence [he said] my loyalty to the British Empire”.'1 23'
Gandhi’s ambivalent view of the British connection
was reflected in a fluctuation in attitude to the
2necessity of getting rid of it. He probably expressed
his continuing conviction when, in about 1904-, he wrote:
It is not right that one people should 
rule another. British rule in India 
is an evil....3
But there were times when he seemed almost to have for­
gotten the urge to get rid of the British, as for instance 
during the recruitment campaign of 1918. At least until 
1920 it seemed that Gandhi was only concerned to make 
the British responsive to the wishes of the Indian 
people, as in the Champaran and Kaira satyagrahas, 
though taken to its logical conclusion responsiveness 
would have been indistinguishable from self-government. 
There was no doubt that in all circumstances, whether 
engaged in making the British more responsive or in 
winning swara.i. Gandhi’s method was to use satyagraha
1. speech, Apr 1915, in Speeches & Writings, p. 310.
2. for a somewhat different view, see P. van den 
Bungen, ’Gandhi as a Political Leader”# (unpublished).
3. Gandhi, Ruskin: Unto This Last, p. 65.
but with his loose definition of the word, this might 
not always involve civil disobedience but (as with the 
case of recruiting) whole-hearted co-operation - even 
in doing something with which he did not altogether 
agree.
On his return from South Africa Sandhi identified
himself with the Moderates, mainly because of his admir­
ation for Sokhale. He agreed with the latter’s commit­
ment to non-violence, to the uplift of the depressed 
lower orders of Indian society, and to self-sacrifice 
and painstaking work in service of India. The Moderates
however, saw how unlike themselves he was: they were 
opposed to satyagraha, which in its aspect of civil
disobedience to authority they recognised as an applic­
ation of coercive sanctions; and they were offended by 
Sandhi’s tendency to reject modern civilisation. One of 
them summed up the Moderate position to Sandhi:
Western civilisation, taken as a whole, 
tends more strongly to justice for all 
than any older civilisation.... condemn 
by all means as strongly as you like every 
feature of Western civilisation which 
merits condemnation....Where we find... 
that we cannot follow you, is in your 
generalisation against modern civilisation 
as such.
1. K. Natrajan to Sandhi, 26 May 1915, no. S 6195, 
Sandhi Papers Sabarmati (emphasis in original).
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Gandhi was suspicious of Tilak and the Extremists of 
Bengal and Maharashtra: Aurobindo had plainly condoned 
violence, and Tilak was tarred with the same brush.^
After his return from South Africa Gandhi denounced 
anarchical crimes committed by the young Bengalis and
pMaharashtrians." He disapproved too of the Home Rule 
agitation.
All of this carries the air of paradox, for Gandhi’s 
satyagraha was far closer as a political method to the 
Extremists* passive resistance than to the protest and 
consultation with Government of the Moderates, whilst in 
drawing on Hindu religious traditions for his method he 
was continuing in the pattern of Hindu revivalism 
followed by Aurobindo, by Tilak with his Ganpati fes­
tivals and by Annie Besant’s work with the Theosophical 
Society. Probably this very similarity made Gandhi feel 
the need to emphasise the difference between himself and 
them. The core of this difference lay in the emphasis 
which the parties placed on ends and means: for Tilak 
and Besant passive resistance and agitation were means
1. see Sri Aurobindo, Passive Resistance, and Chapter I 
above.
2. e.g., Speeches & Writings, p. 307.
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of hustling or coercing the British into granting 
political concessions; for Gandhi, as we have seen, the 
adoption of satyagraha was in itself the prime object - 
means and ends were as one. To Mrs Besant and Tilak 
the gaining of concessions from the British was the 
prime consideration, while for Gandhi the important 
thing was to change the mentality of the Indian people: 
to make them self-reliant and to prepare them for self- 
sacrifice, so that they might offer resistance to the 
Government (and in due course to other social groups) 
and bear the suffering involved without resiling from 
non-violence.
A task for saints and heroes? And yet his pro­
gramme was taken up and his leadership accepted by the 
men of the national movement in 1919» This was partly 
because Gandhi himself was prepared to compromise (except 
in the matter of physical violence itself) with the world 
as he found it. In the face of the national movement's 
desire for parliamentary institutions, for example, Gandhi 
modified his rejection of them. In a similar way, although 
he opposed the agitation for Home Rule during the War, he 
recognised that it had roused large numbers of Indians 
and won their support. At the end of 1917 he expressed
his admiration for Mrs Besant since, he said, it was
due to her that "swaran” was "on the lips of hundreds
of thousands of men and women”.1 234 The enthusiasm which
he harnessed in the Rowlatt satyagraha of 1919 had
2largely been roused by this agitation.
Gandhi's application of Hindu concepts and his 
working out of Hindu dharma in political life won him 
strong (if not always lasting) support among many 
fervent Hindus. Outstanding among these were Swami 
Shraddhananda, the great Arya. Samaj leader and 
educationist, whose headquarters were now in Delhi but 
who had followers in both the Punjab and the UP,^ and 
other leading members of the Arya Samaj in both those 
provinces.^
On the other hand Gandhi set out to win Muslim 
support by appealing to Islamic religious sentiment. He 
wrote: Mmy South African experiences had convinced me
1. Gandhi, Speeches and Writings, p. 402.
2. see letter to Viceroy, 29 Apr 1918, Gandhi, Experi­
ments, pp. 547-8; Speeches and Writings, pp. 437-8.
3. see UP Police 1919. pars 279» 445, 511, 518, 693, 
728; Swami Shraddhanand, Inside Congress, pp. 43-92; 
Gandhi, Experiments, pp. 455, 478-82.
4. notably Dr Satyapal and Rambhuj Dutt Ghowdhuri in 
Punjab, see Young India, 17 May 1919, P* 6; and Purshot- 
amdas Tandon in UP, see National Herald, 4 Aug 1963 
(Magazine Section) (published in Lucknow), pp. 1, 4.
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that it would be on the question of Hindu-Muslim unity
that my ahimsa would be put to its severest test",^ and
he sought ways of cementing at lower levels the entente
that had been established between the educated members
of the two communities. He led the way for the Hindus
in espousing causes to which the Muslims were committed
by their faith. At the 1917 Session of the Muslim
league he supported the plea for the release of the Ali
Brothers, who had been interned by the British for their
sympathies with Britain's Muslim enemies during the War:
to him they had been interned for their religion and he
2contemplated threatening satyagraha for their release.
In his letter to the Viceroy in mid-1918 he urged the 
latter to assure the Muslims that at the end of the War 
the rights of the states of the Ottoman Empire and 
control over the Islamic Holy Places would be regulated 
according to Indian Muslim sentiment.*^ The Pan-Islamist 
Dr Ansari, in his Address as Chairman of the Reception
1. Gandhi, Experiments, pp. 539-40.
2. Montagu, Diary, pp. 339, 373; Gandhi, Experiments, 
pp. 540-1; see M. Ali to Gandhi, 20 Peb 1918, Home Poll 
Dep. Apr 1918, no. 4* Gandhi corresponded on religious 
and political questions with the Brothers and made con­
tact with their spiritual adviser, Abdul Bari of Lucknow.
3. Gandhi, Experiments, pp. 549-50; Gandhi to Viceroy 
(draft), 29 Apr 1918, no. 5237, Gandhi Papers ITidhi.
Committee of the Muslim League at the end of 1918, 
thanked Gandhi as the "intrepid leader of India".^
It is not surprising then to find a Bombay papers 
soon after this saying that "the future belongs to
pReligious Nationalism".
As for organisation, it is clear from Gandhi’s 
satyagraha campaigns between 1906 and 1918 that he would 
work only through organisations which he had set up or 
which were thoroughly subservient to him; he did not 
work in the name of the Congress or of the HR1 in Cham- 
paran, for example, but with a band of helpers whom 
he had called or who had offered themselves.^ In 1919 
this pattern was repeated; the nation-wide satyagraha 
over the Rowlatt Act was organised quite outside the 
Congress and Muslim League. One is struck by the con­
trast with the approach to organisation of Mrs Besant 
and Tilak, who compromised with the Moderates in order 
to v/in control of the Congress.
1. Home Poll A, Mar 1919> nos 251-9; cf. letter of 
Abdul Bari to Gandhi, in Home Poll Dep. July 1918, no. 9, 
pp. 11-14; Gandhi to M. Ali, Nov 1918, in Home Poll Dep. 
Dec 1918, no. 3.
2. New Times. 12 Apr 1919, in Bombay NP. 1919. w/e 
19 Apr 1919, p. 15.
3. Similarly in Kaira, see Jamnadas, "Memoire", p. 328.
In South Africa and in his earlier Indian satya- 
grahas G-andhi had been confronted with ”face-to-face” 
situations1 and therefore able to lead his campaigns 
personally. As we shall see, he continued to try to 
work in this way in the India-wide campaign of 1919 by a 
gruelling series of tours. He knew that his demand for 
complete non-violence was difficult to comply with and 
he wanted to explain it himself. To this extent personal 
leadership was a substitute for more elaborate 
organisation.
Gandhi set up no formal organisation of his own 
until the very eve of the Rowlatt satyagraha, when he 
established the Satyagraha Sabhas in various towns.
These comprised participants in his earlier satyagraha 
campaigns who were prepared to follow him through thick 
and thin, and were formed round the persons of his 
lieutenants.
Indeed, his greatest asset in 1919, from the organ­
isational point of view, was the lieutenants he had 
acquired in many parts of India, as the result of his 
South African reputation and his satyagraha campaigns of 
1917-18, and who played a crucial role as his local
1. see P. Laslett, ’’The Pace to Pace Society”, in P. 
Laslett (ed), Philosophy. Politics and Society, pp. 157- 
84; the sole exception was the suggested, but abortive, 
passive resistance over Mrs Besant’s internment.
executives in the conduct of the Rowlatt campaign.
These lieutenants stood in the relation of devoted dis­
ciples to him: several of them have described the 
process of joining Gandhi as akin to that of conversion.
Among Gandhi’s leading lieutenants was Rajendra 
Prasad who had worked under him in Champaran.^" Born in 
1884 Prasad had a brilliant career at Calcutta University; 
he had considered a call from Gokhale to a life of pov­
erty and service in the SIS, but family pressure had 
forced him to enter the legal profession, which he had 
done with considerable success in Patna. He had heard 
but vaguely of Gandhi when the latter came to Champaran 
and was not impressed by his first contact. But Gandhi's 
fearlessness, his plans for organisation and his quiet 
determination to win better conditions for the poor 
tenants worked a transformation: "a change seemed to 
have come over our lives”, wrote Prasad. "While this 
work enabled the villagers to shed their fear complex, 
we too became fearless!”. Prasad had hitherto been the 
leading organiser in Bihar politics but now found one
1. this paragraph is based primarily on R. Prasad, 
Autobiography, pp. 28-100; he became President of 
independent India.
2. ibid., pp. 86, 93.
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whose organisational ability he could admire. Not all 
who worked with Gandhi in Champaran were from Bihar: 
some were seconded from the SIS in Poona; others were 
young Maharashtrians who had been itching to throw bombs 
at the British.^ Another was J. B. Kripalani from Sind, 
who was also to become one of Gandhi’s leading lieuten­
ants. Then aged 30, Kripalani had already dedicated 
himself to a life of poverty and service at the Brahma- 
charya Ashram in Sind. As a Professor in a Government
College near Champaran he had taken considerable interest
2in the hardships of the Bihari peasants.
Gandhi’s suggestions for passive resistance at the 
time of Mrs Besant’s internment and the satyagrahas in 
Gujarat won staunch followers for Gandhi among the young 
leaders of the HRL in Bombay, and while the Theosophists 
among them, notably Jamnadas Dwarkadas, were later to be 
torn between their loyalty to Mrs Besant and their desire 
to follow Gandhi, others, notably Shankarlal Banker, were 
to remain devoted to him." Although Gandhi had no
1. Deshpande, Autobiography, p. 264; interview with P. 
Katagade, 11 June 19^3 •
2. Gandhi, Experiments. pp. 497-8; B & 0 Police 1917, 
pars 672, 827; Champaran Documents, p. 567; re Ashram, 
see Bombay Police 1917. par. 182(h).
3. see Chapter YE above, also Jamnadas, ’Memoire”, p. 
328; interviews with J. Dwarkadas, 23 Apr and 10 June 
1963, S. G. Banker, 27 June 1963; B & 0 Police 1918. 
par. 579.
formal connection with the KRLs at this time, those of 
his lieutenants, who had been Mrs Besant’s lieutenants 
in her URL organisation, particularly in Bombay, used 
their contacts in the HRL branches to assist Gandhi in 
preparing for the Rowlatt satyagraha. The most dis­
tinguished of Gandhi’s adjutants in Gujarat was Valla- 
bhbhai Patel.1 2 A member of the rising, rich-peasant, 
Patidar class of Gujarat, he had set himself up in law 
in Kaira and Ahmedabad; he had been active in municipal, 
as well as in Congress politics. He virtually threw up 
a flourishing practice to join Gandhi, Being 43 when 
he joined Gandhi, he was the oldest of Gandhi’s 
lieutenants.
These lieutenants were won to Gandhi by personal
contact and were trained in his method by going through
a satyagraha with him. Others were attracted by what
they heard and read of Gandhi’s campaigns: like Jawa-
harlal Nehru they had grown critical of ’’the politics of
talk” and felt that ’’something must be done”, though
2’’what action it should be was not clear”. Jawaharlal,
1. Bombay Police 1917. pars 899(w), 1080(d); Gandhi, 
Experiments, pp. 522, 532; Parikh, Vallabhbhai Patel. I, 
3-47.
2. J. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 43»
who was 27 at the time of Champaran, had taken the 
Natural Science Tripos at Cambridge, where he had joined 
in much bitter criticism of the British in the Indian 
student society, the Majlis. Life as a lawyer in Allah­
abad after his return in 1912 seemed very dull. Home 
and education had given him a high regard for modern 
civilisation, which he never lost, but England had also 
given him a taste of Fabianism, which predisposed him to 
look for some way to better the lot of the Indian 
masses: this and his desire to "do something", which had 
been encouraged by the Home Rule agitation, led him to 
Gandhi.
In south India, Gandhi's principal lieutenant was 
Rajaji (1879- )• He had been drawn into Congress by
Tilak's call for passive resistance in 1906 and his 
admiration had been excited by Gandhi's South African 
work: he recognised in satyagraha a means of involving 
the masses in the national movement and thus bringing 
pressure to bear on the British,1 and saw Gandhi as the 
leader whose programme would take up the one which Tilak 
had failed to carry out.
1. New India, 1 Feb 1917, p. 3c; interviews with Rajaji, 
20 and 21 Mar, 1963; for Rajaji's earlier career, see 
Chapters IV, VI above, and M. Felton, I Meet Raiaii. 
pp. 16-17, 21-4, 32, 86, 116, 128, 136-7, 169.
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Young Muslims were drawn to Gandhi too, as we have 
seen, because of his defence of Muslim interests. Some 
of them, like Umar Sobhani in Bombay or Khaliquzzaman in 
Lucknow, were members of the HRL who felt frustrated by 
Mrs Besant’s increasing moderation in 1918 and saw satya- 
graha as a means of ’’doing something”. Others, again 
like Kitchlu in the Punjab, at first saw satyagraha as a 
means of rousing a revolution, in which mob violence 
might shake British authority:^ during his studies at 
Cambridge and in Paris and Münster he had met Egyptian 
and Irish revolutionaries and had returned to Amritsar in 
1912 with revolution in mind. He eventually agreed with 
Gandhi to commit himself wholeheartedly to non-violence 
as an expedient.
Gandhi's lieutenants were the most outstanding of 
the young men who were Gandhi’s staunchest supporters, 
and were representative of them. These lieutenants were 
men in their twenties or thirties in 1919; they were 
already participants in the national movement, having 
joined Congress (and, if Muslims, the Muslim League) 
in the first or second decades of this century. Their
1. ^interview with Dr S. Kitchlu, 19 Feb 1963; Hunter 
Committee Report, p. 156; for biographical details of 
Umar Sobhani, see Chapter IV.
sac
political ability had, in most cases, been proved before 
they joined Gandhi by their contributions to the organ­
isation of the Home Rule agitation or by participation 
in local Congress politics. The confidence with which 
they challenged the British had been greatly boosted by 
the Russo-Japanese War and by the success of the Bengal 
Partition agitation in 1911« They were professional men 
or (increasingly in this period) engaged in business:1 
they were either the sons of the old elite, largely Brah­
min, which had dominated Congress or (in a few cases) 
sons of the rising elite of rich peasant and trading 
castes. As such they had received a Western education 
and this had opened to them the history of British liber­
alism, the French Revolution, the Risorgimento and of 
Hungarian national self-assertion; these provided a 
romantic model for the Indian national movement and, 
together with the example of European socialism, had 
given them a belief that that movement would best succeed 
if it could mobilise the masses in some way. Tilak and 
the Extremists had pointed to such a way in 1906-7 when 
they urged passive resistance and non-payment of taxes. 
These young men had entered the national movement as
1 . see Appendix B.
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admirers of Tilak: by 1915 many of them had become
equally ardent admirers of Gandhi as the result of his
South African campaigns.^ As Rajaji had written in
mid-1916, comparing Gandhi and Tilak:
Here are two men who each one of them may 
well be literally worshipped as a real 
embodiment of the Spirit of Bharata Varsha, 
whose words and acts have passed through 
the Sacrificial Fire, in whom love of 
country and political thought burn with the 
fire and the light of true religion.2
The young men’s enthusiasm had been roused by the Home 
Rule agitation only to be frustrated by Mrs Besant’s 
and Tilak's curbing of it after mid-1917. They had been 
disappointed by Gandhi's self-effacement after return­
ing to India, his association with the Moderates and 
refusal to join the Home Rule agitation, but they hoped 
that he might eventually be persuaded to take up passive 
resistance,^ and felt that these hopes were justified 
by his campaigns in Champaran and Kaira.
1. see H. C. Ghaudhuri, The Autobiography of an Un­
known Indian, pp. 400-1; J. Hehru, Toward Freedom, pp. 39 
44; Yajnik, 1943, pp- 1-3; Mumshi, I Follow the 
Mahatma, p. 2; B. G. Horniman to Gokhale, 1 Jan and 23 
Dec 1913, in Gokhale Papers; Jamnadas, "Memoire", p. 55.
2. letter, dated 12 Aug 1916, Salem in the Hindu.
14 Aug 1916, p. 7; cf. Hew India. 24 Apr 1916, p. 12d.
3. see Yajnik, 1943, pp. 4-22.
The Rowlatt-Act Satyagraha, March - April 1919«
It was his young admirers in Bombay, Shankarlal 
Banker and Umar Sobhani who approached Gandhi with a 
request for "prompt action” when the Rowlatt Bills were 
foreshadowed in January 1 9 1 9 Two major difficulties 
immediately presented themselves: first^ Gandhi was on 
his sick-bed; secondly, how were the new laws to be dis­
obeyed unless their provisions were brought into force? 
When his health had somewhat improved at the end of 
February, Gandhi discussed the second of these problems
with his followers from Bombay City and Gujarat in
2Ahmedabad. They resolved the difficulty by deciding 
that those who wished to join the agitation should sign 
a Pledge to break the new laws "and such other laws as 
a Committee to be hereafter appointed may think fit".^ 
Gandhi now called on his lieutenants to form
1. Gandhi, Experiments, p. 558; Home Poll B, Peb 1920, 
no. 373; cf. Rajaji to Kasturi Ranga Iyengar, 11 Peb 1919, 
Kasturi Ranga Iyengar Papers; Shankarlal says Horniman 
suggested they approach Gandhi, interview 27 June 1963.
2. Bombay Police 1919, pars 378(a), (i): those present 
included Banker, Sobhani, Jamnadas Dwarkadas, B. G. 
Horniman (ed. of the Bombay Chronicle). Sarojini Uaidu, 
Yallabhbhai Patel.
3. Young India, 2 Mar 1919, Ganesan, pp. 1187-8;
Gandhi, Speeches & Writings, pp. 450-2.
Satyagraha Sabhas of those who were prepared to sign 
this Pledge; these Sabhas would direct the satyagraha 
locally.1 2 At first, activity was confined to Bombay 
City and Gujarat, but due largely to the efforts of 
Shankarlal Banker and to the Bombay papers under the
2editorship of B. G. Horniman and Jamnadas Dwarkadas, 
the proposal to conduct satyagraha spread throughout 
India. Banker had posters printed in the vernacular 
languages exhorting people to satyagraha. For the dis­
tribution of these the channels established by the HRLs 
were utilised, the Secretaries of mofussil ERL branches 
receiving parcels of posters and other literature for 
their areas.^ As the word of the forthcoming trial of 
strength with the Government spread, so the young men of 
the Congress, the HRLs and the Muslim League threw off 
the restraints of the previous months and joined the 
movement. In Sind, Lurgdas Adwani and other young 
officers of the HRL branches addressed meetings urging
1. Bombay Police 1919. par. 378(a).
2. i.e. the Bombay Chronicle and Young India, respectively.
3* e.g. Bombay Police 1919. pars 378(h), 430(a), 
476(a), 500(c), 528(3), (k), 542(d), 555(1).
people to take the Pledge; Rajaji, Chidambaram Pillai
and other young men in Madras, Shraddhananda and Ansari
in Delhi and the Home Rulers of the UP and Bihar did the
same.^ At the local level the name of the HRL was invoked
and the contacts established through the League branches
were used for the organisation of public meetings and
tours by Gandhi’s most active supporters. In the UP,
Motilal Nehru, T and on, Jawaharlal and the other members
of the Allahabad HRL used the League’s office in that
city for their meetings and the collection of signatures;
in Kanpur, the most active members of the HRL branch did
likewise, as did Gokaran and Harkaran Nath Misra and
Khaliquzzaman at Lucknow and the Home Rulers of Gorakh-
2pur; while other Home Rulers toured mofussil centres. 
Similar use was made of their HRL contacts in Gujarat by 
Gandhi’s lieutenants from Bombay and Gujarat itself, 
and of Tilak's HRL officers in Maharashtra and the 
Karnatak by those of Tilak's lieutenants who supported 
the Rowlatt satyagraha.^ In Bengal, on the other hand,
1. Bombay Police 1919. pars 476(f), 500(j), 528(m), 
543(a), 555(q); Home Poll Dep. Mar 1919» no. 17, ’Madras' 
passim; April 1919, no. 48, 'Madras', passim; interviews 
with Durgdas Adwani, 21 and 25 Apr 1963, and with G. 
Shivdasani, 24 Apr 1963; on Dr Choithram Gidwani, see 
Bombay Police 1917. par. 182(h).
2. UP' Police 1919. pars 279, 280-1, 445, 692-4, 728; 
interview with R. Shukla, 8 Aug 1963.
3. Bombay Police 1919, pars 378(i), 473(d), 474, 476(b), 
(e), 528(e), (h), 543(b), (e), etc.
where the HRL organisation had been minuscule, there 
was little preparation for satyagraha until the last 
minute, despite calls to passive resistance by young men 
like Jitendralal Bannerjee.1 23 In the Punjab, where 
politics had but recently been released from strict Gov­
ernment restriction, Gandhi’s lieutenants, Pan-Islamists 
(like Kitchlu) and Arya Samajists (like Satyapal and 
Rambhuj Putt Ghoudhuri) had to build an organisation
almost from scratch and were confined mainly to their
2headquarters of Amritsar and Lahore.
As soon as his health permitted, Gandhi began a 
whirlwind tour,^  such as was to become a feature of his
1. see Home Poll Dep. Mar 1919, no. 16, ’Bengal’, par.
3; Apr 1919, no. 48, ’Bengal’, pars 3, 6; no. 49, ’Bengal’ 
par. 3; Oct 1919, no. 19, Appendix H.
2. ibid, Mar 1919, no. 16, p. 12; no. 17,p. 10; Apr 
1919, no. 48, p. 10; see Hunter Committee Report, p. 156.
3. this paragraph is based on: Bombay Police 1919. pars 
378(g), 476(a), 555(a); UP Police 1919. pars 518, 520;
Home Poll Dep. Mar 1919, no. 17, ’Madras', passim; Apr 
1919, no. 48, 'Madras', passim, 'Delhi', pars 1, 2; July 
1919, no. 46, 'Madras’, par. 6;
Letters from Gandhi to Viceroy, undated [Mar 1915] 
draft, no. S 644O; to V. S. S. Sastri, 8 Mar 1919, no. S 
6446; to Maffey [PS to Viceroy], 11 Mar 1919, no. S 6449; 
to G. P. Andrews, 1 Apr 1919, no. S 6489; to Mr Bhate,
26 Mar 1919, no. S 6478, to du Boulay [Home Member], 12 
Mar 1919, no. S 645O; to [A.] Rangaswami [Iyengar?], 30 
Mar 1919, no. S 6483, Gandhi Papers Sabarmati; Gandhi to 
Vijiaraghavachariar, 28 Feb, 12 Mar 1919; H. Parikh to 
Vijiaraghavachariar, 3 Mar 1919; Vijiaraghavachariar to A. 
Rangaswami Iyengar, K. Ranga Iyengar, Rajaji, et al, n.d. 
(15 Mar 19?]; Satyamurti to Vijiaraghavachariar, 9 Apr 
1919; Secretaries, Madras Satyagraha Sabha, printed circ­
ular, 27 Mar 1919, Vij. Papers; Shraddhanand, Inside 
Congress, pp. 50-4.
future political campaigns. In the first days of March 
he came to Bombay from Ahmedabad, discussed his plans with 
his lieutenants there, formed the Satyagraha Sabha and 
issued the Satyagraha Pledge:^ lie was too weak to address 
public meetings but Jamnadas Dwarkadas and B. G. Horniman 
remedied this deficiency. On 3 March he left for Delhi, 
where he had an interview with the Viceroy and urged him 
to withdraw the Bills and to release the Ali Brothers.
On 6 March G-andhi saw one Bill passed and the following 
night he attended a meeting of 6000 people, where his 
speech was read for him and fiften took the Pledge. A 
Satyagraha Sabha was formed, of which Ansari and Shradd- 
hananda (and later, Hakim Ajmal Khan) were the leading mem 
bers. Prom 9 to 11 March he was in Allahabad and Lucknow, 
where he had talks with Abdul Bari and the Pan-Islamists 
and with the Nehrus and the Home Rulers, and addressed pub 
meetings. He returned to Bombay on 13th, conferred with 
his followers and presided at a public meeting, and left 
for south India on the 16th at the invitation of Rajaji,
Vijiaraghavachariar and Kasturi Ranga Iyengar. Here he
1 . see p. 390 above.
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joined the young men in addressing meetings of 10,000 
people on the famous Madras Beach, formed a Satyagraha 
Sabha, and addressed meetings at cities in the Madras 
mofussil and at Vijayawada (Bezwada) in Andhra, before 
returning to Bombay at the beginning of April!
G-andhi also exhibited in this campaign a charac­
teristic which is rather less desirable in a political 
leader, a hasty improvisation of tactics: in later cam­
paigns he was to extend this penchant for ad hoc 
innovations and changes to the very goals of his cam­
paigns. It was not until he received word in Madras on 
18 March that the Viceroy had signed the Rowlatt Act 
into law that he hit on the idea of launching the satya­
graha with an India-wide hartal.1 Hartal was in the 
tradition of dharna and in keeping with G-andhi’s own 
views on the need for self-purification in preparation 
for national service, since the cessation of business 
has been looked on as a self-purificatory act in India - 
and G-andhi proposed that it should be accompanied by 
bathing, prayer and fasting for 24 hours (the maximum 
period for which a Muslim may fast). In addition 
Gandhi wanted to find a more striking demonstration of
1 . (Gandhi, Experiments, p. 562.
the nation’s disapproval of the Rowlatt Act and a more 
effective means of giving expression to the reservoir of 
feeling, that had been built up by the previous frus­
tration and the criticism of the Act, than was provided 
by the taking of the Pledge. After all, those who took 
the Pledge exposed themselves to the possibility of 
imprisonment and on 17 March it was reported that only
982 people had taken it.'*' Gandhi felt that the ’’work
2had to be started at once” and so fixed the hartal for 
30 March. Realising later that 10 days was insufficient 
to complete arrangements, he changed the date to 6 
April. This, however, created confusion and in Delhi, 
Sind and the Punjab hartals were held on 30 March.
Opposition to the hartal and to the Pledge came 
from the Moderates and, after some hesitation, from Mrs 
Besant. They feared that mass demonstrations and the 
breaking of laws would lead to violence; Mrs Besant was 
also mortified by the young men’s rejection of her at the 
1918 Delhi Congress, and now saw that her brightest
1. Bombay Police 1919. par. 476(a): Bombay City,
397; Kaira 400; Sind 101; elsewhere in India 84; 
total 982.
2. Gandhi, Experiments, p. 563.
She waslieutenants were turning to the new leader.^ 
prepared, she said,1- 23 to disobey the Rowlatt Act itself 
but she could not agree to submit her conscience to the 
dictates of a Committee on the question of disobeying 
other laws, an argument which at first appealed to some 
other older Congressmen. However Besant’s obvious 
persecution complex and her demand that her young lieu­
tenants choose between her and Gandhi alienated all but 
a handful of her most devoted Theosophical followers: 
even C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar quarrelled with her on a 
personal matter and Jamnadas Dwarkadas wrote to her:
Your attitude is quite correct as far 
as you yourself are concerned. You cannot 
take part in a movement like this, because 
you do not know the language of the people^ 
you are speaking to. But we have no [such] 
justification....One cannot imagine a 
graver crisis than the present. The people 
[,] fired in the right way because of my 
speeches, in Bombay and Gujarat especially, 
are prepared to lay down their lives as they 
were at the time of your internment. Gandhi 
said to me that I should be doing the
1. see her article in the Theosophist, early 1919, in 
Bombay Police 1919. par. 471; S. Subramania Aiyer to 
Gandhi, 23 Mar 1919, no. S 6465; Gandhi to Subramania 
Aiyer, 23 Mar 1919, no. S 6466; A. Besant to Gandhi,
10 May, 11 May 1919; Gandhi to Besant, 10 May 1919, 
no. S 6605, Gandhi Papers Sabarmati.
2. Besant to P. K. Telang [telegram], n.d. no. S 
6442, Gandhi Papers Sabarmati; interview of writer with 
K. Dwarkadas, 27 May 19^3; A. Besant to K. Dwarkadas,
21 Mar 1919, K. Dwarkadas Papers.
3. e.g. Motilal Nehru, see UP Police 1919. par. 445; 
possibly also Hasan Imam in Bihar, see B £ 0 Police 1919 
par. 596. Cf. Modern Review. XXV, no. 4 (Apr 1919)3. 424
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greatest disservice to you if I did not 
join the movement, and assist him in 
leading it. All those whom I reckon 
among my following have joined it. If 
I don’t, against my conviction, it will 
be fatal to our influence here.
Jamnadas continued to work with his colleagues as a 
lieutenant of Gandhi’s throughout the Rowlatt campaign. 
The Moderates had discredited themselves in the eyes 
of the youthful majority in the national movement by 
seceding from Congress, and had weakened their oppos­
ition to satyagraha by their denunciation of the Rowlatt 
legislation. Mrs Besant, too, was discredited at the 
Delhi Congress: she dared not appeal to the HRL she had 
founded, for clearly the great majority of its young 
members would reject her leadership. Instead she formed 
a new, National Home Rule League, composed mainly of 
Theosophists, to legitimise her claim to speak for India
before the Joint Select Committee on the Indian Reforms
2Bill now under consideration at Westminster.
Some eminent members of the national movement, 
while not openly opposing Gandhi’s satyagraha, were more
1. J. Dwarkadas to A. Besant, 27 Peb 1919, Advar 
Archives.
2. interview of the writer with R. Shukla, 8 Aug 1963; 
A. Besant to K. Dwarkadas, 3 May 1919, K. Dwarkadas 
Papers; NHRL 1st Annual Report (Apr 1919-Dec 1920);
JSC on G of I Bill, Evidence, Q 1439, P» 82.
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concerned with the course of the Government of India 
Bill (as the Reforms Bill was called). The older 
Extremists were jealous of Gandhi’s rise and were mainly 
concerned that any agitation in India should be conducted 
with the object of encouraging the British to grant wider 
Reforms: Pal opposed the extension of passive resistance 
to laws other than the Rowlatt Act, and Vithalbhai Patel 
wrote:
I am still not convinced about the wisdom 
of the Satyagraha movement in reference to 
the [Rowlattj Bill. One could understand 
such a movement in reference to the bigger 
question of Home Rule. Ho doubt the move­
ment will educate public opinion but if it 
had been taken up in connection with the 
Reforms, the sacrifices involved would have 
been satisfied [justified?].1
Jinnah, while not participating in the satyagraha, iden­
tified himself with the anger over the Bills by resign- 
from the Imperial legislature. Tilak's lieutenants were 
divided: the younger ones, like Sathaye, and the more 
impetuous, like Gangadharrao Deshpande and S. M. 
Paranjpe, took up Gandhi's satyagraha eagerly as the 
heir to Tilak's passive resistance. His older followers 
and those who had shared leadership with him most
1, V. J. Patel to Vijiaraghavachariar, 3 Apr 1919» 
Vi.i. Papers.
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closely, like Xelkar and Khaparde, were piqued at 
Gandhi’s virtual assumption of the leadership without 
consulting them: they dared not court unpopularity by 
opposing a campaign aimed against the British, and gave 
the Rowlatt satyagraha their grudging support.1 2 Tilak, 
who was in England, was primarily concerned with the 
Reforms; he seems to have been torn by conflicting 
advice from his followers, but was not disposed to court 
unpopularity and gave guarded support to Gandhi’s move-pment. Of other leading Congressmen, Malaviya stood in 
the background, while Motilal Nehru, Hasan Imam and 
C. R. Das joined and helped to direct the satyagraha 
campaign. A number of older Congressmen thus held aloof 
but did not oppose satyagraha. Opposition to it was 
weak or came from discredited sources. Enthusiasm, 
organisation and the programme of action were all with 
Gandhi and his young followers.
The response to the call for hartal varied
1. see e.g. Bombay Police 1919. pars 500(a), (e), (h), 
542(b), 543(f), lh), 551(1), 555(a), (l); Itahratta.
9 Mar 1919» p. 113; 30 Mar 1919» p. 156; Home Poll Dep. 
July 1919, no. 46, ’CP’, pars 4, 5; Deshpande, Autobiog­
raphy. pp. 258, 270, 280, 287, 295*
2. Tilak to D. D. Sathaye, 13 Mar, 8 May, 15 May 1919; 
Tilak to Baptista, 24 Apr 1919, D. D. Satha.ye Papers;
D. D. Sathaye, ”Autobiographical Note”; Tilak to 
Khaparde, 28 Peb, 5 Mar 1919, Khaparde Papers; for biog­
raphical details of Sathaye, see Chapter IV above.
considerably from place to place, but was no doubt
heightened throughout India by the events associated with
its premature observance on 30 March in Delhi. Shradd-
hananda and the Pan-Islamists had done their work well
there: all shops and businesses closed,public transport
ceased running and the leaders addressed a meeting of
some 40,000 in Old Delhi.^ But, in a disturbance at
the Railway Station in the absence of the principal
leaders, troops opened fire and killed several people,
both Hindu and Muslim. This served to cement the Hindu-
Muslim cordiality resulting from Gandhi’s espousal of
the Pan-Islamic cause, and led to the Swami being invited
to speak from the pulpit of the Juma Masjid, the Great 
2Mosque. The hartal on the 6 April in the rest of India 
therefore became also a protest day for the Delhi Martyrs. 
In Hyderabad (Sind) the 30th had been observed as in 
Delhi (some shops being shut under threat of violence), 
but processions were held on the 6th;^ in Karachi,
1. Shraddhanand, Inside Congress, pp. 56-7.
2. ibid., pp. 61-70.
3. Bombay Police 1919. pars 555(b), (r); cf. Sukkur 
observance on 30 March, ibid., par. 542(n).
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where the HRL branch had constituted itself into a Satya-
graha Sabha, the 6th was thoroughly observed by Muslims
and Hindus.'1 23' In Bengal outside Calcutta, the hartal was
most successful in the Muslim city of Dacca: in Calcutta
itself, Das hastily assumed the leadership of the movement
in correspondence with Gandhi. Gandhi was conscious of
the inadequate preparation in Calcutta and when he heard
reports of stone-throwing and threats to the police he
telegraphed to Das: "till we can [restrain crowds] we
are bound [to] refrain [from] processions [and] large
gatherings”, and promised to come himself as soon as 
2possible.' In Bihar, the hartals in Patna and in 
mofussil towns were organised through local HRL officers 
by Hasan Imam, Mazharul Haque, Rajendra Prasad and the 
other Patna politicians: they were well aware of the 
dangers of mob-enthusiasm flowing over into violence and 
at all the Bihar meetings the need for restraint was em­
phasised.^ In Maharashtra Tilak's older lieutenants 
pointedly ignored the hartal: in Poona it was only
1. Bombay Police 1919. par. 555(q).
2. Gandhi to C. R. Das, 8 Apr 1919» no. S 6509, Gandhi 
Papers Sabarmati; Home Poll Dep. July 1919, no. 46,
pp. 8-9.
3. B & 0 Police 1919. pars 569, 600, 601, 604, 649;
see E. C. Ryland, Dep. Inspector-General of Police, B & 0. 
Reports on Satyagraha Movement 12 - 16 April 1919, Secretariat, Patna.
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partially observed and in the OP and Berar hardly at all;
but in a number of the other towns and market centres,
where the younger men had been active, shops were closed,
baths taken and meetings held, mainly on the 30th.^ The
hartal was most thoroughly observed in Madras, Bombay City,
Amritsar and in the cities and towns of the UP and G-ujarat.
In Gujarat both days were observed quietly in towns, small
2regional headquarters and even in villages. The same 
was true of the UP, though here shopkeepers in the west 
of the province were given an added incentive to close as 
the result of pressure from Delhi wholesalers. In Amrit­
sar crowds of 30,000 attended meetings addressed by Kitchlu 
and Satyapal, while in Madras 100,000 were reported at 
meetings on the Beach.^ G-andhi himself directed operations 
in Bombay, where 80 per cent of shops were shut and 20,000 
bathed at Ghowpatti; G-andhi addressed Muslims at a mosque 
and at a large meeting in the evening, and sold copies of 
his prohibited books, Hind Swaraj and Sarvodaya. This act
D. Bombay Police 1919» pars 543(f) (h) (i) (j), 555(j)
(l) (m)(n); Home Poll Dep. July 1919, no. 46, pp. 22-5.
2. Bombay Police 1919. pars 555(g) (h) (i); Parikh, 
Vallabhbhai Patel, pp. 99-100.
3. UP Police 1919. pars 733, 760; Home Poll Dep. July 
1919, no. 47, ’UP’, pars 1-13.
4. Home Poll Dep. July 1919, no. 47, ’Punjab’, par 1; 
July 1919, no. 46, pp. 1-5.
of disobedience the Government however declined to 
notice.~
The response to Gandhi’s call for hartal was appar­
ently greatest in the cities and towns, where newspapers 
and the means of communication were most developed or - 
as in the case of Calcutta - where, despite the lack of 
painstaking organisation by Gandhi in advance, there was 
long experience of political activity and a body of ’’angry 
young men”. A beginning had now been made in drawing 
smaller centres and villages into nationalist politics 
in Gujarat, Maharashtra and the UP: here the channels dug 
by the HRLs had been used by Gandhi’s lieutenants in pre­
paring the ground. The HRL branches in the Madras
2mofussil had apparently been less effectively used, 
probably because they were officered to a great extent by 
Theosophists who loyally followed Mrs Besant in opposing 
satyagraha. The regional variation in response in the 
cities and towns may be related closely to Gandhi's 
personal tours and to the number and activity of his 
lieutenants: the hartal was most thoroughly observed 
where Gandhi was known by the crowds face-to-face (as in
1. Bombay Police 1919. par. 555(a); Gandhi, Experiments, 
pp. 564-7.
2. see Korne Poll Pep. July 1919» no. 46, 'Madras’, par.5.
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Bombay City, Madras City, Gujarat and D e l h i a n d  where 
his lieutenants had been most active (in the same places 
and in Sind, the Punjab and the UP mofussil).
After conducting the Bombay satyagraha. Gandhi left 
to investigate the trouble spot, Delhi, and the Punjab 
for himself; the Governments however externed him from 
these areas and, when on 10 April he insisted on proceed­
ing, arrested him and sent him back to Bombay. Gandhi 
was jubilant and issued the press release: MIt is a 
matter of the highest satisfaction to me,...that I have 
received an order from the Punjab Government not to 
enter that province....I have received what I was seek­
ing, either withdrawal of the Rowlatt legislation orpimprisonment”.
A week later, however, he lamented: ’’Had Government 
in an unwise manner not prevented me from entering Delhi 
and so compelled me to disobey their orders, I feel 
certain that Ahmedabad and Viramgam would have remained 
free from the horrors of the last week”.^ He was
1. the exception seems to be Bihar: this requires 
further investigation.
2.
3 .
Young; India. 10 Apr 1919, Ganesan, p. 1195» 
ibid., 18 Apr 1919, pp. 1199-1200.
referring to the outbreaks of arson, pillage and murder 
which had followed the issue of his press release and 
which led him to suspend satyagraha. At the time of his 
arrest he had warned that M. ..violence committed against 
anybody, whether Englishman or Indian, will surely damn 
the great cause the Satyagrahis are handling", but he 
clearly had not expected the violence which ensued.
The news of his arrest had angered the crowds which had 
heard him speak, and it seems certain enabled rowdy 
elements or goondas to whip up these crowds in cities 
across India:1 2 in Delhi for example there was a spon­
taneous hartal from 10 April, when the train came in 
without Gandhi, until 17th, when at last with great 
difficulty, Shraddhananda and Hakim Ajmal Khan got the
pshops to open. In the Punjab, not only were the people 
deprived of Gandhi but also on the same day of their 
own leaders, for the Government arrested Kitchlu and 
Satyapal. This led to mob violence, arson and murder in 
Amritsar, the countryside and, to a lesser extent, in 
Lahore, but, instead of allowing the Indian leaders to 
calm the crowds as was done at Delhi and at Bombay,
1. see B. G. Horniman to Gandhi, 17 Apr 1919, no. S 
6545» Gandhi Papers Sabarmati.
2. Shraddhanand, Inside Congress, pp. 74-89; Home Poll 
B, June 1919, nos 494-7, pp. 8-10.
Ahmedabad and Viramgam in the Bombay Presidency, the 
Punjab Government sent in the military, who set out to 
humiliate as well as to cow the Punjabis: they imposed 
degrading regulations, bombed and machine-gunned inoff­
ensive villages from the air and, as an example to the 
rest of the Punjab, General Dyer shot dead 379 partici­
pants in a public meeting in the Jallianwala Bagh, 
Amritsar, on 13 April. These details were not known 
outside the locality where they occurred for some time: 
Gandhi merely knew that there had been violence on the 
part of Indians. Admitting to ”a Himalayan miscalcul­
ation”, in that he had not recognised that mass groups 
were not convinced of the need for non-violence, he 
suspended satyagraha on 18 April.1
Gandhi had replied to a Moderate critic earlier in 
1919 that "nothing but an energising activity which 
Satyagraha certainly is could have prevented the ambit­
ious and high-spirited youths of the country from seeking 
questionable activities for want of a better” and as 
late as 15 April he claimed that satyagraha had been a 
check on the fury that existed as the result of the
1. Gandhi, Experiments, pp. 575-7; Young India. 
18 Apr 1919» Ganesan, pp. 1199-1201.
Rowlatt proposals."1' The violence which forced G-andhi to 
suspend satyagraha might be seen as refuting these 
claims; certainly Gandhi had received a shock and was to 
be more wary in launching satyagraha in the future.
From this time he concentrated on solving the problem 
of control. On the other hand, the violence was in 
fact of remarkably small extent, when one considers the 
large numbers of people involved and the inexperience of 
Gandhi’s followers in guiding and controlling such 
crowds. Also, it is hard to resist the conclusion that, 
in another sense, Gandhi was right. For the temper of 
the young men of the Congress and the Muslim League was 
such at the beginning of 1919» that some form of 
expression, some catharsis was required. Gandhi’s 1919 
Rowlatt satyagraha and the role that he gave to his young 
lieutenants and followers had provided such a catharsis.
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1. Gandhi to V. S. Sastri, 8 Mar 1919» no. S 6446; 
and to Sir Stanley Reed, ed. of Times of India. 15 Apr 
1919» no. S 6534, Gandhi Papers Sabarmati.
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PART 3: GANDHI * S RISE TO LEADERSHIP (CONTD.)
Chapter VIII
AFTERMATH AND PRELUDE; APRIL - DECEMBER, 1919«
I
After Satyagraha.
April to December 1919 was a time of indecision 
at the helm of Indian nationalism: after the storm of 
satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act Gandhi tried various 
tacks. Perhaps for this reason the period has been passed 
over lightly by writers who have been obsessed by the on­
ward impetus of the movement and who have hurried to the 
later part of the following year when Gandhi finally set 
his course and that of the national movement, and was 
confirmed in its command.
After calling off the Rowlatt Act satyagraha Gandhi 
retained the same aims as before. At the back of his 
mind was the vision of India that he had sketched in Hind 
Swaraj: a land of self-sufficient, self-governing villages
shunning most Western innovations^ where the members of 
the intellectual and professional elite would re-identify 
themselves with this village-centred life. Reason made 
him recognise that the elite had adopted many Western 
norms - for example Parliamentary Government - as its 
own and that if he would win their adherence he could 
not ask them to reject these norms immediately and in 
toto. but he hankered after this dream nevertheless. In 
the more immediate sense, he was anxious to involve the 
masses, the peasants, in the national movement, to waken 
them from their traditional subservience to the Govern­
ment, and to instil into them (and indeed into the Indian 
elite also) a sense of self-respect and fearlessness.
But while Gandhi was primarily concerned with the effect 
that the activities of the national movement under his 
guidance were having on the Indians themselves, this did 
not mean that Indians should ignore the British. On the 
contrary, Indians could not, without loss of self-respect, 
acquiesce in British refusals to heed Indian public 
opinion. As he had written during the Rowlatt Act 
satyagraha: f,I have been told that I am diverting the 
attention of the country from the one and only thing that
1. see Chapter VII above, p. 374,notes 1, 2.
matters viz., the forthcoming Reforms.... To my mind, the 
first thing needful is to secure a full and frank recog­
nition of the principle that public opinion properly 
expressed shall be respected by the Government". ^ A 
more particular task that Gandhi set himself was the 
reconciliation of Hindus and Muslims at all levels of 
Indian society.
These goals could, he believed, be attained if he 
could prevail upon Indians to adopt satyagraha, partic­
ularly in the form of civil disobedience, and - needless 
to say - under his leadership. He had no clear-cut plan, 
however, for achieving these aims. He was to write in 
1924:
That is the beauty of Satyagraha. It comes 
up to oneself, one has not to go out in 
search of it....A dharma-yuddha [righteous struggle]... comes unsought; and a man of 
religion is ever ready for it. A struggle 
which has to be previously planned is not 
a righteous struggle. In a righteous 
struggle God Himself plans campaigns and conducts battles.2
This aphorism reveals what was probably Gandhi’s greatest
weakness, his reliance on improvisation in formulating
1. Gandhi to [A.] Rangaswami [Iyengar], 30 Mar 1919, no. S 6483, Gandhi Pacers Sabarmati.
2. Gandhi, Satyagraha in South Africa. Preface, p. xiv.
jL k.
his programme, which led (in 1921 for example) to the 
dissipation of his own energies and those of the national 
movement in too many concurrent activities and (in 1919) 
to a sense of drift and aimlessness.
In mid-1919 Gandhi was confronted with a somewhat 
paradoxical problem. The national movement was profoundly 
emotional and in times of excitement - as during the 
Howlatt Act satyagraha - this emotionalism flared up, 
presenting leaders with grave problems of control. As 
the collapse of Extremism after 1908 had shown, however, 
this excitement might easily subside into inactivity or 
depression. Gandhi recognised that in launching satya­
graha he had underestimated the problem of control1 and, 
while in May he was anxious to provide expression for 
the bitterness that remained and to recommence satyagraha 
as soon as possible, he wrestled with the problem of 
controlling it in the future. At the same time the 
national movement, having been provided with catharsis 
in the Rowlatt agitation, was in danger of losing way, 
and Gandhi was at pains to maintain its momentum. He 
concentrated on these problems and took little interest 
in the reforms which were being hammered out in England
1. see Gandhi to [A.] Rangaswami [Iyengar], 30 Mar 1919, loc. cit.
at this time and which were all-important to many- 
outstanding members of the Indian national movement, 
such as Tilak, Jinnah, Mrs Besant and Das.
With regard to the first of his problems, that of 
control, Gandhi personally was able to control the crowds 
wherever he went during the Rowlatt agitation. This was 
largely due to his appeal through asceticism and through 
religious notions and symbols to the Hindus, and as a 
champion of the embattled Khilafat to the Muslims; it 
was due also to his identification with mass groups 
through his campaigns in South Africa and, in India 
since his return, his fearlessness in pressing the case 
of the peasants and workers. Satyagraha, furthermore, 
offered a new method of pressing the cases that Gandhi 
took up, an esoteric method of which he alone possessed 
the secret lore, or cabala.
In addition the authority of Gandhi*s lieutenants 
in various parts of India was adequate to ensure the 
smooth running of the hartal and its associated pro­
cessions and civil disobedience (often known as CDO), 
against which the Government declined to take action. 
Indeed the authority of Gandhi*s lieutenants over shop-
keepers and crowds was most irksome to British officials. 
Some of those who acted as his lieutenants already had 
a local reputation and a local following (for example, 
Das in Bengal, S. M. Paranjpe and Gangadharrao Desh- 
pande in Maharashtra and the Karnatak, Jamnadas and the 
Home Rulers in Bombay and Sind). But all of them had 
augmented their power through association, in fact and 
in the public mind, with Gandhi. The personal loyalty 
of most of Gandhi*s lieutenants to him, the teacher- 
disciple relationship which bound them to him, ensured 
his control over them and provided them with their major 
credentials for leadership.
Gandhi’s sole access to the cabala of satyagraha 
and the discipular relationship between him and his 
lieutenants explain why Gandhi’s call for the suspension 
of satyagraha was so implicitly obeyed. Control had 
been assisted by the conscientious inculcation of non­
violence both by Gandhi and his lieutenants. Gandhi 
claimed:
...whenever I addressed the people the 
audience addressed by me became sobered, 
and there was an appreciable change in
1. see e.g. explanation why Drs Kitchlu and Satyapal 
were deported, Hunter Committee Report, pp. 28-9; regard 
ing Gokul Chand Narang’s control over the Lahore mob, 
see ibid., p. 54.
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their attitude towards the English....
My chief work, however, is done through 
private conversation with people, who 
visit me, wherever I go....I can recall 
many conversions of people who came in 
to express their curses and went away 
...with no unfriendliness tov/ards the 
British.1
But while Gandhi was able to control crowds in 
person, this was clearly inadequate: India was too vast 
for effective face-to-face leadership on a countrywide 
scale by Gandhi himself, even discounting the possibility 
that the Government might restrict his movements. Indeed 
the reverence in which Gandhi was held constituted a 
weakness, for when the Government arrested him the 
crowds, through fear for his safety and anger at the 
Government whom they regarded as his assailant, struck 
blindly and violently at the latter. Clearly, also, too 
heavy a burden was placed on the shoulders of too few 
lieutenants: while they were controlling crowds in one 
part of the region for which they were responsible,
prabble-rousers would be at work elsewhere. A hierarchy 
of deputies and assistants was necessary to enable
1. Gandhi to Sir Stanley Reed, 15 Apr 1919, no. S 6534,
Gandhi Papers Sabarmati: for instructions to intending
satyagrahis, e.g. by Kitchlu, see Hunter Committee Report, p. 156.
2. see e.g. the braggart who stirred the Lahore-mosque 
crowd, ibid., p. 58; Shraddhananda^ account of Delhi, 
Inside Congress, pp. 56-92.
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Gandhi*s lieutenants to exert effective control. Gandhi 
had started to form Satyagraha Sabhas, consisting of those 
who took the Satyagraha Pledge and made themselves 
responsible for conducting civil disobedience in their 
locality, but these were small and articulated only 
through the personal contact of their most prominent 
members with Gandhi. The lieutenants were in many places 
incapable of exercising control when Gandhi was arrested. 
In Ahmedabad, for instance, they **were thoroughly dumb­
founded] on seeing the burning lava of popular fury 
that began, as it were, to suddenly spout forth with 
demonical energy from some mysterious subterranean 
vaults, and that kindled hell-fires all over the city 
for three mad days”. ^  Gandhi had not elaborated his 
programme sufficiently: he had not clearly thought out 
the consequences of his arrest, nor of the arrest of his 
lieutenants, and consequently had not instructed the 
people on what action they should take under those 
circumstances.
1. Yajnik 1943» pp. 97-9; cf. N. D. Parikh, Sardar 
Vallabhbhai Patel, p. 100; for Delhi, see Shraddhanand, 
loc. cit.; for Lahore, see Hunter Committee Report, pp. 
57-8; for other Punjab areas, see ibid., e.g., pp. 62- 
71; for Bombay, see Gandhi, Experiments, p. 569«
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Gandhi recognised - if inadequately - that a more 
developed organisation and a more thorough inculcation 
of his ideas were required to ensure control of the move­
ment when it was resumed.1 2 Immediately on suspending it 
he therefore set about recruiting, through the agency of 
the Bombay Satyagraha Sabha and his lieutenants, a band 
of volunteers, ’well-tried, pure-hearted...who thoroughly 
understood the strict conditions of Satyagraha”, whose 
task would be to instruct participants in future cam- 
paigns and keep them ”on the right path”. In this he 
may have taken as his model the volunteers who helped 
control the annual Congress sessions. He turned to 
Congress in another sense too. He attended the AICC on 
20 and 21 April and prevailed on it to condemn the ’acts 
of violence” on the part of Indians and to appeal to the 
people to ’’maintain law and order”.1 He does not, however, 
seem to have yet recognised the organisational require­
ments of running a campaign over an area and population 
as large as India’s. He made no attempt, for instance,
1. see Gandhi to Maffey [Private Secretary to Viceroy3, 
14 Apr 1919» no. S 6534, Gandhi Papers Sabarmati.
2. Gandhi, Experiments, p. 576.
3. AICC Minutes. 20-21 April 1919.
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to refurbish the Satyagraha Sabhas either internally or as 
regards their co-ordination.
As for propaganda, he set out to inculcate the 
need for non-violence through "leaflets of an educative 
character"; through posters ordering satyagrahis to 
offer no resistance to their arrest; through messages 
delivered personally or by his volunteers at public 
meetings; and through the columns of the newspapers 
Young India and Nava.iivan (published in English from 
Bombay and in Gujarati from Ahmedabad respectively), 
which the owners, Banker, Sobhani and Yajnik, placed at 
his disposal.'1’ Gandhi had learnt the value of a news­
paper in South Africa and (while he had had access 
during the Rowlatt satyagraha to the columns of Young 
India under Jamnadas and Banker and of the Bombay 
Chronicle under B. G. Horniman) it is surprising that he 
had not felt the need to supplement face-to-face leader­
ship regularly through such a communications medium 
before this.
Gandhi found that, with his suspension of the 
movement and his emphasis on control and restraint,
1. Gandhi, Experiments, pp. 576-81; Shraddhanand,
Inside Congress, p. 93? Yajnik 1943, p. 98; Young India. 
11 June 1919, p. 3«
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combined with Government repression in the Punjab,
Calcutta and Gujarat, the enthusiasm of the masses and
even of some of his lieutenants evaporated: enrolment of
volunteers declined, and (in the words of Indulal Yajnik,
one of those who under Gandhi*s instructions lectured the
people of Ahmedabad on the need for restraint), ’people
...were too terror-stricken by the memory of the martial
law regime...to be affected by our words”.1 23 After
travelling across northern India, C. P. Andrews wrote
that he saw ’’the tide of the merely popular and clamorous
2India turning against Bapu [as Gandhi was referred to]”.
Gandhi’s position in trying to remedy this was 
complicated by his concern lest the Government arrest him. 
This would remove his influence at a time when he wanted 
to repair the damage done to the cause of satyagraha, and 
it might lead to renewed violence and Government repression 
which would further discredit non-violence.1
His position was made more awkward by disagreement
1. Gandhi, Experiments, p. 577; Yajnik 1943, p* 98.
2. C. F. Andrews to Mahadev Desai [secretary to Gandhi], 
[?] May 1919» no. S 6573» Gandhi Papers Sabarmati.
3. see Gandhi to Rahimtoola, n.d. [14 Apr 1919?]» no.
S. 6534» Gandhi to Mr Cowie [Private Secretary to Governor 
of Bombay], 29 Apr 1919, no. S 6574, in ibid.
among his lieutenants and followers. Some had been
frightened by the violence that had erupted, and urged
Gandhi to suspend civil disobedience: among these were
Horniman, Dr Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan of Delhi.^
Some - particularly Theosophist Home Rulers, who had
followed Gandhi, such as Jamnadas and, in Bihar, Pumendu
Narayan Sinha - now felt that Mrs Besant’s warning against
violence had been vindicated, and that civil disobedience
2should be renounced. Hasan Imam and Rajendra Prasad 
concurred in this view.^ Some, while approving of 
Gandhi’s temporary suspension of the movement, were 
angered by his criticism of his lieutenants and those 
who had taken the Satyagraha Pledge. Swami Shraddhananda 
in particular felt that Gandhi nhad laid the responsib­
ility for the peaceful citizens being shot...on the 
shoulders of the Satyagrahis”, and had endorsed Government 
accusations against satyagrahis without enquiring into
1. B. G. Horniman, Vice President, Satyagraha Sabha,
to Gandhi, 17 Apr 1919, no. S 6545, ibid.; Home Poll Dep. 
July 1919, no. 49, ’Delhi*, par. 1.
2. regarding Jamnadas Dwarkadas, see Bombay Police 1919. 
pars 754, 79Ma); P. N. Sinha, see E. G. Ryland, Deputy 
Inspector-General of Police, Bihar and Orissa, Special 
Report on ’’Satyagraha Movement”, 14 Apr 1919, in B & 0 
Police 1919.
3. H. Imam to Gandhi and to M. Desai, 25 May 1919, no.
S 6626, Gandhi Papers Sabarmati; cf. Home Poll Dep. July 
1919, no. 48, *B & O’, par. 4.
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the facts.^ Shraddhananda wrote asking Gandhi whether
those who had committed themselves to the Pledge could
be held responsible for violence on the part of those who
had not. When Gandhi replied that "we [satyagrahis] are
just as responsible for the action of non-Satyagrahis
when they act with us as we are for our own”, the Swami
(while promising to continue to preach ahimsa) resigned
from the Satyagraha Sabha and, with Ansari, prevailed
upon the Delhi Sabha to disband and burn its membership 
2records. Similarly the loyalty of Gandhi’s Gujarati co­
workers was strained by his implication of the ’educated
■3workers” in the disturbances, and the Satyagraha Sabhas 
there declined in numbers or disbanded themselves.
Others among his followers felt disgusted or ’deeply 
humiliated at having a leader who...had not the courage 
to face the natural consequences of his own plans”.
1. Shraddhanand, Inside Congress, pp. 92-7; cf. Gandhi, 
Experiments, p. 574.
2. Shraddhananda to Gandhi, n.d. and reply 17 Apr 1919, 
no. S 6546, Gandhi Papers Sabarmati; Home Poll Dep. July 
1919, no. 49, ’Delhi*, par. TT
3. Yajnik 1943, pp. 97-9; see Home Poll Dep. Aug 1919, 
no. 51. p. 4.
4. Munshi, I Pollow the Mahatma, p. 9; cf. Yajnik, 1943, 
p. 98.
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Some of these remained loyal, but others fell away from
the Satyagraha Sabhas1 2 and others again, notably Hazrat
Mohani and Sunder Lai of the UP, urged Gandhi to recomm-
2ence civil disobedience.
There was some danger that those who were urging 
Gandhi to recommence civil disobedience would decide 
that satyagraha was inadequately aggressive and reject it: 
Gandhi was anxious to convince them of its efficacy. He 
was also disturbed by the fragmentation and disaffection 
of his following. Thus, while wishing to tighten his 
control over the movement, to inculcate restraint and 
non-violence, he wanted to find some way to maintain the 
momentum of the movement, to prevent it from subsiding 
or fragmenting, and this ambivalence led him to vacillate 
during mid-1919. He managed, however, to give the 
impression of activity, or of being about to act, while 
allowing passions to cool.
At the beginning of May, two weeks after suspending 
civil disobedience he wrote optimistically that by the 
end of July "we shall have... spread our message throughout
1. see e.g. Yajnik, 1943, pp. 98-9; Home Poll Dep. Aug 
1919, no. 51, p. 4.
2. Home Poll Dep. July 1919, no. 49, 'Bombay1, par. 2.
the country" and that therefore "we shall be fitted for 
resuming civil disobedience in about two months".^
After a further two weeks he held a hartal in Bombay City 
in protest at the deportation of Horniman by the Bombay 
Government, but he stressed that there should be no pub­
lic demonstrations of any kind and the hartal was only
ppartially, and quietly, observed. This failed to satisfy 
many of those who had taken the Pledge in western and 
northern India, and at meetings in Bombay and Ahmedabad 
in mid-May they urged him to recommence civil disobed­
ience or at least to call public meetings.^ His public 
pronouncements at this time were dispiriting to those 
who were looking for resumption of activity: he urged 
those who had participated in violence to confess their 
guilt; to those who came as volunteers, he said that he 
expected blind obedience and that they must reconsider 
before he would accept them as followers; and at public 
meetings he refused to elaborate how he proposed to
1. "When is Satyagraha Going to be Resumed", 2 May 1919 
in Young India. 7 [10] May 1919, p. 6b.
2. Home Poll Dep. July 1919, no. 48, p. 4; Satyagraha 
leaflets 5 - 1 2  May 1919 in Young India. Ganesan, pp. 
1227-35; Bombay HP« 1919. w.e. 10 May 1919, p. 10.
3. Home Poll B, June 1919, nos 701-4, p. 15.
recommence civil disobedience.^
Gandhi realised that, after the first stunned 
silence, Indian anger would rise over Government re­
pression in the Punjab, and that he must mount and ride 
this fury if he would restrain and direct it. During
May news filtered out from the Punjab. Not only were
2vicious punishments meted out to the Punjabis; the 
Punjab Government, instead of placating the population 
under its charge, extended the duration of martial law 
so that it could punish those, whom it regarded as res­
ponsible for the violence, without having to submit to 
the processes of the ordinary courts. In this way it 
obtained sentences of transportation for life (later 
quashed) for most of the leading politicians who had 
advocated satyagraha, Kitchlu, Satyapal, Rambhuj Dutt 
Uhoudhuri and others. At the end of April Rs 2000 
security was demanded from Motilal Nehru’s Independent 
for its criticism of the Punjab Government, and C. P. 
Andrews found that Mevery Indian I meet is saying
L. ibid., and p. 23.
2. "There were too many sentences of flogging", ad­
mitted the Majority Report of the Hunter Report (which 
nas not conspicuous for its severity toward the officers 
administering martial law): Hunter Committee Report, pp.
52, 140; Home Poll Dep. Aug 1919, no. 54, p. 15; see 
0. P. Andrews to Tagore, 21 Oct 1919, C. P. Andrews Papers.
'Take away your d----d Reforms: we don’t want them and
we won’t have them. Answer us this, are we to be treated
as serfs, with no human rights at all?’ At the end
of May Rabindranath Tagore renounced his knighthood: to
understand the impact on educated Indians of the
”frightfulnessM committed and condoned by the Punjab
Government, one has only to savour the quiet fury and
anguish of Tagore’s letter of renunciation.^
After the appointment by the AICC of a Committee
to enquire into the Punjab early in June, Gandhi wrote:
With reference to the Punjab disturbances 
by my complete silence over them I have 
allowed myself to be misunderstood by many 
friends and...deprived of the co-operation 
...of...Shri Shraddhanandji.
and took up sentences which he held to be a ’travesty
of justice”.^ The public comments which Gandhi had made
on the Punjab up to this point had been quite neutral,
1. Andrews to Tagore, 1 May [1919]» C. F. Andrews 
Pacers: Home Poll Dep. July 1919» no. 47, ’UP*, par. 12.
2. The term is Churchill's, see House of Commons 
Debates, 8 July 1920, CXXXI, col. 1728.
3. Home Poll Dep. Aug 1919, no. 52.
4. Young India. 11 June 1919, p. 3; 12 July 1919, p. 2a; 
see AICC Minutes. 8 June 1919.
5. see e.g. ibid., 17 May 1919, p. 6.
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partly (as he said) because he had no conclusive evidence 
to go on: he had asked permission of the Viceroy to enter 
the Punjab, but in vain.'*' Also, one suspects, he was 
anxious to avoid contributing to the rise in Indian 
temper, which would increase the difficulties of control, 
and was uncertain of the course he wished to follow.
At a hastily-called meeting on May 28 in Bombay 
with some of his followers from various provinces, how­
ever, Gandhi’s desire for continued momentum came upper­
most. At this meeting he decided to call on the Viceroy 
to appoint a Committee to examine the disturbances and 
to revise the martial law sentences, failing which 
’’satyagraha should be taken up...after two weeks at the 
earliest”. Gandhi’s followers responded with varying
1. Gandhi, Experiments, p. 578.
2. Gandhi, ’’Note on the Informal Private Satyagraha 
Conference”, no. S 6628; draft invitation to Conference 
on 28 May from Gandhi to Hasan Imam, Sunderlal, Kasturi 
Ranga Iyengar [for Madras: Rajaji’s name is deleted], 
Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Vallabhbhai Patel and Shraddhananda [?] 
21 May 1919, no. S 6618; H. Imam to Gandhi, 25 May 1919, 
no. S 6626. Gandhi Papers Sabarmati: Bombay Police 1919. 
par. 719(a); Home Poll B, June 1919, nos 701-4, w.e. 16 
June 1919» par. 11; those who attended included Jamnadas, 
S. G. Banker and L. R. Tairsee, from Bombay; Vallabhbhai, 
Mrs Anasuyabai, Yajnik and others from Ahmedabad; Gan- 
shyamdas Shivadasani from Sind; and the Muslims, Hazrat 
Mohani and Zulfikar Khan, and the Hindu, Sunder Lai, from UP.
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degrees of enthusiasm to this decision. Hazrat Hohani 
and Sunder Lai had urged him to it; Rajaji was enthus­
iastic; others like Hasan Imam felt that resumption of 
satyagraha would lead to violence but promised their 
loyalty to Gandhi while Jamnadas resigned from the 
Satyagraha Sabha in protest.^
Still fearful of violence, Gandhi formulated a 
more detailed programme, that would provide guidance in 
the case of his arrest and limit the opportunities for 
violence. His first solution was to suggest that only 
those who had taken the Satyagraha Pledge in Bombay and 
had therefore been indoctrinated by him should perform 
acts of civil disobedience and that "there should be no
Hartal on any account whatsoever,...no demonstration of
2any kind.” He then modified this to limit satyagraha 
in the first instance to himself, unaccompanied by any 
demonstrations, after which "if full peace is observed 
for one month...and it has been ascertained that the 
people have understood the doctrine of Satyagraha.... 
Civil disobedience may then be offered by those who may
1. letter from Rajaji, 2 June 1919* in Young India.
7 June 1919, p. 7d.
2. Gandhi "Note on the Informal Private Satyagraha 
Conference", loc. cit.
m
be selected by the leaders’1 *V. in other towns in India, 
though he advised that ’’not more than two should offer 
civil disobedience from any one centre [i.e. town] nor 
should civil disobedience be commenced simultaneously at 
all centres”.1 Indeed, so wary was he of violence, that 
he wrote ’’one real Satyagrahi is enough for victory”
pthough he did not spell out how this could be: this
one, of course, was to be himself, and he would court 
arrest by breaking the regulation externing him from the 
Punjab. It is hard to believe that he was in earnest 
about recommencing civil disobedience even alone, for he 
had had no opportunity to prepare the Punjabis for it, 
nor had he refashioned the Satyagraha Sabha into a well- 
developed or -articulated organisation, nor substituted 
another organisation for it. After further hesitation,
1. Gandhi, ’’Instructions for Satyagrahis in the terms,
and in virtue, of the Resolution Passed by the Committee
of the Bombay Satyagraha Sabha, on June 19, 1919H, in 
Home Poll Dep. Aug 1919, no. 51, pp. 6-8; see also Grandhi 
to U. Sobhani, D. D. Sathaye and S. G. Banker, Joint Hon. 
Secretaries, Satyagraha Sabha, 12 June 1919, no. S 6649; 
Gandhi to [Rajaji], 25 June 1919> no. S 6681; Gandhi to
Polak, 27 June 1919» no. S 6690; Gandhi, telegram, to
V. S. S. Sastri, 27 June 1919» no. S 6691, Gandhi Papers 
Sabarmati; Rajaji to Vijiaraghavachariar and other 
friends [printed circular, enclosing Gandhi’s letter of 
25 June 1919]» n.d. Vij. Papers.
2. Gandhi to [Rajaji], 25 June 1919, loc. cit.
in fact, he announced on 21 July that the Governor of
Bombay had warned him that "resumption of Civil
Disobedience” was "likely to be attended with serious
consequences to the public security" and that its
"temporary suspension" was to continue.^"
Civil disobedience had now been suspended for over
three months, and many who had taken the Satyagraha
Pledge deplored this de facto ending of it, reminding
Gandhi that he had vowed to agitate until the Rowlatt Act 
2was withdrawn. Under these circumstances he sought to 
divert attention from civil disobedience, the Rowlatt Act 
and the Punjab repression. There is no evidence that 
Gandhi deliberately set out to distract his followers, but 
that he instinctively felt the need to do so was shown by 
his actions. In Young India, for example, he devoted a 
great deal of space to the affairs of Indians in South 
Africa from June onward.-^
More important, he enjoined his followers to take 
up hand-weaving and -spinning. The inmates of his Satya­
graha Ashram had between 1915 and 1918 resuscitated these
1. Young India. 23 July 1919» p. 1*
2. Bombay Police 1919. pars 1032(a), 1063(b); Gandhi, 
Experiments, p. 582.
3. see e.g. Young India. 5 July 1919, p. 2a.
arts and the machines appropriate to them, notably the
charkha or spinning-wheel, which had fallen into disuse.
In May 1919 Gandhi promulgated two Swadeshi Vows pledging
those who took them to use only Indian-manufactured cloth,
and during the following months he prevailed upon his
lieutenants and followers to take up hand-spinning and
-weaving, quoting the Gita: "the multitude will copy the
actions of the enlightened”.1 2 His newspapers and others
like the Bombay Chronicle publicised hand-spinning and
2-weaving, and letters arrived seeking instructions.
While Gandhi’s introduction of the charkha was a useful 
diversion in a time of inactivity, it bore a deeper 
significance for the fulfilment of his aims. Gandhi had 
long sought some means of reviving village handcrafts, 
which agriculturists and their families might take up in 
their spare time in order to supplement their incomes, 
and the introduction of the charkha was the first step 
toward the attainment of the self-sufficient village he 
had foreshadowed in Hind Swarari: in time the principle of
1. Young India. Ganesan, p. 1274; this paragraph is 
based on his articles of 17 May to 20 Aug 1919» repro­
duced in ibid., pp. 1240-6, 1268-93; Yajnik 1943, p. 104; 
Gandhi, Experiments, pp. 599-607; see Gandhi to Dr. N. 
Nagarkatti (Assistant Director of Industry, Hyderabad 
[Deccan]), 14 July 1919, no. S 6748, Gandhi Papers Sabar- 
mati.
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2. see e.g. B. Aida to Gandhi 17 Oct 1919, no. S 6945, 
loc cit.
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swadeshi, of using indigenous products, would be exten­
ded to commodities other than cloth. By making the 
masses less dependent on the outside world, the charkha 
and handloom would raise them in their own eyes. 
Furthermore, by insisting that his lieutenants and 
educated followers take to the charkha. he was asking 
them to identify themselves - as he had done - with the 
meanest of their fellow-countrymen. In this way he would 
accelerate the involvement of the masses in the national 
movement.
It was clear, however, that Indian nationalist 
attention could not be effectively diverted from the 
happenings in the Punjab. In August, for instance, the 
Madras and Bihar Provincial Conferences, respectively, 
passed resolutions denouncing the military Mfrightfulness 
in the Punjab and demanding the recall of the Viceroy for 
having condoned it. Early in the following month the 
Indian press censured the Hunter Committee appointed by 
the Government to enquire into the disturbances for the 
paucity of unofficial and liberal-minded men among its 
members.1 Young India had been criticising martial law
1# Home Poll Pep. Oct 1919» no. 44, 'Madras', par. 3; 
'Bihar*, par. 3; ibid., no. 59, 'Madras', par. 4; Shradd- 
hananda to Gandhi, 7 Sept 1919, no. S 6847 [in Hindi, 
kindly translated for writer by Mrs Singh, National Arch­
ive® of India], Gandhi Papers Sabarmati; the Government's 
Indemnity Bill to indemnify its martial law officers was 
severely criticised also.
judgments and now devoted more space to this and to 
publishing judgments in full.'*'
On October 17 Gandhi’s externment from the Punjab 
was lifted, and he immediately entered that province. 
Gandhi knew from C. F. Andrews, Hasan Imam and the mem­
bers of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the AICC, who 
had already gone there, how cowed the Punjabis were as
the result of the repression and the removal of their 
2leaders. At Malaviya’s invitation he joined the Cong­
ress Inquiry Committee and set about infusing a spirit 
of firmness and self-reliance into its members and into 
the people who came to see him. The ordinary people were 
heartened merely by the presence of sympathetic, educated 
men who were determined to hear their story and represent 
their grievances to the Government. "Courage is coming 
back, at last, to these terror-stricken people", wrote 
Andrews to Tagore, "peasants have come from 50 or 60 
miles to meet me in Lahore and tell me about their 
villages".^ And "....What a relief it has been now that
1. see Young India, passim; Gandhi, Speeches and Writ- 
ings, pp. 482-3.
2. see e.g. H. Imam, telegram, to Gandhi, 11 July 1919, 
no. S 6740, Gandhi Papers Sabarmati.
3. Andrews to Tagore, 1 Oct 1919, C. F, Andrews Papers.
Mr Gandhi has come and Pandit Malaviya is away....things 
were being badly done...and this, just at a time when 
faith and strength and courage were pre-eminently 
needed”.^
Gandhi now received a striking tribute to his will 
and to his ability to lead from the members of the Cong­
ress Inquiry Committee. He convinced them that, in order 
to ensure a fair revision of the martial law sentences, 
they should demand that the Hunter Committee allow those 
who appeared before it to be cross-examined and to have 
the aid of counsel, and that it should have the principal 
Punjabis under sentence released under security. The 
Hunter Committee gave way on the first two points but 
not on the third, whereupon Gandhi prevailed upon the 
Congress Committee to refuse to give evidence to the 
Hunter Committee. He did so by threatening to resign 
from the Congress Committee if it did not stick to its 
guns: recognising that, in view of Gandhi*s reputation 
for uprightness and truthfulness, their position would 
be considerably weakened if he parted from them, the
1 . Andrews to Tagore, 20 [29?] Oct 1919, ibid
Committee acquiesced.^ Gandhi, wrote Andrews, had 
prevailed upon the Committee to “purge out the weakness 
of always acquiescing as beggars in whatever Government
psays or does”.
As further training in self-reliance Gandhi 
persuaded the Congress Committee to hold “almost a para­
llel inquiry“ to that of the Hunter Committee into the 
Punjab. In this way he identified himself with the 
Indian condemnation of the Punjab repression: Indian 
anger over the Punjab was provoked in November by General 
Dyer's admission before the Hunter Committee that he fired 
on an innocent crowd in order to intimidate the popul­
ation of the province, and that if he could have got his 
machine-guns into Jallianwala Bagh he would have done 
“all men to death“. On the Inquiry, Gandhi was assoc­
iated with Das, who had been the spokesman for the young
1. Shraddhanand, Inside Congress, pp. 109-10; C. P. 
Andrews to Tagore, 3 Nov and 16 Nov 1919, C. F. Andrews 
Papers: Young India. 19 Nov 1919, Tagore, pp. 74-6.
2. C. P. Andrews to Tagore, 16 Nov 1919, loc. cit.
3. Gandhi, Experiments, p. 584: the Congress Inquiry 
Committee comprised Gandhi, Malaviya, Das, Motilal 
Nehru (later replaced by Jawaharlal), Abbas Tyabji and 
M. R. Jayakar; see Jayakar, I, 319-33*
4* Hunter Committee Report, pp. 188-94; Home Poll Dep. 
Jan 1920, ho. 5, pp* 1, 5, 7, 9, 16; see Jitendralal Bann- 
erjee's speech, Congress 1919. Report, p. 72: “thou 
[General Dyer] art convicted out of thy own mouth”.
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Congressmen at the 1918 Session, and with Motilal Nehru, 
one of the severest critics of the British but not yet 
committed entirely to Gandhi: Gandhi won their admir­
ation by his sharp, judicial mind and industry, and 
dominated the Inquiry.'1 23' In the last weeks of 1919 the 
Congress Committee heard 1700 witnesses and sifted the 
evidence in preparation for the writing of its report.
At Gandhi*s urging, the Committee rejected evidence that 
could not be substantiated. Gandhi*s voice, wrote one 
of the members, ’’was always for moderation and restraint”. 
Gandhi was here inculcating into his fellow-members a 
sense of responsibility, and attempting to curb the 
passions not only of the Committee but of Indians who 
would read its report. Gandhi’s desire to impress the 
need for restraint and non-violence on his fellow Indians 
concerning the Punjab question was most strikingly seen 
at the Amritsar Congress at the end of the year, where he 
prevailed upon the Subjects Committee to put forward a 
resolution regretting and condemning the ’’excesses” comm­
itted by Indians in the Punjab and Gujarat in April.^
1. see J. Nehru, Toward Freedom, pp. 50-1.
2. Jayakar, I, 321.
3. Home Poll Dep. Mar 1920, no. 2, p. 17; Congress 
1919. Report, resolution 5, pp. 65-8.
II
Gandhi and the Khilafat.
Gandhi had for some time been aware of a fund of 
anti-British bitterness other than that roused by the 
Punjab repression, this time among the Pan-Islamists 
over the threatened dismemberment of the Khilafat. HThe 
ferment among the Mahomedans", he wrote to Maffey, the 
Viceroy*s Secretary, "is too great to be checked for ever 
It may burst like a torrent at any moment".1
He wanted both to restrain and to harness this 
ferment. The Pan-Islamists regarded the British as 
religious oppressors: Islam offers its adherents the 
choice of jihad (holy war) against, or hi.1 rat (flight) 
from, such oppressors. Gandhi wanted to persuade Muslims 
to substitute for these courses his alternative of non­
violent coercion, to reduce the likelihood of violence 
and to win them as adherents to his method of satyagraha. 
He hoped to attain these ends by espousing the Khilafat 
cause and by prevailing upon his fellow-Hindus to do like 
wise: he accepted the righteousness of the Pan-Islamists* 
desire to preserve the Khilafat and its temporal
1. Gandhi to Maffey, 14 Apr 1919, no. S 6534, Gandhi 
Papers Sabarmati.
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embodiment, the Ottoman Empire, as prescribed by their 
religion (even though the metropolitan, Turanian nation 
was preparing to repudiate both). By associating him­
self and the Hindus with the Muslim religious feelings, 
he also hoped to reconcile Hindus and Muslims at all 
levels of society.
Gandhi had endorsed the Khilafat demands in his 
letter of April 1918 to the Viceroy,1 234and after he met 
Abdul Bari in the course of his preparations for the 
Rowlatt Act satyagraha, the latter advised Muslims to 
join the Rowlatt agitation and "to organise some sort of 
passive resistance” if their wishes regarding the Holy
pPlaces were disregarded. During the Rowlatt agitation, 
it seemed that Gandhi*s strategy was succeeding for, 
like Swami Shraddhananda, he and other Hindus were 
invited to preach in mosques.1 In May 1919 he told a 
Muslim audience: "there are two things to which I am 
devoting my life - permanent unity between Hindus and 
Muhammadans, and Satyagraha*1,^  and in October he wrote,
1. see Chapter VII, p.380 above.
2. A. Bari, letter in Muslim newspaper, Akhuwat. 14 
Mar 1919 in Home Poll B, Apr 1919» nos 148-52, p. 11.
3. see Chapter VII above.
4. 3foung India. 14 May 1919, p. 6b.
"it is the bounden duty of the Hindus and other religious 
denominations to associate themselves with their 
Muhammadan brethren [in the Khilafat agitation]. It is 
the surest and simplest method of bringing about the 
Hindu-Muhammadan unity"
On 19 March 1919, during the agitation leading up
to the Rowlatt Act satyagraha, a Muslim mass meeting
was held in Bombay, which resulted in the formation of a
Khilafat Committee comprised mainly of wealthy, Muslim
merchants and millowners under the presidentship ofa
2a rich timber-merchant, Mian Mohamad Chotani. There 
is no evidence that Gandhi was directly associated with 
this meeting but, of Gandhi*s aides, Horniman was active 
at the meeting itself and Umar Sobhani moved in the 
cotton-industry circles of Bombay responsible for holding 
it. As businessmen,the members of this Committee were 
but dilatory politicians, and the disturbances accom­
panying the Rowlatt Act hartals made them fearful of en­
couraging agitation among the Muslim masses.
1. Young India. 4 Oct 1919, quoted in Gandhi, Speeches 
and Writings, p. 483; cf. Young India. 5 May 1920, Tagore, 
p. 250; for Gandhi’s fear of Muslim violence, see Gandhi to 
Shraddhananda, 17 Apr 1919, no. S 6546, Gandhi Papers 
Sabarmati.
2. Bombay Police 1919. pars 503, 529, 575, 603; the 
Committee was formed on 25 April; its leading members were 
Chotani, Devji Kanji, Sir F. Currimbhoy, Mirza Ali Mahomed 
Khan, S. Mitha, B. Koor, C. A. Peerbhoy, Maulvi Abdul Rauf 
of the Zia-ul-Islam.
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Gandhi was confronted with a problem similar to 
that posed by the Punjab: how to maintain the momentum 
of the Khilafat movement while restraining the more 
ardent Pan-Islamic spirits, like Hazrat Mohani, who 
could whip themselves and their audiences into a frenzy 
of fanaticism over "Islam in danger". It would help 
considerably toward a solution of this problem, if those 
who had a stake in the country and who might thus be 
expected to exert a moderating influence - to whit, the 
Muslim businessmen of Bombay -, could be induced to 
adhere to the movement. The most likely solution to 
the problem lay in satyagraha, if Gandhi could get the 
moderating classes to regard it as a guarantee against 
social disorder and the more fanatical elements to regard 
it as the most practical method of bringing pressure to 
bear on the British. Gandhi argued that it was at a 
Muslim meeting in Bombay on 9 May.1
Following Gandhi*s suspension of the Rowlatt Act 
satyagraha, the Khilafat movement, like other forms of 
political agitation, declined. The demonstrations had 
allowed an outlet and a partial catharsis for emotional
1. "The Khilafate: Mr Gandhi*s Address before the 
Anjuman [Zia-ul-Islam]", Young India. 14 May 1919, p. 6b.
4^0
tensions, although without providing a satisfactory 
solution to the problems which had given rise to those 
tensions, thus ensuring that they would re-emerge. 
Afghanistan ill-advisedly chose this time to attack 
India. Not wishing to appear treasonable, all but the 
most fanatical Pan-Islamists desisted from agitation 
over the Khilafat. Needless to say, Gandhi did not wish 
to take advantage of the Amir’s violence, and desisted 
likewise.^
Nevertheless discontent over the Khilafat continued 
and in August the activity of the Bombay Khilafat Comm­
ittee and of Pan-Islamists throughout India was revived 
by messages from Muslims in England. It seemed that 
Curzon might at last get his way and that Turkey would 
not only be deprived of the ’rich and renowned” lands of 
Thrace and of her capital, Constantinople, which Lloyd 
George had soberly promised would remain with her, but 
would also be divided into spheres of influence under the
pGreat Powers. The Bombay Khilafat Committee and the
1. see Maffey to Gandhi, 7 May 1919, no. S 6593, reply 
11 May 1919, no. S 6606, Gandhi Papers Sabarmati.
2. see H. Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase« 1919-25. 
pp. 110-3; Home Poll Dep. Oct 1919, no. 44, ’Bombay*, 
par. 2; ’UP’, par. 1; ’Delhi*, par. 3; ibid. no.
59, ’Madras’, par. 3.
4^1
Lucknow Pan-Islamists arranged an All-India Khilafat 
Conference at Lucknow for 21 September.^ This was the 
cue for G-andhi's re-entry, and at a preliminary public 
meeting at Bombay on 18 September he upbraided the 
organisers for failing to put forv/ard a minimum demand 
on behalf of Turkey, and told the 25,000 Muslims present 
that ’’they had 21 crores [lie. 210 million] of Hindus 
at their back and that with their moral support they 
could dictate whatever terms they liked”; they should 
’’put their heart and soul into the agitation and they 
could not do that better than by adopting the satyagraha 
spirit”.^
This exhortation to greater determination may have 
been prompted by a letter Gandhi had recently received 
from Abdul Bari regarding satyagraha: ”1 formed the 
opinion, chiefly from the events of the Punjab, that 
the Indian mass [does] not yet possess the aptitude for 
the movement. We consider that the swadeshi and a boy­
cott movement more appropriate, being more useful and
1. Home Poll B, Aug 1919, nos 432-5, w.e. 25 Aug 1919, 
par. 6; Dep. Oct 1919, no. 44, ’Bombay’, par. 2;
Khaliquzzaman, pp. 47-8.
2. Home Poll Dep. Nov 1919» no. 15. pp. 4-5; Bombay 
NP, 1919. pp. 342, 375, 420.
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harmless”.1 2 The Muslims were thus threatening to discard 
satyagraha before they had really tried it. In fact 
articulate Muslim opinion was divided over the Khilafat. 
The "nationalists” like Jinnah (at this time in England 
in connection with the Reforms) and the Raja of Mahmud- 
abad, the President of the Muslim League, still cherished 
the ideal of a secular India and feared the results of 
civil disobedience and the involvement of the masses in 
agitation. Secondly were those, like the Bombay merchants 
who were genuinely distressed by the threatened dismember­
ment of the Khilafat, but who feared likewise to appeal 
to the masses. Some of the Pan-Islamists, like Abdul 
Bari, Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan, had got cold feet after 
seeing the violence in April, but were looking for an 
effective means of protest. Finally there were the Pan- 
Islamic irreconcilables, obscurantist Pan-Islamic divines 
and young Muslims for whom the Khilafat was of political 
rather than religious significance as a means of uniting
AMuslims (and possibly Hindus) against the British.
1. Abdul Bari to Gandhi, 3 Sept 1919, no. S 6844, Gandhi 
Papers Sabarmati.
2. concerning latter group, see Asaf Ali to Gandhi, 19 
Jan 1920, no. S 7062, ibid; others in this category 
include Azad and M. H. Kidwal; for Fazlul Huq in this 
period, see Home Poll B, June 1919, nos 494-7, pp. 6-7.
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Outstanding among the irreconcilables were the Ali 
Brothers, who from internment had written to the Viceroy 
at the time of the Afghan invasion threatening hijrat 
as a preparation for .iihad against the Government of 
India: Gandhi clearly had not yet won them to satyagraha.1 23
These divisions, which were complicated by personal 
feuds, appeared at the Lucknow Khilafat Conference on 
21 September. Here the majority was in favour of some 
form of agitation and Mahmudabad and the Muslim League 
were by-passed. The Bombay Khilafat Committee (due to 
Chotani's wealth and liberality to the cause) was raised 
to the status of All-India Khilafat Committee, October 17 
was proclaimed a day of fasting and mourning as Khilafat 
Day and local Khilafat Committees were to be formed to 
supervise arrangements.^ Gandhi (who had not been invited 
to the Conference) responded by urging that Khilafat Day 
be observed with a hartal, in which Hindus should join.^
The Khilafat Committee welcomed his support and allowed
1. see their letter to Viceroy, 24 Apr 1919, in Home Poll 
A, May 1919, nos 363-8; their letter to Gandhi, 9 May 1919, 
no. S 6601, his reply 23 May 1919, no. S 6622, Gandhi 
Parers Sabarmati.
2. Khaliquzzaman, pp. 47-8; Home Poll Dep. Nov 1919, 
no. 15, p. 12; UP Police 1919. pars 2116, 2164, 2320.
3. Young India. 4 Oct 1919, in Gandhi, Speeches and 
Writings, pp. 482-3; Bombay NP. 1919. pp. 449, 474-5.
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him to take over much of the preparatory work for the 
observance in Bombay: wary of violence, he proscribed mass 
demonstrations.1 23 In Madras Rajaji helped the local Khil- 
afat Committee by winning the co-operation of the Hindus, 
as did other followers of Gandhi in Calcutta, Delhi and 
the towns of Gujarat and the UP, and the hartal was quietly 
and widely observed, though not as thoroughly as that in 
April.
This peaceful hartal increased the reputation of 
satyagraha among Muslims, including the more cautious, and 
Gandhi was invited to an All-India Conference called by 
the Delhi Khilafat Committee for 23 and 24 November.^
Here he took up a suggestion, calculated to appeal to the 
more aggressive Pan-Islamists, to boycott the Peace 
Celebrations. Despite the qualms of the Khilafat Committ­
ee in Bombay the Celebrations were effectively boycotted 
throughout the country. Gandhi might indeed consider 
himself successful in wooing Hindus to co-operation with
1* Young India. 22 Oct 1919, p. 2; Home Poll Dep. Nov 
1919, no. 14, pp. 7-8; Gandhi, draft resolution for Mosque 
meeting, Oct 1919» no. S 6952, Gandhi Papers Sabarmati.
2. UP Police 1919. par. 2457; Gandhi, Experiments, pp. 
586-91; Home Poll Dep. Jan 1920, no. 5, *Delhi1, par. 1; 
Bombay NP. 1919. pp. 633-5.
3. Home Poll Dep. Jan 1920, no. 5, 'Bombay', par. 2; 
ibid., nos 44, 45, passim; UP Police 1919. par. 2360.
the Muslims, and both to belief in satyagraha. He 
regarded the peaceful hartal of October 17 as "the great­
est event" of the year, claiming that it marked "the 
acceptance of Satyagraha*..both by the rulers and the 
ruled".'1 2' At the November Khilafat Conference he had gone 
a step further in the application of satyagraha, by 
suggesting that if "justice" was not done to the Muslim 
claim the Khilafat Committee should "advise Mahomedans to 
withdraw co-operation from the Government". He had not, 
however, worked out a programme of Non-Co-operation, nor 
it is clear had he worked out its implication for the 
Reforms which were passed into law by the British 
Parliament in December 1919.
Ill
Co-operation or Non-Co-operation?
Gandhi was uninterested in the Reforms. This may 
be traced to his preoccupation with changing India; 
restoring self-respect; turning her elite back from the
1. Young India. 5 Nov 1919, Tagore, p. 44.
2. Young India. 3 Dec 1919, p. 8.
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Western to the indigenous; and converting her to satya- 
graha. But mixed up in this was an irrational commitment 
to the efficacy of suffering, “...it is my firm belief’, 
he said,1 2 “that we shall obtain salvation only through 
suffering and not by reforms dropping on us from England, 
no matter how unstintingly they might be granted".
The Extremists, on the other hand (and in this they 
agreed with the Moderates and Mrs Besant), regarded the 
Reforms as of prime importance. Tilak gave guarded supp­
ort to Gandhi’s satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act, but 
was primarily concerned with the Reforms. "It is a
pmistake", he wrote from England, "to lower our demands 
[for larger Reforms] just now in order to conciliate the 
Government of India. The Rowlatt Act and bombing of 
people from aeroplanes has [sic] created a very bad 
impression in England about the bureaucratic methods of 
governing India....we shall only be harming our own 
interest if we lower our demands". In February Congress 
had chosen a deputation to present its case before the 
Joint Select Committee on the Reforms Bill, including
1. Message on his arrest, Young India. 10 Apr 1919, 
Ganesan, p. 1196.
2. Tilak to D. V. Gokhale, 24 Apr 1919, Khanarde Papers: 
cf. ibid to ibid. 23 Jan 1919, Tilak to G. S. Khaparde,
5 Mar, 13 Mar 1919, in ibid; Tilak to Lajpat Rai [date 
not given], Home Poll B, June 1919, nos 701-4, p. 34; cf. 
Vithalbhai Patel to Vijiaraghavachariar, 3 Apr 1919, Vi.i. 
Paners.
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Malaviya, Motilal Nehru, Hasan Imam, B. Chakravarti and 
Vithalbhai Patel.1 Most members of the deputation were 
drawn into the Rowlatt agitation and many were won to 
Gandhi’s view that Indian nationalists’ work lay in 
India. George Joseph of Madras spoke for these when, in 
resigning from the deputation, he wrote: "Mr Gandhi’s 
work in India is more urgent,...I should do ’my bit’ by 
the side of Mr Gandhi”.^  On the other hand Vithalbhai 
Patel, Kelkar and Jinnah (on behalf of the Muslim League) 
went to England to put India’s case before the Joint 
Committee, and the opposite view to George Joseph’s was 
put by Satyamurti, who wrote: ”1 agree...that our present 
position has been complicated by the satyagraha movement. 
But...we cannot give up our work in England”.^
Indeed for many nationalists it was not easy to 
choose between Gandhi’s brand of nationalism and the 
Reforms. The dilemma confronting them was most poignantly 
illustrated in the case of C. R. Das. Das tried to commit 
the 1919 Bengal Provincial Conference, held just after
1. Kelkar to Vijiaraghavachariar, 28 Peb 1919» Vi.i * 
Papers.
2. G. Joseph to Vijiaraghavachariar, 31 Mar 1919» ibid.
3. S. Satyamurti to Vijiaraghavachariar, 4 Apr 1919» 
ibid.
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Gandhi had suspended civil disobedience, to unconditional 
support for satyagraha.^ He was opposed by leading Mus­
lims and fellow-members of the Hindu bhadralok - Fazlul 
Huq, I. B. Sen and Pal. They were fearful of asking the 
masses to disobey the law: to do so would ”work disaster 
among [the] masses who are illiterate and not in a position 
to do anything with regard to the consequences”. Das 
threatened to leave the provincial Congress institutions, 
to ”sign the [Satyagraha] Pledge...and go to the masses”, 
but eventually he accepted the verdict of the Conference 
which represented the bhadralok political viewpoint.
The Bengali bhadralok. being a minority elite separated 
by tradition and education from the lower-caste and 
Muslim masses, feared that its social and political 
dominance would be swept away by an appeal to those masses. 
Das’ heart inclined him to follow Gandhi and identify 
himself with the masses; but his head told him that his 
place was with his elitist fellows.
Mounting bitterness at British repression in the 
Punjab distracted Indian attention from the Reforms. In
1. Home Poll B, June 1919, nos 494-7, pp. 4-7.
2. see J. H. Broomfield, op. cit., passim.
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England Tilak and his fellow Extremists on the Congress 
deputation considered boycotting the Joint Committee 
"in view of the doings in the P u n j a b T h e  "frightful­
ness” was even more present to those in India: "the 
Punjab trouble is foremost in our hearts", wrote 
B. Chakravarti, "and has relegated the question of reform
pto a secondary place". This bitterness was particularly 
strong among younger and less prominent members of the 
national organisations who were not distracted by the 
forthcoming Reforms, since they could not expect to play 
important roles in the reformed Councils.
The Congress deputation and Jinnah were able to 
claim that by their representations before the Joint 
Committee they had widened the Reforms granted under the 
Act passed at the end of the year.^ But it was clear when 
they returned to India at this time that the Act fell 
far short of the "irreducible minimum" claimed by Tilak.
He had claimed this minimum as a tactic of winning more
1. Khaparde "Diary" (Poona), 21 July 1919.
2. B. Chakravarti to Vijiaraghavachariar, 5 July 1919, 
Vij. Parers.
3. see Kesari. 4 Nov 1919 and Mahratta. 30 Nov 1919 in 
Bombay NP. 1919. pp. 535, 620.
from the British. He had no intention of rejecting 
whatever the British might give: now that his bluff was 
called, he strove to find some way of accepting less than 
his minimum without appearing inconsistent to those who 
had taken him literally. His solution was ’responsive 
co-operation”: Indian national politicians would co-operate 
in working the Reforms wherever the British genuinely 
devolved power. ’Responsive” was added rather as an 
expression of defiance than with any clear sense of the 
limits of Indian co-operation.
Das, however, who as a member of the Congress Inquiry 
Committee had confronted the sufferings of the Punjab, 
expressed the bitterness of the younger generation of 
Congressmen more faithfully when he refused to offer any 
co-operation whatever in working the Reforms and, at the 
Amritsar Congress in December, got Tilak to do likewise.'1 2'
Their resolution merely reaffirmed India's fitness for 
responsible government and stigmatised the Reforms Actpas ’inadequate, unsatisfactory and disappointing”.
This has led some people to believe that they proposed to
1. Shraddhanand, Inside Congress, p. 112; Leader. 26
Jan 1920, in Home Poll Dep. Mar 1920, no. 2, p. 17.
2. Congress 1919. Report, pp. 114-5.
reject the Reforms, There is no evidence however that 
Das had any plan to substitute for Tilak*s: he was 
simply determined to express India*s bitterness over the 
Punjab and the paucity of the Reforms, while preparing to 
accept them and go on working for more.
Both in the Subjects Committee and in the open 
session, Gandhi opposed Das and Tilak strenuously: he 
called on the Session to add to Das' resolution a promise 
to co-operate with the Government in working the Reforms 
and an expression of thanks to Montagu.'1" It has been 
suggested that Gandhi did so because he was basically a
pModerate, that he wanted to work the Reforms meekly 
while Das, Tilak and the Extremists were all for refusing 
to co-operate with the Government. Rot only was this 
untrue for Das and Tilak, but Gandhi was no Moderate in 
the sense of regarding the reformed Councils as the means 
to the Westernisation and political progress of India.
Gandhi still looked not to the Councils but to 
satyagraha for India's salvation. In October he had 
written, "for aught we know the reforms may not come.
Even if they do, they will be worthless. The Congress
1. Congress 1919, Report, pp. 121-4.
2. see Yajnik, 1943, p. 119
League Scheme, then the Delhi Congress Scheme and subse­
quent schemes are now airy nothings.... The Punjab has been 
a scene of most revolting episodes”.^  His advice to the 
November Khilafat Conference to ’withdraw co-operation 
from the Government” committed him to working out a 
programme of Non-Co-operation and, while he had as yet no 
clear idea of how ’’obstruction” of the Reforms might be 
incorporated in such a programme, its operation would 
certainly distract attention from the Councils. In his 
speech on Das’ resolution he foreshadowed obstruction if 
the British ’’resisted Indian advance to self-government”, 
and in explaining his amendment soon after the Amritsar 
Session, he wrote, ”we shall lose nothing by beginning
with co-operation. We at once place the bureaucracy in
2the wrong by our readiness to co-operate”.
Part of the aim of satyagraha was to make the 
Government responsive to public opinion. And it seems 
that Gandhi quite genuinely believed that the King’s 
Proclamation and the amnesty to the Punjab and Pan-Islamist 
internees, which accompanied the Reforms, indicated 
deference on the part of the Government to public opinion.^
1. Nava.iivan, 26 Oct 1919» in Young India. 5 Nov 1919» p.4*
2. Young India. 7 Jan 1920, Tagore, p. 1129.
3. Gandhi, Experiments, p. 592.
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Gandhi's reaction to the Proclamation and the amnesty was 
emotional: he believed that India should show her gratit­
ude.1 Here was evidence again of that admiration for the 
British which ran through Gandhi's ambivalence toward 
them.
But Gandhi's opposition to Das represented more than 
an emotional response to the British. It represented 
above all a further attempt to restrain the national 
movement and an attempt to strengthen the leadership which 
he had gained in early 1919*
In preparation for the renewal of satyagraha he 
wanted to enjoin restraint and non-violence upon the 
national movement. Writing just after the Congress Session, 
he gave "first place" to the resolution he had moved for 
the condemnation of excesses committed by Indians in April: 
"If we are to make orderly progress we must unequivocally 
disapprove of violence being committed by the people.... 
we shall find it impossible, when we have full control 
over our own national affairs, to carry on the government
pof the country without self-restraint". Tilak's and Das'
1.
2.
see Young India. 7 Jan 1920, Tagore, pp. 1128-9* 
ibid., p. 1127*
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resolution offered no programme, but might be taken as 
encouraging rejection of the Reforms. This Gandhi 
regarded as inflammatory, and his amendment marked in 
part an attempt to avoid raising the political temperature 
in this way.
Whether Gandhi recognised it or not, he was 
effectively challenging Tilak's and Das* bid for leader­
ship. Gandhi believed that Congress should give a lead 
to the country on the Reforms - to avoid doing so would 
be impossible - and this Das’ resolution failed to do.1 2
He himself had evolved no alternative programme to 
working the new Councils. By adopting a tough stance on 
the Reforms, Tilak and Das were identifying themselves 
with Indian anger and bitterness over the 11 fright fulness” 
in the Punjab, as well as encouraging similar feelings 
over the Reforms. But, as Gandhi saw, they had no
alternative programme to working the Reforms and in the
2open session he pressed them to say so. In this way 
he demonstrated that their stance was a hollow one, and 
when Tilak and Das accepted a Hcompromise”, which was 
virtually synonymous with his amendment, the panda!
1. see Young; India. 14 Jan 1920, Ganesan, pp. 826-7.
2. Congress 1919. Report, p. 123.
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erupted into cries of "Mahatma Gandhi ki jai".
Gandhi’s leadership had been strikingly demon­
strated in March and April 1919* In the period between 
calling off satyagraha and calling for co-operation in 
working the Reforms he had been confronted with the 
difficult problem of restraining the movement and improv­
ing his control of it, while maintaining its momentum. He 
had inculcated restraint through written and spoken pro­
paganda and by elaborating more detailed instructions for 
the conduct of civil disobedience and avoiding mass 
demonstrations. It was a question, however, of how long 
he could afford to eschew more demonstrative forms of 
satyagraha without losing adherents both among the elite 
and the masses.
Furthermore up to December 1919 he had only partly 
remedied his lack of organisation adequate to guarantee 
control through the recruitment of volunteers and the 
establishment of Khilafat Committees. But he had been 
turning increasingly to the Congress since calling off 
satyagraha: in June he had got the AICC to« condemn the 
mob excesses of April; in October he joined the Congress
Punjab Inquiry; and in December he dominated his rivals 
at the Amritsar Congress. In 1920 he was to capture the 
Congress, combine it with his more informal organisation 
and refurbish it as his instrument of agitation and 
control.
The partial catharsis provided by satyagraha in 
March and April, Gandhi1s suspension of it and his 
vacillation for fear of a recrudescence of violence 
deprived the national movement of momentum in mid-1919* 
But during the later part of the year, Gandhi rehabili­
tated the sources of momentum in the bitterness over the 
Khilafat, the Punjab and (among the elite) over the 
Reforms, encouraging here, restraining there. He had 
foreshadowed Non-Co-operation, but he had yet to 
elaborate his programme to harness the momentum 
effectively.
Chapter IX
NON-CO-OPERATION: ITS EVOLUTION AND ADOPTION, 1920
The 'uncertainty, which had surrounded the national 
movement and the direction it would follow since April 
1919> continued into 1920. But we shall see that Gandhi 
gradually evolved his programme of Non-Co-operation [here­
after "NCO"] over the first six months of the year and 
that, despite the opposition and misgivings of many out­
standing members of the Muslim community, he succeeded 
in having this programme adopted by the Khilafat Committee 
and the Muslim League and by large numbers of Muslims out­
side these formal organisations. Again, in spite of 
opposition from many leading Congressmen, he won the 
adoption of the NCO programme by Congress at its Special 
Session in September and, even more convincingly, at its 
annual Session at Nagpur at the end of the year. Gandhi's 
evolution of his programme and its adoption by the Muslims 
and Congress were, indeed, painstaking processes and were 
not the result of some inexorable, historical law, as 
has sometimes been suggested.^-
1. Gandhi himself may have contributed to this imp­
ression by playing down the opposition to NCO in his 
autobiography, for instance, see Experiments, pp. 611-4.
IThe Svolution of ITGO
G-andhi evolved his programme of NCO in the first 
half of 1920 in order to harness and control the feel­
ings of bitterness over the Khilafat and, to a lesser 
extent, those over the Punjab repression that have been 
examined in Chapter VIII. The feelings aroused 
by the Khilafat question, which had been rising at the 
end of 1919, became rapidly more intense during 1920.
As for the Punjab repression, during the first months 
of 1920 India watched and waited while the Hunter 
Committee prepared the Government’s Report, but 
bitterness rose rapidly and decisively over this question 
after the publication of the Report in May.
In HCO G-andhi was evolving a programme which 
would balance the impetuosity of the more aggressive 
Pan-Islamists and the hesitancy of the more timid.
One can compare what he was attempting with Mrs 
Besant's attempt to balance the Extremists and young 
men and the Moderates in the Congress "united front" 
of 1915-18: the more timid would help to restrain the 
more impetuous and the impetuous would provide 
momentum. But whereas Mrs Besant had become increas­
ingly concerned to restrain the impetuous from action 
without considering the frustrations and tensions thus 
produced, G-andhi produced a programme which would 
allow a release for such feelings, even at the risk of 
losing the adherence of some of the more timid.
G-andhi was anxious to maintain the momentum of 
the Khilafat movement during the later part of 1919^ 
and to engage the support of his fellow Hindus for it. 
By doing so he hoped to win the Muslims to satyagraha 
and to provide a basis for Hindu-Muslim harmony. As 
he was to say in May,1920,
I hope by my alliance with the Mahomedans...to 
obtain justice in the face of odds with the 
method of satyagraha and to show its efficacy 
over all other methods, [and] to secure 
Mahomedan friendship for the Hindus and 
thereby internal peace also.1 2
1. see Chapter VII.
2. Young India, 5 May 1920, p. 4; see also speech 
19 Mar 1920, quoted in Mahatma. I, 347*
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He also encouraged the Khilafat movement because 
he saw that although some Pan-Islamists - and particularly 
those of the Central Khilafat Committee of Bombay - were 
inclined to rest on their oars there were others of 
sterner stuff, the "irreconcilables” like Hazrat Mohani 
v/ho had urged (Gandhi to recommence civil disobedience in 
May 19191 if the Khilafat movement were left entirely in 
their hands, it might well be more difficult to restrain. 
While the most prominent irreconcilables - the Ali 
Brothers, Azad and Kitchlu - were interned, they could 
not be kept thus indefinitely now that the War was over, 
and the Ali Brothers had made it clear to G-andhi that, 
once released, they would take up the agitation in earnest.
This, in fact, is what they did. The Brothers were 
liberated at the end of 1919, in time to attend the last 
two days of the Amritsar Session of the Muslim League, 
and a rise in Pan-Islamist temper was immediately evident 
at this Session. Before they arrived, the more cautious 
Pan-Islamist leaders, notably Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan, 
had rejected a resolution proposed by Hazrat Mohani that
1. see A. Bari to (Gandhi, 4 Aug 1919, no. S 6788, 
(Gandhi Papers Sabarmati.
the League should imitate the Khilafat Committee in 
adopting the principle of "non-co-operation" which 
had been suggested by G-andhi; but after the Ali 
Brothers’ arrival Mohani succeeded in amending another 
resolution in the open session incorporating part of 
his earlier resolution to the effect that the army 
should be boycotted if it was to be used for "anti- 
Islamic purposes".1 2 Mohamed Ali argued that, in view 
of British treatment of the Khilafat, the only course 
left to Indian Muslims was to demand independence from 
the British Empire, and urged the Session to alter the 
League’s Constitution accordingly, but even his most 
ardent colleagues seemed taken aback and insisted he
pmust give notice of such radical alterations. In 
the first three months of 1920 Khilafat meetings were 
held throughout northern and western India which 
threatened to provoke Muslim violence. The Ali Brothers 
and Azad (who was released in January) addressed 
meetings in Sind, for instance, and the ulema from 
Lucknow in their entourage and the local mullahs, 
catching their enthusiasm, preached in favour of jihad.
1. UP Police 1920. par. 18.
2. ibid.; Bombay Police 1920. par. 242; Khaliquzzaman, 
Pathway to Pakistan, p. 51.
The Brothers were joined on these tours by their 
spiritual adviser, Abdul Bari of Lucknow, whose 
courage had been greatly raised by renewed association 
with them. In February they shifted their attention 
to Bengal, where by their defiant tone they "set an 
example to the rest of India" and where Abdul Bari 
was reported to have been so carried away that he 
spoke of soaking Christians in kerosine and burning 
them.1 2
In response to this rise in feeling over the
Khilafat in early 1920, G-andhi began to formulate a
definite programme of NCO. At a Conference of the
Khilafat leaders at Delhi in January he, Azad and
Hakim Ajmal Khan were authorised to draw up a pro- 
2gramme. G-andhi, however, was still occupied with 
the preparation of the Congress Report on the Punjab 
and when, a month later in mid-February, 175 repres­
entatives of 33 Khilafat Committees throughout India 
met at Bombay he had no more than a vague manifesto 
to offer for their adoption: if British Ministers did 
not press the Muslim viewpoint at the Peace Conference, 
it said, the Government could not "expect peace in
1. Home Poll Dep. Mar 1920, no. 89, pp. 16-26; July 
1920, no. 89, pp. 3, 12-3; July 1920, no. 90, p. 9; 
cf. ibid., Jan 1920, no. 78, p. 9.
2. Azad, India Kins Freedom, p. 9; Mahatma., I, 344.
India" or the continuance of "blind loyalty", but
beyond that it was "impossible for the conference to
foresee".- This did not satisfy the irreconcilables
and at a large conference a few days later in
Calcutta, Shaukat Ali, Azad and Kitchlu called a
nation-wide hartal on 19 March, which the Central
pKhilafat Committee meekly endorsed." Gandhi welcomed 
the adoption of this weapon which he had popularised 
but, with the violence of 1919 still in his mind's 
eye, urged that the city working-masses should be 
"left untouched".^ He now proposed that the first 
stage of HCO should involve the giving up of titles 
and of "offices of emolument" under the Government. 
"Those who belong to the menial services under the 
Government should do likewise". But "advice to the 
soldiers to refuse to serve is premature".^ The 
Khilafat, he said, "overshadows the Reforms and 
everything else". The hartal, as the Government 
admitted, was a great success, with Hindus and 
Muslims ceasing business throughout India.:
1. Home Poll Pep. July 1920, no. 89, pp. 11-12.
2. ibid., Mar 1920, no. 89, p. 16; April 1920, 
no. 103, p. 13; July 1920, no. 90, pp.~5-6.
3. Youn^ - India. 10 Mar 1920, p. 4.
4. ibid.
"everywhere the agitators have addressed enormous 
meetings of thousands of men...".1 2 At an informal 
Khilafat Conference in Delhi following the hartal, 
attended by Hindu Congress leaders like Tilak as well 
as by Muslims, Gandhi proposed that NCO should be 
offered in four stages: first the giving up of titles 
and honorary posts, next the gradual withdrawal from 
service of Government employees, thirdly the with­
drawal from service of the police and military and 
last, and most remote, the suspension of the payment 
of taxes. This programme was accepted by the 
Conference and promulgated by Gandhi and others in
pmeetings in northern India.
Gandhi was not yet satisfied with his programme 
since it would primarily affect Government servants 
and he wished to involve other groups which were 
active in the nationalist organisations, particularly 
professional people such as lawyers. Government 
servants were reported to resent his programme since 
it allowed pleaders "to carry on work in the courts and 
rich contractors and others making money from the
1. Home Poll Dep April 1920, no. 103, pp. 13-4.
2. ibid., p. 11; Azad, India Wins Freedom, p. 10; 
Khaparde 'Diary"(Poona), 22 Mar 1920.
Government were not even referred to"/ At the same
time it was clear that his programme must satisfy the
more aggressive among the Pan-Islamists. Evidence of
their rising temper was given in April, first by a
Conference of ulema, of the UP at Kanpur, which drew
audiences of 7000 at its open sessions and resolved to
prevent recruitment for the army and to liberate
Khilafat workers who might be arrested, and secondly
by a so-called Khilafat Workers’ Conference at Delhi
which established an office to encourage Muslims to
2perform hijrat to Afghanistan. Through the ulema the 
notion of hi j rat spread, and thousands of muha.irin 
flooded into the North West Frontier Province on their 
way to Afghanistan.^ G-andhi was formally elected to 
the Central Khilafat Committee in May,^  and at a 
series of important meetings of the Committee at Allah­
abad on June 1st and 2nd he elaborated the first stage 
of NCO in greater detail. In addition to the giving 
up of titles, this should now include the boycott of
1. Home Poll Dep. April 1920, no. 103, p. 11.
2. ibid., pp. 14-16; Home Poll Dep. July 1920, no. 94, 
p. 25.
3. e.g., ibid., July 1920, no. 106, p. 26.
4. Home Poll Dep. June 1920, no. 112; the rest of 
this paragraph is based on Home Poll B, July 1920, no. 
109, ’Accompaniment C’, pp. 8-9; Dep. July 1920, no. 13, 
pp. 5-6.
Government schools and colleges and the boycott of 
Government Law Courts. At the instance of Hazrat 
Mohani and others, the buying of Swadeshi, to the 
exclusion of foreign, goods was also included. Gandhi 
proposed that a committee should be set up with him­
self as a "sort of dictator" to execute the programme, 
and such a Committee was duly formed consisting of 
Gandhi, Shaukat and Mohamed Ali, Azad, Kitchlu and 
Mohani, with power to co-opt.
Gandhi’s programme was rounded out early in 
July with the addition of the boycott of the Legis­
lative Councils. The inspiration for this provision 
came from the bitterness over the Punjab. In early 
1920 in company with other Indian papers, Gandhi’s 
Young; India continued to publicise the activities of 
the Punjab Government illustrating its racial arrog­
ance.^ In April 1920 the Government of India most 
unwisely added fresh fuel to these embers by refusing 
to exercise clemency in the case of two Punjabis 
convicted of murder during the 1919 riots; Gandhi 
wrote: "More than full reparation has been taken for
1. see e.g., Lady 0’Dwyer's letter to Mrs Putt 
Choudhrani, April 1919, in Young; India, 11 Feb 1920.p. 11.
the murders and arson".1 2 On May 26 the Hunter 
Report on the Disorders was published together with 
despatches from the Viceroy and the Secretary of
2State, which Gandhi characterised as "whitewash".
The AICG met at Banaras on May 30 and 31? roundly 
condemned the Report and the Government, and demanded 
the recall of the Viceroy.'3 45 Lala Lajpat Rai, the 
Punjabi politician, fearing that his imprisonment of 
1908 for advocating the non-payment of taxes might be 
repeated under the wartime Defence of India Act, had 
gone into voluntary exile in the United States during 
World War I. He returned to India in March 1920 and 
was staggered by what he saw and heard of Government 
repression in his native province. In June he wrote 
an article suggesting that Indians boycott the 
reformed Legislative Councils.^ Gandhi took up 
Lajpat Rai*s suggestion: "Needless to say...I am in 
entire accord with Lala Lajpat Rai", he wrote. ^
Gandhi had already expressed his doubts about the
1. Young India. 7 April 1920, p. 2.
2. Young India, 9 June 1920, Tagore, p. 79; of. Bombay 
Chronicle, 29 May, Kesari, 1 June, etc. in Bombay NP, 
w/e 29 May 1920, pp. 4-8, w/e 12 June 1920, p. 9.
3. Home Poll Dep. July 1920, no. 96, p. 9.
4. in his Urdu paper Bande Mataram, quoted [in 
English] in Young India. Ganesan, p. 341.
5. Young India, 7 July 1920, p. 8; in Tagore, pp. 
400-2; Ganesan, pp. 341-2.
usefulness of the Councils. While, even as late at 
May 1920, he had been prepared to admit that ”the 
most expeditious manner of reforming the Reforms Act 
would be to send to the Councils only those who wish 
to serve the nation”, he felt that ”many can serve the 
country better by remaining outside.... They will find 
that they will be better occupied by educating the 
electorate and keeping the elected members to their 
promises at the polls”.^ He now seemed glad to be able 
to wash his hands of the imperfect Councils: to him 
there was something intrinsically unhealthy about 
parliaments. ~ In terms of his immediate strategy, the 
boycott of the Councils was a more clear-cut issue 
than the other items on his programme, and if he could 
get the Hindus to agree to this plank it would indeed 
involve a commitment on their part to join the Muslims 
in NCO. His colleagues on the Khilafat NCO Committee 
eagerly adopted his suggestion to incorporate this in 
the enlarged programme for the first stage of NCO, 
which was published on July 7. In toto, this now read:
1 .
2.
ibid., 19 May 1920; in Tagore, pp. 395-7. 
ibid., p. 396; cf. Hind Swara.i. p. 22.
1. Non-participation in Government loans.
2. Surrender of all titles and honorary 
offices. 3. Suspension by lawyers of prac­
tice and settlement of civil disputes by 
private arbitration. 4. Boycott of Govern­
ment schools. 5* Boycott of reformed Councils.
6. Non-participation in Government parties.
7. Refusal to accept any civil or military ^
post in Mesopotamia. 8. Swadeshi must be pushed.
And this, with minor alterations, was the programme which
Gandhi moved for acceptance by the National Congress at
2its Special Session in Calcutta in September 1920.
II
Gandhi Wins The Muslims.
Although Gandhi had evolved NCO largely in relation 
to a Muslim grievance, this programme aroused considerable 
misgivings and opposition among Muslims. Among Muslim 
opponents of NCO four strands may be distinguished: first 
were those who felt it to be inadequately aggressive; 
secondly were those who, while accepting NCO in principle, 
opposed one or more of its detailed provisions; thirdly
1. Youn,p; India, 30 June 1920, p. 5; 7 July 1920, 
Tagore, pp. 390-2, 400-2; Home Poll A, Nov 1920, nos 
19-31» p. 50, ’Accompaniment A'.
2. see Appendix A.
were those orthodox Muslims who supported the Khilafat 
agitation but dreaded 1T00, in Gandhi' s words, "as being 
too strong for India in her present stage",1 2 or who 
objected to a non-Muslim leading the Muslims; and lastly 
the Muslim "nationalists" who opposed the whole appeal 
to Muslim religious sentiment.
The first group comprised the more reckless young 
Muslims and ulema who were calling for hi.1 rat or for 
violence, in the form of jihad or an Afghan invasion.
pGandhi did not at first oppose hijrat, but with the 
closing of the frontier by the Amir, this alternative 
to NCO was removed. The only methods which Gandhi 
insisted the Pan-Islamists give up were those involving 
violence, and India's disarmed condition and the 
failure of the 1919 Afghan invasion made all but the 
most purblind Pan-Islamists recognise that violence 
was impracticable. "...my argument today against 
violence", wrote Gandhi in March 1920, "is based upon 
pure expedience, i.e. its utter futility".J Prom time
1. Yourr; India, 23 June 1920, Tagore, p. 252.
2. Home Poll Dep. July 1920, no. 104. p. 26.
3« Young India, 10 Mar 1920, p. 4; im Tagore, p. 137
to time, nevertheless, Shaukat Ali stressed that 
jihad had not been permanently foresworn and suggested 
that for Muslims even the shedding of blood might be 
regarded as satyagraha.1 Recognising that such state­
ments enabled Shaukat Ali to save face by demonstrating 
that he was as aggressive as any Muslim, Gandhi turned 
a deaf ear, but continued to warn of the danger of 
impatience and to insist on non-violence while he was 
associated with the movement. The most impetuous Pan- 
Islamists were reconciled to NCO by the adherence to 
it of their most aggressive leaders, and like them 
recognised in it an additional weapon to jihad and 
hi;irat. They were attracted too by Gandhi's promise 
of support by the "23 crores" of Hindus. Gandhi had to 
confess at the Allahabad Khilafat meeting in June that 
the AICC had refused to commit Congress (and by 
implication the Hindus) to NCO; and to assuage the 
storm of recrimination that this aroused he promised
pto launch NCO forthwith, and clinched their support 
by incorporating Hazrat Mohani's demand for the boy­
cott of foreign goods in the first stage of NCO.
1 .
2.
B 1 .
Home Poll A, Sept 1920, nos 100-3, pp. 49-50. 
Home Poll B, July 1920, no. 109, 'Accompaniment
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As to the second group, some like Hakim Ajmal 
Khan and Dr Ansari of Delhi, who supported NCO were 
nevertheless frankly pessimistic about its likely 
success: they were unhopeful of any large response 
from title-holders, G-overnment employees, the police 
and the army.^ They were carried along, however, by 
Gandhi’s determination. Others who were party to 
the adoption of N00 at the June Khilafat meeting were 
doubtful of certain parts of the programme. Represen­
tative of these was Fazlul Huq, President of the pro- 
Congress Bengal Muslim League. He denounced the boy­
cott of schools as harmful to young people, and to
Muslim youth in particular, and vehemently opposed the
2Council-boycott. We have seen that Huq's rival,
Nawab Ali Choudhuri, had helped to form the Bengal 
Muslim Association, which opposed the Congress-League 
Pact. After some hesitation, this Association decided 
not to boycott the Council:^ Huq thus found that by 
adhering to Council-boycott he was denying himself 
political opportunities which his rivals were only too
1. Ansari to Gandhi [1 April 1920], no. S 7143,
Gandhi Papers Sabarmati.
2. Home Poll Dep. July 1920, no. 105, p. 5.
3. Home Poll Dep. Dec 1920, no. 59, 'Bengal', par. 3; 
ibid., no. 66, 'Bengal', par. 3*
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willing to exploit.
These Muslims might have combined with the more 
timid who were fearful of the whole NGO programme to 
form a majority at the June meetings in Allahabad, 
but they lacked such co-ordination and were inhibited 
by the intensity of the popular Muslim clamour over 
the Khilafat: it was thus relatively easy for Shaukat 
Ali to browbeat them into acquiescence to the whole 
NGO programme by taunting them with being nbad Muslims".1
Timidity characterised most of the members of 
the Central Khilafat Committee of Bombay. With the 
rise in violent speaking after the release of the Ali 
Brothers and Azad a number of them resigned from the 
Committee. One letter of resignation explained the 
sorts of reasons that prompted them to do so. First, 
they quailed at the hardship that the NCO programme 
would entail as the result of refusing to pay taxes 
(for instance). Secondly, they feared and objected to 
acting unconstitutionally (by tampering with the 
loyalty of the troops, for example). Thirdly, they 
feared that the boycott of schools and Government em­
ployment would harm the already backward Muslim
1. Home Boll B, July 1920, no. 109? ’Accompaniment 
C, p. 10; Home Poll Dep. July 1920, no. 96, p. 9.
community, that the Hindus would not support the Mus­
lims wholeheartedly in NCO and that the Muslims would 
merely be put at a disadvantage by adopting it.1 23 He 
might have added, as did others, that he feared that
NCO, far from assuaging Muslim tempers, would rouse
2Muslims - particularly the masses - to violence.
Others who were timid, like Chotani, the President of 
the Central Committee, stayed on in the hope of pre­
vailing upon G-andhi to tone down his programme, by 
the deletion for example of the later stages relating 
to soldiers and the non-payment of taxes.J Because 
of their substantial contributions to the Khilafat 
Committee's funds, they succeeded in restraining the 
movement at least until the Allahabad meetings in June, 
and Gandhi further reassured them by emphasising the 
first stage of the programme and allowing the later 
stages to recede into an indefinite future. The major 
factor in reconciling the more timid to NCO, however, 
was undoubtedly Gandhi's emphasis on non-violence, 
which was the best assurance that their more impetuous
1. Badruddin Abdulla Koor to Chotani, 12 May 1920 in 
Home Poll Dep. June 1920, no. 112, 'Accompaniment A'.
2. see Bhurgri, telegram, to Ameer Ali, 22 March 1920, 
in Home Poll Dep. Mar 1920, no. 89, p. 32.
3. Home Poll Dep. July 1920, no. 94, p. 5-
brethren would be restrained.
The more orthodox Muslims, who reacted instinct­
ively against the leadership of a Muslim movement by 
a non-Muslim, either held aloof from the Khilafat 
movement or acquiesced in it during 1920-1 because of 
their Pan-Islamist sympathies. But with the decline 
in the Khilafat movement from 1922 onward, their 
criticisms were heard more clearly.^
The Muslim "nationalists", like Jinnah and the 
Raja of Mahmudabad, opposed the whole appeal to the
pMuslim community through religious sentiment. They 
saw the rousing of religious passions and the involve­
ment in the national movement of the fanatical ulema. 
and o'f the masses as reversing the progress toward 
secularism by the Muslim community and thus toward 
democracy by India as a whole. These emotions, they 
believed, might well recoil on the heads of G-andhi 
and the others who used them. The tide of feeling was 
running too strongly for the handful of "nationalists" 
to oppose it on the public platform, and they held 
aloof from the Khilafat Committees. Their viewpoint 
was not brought forward until the Special Sessions of
1. see Aligarh Institute Gazette. 6 Jan 1922, p. 3, 
16 Jan 1922, p. 2, in Lai Bahadur, The Muslim League, 
p. 141.
see, e.g., Asaf Ali to G-andhi, 19 Jan 1920, no.
S 706?, G-andhi Papers Sabarmati.
the Muslim League and Congress in September, and it is 
to these bodies that we now turn.
Ill
Gandhi Wins Congress.
Despite Gandhi’s promise to the Muslims that he 
would provide them with the support of the Hindus, he 
failed to persuade the AICC meeting held at Banaras on 
May 30 and 31, just before the Khilafat meetings at 
Allahabad, to commit Congress to support for MCO. The 
most that his opponents in the AICC would do - very 
unwisely for them, as it turned out - was to call a 
Special Congress in September to consider HCO.^ Gandhi’s 
opponents at this meeting included the erstwhile leaders 
and older Congressmen: Tilak, Malaviya, Das, Motilal 
Hehru (not to mention Mrs Besant) and their associates 
and followers. Their opposition was compounded of a 
number of elements.
Birst was jealousy. It was not unnatural that 
Tilak and his lieutenants, like Khaparde and Kelkar, 
and Das and his Bengali followers should envy Gandhi’s
1. Home Poll Dep. July 1920, no. 13, pp. 5, 15; B, July 
1920, no. 109» 'Accompaniment B'; AICC Minutes. 20 Dec 
1919, 30 and 31 May 1920.
rise to popularity and power.""
Secondly, Tilak and his lieutenants considered
G-andhi to be inconsistent and to lack determination
in putting his programmes into effect. They cited his
suspension of the Rowlatt satyagraha and the changes
in the NCO programme during its evolution. Khaparde
had written that Gandhi "would say something today
2and another thing tomorrow".
Thirdly, as regards the NCO programme itself, the 
Congress leaders regarded it as impracticable. Mala- 
viya never favoured the implementation of passive 
resistance or satyagraha. Tilak, as we have seen, had 
grown more cautious during his imprisonment and had 
concluded that India was incapable of the sacrifices 
and the organisation necessary for passive resistance 
or non-co-operation. A fortnight before his death in 
August 1920, Tilak told Gandhi that NCO "was an 
excellent method if the people could be persuaded to 
take to it. But he said he had his doubts".-' In 
addition, the Congress leaders were dubious of the
1. cf. re Das, Chakravarti, J. H. Broomfield, op. cit. 
p. 221; Shraddhananda, Inside Congress« p. 113.
2. Home Poll Dep. April 1919, no. 49«
3. M. K. Gandhi, Gokhale, My Political Guru, p. 53*
Muslims’ capacity for NCO. The Ma.hratta noted "a 
sharp division of Muhammadan opinion on G-andhi ’ s plan" 
and an "absence of any striking response from the 
Moslem public", which made it "difficult for Hindus 
to follow the Moslem lead consistently".^
Fourthly, the Hindus were averse to diverting 
the resources of the national movement to the support 
of a specifically Muslim issue founded on Muslim rel­
igious sentiment. One of Tilak's acquaintances has 
recorded that
To those Hindu nationalists who said that they 
did not believe a word of this Khilafat but 
still had agreed to agitate for it only to 
secure the friendship and active co-operation 
of the Muslims in our national fight for free­
dom, Tilak had only one reply that if the 
Hindus think that they will succeed in 
deceiving the Muslims, they will soon be dis­
illusioned and will find that they will succeed 
in deceiving themselves only....Let us not 
therefore confound issues. Let us seek Muslim 
co-operation on the broad national question of 
Swaraj.1 2 3
The Pan-Islamists' protestations of their loyalty to 
the Khalif implied that it took precedence over their 
loyalty to India and raised the spectre of Pan-Islamic 
anti-Hinduism, against which B. G. Pal had warned.^
1. Mahratta, 30 May 1920, in Bombay HP, w/e 29 Mav
1920, p. 14.*
2. in S. V. Bapat, Reminiscences of Tilak. IT, p. 127 
quoted by M. R. Jayakar"," I, 388, (Jayakar says "III").
3. Pal, Nationality and Empire, passim; cf. Jayakar, I
At a series of joint Hindu-Muslim meetings held in 
Allahabad in early June concurrently with the Khilafat 
Conference, Malaviya, Lajpat Rai and other Hindus were 
very disturbed by the suggestions of Shaukat Ali and 
Hazra.t Ivlohani that Indian Muslims would welcome and 
assist "any Moslem foreign power" which might invade 
India to "drive away the enemies of Islam".^
Fifthly, those like Tilak, whose whole policy 
had been geared to extracting the maximum of reforms 
from the British, were averse to diverting the energies 
of the national movement from winning Swaraj to any 
subsidiary purpose, which they considered the Khilafat 
and the Punjab to be. Here, as we have seen, they 
differed fundamentally from G-andhi, who was more con­
cerned to make Indians self-reliant and self-respecting 
than to move the British to grant political 
concessions.
Sixthly, as with the Muslims, there were consider­
able misgivings among Hindus over specific planks in 
G-andhi1 s programme, such as the boycott of courts and 
the withdrawal of children from G-overnment schools and 
colleges. Lajpat Rai expressed the opinion of many 
Congressmen when, as President of the Special Congress
1. Home Poll B, July 1920, no. 109» 'Accompaniment 
E*; see Young India, 23 June 1920, Tagore, p. 255.
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in September, he said that the boycott of schools would 
be harmful to the youth of the country and that no 
nation could solve the problem of education by private 
means.^
The leading Congressmen also opposed the boycott 
of the Legislative Councils. Gandhi had not included 
this proposal in his programme at the time of the 
Banaras AICC meeting which decided to hold the Special
Congress, but at the Congress itself this proved the
2main bone of contention. Having striven for the 
devolution of the maximum amount of power to these 
Councils through the Home Rule agitation and their 
Deputations to England, and having gained as much as 
they could by these methods, Tilak, Das and the others 
were keen to make use of these gains. Tilak had 
organised his Congress Democratic Party in April 1920 
to fight the elections;^ Kasturi Ranga Iyengar and 
his colleagues in the south, and Das, Chakravarti and 
their followers in Bengal had begun their election 
campaign: now Gandhi wanted them to give up all this.
1. Jayakar, I, 399; for others who opposed the boycott 
of schools, see G. Patel, Vithalbhai Patel, I, 449ff.
2. see N. C. Kelkar, A. Passing Phase of Politics, p. 13.
3. see Manifesto, Mahratta, 18 April 1920, p. 185.
They felt that to surrender the Councils was too 
passive a strategy; that more pressure could be put 
upon the Government by working for a large majority 
of elected members in the Councils who could then ob­
struct Government business or use the Council as a 
sounding board for denunciation of the Government.^
At the same time the leading men of the Congress were 
looking over their shoulders at their rivals for 
election: if they withdrew their candidatures, to 
whom would they be conceding places in the new Councils? 
Undoubtedly the Moderates and Mrs Besant's followers 
would stand for election, and while they were perhaps 
not greatly feared, the ’Besantines" were bitterly 
resented as apostates and the Moderates as the 
Extremists’ traditional rivals. More ominous were
pthe non-Brahmin rivals of Congress. In Maharashtra 
and Madras they were growing in strength^ and threat­
ening to undermine Congress’ popular, low-caste 
support, both actual and potential. Congress was 
still dominated in these areas by Tilak, Kasturi Ranga
1. Kesari, in Home Poll Dep. Aug 1920, no. Ill, p. 4; 
Mahratta, 4 July 1920, Bombay HP. w/e 3 July 1920,"
pp. 22-3*
2. see Chapter IV.
3. see, e.g., Mahratta, 16 Mar 1920, pp. 138-9, 173-5.
Iyengar and Satyamurti and their Brahmin caste- 
fellows. In Bengal the lower caste Namasudras had 
begun to organise," and they might be drawn into 
alliance with the anti-Congress/League Muslim Association 
of Nawab Ali Ghoudhuri. For Congressmen in these 
areas to withdraw their candidatures was to leave the 
way open to these rivals and to allow them free access 
to the prestige and patronage attaching to membership
pof the Councils and to Ministership under the Reforms."'
Finally, many of Gandhi’s opponents were fearful 
of Gandhi's involvement of the masses in the movement. 
Through his satyagraha campaigns like those of Cham- 
paran and Kaira and the non-payment of taxes which 
formed the fourth stage of HCO and by urging the 
nationalist elite to turn away from the Councils,
Gandhi was trying to embroil the masses in nationalist 
politics and to deflect the nationalist elite from 
obsession with the gaining of power from the British 
to work amongst and on behalf of the masses. He 
promoted the revival of the charkha as a symbol of 
identification of the nationalist elite with the
1. see J. H. Broomfield, op. cit., pp. 239-40;
N. K. Bose, ’’Some Aspects of Caste in Bengal" in Man 
in India, XXXVIII, June 1958, 88.
2. re Madras, see Searchlight, 29 Sept 1920, p. 6a.
masses, and was to symbolise his own identification with 
them by assuming the loincloth in September 1921. In 
much of India the groups which comprised the nationalist 
elite were predisposed by all the weight of tradition 
to regard with extreme distaste any suggestion that they 
identify themselves with the mass of the population, 
and this cleavage had been intensified by Western educ­
ation and the status of the professions to which it opened 
the way. The degree of cleavage varied from group to 
group and region to region. A high degree of social 
consensus has been claimed, for example, for Maharashtra,^  
and Tilak had earlier achieved considerable popularity 
among urban workers and among peasants in some areas.2 
In the Punjab the Arya Samaj provided a strong link between 
the Hindu elite, largely composed of urban businessmen, and 
the Hindu agricultural masses and gave the Hindu elite con­
fidence in approaching the masses. In Madras and Bengal, on 
the other hand, the cleavage between the nationalist elite 
and the masses was deep. In Madras religious belief and 
social practice separated the Brahmins from both caste 
non-Brahmins and from the outcastes, though social
1. R. Kumar, op. cit., pp. 9-17, 510-36.
2. see HPI.i Bombay. II, 207, 256-77.
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practice also sharply divided the two latter groups.^
In Bengal the Hindu bhadralok were separated from the
Muslim majority of the peasantry by religion and from
the whole mass of peasantry by their caste traditions
2which forbade them to lay hand to the plough.
Hot only were the elite averse to identifying 
themselves with the lower orders of Indian society, but 
their economic interest and their fear that those 
orders once aroused would become uncontrollable com­
bined to make them oppose embroiling mass groups in 
nationalist politics. This was particularly the case 
in Bengal and Madras, where many of the bhadralok and 
Brahmins owned landed property, and feared to rouse 
the tenantry to a sense of its rights.^ In the UP, 
the nationalist elite, while having no cultural bonds 
with the masses, nevertheless lacked personal owner­
ship of land and felt at liberty to ally itself at 
will with the landowning aristocracy or the slowly 
awakening tenantry.
But, while the members of the nationalist elite
1. see JSO on 0- of I Bill, QQ. 3147-9, p. 188.
2. for a full discussion, see J. H. Broomfield, op. 
cit., pp. 220-34; cf. K. Hair, Blossoms in the Bust, 
pp. 146-50.
3. see Chakravarti's election manifesto, Amrita 
Bazar Patrika, 4 May 1920, p. 6; retort, ibid., 14 May,
1920, p. 6.
particularly in Bengal and Madras, were unwilling to 
arouse the peasantry, they were starting to rouse and 
organise urban mass groups, Government employees and 
workers in British enterprises. Not only were these 
groups relatively compact and therefore more amenable 
to control than the dispersed peasant masses, but they 
could be turned directly against the British and used 
as a political weapon. In Madras and Bombay city, 3. P. 
Wadia, Satyamurti, Chidambaram Pillai and others est­
ablished trade unions among millworkers, railway and 
post-office employees, and in Bengal, Pal and Das’ 
lieutenants, I. B. Sen and B. K. Lahiri, did likewise 
among workers in Calcutta and Jamshedpur and in the 
British tea-gardens of Assam.1 Gandhi, however as 
we have seen, was aiming at a far more all-embracing 
commitment to rouse the masses and engage them in the 
national movement.
Gandhi succeeded in overcoming his Congress oppon­
ents by outmanoeuvring and outflanking them, in other 
words by superior tactics: in addition his organisation
1 .  Home Poll Dep. Mar 1 9 2 0 ,  no. 8 9 ,  p. 25;  for the 
influence of European models, see JSC on G of I Bill, 
Evidence, Q. 1 4 1 1 ,  p. 79;  P. K. Telang to K. Dwarkadas, 
28 Aug 1 9 1 9 ,  17 Sept 1 9 1 9 ,  etc., K. Dwarkadas Papers.
was superior to theirs: and, more fundamentally, his 
NCO programme promised to give expression to the dis­
contents which he and other leaders had helped to 
rouse, while his opponents had failed to evolve any 
distinctive or equally-promising programme.
G-andhi ’ s opponents were weakened by disunity.
On the one hand were the Moderates, the followers of 
Mrs Besant and Jinnah, who wanted to use the Reforms 
as far as possible in a spirit of trust with the 
G-overnment. Most of the Moderates were outside the 
Congress (with the notable exception of Malaviya) 
and therefore unable to influence its decisions, but 
Mrs Besant and her followers and Jinnah retained 
positions on the policy-making Committees of Congress, 
the AICC and the Subjects Committee. On the other 
hand were the leading Extremists and spokesmen for 
the young men, Tilak and Das, who also proposed to 
enter the Councils with the somewhat hazy aim of 
using them to wring further concessions from the 
G-overnment.
Even before G-andhi incorporated Council boycott
in his ECO programme the rank-and-file and many of
the younger men of Congress felt that the Tilak-Das
programme of Council-entry was inadequately aggressive
for the mood of the time. Tilak and Das (together with 
Mrs Besant) were partly to blame for this feeling.
* 4H7
Their strategy in 1917-19 had been to arouse discon­
tent with the British among the rank-and-file in Con­
gress: filak had argued that the Reforms should be 
rejected if they were unsatisfactory, but he had 
failed to explain to the rank-and-file that this was 
meant to frighten the British into amplifying the 
Reforms rather than to be taken literally by Congress. 
His advocacy of "responsive co-operation" at the 
time of the Amritsar Congress had therefore been seen 
by them a.s apostasy rather than as policy,1 and Das 
had urged that in order to retain his popularity Tilak 
drop all mention of co-operation and simply reiterate 
his condemnation of the Reforms. But as G-andhi forced 
Das and Tilak to admit at Amritsar they both intended 
to enter the Councils.
The first test between RCO and its opponents came 
at the AICC meeting in Banaras on May 30-31. Even 
though G-andhi had not included boycott of the Councils 
in NCO at this time, it was clear that if NCO were 
launched it would turn all attention from the Councils 
to work among the masses, and G-andhi had said that the 
main work, from his point of view, lay outside the
1 . see Deshpande, Aut obio graphy, p. 304.
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Councils.'1 23 Das and Tilak, like Kasturi Ranga Iyengar 
and Satyamurti in Madras, hesitated to oppose G-andhi 
point-blank because of his popularity among the rank- 
and-file. They found it difficult to maintain a 
posture of defiance toward the British while opposing 
NCO, and they shrank from giving up this posture since 
to do so was to take on the colour of the Moderates.
Thus at the AICC meeting they dared not declare them­
selves against NCO and deferred taking a decision until a 
Special Session of Congress in early September.
Gandhi's lieutenant, Raja.ji, wrote that
This was a deliberate plan sent up by Mr 
S. Srinivasayyangar^ through his friends 
Satyamurti and A. R[angaswami] Iyengar.
Mr. Satyamurti could not declare himself 
in favour of or against Non-Co-operation; 
so this plan....[These men speak] Moderate 
politics garbled in Nationalist phrase­
ology. 3
By calling the Special Session, they were avoiding a 
head-on clash with G-andhi and playing for time.
Bitterness over the Punjab repression was at its 
height following the publication of the Hunter Report 
at the time of the AICC meeting, and this would have
1. Young India. 19 May 1920, quoted on p.4-68 above.
2. a Madras lawyer seeking the leadership of Congress 
in Madras at this time.
3. Rajaji to Vijiaraghavachariar, 16 and 17 June, 1920, 
Vij. Papers.
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made outright rejection of NCO even more difficult.
But the leaders hoped that this feeling v/ould have
subsided by the time of the Special Session.
Peelings over the Punjab, however, continued to
rise, and were exploited by Gandhi to assist him in
carrying his policy in the Congress. Prom the time
of the AICC meeting he and Shaukat Ali linked the
Government's failure to punish those responsible for
the Martial Lav; excesses with the Khilafat in
justification of NCO."^  This was a counter to those
Hindus who objected to diverting the energies of the
national movement into NCO on behalf of a purely
Muslim issue. Once again the British played into
Gandhi's hands, for in July the House of Lords
2exonerated and lauded General Dyer. The opponents 
of NCO were themselves infuriated at this gratuitous 
insult to Indian feeling, and through their newspaper 
articles and speeches contributed to the rise in Indian 
temper.^ The Government of India, too, failed to take 
steps which could have reduced tension over the Punjab.
1. NCO PLesolution, Special Congress, see Appendix A; 
Home Poll Dep. July 1920, no. 97, p. 15.
2. House of Lords Debates,19 & 20 July 1920, vol. XLI 
cols 222-307, 311-78.
3. see e.g., Amrita Bazar Patrika, 23 July 1920,
P* 6; Bombay Chronicle, 22 and Kesari, 27 July 1920, in 
Bombay NP, w/e 24 July 1920, pp. 10, 14.
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Por example, as Gandhi was to point out, the few 
Europeans who suffered in the Punjab outbreaks con­
tinued to receive incomparably larger compensation 
than their Indian counterparts.^
In these circumstances many of the young Congress­
men welcomed Gandhi’s Council-boycott proposal. To 
the ’’angry young men" like Jawaharlal Nehru, Gandhi’s 
programme seemed a much more natural continuation of 
filak's earlier calls for passive resistance and for 
the '’rejection" of unsatisfactory Reforms, and of the 
Bengal Extremists' boycott of the Bengal Legislative 
Council, than did Tilak's new programme of "responsive 
co-operation". Some of Tilak's closest lieutenants 
shared this view: Gangadharrao Leshpande of Belgaum 
and S. M. Paranjpe of Poona, for example, had already 
worked for Gandhi in the Rowlatt Act satyagraha and 
though they remained loyal to Tilak and the majority 
of Tilak's lieutenants up to the time of the Special
pCongress, they joined Gandhi wholeheartedly in 1921.
1. Young India, 22 Sept 1920, Tagore, p. 1092; for 
promotion of Bosworth Smith, in charge at Sheikhupura 
in April 1919, see ibid., 23 June 1920, Tagore, pp. 
116-20; cf. Hunter Report, pp. 160, 210-2.
2. see Deshpande, Aut obio graphy, pp. 328-31, 337-8, 
342-6.
A number of younger, more impetuous bhadralok nation­
alists in Bengal also threw in their lot with G-andhi. 
Their decision to do so may have been encouraged by 
a belief that the future of Indian nationalism lay 
with Gandhi and NCO, but they could have by no means 
been sure of this in mid-1920, and their decision took 
courage for it involved a deliberate turning away from 
the interest of their group to a more national outlook 
and a commitment to work among the masses. One of the 
more outstanding of them was Jitendralal Bannerjee.
Aged 37 in 1920, he was a lawyer and owned land near 
his family town of Rampur Hat. Until July 1920 he had 
been electioneering for B. Chakra.varti but threw this 
up on G-andhi1 s call for Council-boycott.^
Needless to say G-andhi ’ s young lieutenants, who 
had committed themselves to follow him during his 
earlier satyagraha campaigns, threw themselves behind 
the campaign to boycott the Councils. In view of the 
forthcoming Special Congress Session, the PCCs met and 
held Provincial Conferences in August 1920 to decide 
the provinces’ attitudes to NCO. At each of these
1. Amrita Bazar Patriks, 7 July 1920, p. 6; Home Poll 
Dep. Oct 1919» no. 19; interview of writer with Prof. 
S. Mukherjee, 27 Aug 1963.
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meetings G-andhi' s local lieutenants strove success­
fully to have resolutions passed supporting NCO:
Rajaji, for example, mustered the Pan-Islamists at 
the Madras Provincial Conference to counter the Hindus 
opposed to NCO; Vallabhbhai Patel and Gandhi’s large 
following in Gujarat carried NCO at the Gujarat Con­
ference; and in Bihar Rajendra Prasad, as President 
of the Provincial Conference, argued successfully for 
NCO.^ Rather than make a determined stand against NCO 
at these provincial meetings, most of Gandhi's oppon­
ents in the Congress accepted resolutions which approved 
NCO "in principle" while deferring the decision as to
pits precise details until the Special Session. That 
they did so highlighted their weakness, as compared 
with Gandhi, in regard to programme, organisation and 
tactics.
Gandhi’s opponents recognised that his proposal 
for the rejection of the Councils provided a straight­
forward and, prima facie, therefore a more satisfactory 
expression for Indian feelings - which, indeed, they
1. Home Poll Pep. July 1920, no. 97, 'Madras’;
Sept 1920, no. 70, p. 14; Parikh, Vallabhbhai Patel, I, 
110-5; Gandhi, Experiments, p. 609; cf. Searchlight,
4 Aug 1920, p. 3c; 29 Aug 1920, p. 8a-b.
2. see ibid.; Searchlight, 13 Aug 1920, p. 3b; 25 
Aug 1920, p. 9a; 3 Sept 1920, p. 4c; Home Poll Pep. Aug 
1920, no. 112, pp. 1-2, 4, 6, 16.
shared - than did their rather more devious policy of 
obstruction from within the Councils. Not only did 
they recognise that Gandhi's programme appealed to the 
rank-and-file, but they themselves felt drawn to it 
by that part of them which hankered after some means 
of striking at the British. They saw too that their 
policy was dangerously close to the Moderates' strategy 
of 1918-19 of accepting the Reforms while criticising 
them, which they had branded as co-operation with the 
British and traitorous to the national cause, and were 
therefore reticent about putting it forward. They 
failed even to present the case for Council-entry in 
their newspapers; the Bengal Extremist paper, Amrita 
Bazar Patrika, refused to "say or do anything in re­
gard to the NCO movement till the September Session 
of the Congress... comes to a final decision", while 
Tilak's Kesari and Mahratta tried uneasily to get the 
best of both worlds by urging the Special Congress to 
"accept non-co-operation" but to "draw up a programme 
of obstruction in and outside the Councils".1
1. Amrita Bazar Patrika. 31 July 1920, p. 6; Mahratta. 
29 Aug 1920, in 3ombav NB, w/e 28 Aug 1920, p. 13; cf. 
ibid., 11 July, 25 July, 15 Aug 1920, and Kesari, 20 
July, 17 Aug 1920, in Bombay BP, w/e 10 July 1920, p. 6, 
24 July 1920, p. 5, 14 Aug 1920, p. 17, 24 July 1920, 
p. 2, 21 Aug 1920, p. 4 respectively.
In regard to organisation the Congress opponents 
of NCO consisted of disparate groups in each province, 
with little co-ordination between them. Even within 
the provinces a strong sense of party existed among 
the opponents of NCO only in Maharashtra, round the 
figure of Tilak, and in Bengal, round Das; in Madras 
they formed a constellation in which Kasturi Ranga 
Iyengar and Srinivas Iyengar were merely the most 
luminous, and in the UP, Motilal Nehru and Gokaran Nath 
Misra stood out as individuals rather than as leaders 
of an anti-NOO party. This disarray v/as heightened by 
the death of Tilak a month before the Special Session, 
leaving Kelkar as heir to his leadership in Maharashtra. 
G-andhi, on the other hand, had an informal network of 
lieutenants throughout the country, who were committed 
to following him and were members of the local 
Congress, and (if Muslims) the local Muslim League 
organisations. In addition Gandhi controlled the 
network of Khilafat Committees through the NCO Committ­
ee, established at the June Khilafat meeting in 
Allahabad, in which, as he had stipulated, he was "a 
sort of dictator". Even Gandhi's non-Muslim lieuten­
ants were members of these Khilafat Committees or
worked closely with them,''" and the Pan-Islamic ulema
supplemented the Khilafat Committees in rousing
support for NCO. When Mrs Besant resigned from her
All-India HR! in early 1919, the young men who remained
in charge of it had used it in preparing for G-andhi ’ s
Rowlatt Act satyagraha: in April 1920 Gandhi formalised
2his control of the HRh by accepting its Presidentship.
G-andhi ’ s superiority was demonstrated at the 
Calcutta Special Session itself. He had gathered 
support in a series of "face to face" tours to G-ujarat, 
the Punjab, the South and the UP.^ His lieutenants and 
the Khilafat Committees ensured that a much larger 
proportion of Muslim delegates (committed to NCO, 
needless to say) attended this than any previous 
session. Rajaji brought a train-load of Pan-Islamists
1. e.g., for Rajaji's association with the Khilafat
Committees, see Home Poll Dep. July 1920, no. 94, pp.
1. 5; for R. Prasad’s, see ibid., p. 17.
2. Young; India, 28 April 1920, p. 1; the young men 
in charge of the HRL included its G-eneral Secretaries, 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Umar Sobhani, see Circular Letter 
from Gen. Secs., A-IHRL, 10 April 1920, Adyar Archives; 
in July the HRL’s Central Council committed the HRL to 
support adoption of the full NCO programme by the Con­
gress Special Session, Report of the Commissioner of 
Police, Bombay, 3 Aug 1920, section II, in Home Poll 
Dep. Aug 1920, no. 31.
3. Home Poll Dep. July 1920, no. 104, pp. 25-6; Aug 
1920, no. Ill, p. 1.
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from Madras as, from Bombay, did Umar Sobhani and Shan- 
karlal Banker.1 The success of these tactics was reflec­
ted in the election of a number of Pan-Islamists to the 
Subjects Committee. It was in the Subjects Committee 
that NCO was thrashed out, the main point at issue being 
the boycott of the Councils. The Committee, 300 strong, 
consisted of a few who opposed NCO outright (Mrs Besant’s 
followers and Jinnah); some who had accepted NCO in prin­
ciple but wished to delete its more important provisions; 
some who were committed to the full NCO programme - Pan- 
Islamists and young men, like Jitendralal Bannerjee and 
Candhi's lieutenants -; and a number who wavered between 
the second and third of these courses. The outright oppon­
ents of NCO were too few to have any chance of passing a 
resolution rejecting it in toto or clearly proposing to 
make use of the Councils. There were thus only two prac­
tical alternatives: a resolution threatening to put NCO 
into operation if England did not grant India full auto­
nomy but meanwhile suspending NCO, put forward by Pal,
Das and Chakravarti, who controlled the Reception 
Committee of the Congress;^ and G-andhi' s resolution
1. interviews with K. Dwarkadas, 25 May, 1 June 1963, 
with S. Banker 27 June 1963; Home Poll Dep. Aug 1920, no.
110, p. 30.
2. see Home Poll Dep. Sept 1920, no. 70. p. 6.
3. see Chakravarti's Welcoming Address in Amrita Bazar 
Patrika, 5 Sept 1920 (Supplement); see also ibid., 6 Sept 1920, p. 6; Jayakar, I, 395-6.
for the complete NCO programme.“
In tactics, the Congress opponents of NCO were 
inferior to G-andhi. By accepting NCO in principle 
but deferring the decision as to the details of the 
programme they had no doubt hoped to be able to reduce 
G-andhi' s programme to a nullity while avoiding the 
obloquy of making insufficiently aggressive gestures 
to express Indian bitterness over the Punjab and the 
Khilafat. Had their tactic succeeded they might have 
satisfied both their rational desire to make the most 
of the enlarged powers (however inadequate) granted by 
the British and the irrational urge of the rank-and- 
file to harm the British in some way for the wrongs 
they had done to India. But by accepting NCO Min 
principle" they had, of course, weakened their case.
G-andhi* s tactics in the Subjects Committee were 
excellently designed to increase the disarray among 
his opponents and to swing the waverers in his favour. 
He threatened that if the Committee rejected his 
resolution he would launch NCO outside the Congress.1 2
1. for text, see Appendix A.
2. Home Poll Dep. Sept 1920, no. 70, p. 6; details 
of Subjects Committee debates are from this source or 
from Leader, 9 Sept 1920, in Home Poll A, Dec 1920, 
nos 210-6 and KW.
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He had already hegun NCO on 1 August without consult­
ing Congress and, although the response had generally 
been slow,± it was clear that G-andhi could by-pass 
the Congress through his formal and informal organis­
ations. He satisfied those, who objected to the idea 
of throwing all the resources of Congress behind the 
Khilafat and Punjab grievances, by incorporating the
demand for Swaraj in his NCO resolution. This won a
2most important ally for G-andhi, Motilal Nehru who as
Congress President presided over all Congress meetings,
including those of the AICC, for the year (excepting
the Special Session, over which Lajpat Rai presided).
To many of the waverers, his opponents’ programme must
have appeared as little more than a pale reflection of
Gandhi's. Gandhi reconciled some to his programme by
admitting to it the boycott of foreign goods, which
many felt to be the most effective way of bringing
■5pressure upon the British.-'' Others who thought they 
could still accept NCO in principle v/hile rendering it
1. Home Poll Dep. Aug 1920, no. Ill, passim.
2. Gandhi, Experiments, p. 610; cf. G. Patel, 
Vithaibhai Patel, p. 443.
3. this was moved by Vijiaraghavachariar, Leader,
9 Sept 1920, loc. cit.
nugatory in practice were reconciled to Gandhi’s pro­
gramme by his acceptance of the word ’’gradual” before 
the boycott of schools and courts in his resolution:
Vijiaraghavachariar believed that this turned the 
resolution into ’nothing more than a pious wish” and 
Das said that ITCO was ’’now only an ideal”.^  Gandhi’s
resolution was thus carried by the narrow margin of 
148 votes to 133 after three days’ debate in the 
Subjects Committee.
On behalf of Gandhi’s opponents, Pal moved his 
resolution as an amendment to Gandhi's in the open 
session, but here the imprimatur of the Subjects 
Committee upon Gandhi's resolution and Gandhi's popul­
arity and his superior organisation told, and his res­
olution was passed by 1855 votes to 873* Over 2000
delegates abstained from voting however, - some
2authorities put the figure at over 3000 - which
suggests that at least one-third, if not half, of the 
delegates opposed all or part of Gandhi's programme 
but felt that Pal and his colleagues had no adequate 
alternative.
1. ibid.; Amrita Bazar Patrika, 9 Sept 1920, p. 6.
2. Indian Social Reformer. 12 Sept 1920, in Bombay NP 
w/e 11 Sept 1920, p. 1; cf. Mahatma. II, 17.
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Gandhi Consolidates His Control.
At the Special Session of the Muslim League, Jinnah,
who presided, and the other "nationalist” Muslims opposed
Gandhi’s programme, hut dared not do so point-blank. On
the question of the IChilafat (which, as a Muslim, it
would have been political suicide to ignore, however
opposed he might be to bringing it into national politics)
Jinnah advocated "resort to NCO as the final weapon to get
redress, but not necessarily Gandhi’s brand".^ Most of
the delegates to the Muslim League had been deeply stirred
by the Khilafat agitation, and it was difficult to oppose
NCO outright without appearing to be a "bad Muslim". At
the instance of Fazlul Huq, who had been browbeaten into
supporting the full NCO programme in the Congress Subjects
Committee by Shaukat Ali, the Muslim League swept aside
Jinnah’s warnings and adopted the full NCO programme,
deleting the word "gradual" from the boycott of schools 
2and courts.
These NCO resolutions would have remained, in Vij- 
iaraghavachariar’s phrase, "a pious wish" but for Gandhi's 
determination to put them into effect. The AICC appointed
1. Home Poll Pep. Sept 1920, no. 70, p. 6.
2. ibid.
501
a sub-committee consisting of Gandhi, Motilal Nehru 
and Vithalbhai Patel to draw up the detailed programme 
of NCO. Assured of Motilal’s support, G-andhi produced 
a programme for the surrender of titles; the boycott 
of educational institutions, law courts and the Council 
elections; propaganda against recruitment for Meso­
potamia; the collection of a large fund; and ’’the 
formation of a volunteer corps to engender discipline 
and maintain order”. The boycott of foreign goods 
was, he wrote, ”an unfortunate interpolation”, but 
hand-spinning and -weaving were to be encouraged.^
The Khilafat Committees had been implementing a 
similar programme since August 1; Gandhi now called 
for the full implementation of this programme by the 
PCCs and the branches of the HRL, which he had renamed
pthe Swarajya Sabha. Gandhi supplemented the activit­
ies of these organisations and of his lieutenants 
during the last three months of 1920 by touring the
1. Report of Congress Sub-Committee on 1'ICO, in Home 
Poll Dep. Sept 1920, no. 70, p. 37; for Patel's 
objections, see G. Patel, Vithalbhai Patel, pp. 447-9;
V. J. Patel’s 'bote on NCO’, no. S 7266, Gandhi Papers 
Sabarmati.
2. "Instructions to the Branches of the Swarajya Sabha, 
lately the AIHRL”, Oct 1920, no. S 7327, Gandhi Papers 
Sabarmati.
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towns and countryside of northern, western and central 
India.1 23
While his immediate purpose in these activities
was to ensure the implementation of ITC0, a subtler
effect was quickly noticeable. G-andhi addressed
2peasant audiences in the countryside - he could be
understood across the densely-populated north, wherever
Hindustani or G-ujarati was spoken - and a sense of
confidence and of an impending change for the better
began to spread through the countryside. In the Punjab,
for instance, the peasants began to talk of not paying
their land revenue. Sven where G-andhi could not go in
this short time his reputation penetrated. G. P. Andrews
reported of the peasantry in a part of Bihar that Gandhi
had not visited, that they
do not understand in the least HCO; but they 
do understand that one little tiny man, frail 
in body and all alone, is challenging the 
great "Burra Lord Sahib" [personification of 
the G-overnment] himself and bringing him to 
his knees time after time! They only under­
stand one thing, viz. his absolutely fearless
1. Home Poll Dep. Dec 1920, no. 66, 'UP', pars 2, 3; 
'Punjab', par. 1; ibid., no. 74, ’Bombay', par, 2; Jan 
1921, no. 33, 'UP', par. 2; Feb 1921, no. 35, 'Bihar', 
par. 3; 'Bengal', par. 3.
2. e.g. in UP and Bihar he addressed the Kisan Sabhas 
"Peasant Associations" which had been founded by follow­
ers of his inspired by his call for work among the peas­
ants and by his example at Kaira and Champaran: ibid, 
Dep. Jan 1921, no. 33, 'UP', par. 2.
3. Home Poll Dep. Dec 1920, no. 66, 'Punjab', par. 1.
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and absolutely pure character and they 
worship that and make him their hero - 
both men and women and the young 
especially.-
In the words of one commentator: nabhyaya [fearlessness]
2rather than ahimsa was Gandhi’s legacy to his people".
The Government of India had carefully avoided 
taking any action against Gandhi since April 1919 for 
fear of enabling him to pose as a martyr and of thus 
consolidating support behind him,^ but took fright 
at this increase of his influence in the countryside 
and asked the Governments of the UP and Bombay whether 
he should not be prosecuted in view of the fact that 
he was "apparently causing immense excitement and 
rousing the masses to danger point".^ These Govern­
ments retained their nerve, however, and advised 
against prosecution: the UP pointed out that Gandhi 
had been laying great stress on non-violence and that
1. C. P. Andrews to R. Tagore, 15 Oct 1920, G_._P.
Andrews Papers.
2 . H . Huker j ee, Gandhiji, A Study, p. 20 .
3. the responsibility for this policy of non­
interference may be traced largely to Sir William 
Vincent, Home Member of the Government of India, 1917- 
23, see D. A. Low, "The Government of India and the 
Pirst NCO Movement, 1920-2".
4. Telegrams, Government of India, Home Dept, to 
Governments of UP and Bombay, 20 Oct 1920, Home Poll 
A Dec 1920, nos 210-6, p. 15.
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without him violence was much more likely.’*' The 
Governments’ trust of Gandhi still held, therefore, 
and he remained free to pursue his policy of non­
violent non-co-operation.
During the four months between the Special Session
at Calcutta in September and the regular annual Session
at Nagpur at the end of 1920, Gandhi had mixed success
in putting NCO into effect. Relatively few titles and
honours were surrendered. Very few lawyers gave up
their practices, although Motilal Nehru provided a
2most conspicuous exception. The boycott of educat­
ional institutions had its greatest success among 
Gujarati students, and, with financial assistance from 
Marwari and Muslim merchants, Gandhi was able to open 
"National" institutions in Bombay, Calcutta, and 
Ahmedabad and other towns of Gujarat; but Gandhi and 
the Ali Brothers failed signally to convert the 
Aligarh Muslim University or the Banaras Hindu
1. Telegram, Government of UP to Government of India, 
23 Oct 1920; Demi-official letter, A. Montgomerie to 
H. McPherson, 28 Oct 1920, ibid., pp. 4, 5.
2« Searchlight, 24 Sept 1920, p. 8a; cf. B. Sita- 
ramayya to Gandhi 24 Sept 1920, no. S 7273, Gandhi 
Papers Sabarmati; Home Poll Dep. Dec 1920, no. 59, 
'Bihar', 'Delhi'; C. P. Andrews to Tagore, 21 Dec 1920, 
Q. P. Andrews Papers.
University into National institutions.1 23 The recruit­
ment and drilling of volunteers occurred in only a
2few centres. G-andhi himself played down the boycott 
of foreign goods, since for one thing it was unpopular 
with his Muslim and Marwari merchant supporters, but 
his followers found that this was one of the more 
popular parts of the programme as it involved less 
hardship than, say, boycott of schools.1
As the elections were to be held in November, 
time was short for organising the boycott of the 
Legislative Councils, and Gandhi concentrated his 
efforts on this plank of the NCO programme.^ Voters 
were urged to stay away from the polls and in Bombay for 
example only 15 per cent of the electors voted.1 In 
conformity with their promise to abide by the Special 
Congress resolution on NCO, Las, Kelkar and their 
followers withdrew their candidatures; after some
1. Home Poll Lep. Lee 1920, no. 84, ’Bombay’; no. 59, 
’Bombay'; no. 67, 'UP'; Peb 1921, no. 35, ’Bengal'.
2. e.g. ibid. Lep. Lee 1920, no. 59, 'Lelhi'.
3. Ibid. Lep. Lee 1920, no. 84, ’Bombay'; no. 59, 
'Bengal', 'Bihar'.
4* see Report of Congress Sub-Committee on NCO, loc. 
cit., art. Ih); instructions to Swarajya Sabha Sabha 
Oct 1920, no. S 7327, Gandhi Papers Sabarmati.
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5. Home Poll Lep. Jan 1921, no. 33.
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hesitation (notably on the part of Kasturi Ranga 
Iyengar and the Madrasis) most of the others, who had 
opposed Gandhi while accepting NCO Min principle", did 
likewise.1 2 NCO had thus achieved a moderate, hut quite 
spectacular, success in its first few months of 
application.
has and his party, Kelkar and most of Tilak's
other followers, Llalaviya, Lajpat Rai and others, who
had opposed Gandhi at the Special Congress, came to
the annual Session at Nagpur in December determined if
possible to reverse the decision on NCO. Their position
however, was as weak as it had been on the previous
occasion, with the added disability that they had
committed themselves to the boycott of the Councils by
their abstention from the elections. Nagpur was in the
heart of the country which could be expected to support
the late Lokamanya’s lieutenants, but several of the
latter (notably Gangadharrao Deshpande) had thrown in
their lot wholeheartedly with Gandhi since the Special
Congress and countered Das' attempt to rouse the local
2delegates against Gandhi.' Furthermore Gandhi had the
1. Home Poll Dep. Oct 1920, no. 51, p. 3«
2. ibid. Dep Feb 1921, no. 35, p. 21; Khaparde "Diary" 
(Bombay), 3 Dec 19®0.
support of the merchant community of Maharashtra, 
symbolised in the election of the wealthy Marwari,
Jamnalal Bajaj, to Chairmanship of the Reception Committee. 
To counter Das’ party, the Bengal IChilafat Committee 
sanctioned Rs 10,000 for fares and Congress fees for 
Bengali Hindu and Muslim supporters of G-andhi,^ and 
Gandhi's lieutenants brought 14,582 delegates, the 
largest number (which also included the largest percent-
n
age of Muslims), to attend any Congress. They elected 
a Subjects Committee more markedly pro-Gandhi than the 
last.
Gandhi's opponents still had no policy on which 
they agreed or which was clearly distinguishable from 
Gandhi's programme of NCO. The President of the 
Session, Vijiaraghavachariar, expressed their dilemma. 
While criticising Gandhi's programme sharply he con­
fessed that "The one question everywhere asked is, 
what is the sanction...backing up our demand [for 
responsible self-government]?" The alternative he 
offered to Gandhi's programme was education and social
1. Home Poll Dep. Peb 1921, no. 35, 'Bengal'.
2. Congress 1920, Report, pp. I64ff.; see Appendix B.
3. it included such Pan-Islamists as Chotani, Azad, 
the Ali Brothers, ibid.; Khaparde "Diary" (Bombay), 27 
Dec 1920.
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reform; strikes and trade boycotts to reduce British
profits; and alliance with the British labour Party/
Pacing inevitable defeat 0. R. Das capitulated
and moved the NCO resolution; lajpat Rai, Pal and others
followed suit. Only Khaparde, Tilak's lieutenant from
Berar, and Jinnah and Llalaviya (confined to a sick-bed)
2maintained their opposition. The Ali Brothers, with a 
clear majority of Pan-Pslamists, had a similar victory 
at the Muslim league presided over by Ansari.
Gandhi identified himself with the bitterness of 
the rank-and-file of the Congress and the Pan-Islamist 
irreconcilables by moving that the object of the 
Congress should be the attainment of "Swarajya", by 
which he clearly opened the way to self-government 
outside the British Empire/1 *34" This was passed and 
Shaukat Ali induced the Muslim league to pass a similar 
modification in its Constitution/ This resolution was
1. Vijiaraghavachariar Presidential Address, Nagpur 
Congress, in Congress Presidential Addresses, II, 502, 
505-18; see Vijiaraghavachariar to C. P. Andrews, quoted 
in C. P. Andrews to R. Tagore, 28 Nov 1920, G. P. Andrews 
Papers.
2« Congress 1920, Report, p. 83; Khaparde "DiaryM 
(Bombay), 28 Dec 1920.
3. Home Poll Dep. Peb 1921, no. 77, p. 3.
4. Congress 1920, Report, pp. 4-6-9.
5. Home Poll Dep. Peb 1921, no. 77, p. 3.
opposed bitterly in both bodies by Jinnah, who had 
earlier opposed the adoption of a similar object by 
the Swarajya Sabha at Gandhi’s urging." Jinnah's 
opposition arose partly from the termination of the' 
leadership of the Luslirns, which he had enjoyed 
since 1915, by the re-emergence of the Ali Brothers 
in the van of Pan-Islamism. But in addition, as one 
of Gandhi's Muslim friends told Gandhi, most Muslims 
were not ready to accept swaraj outside the Empire as
2their goal since they were "still afraid of the Hindus".- 
Khilafat agitation obscured these fears; Muslims were 
so embittered against the British that they accepted 
the thinly-veiled call for "independence", but when 
the agitation subsided these fears re-emerged. Jinnah's 
opposition to Gandhi was thus a portent of failure for 
Gandhi's hopes of reconciling Hindus and Muslims.
Gandhi had barely recognised, let alone grappled 
with, the problem posed by the alienation of the non- 
Brahmin elite from Congress.J Buring 1915-20 an
1. Home Poll Dep. Dec 1920, no. 59, 'Bombay'.
2. A. Tyabji to Gandhi, 8 Oct 1920, no. S 7296,
Gandhi Papers Sabarrnati.
3. see Young^India, 17 Nov 1920, Tagore, p. 608:
"I little realised that the Non-Brahmin case was...a 
political matter"; ibid., 27 Oct 1920, Tagore, pp.
611-2; 27 Apr 1921, Ganesan, pp. 425-6.
increasing proportion of those taking part in
Congress sessions were businessmen, mainly belonging
doubtless to the non-Brahmin trading castes,1 23and
Gandhi - himself belonging to such a caste - had won
considerable support from traders. Congress was
still dominated by the Brahmins, however, especially
in the areas where the non-Brahmin movement was strong,
and Gandhi had not ingratiated himself with the non-
Brahmins by drawing his lieutenants from these dominant 
2groups. A lasting solution could only be obtained by 
drawing the non-Brahmin elite and the rich peasants 
into the upper echelons of the national movement and 
to that extent depleting the dominance of the Brahmins 
and bhadralok. Gandhi had already taken up so many 
great problems that he may be excused for handling 
another gingerly.^
Gandhi followed up his success in capturing the 
Congress by re-organising it to suit his programme.
The amendment of the Congress Constitution and Rules 
had long been under consideration. A Sub-Committee to
1. see Appendices B and C.
2. e.g. Rajaji in Madras, Gangadharrao Deshpande in 
Maharashtra and members of the bhadralok in Bengal.
3. see C. F. Andrews to Gandhi, 8 Sept 1920, no. S 
7245, Gandhi Papers Sabarmati.
recommend amendments appointed at the 1918 Session
had been distracted by the Punjab troubles, and a new
Sub-Committee had been appointed at the 1919 Session,
consisting of G-andhi, Kelkar, I. B. Sen and three
others." This Committee was also dilatory and after
the Calcutta Session Gandhi drew up his own amendments,
which were accepted by the Nagpur Subjects Committee
2with minor alterations:" Congress was to become a much 
more efficient instrument for the direction and control 
of day-to-day political work and agitation. This was 
ensured by the setting up of a compact, 15-man 
Working Committee to act as a permanent executive on 
behalf of the cumbrous AICC, and by the revitalisation 
of District and other local Congress Committees which 
were to elect the PCCs.^ The compact executive
1. Vithalbhai Patel, Gokaranath Misra, A. Rangaswami 
Iyengar, AICC Minutes, 31 Dec 1918; 25, 28 Dec 1919;
2 Jan 1920.
2. Young India, 3 Nov 1920, Tagore, p. 1130; Gandhi, 
Experiments. p. 612.
3. Constitution adopted at the Nagpur Congress, art­
icles 6 and 24-, in M. V. Ramana Rao, Development of the 
Congress Constitution, pp. 36, 40; MThe Working Comm­
ittee”, in Young India. 29 June 1921, Tagore, p. 1142. 
The PCCs were now based on provinces corresponding to 
linguistic areas; delegates to annual Sessions were 
limited and (as with members of the AICC, and the 
bubjects Committee with which the AICC was non syn­
onymous) elected in proportion to population.
proposed by Tilak in 1916 was thus brought into being, 
and Mrs Besant’s dream of the amalgamation of the branches 
of the HRL with Congress, in effect, finally realised: 
Gandhi, in fact, allowed the branches of the Swarajya 
Sabha to wither away.
Retrospect and Prospect.
Gandhi emerged as the leader of the national 
movement in 1920 and, although he was to lose this 
position in 1922 and again in the 1930s, the national 
movement turned back to him and to his programme of NCO 
in 1928-29 and in the 1940s. In 1920 the Congress, 
reorganised by Gandhi, had been established as the vehicle 
of Indian nationalism.
The leaders of the national movement in the second 
decade of this century were confronted with a complex 
problem. They had to provide an outlet for the large 
and increasing reservoir of Indian bitterness and defiance 
toward the British, while retaining control of the move­
ment and alienating as few of the more cautious members 
as possible. The leaders had to solve this problem while 
trying to move the British to devolve power. The 
situation was complicated still further by the rise of 
new groups, which challenged those who dominated the
national movement, and for which, sooner or later, room 
mast he found in the movement.
Mrs Besant succeeded partially in solving these 
problems. Her programme of agitation without sanctions 
in support of full self-government was at first highly 
successful in providing expression for the emotionalism 
of the young and the more impetuous. This programme 
also accelerated the devolution of power by Britain. 
Paradoxically, however, her success contributed to her 
failure: she had not won the whole-hearted support of 
the former Moderate leaders of the movement, and the 
devolution of power which she helped to bring about was 
sufficient to satisfy them and encouraged them to with­
draw from association with her. She was thus deprived of 
their help in restraining her more impetuous followers.
By initially demanding full Home Rule she limited her 
later ability to manoeuvre, since any attempt to change 
her strategy in relation to the British was regarded as 
apostasy by her followers. Furthermore, and this was of 
basic importance to the failure of her leadership, her 
agitation so contributed to the increase of excitement 
that a more active programme than she was prepared to 
provide became necessary.
The HRL organisation v/hich Mrs Besant had created
was inadequately developed and articulated to provide 
her with means of control. She failed to use her election 
as President to strengthen the Congress organisation. 
Having set her sights on achieving command of Congress, 
she encouraged the members of her HRL to join this body 
and worked with Tilak for his readmission to it, and was 
thus largely responsible for the predominance of young 
men and Extremists in Congress after 1916. When the 
Moderates seceded in 1918, Congress was left in the hands 
of these groups, and when a majority of them offered their 
allegiance to G-andhi, Congress fell under his command.
Through her HRL Mrs Besant mobilised many, 
particularly the younger, educated men, who were to part­
icipate in the movements led by G-andhi, both in areas 
which had hitherto been active and others which had been 
inactive in the national movement. She gave training 
in rousing agitation to a number who were to become his 
lieutenants.
While she did not retain the leadership of the 
national movement she contributed substantially to the 
form the movement had assumed by 1920.
On the side of the Muslims, Jinnah and the 
"nationalists1' prepared the way for the co-operation of 
Muslims with the Hindus in the expression of Pan-Islamist
bitterness against the British, but were themselves 
quite unwilling to lead such an expression of Muslim 
feeling.
G-andhi succeeded where Mrs Besant and the Muslim 
"nationalists” failed, in providing a programme which 
gave expression to the feelings of young and impetuous 
Congressmen and Muslims and Pan-Islamists, while re­
assuring more cautious Indians. NCO provided the first 
group with a means of venting their bitterness upon the 
British, while G-andhi ’ s emphasis on nonviolence inspired 
faith among the second group that he would, and could, 
control the forces to which he was appealing. The 
success of ’ G-andhi ’ s appeal to those whose interest was 
opposed to violence was symbolised in the support he 
received from Jamnalal Bajaj, the merchant prince. As 
Chairman of the Nagpur Congress, Bajaj expressed also 
the emotionalism which NCO promised to satisfy: "at 
present,” he said, ”the real work before us is one of 
destruction and not of construction....It becomes incum­
bent upon us to discard all things whether good or evil 
if they come to us through our rulers”.^" In its 
rejection of everything that came from the rulers, NCO
1. J. Bajaj, Welcome Address, Congress 1920, Report, p.91.
marked an attempt to provide the national movement with 
a simple, clear-cut solution to its infinitely- 
complicated problems, and was reminiscent of the 
Extremist programme of 1906-7.
Ironically enough, it was the old Extremists, Tilak 
and Pal who, together with Das, expressed doubt about 
the feasibility of such a doctrinaire rejection of India’s 
British heritage. In 1919-20, while Tilak and Das were 
voicing the emotionalism of the national movement by 
denouncing the Reforms, they were preparing to work the 
new Councils which the British had given. Their assoc­
iate, Vijiaraghavachariar, as President of the Nagpur 
Session, expressed their doubts about Gandhi’s programme. 
While wishing, he said, to compel the British to grant 
self-government, he regarded NCO, with its boycotts of the 
institutions of education, justice and government intro­
duced by the British, as a proposal "to rebarbarise the 
people of India”, an inauspicious preparation for 
responsible government.^
By turning the attention of the national movement 
from the Councils Gandhi was also hoping to encourage the 
nationalist elite to identify itself with the masses.
1. Congress Presidential Addresses, II, 513.
The more impetuous members of the movement saw the 
peasant groups that G-andhi had mobilised at Champaran and 
Kaira as an added source of strength to the movement and 
were thus all the more predisposed to accept Gandhi's 
programme and leadership. But, conversely, the older and 
more cautious members of the nationalist elite in Bengal 
were opposed to involving the peasant masses, because 
they feared that they would prove uncontrollable. 
Furthermore the older Chitpavan and Tami1-Brahmin 
Extremists of Maharashtra and Madras opposed Gandhi's 
hoycott of the Councils, since to vacate these reposit­
ories of power (however limited) was to leave them to the 
rising socio-economic groups which were challenging them 
for privilege and power. This challenge had absorbed 
much of the energy of Tilak and Mrs Besant whose bases 
of power were in these areas, and was to further weaken 
the national movement there. But Gandhi, whose main 
strength lay outside these areas, in Gujarat and the 
Hindi-speaking regions, had not as yet to grapple with 
this problem.
In 1920, nevertheless, NCO was adopted, thanks 
largely to the young and less eminent Congressmen on the 
Subjects Committee.
But in 1922 NCO collapsed. At the end of 1921 it
seemed that, in the face of the NCO campaign, the 
Viceroy, Lord Reading, was prepared to concede responsible 
government.^ But G-andhi imposed such stringent conditions 
on his negotiations with Reading that the latter refused 
to accede to them. NCO thus failed to lead to any 
devolution of power by the British, a failure made all 
the more emphatic by G-andhi' s promise at the Nagpur 
Congress Session to achieve "swaraj in one year".“
G-andhi recognised in 1922 that his organisation was 
inadequate to prevent outbreaks of violence: the problem 
of control was threatening to become too great for him. 
Even before he called the movement off, hov/ever, there 
was evidence that the boycott of institutions and the 
hartals of the NCO campaign of 1921 had provided 
catharsis for the emotions that Gandhi had set out to 
express, and that these were now subsiding. So that, 
once again, the very success of a leader's programme 
carried in it the seeds of failure.
In Congress the more pragmatic attitude toward 
British institutions, which had been put forward by Das
1. see D. A. Low "The Government of India and the first 
Non-Co-operation Movement, 1920-22" (unpublished paper, 
Australian National University), pp. 14-5; Jayakar/l,
504.
2. Congress 1920, Report, p. 49.
and Tilak in 1920 and had received very considerable 
support, now re-emerged, embodied in the Swaraj Party 
led by Das, Motilal Nehru and Tilak*s lieutenant, Kelkar. 
G-andhi’s nativism, it was thus acknowledged, would not 
provide an adequate solution to India’s problems, and 
India's British heritage could not be summarily rejected. 
Even though the Swaraj Party set out to gain reforms by 
immobilising the Councils, its programme signified that 
the Councils were not simply to be dismissed by the 
national movement.
Nevertheless, continued British obduracy in the 
face of Indian demands for self-government gave rise 
once again to despair and bitterness, and British snubs 
to Indian pride provoked indignation, both in the later 
1920s and again in the 1940s. To express these feelings 
in both these periods, the national movement turned back 
to G-andhi and NCO.
APPENDIX A
Non-Go-operation Resolution Moved by M. K. G-andhi and 
Passed at the 1920 Special Congress, Calcutta.«
In view of the fact that on the Khilafat 
question both the Indian and Imperial Governments have 
signally failed in their duty towards the Mussalmans 
of India, and the Prime Minister has deliberately broken 
his pledged word given to them, and that it is the 
duty of every non-Moslem Indian in every legitimate 
manner to assist his Mussalman brother in his attempt 
to remove the religious calamity that has overtaken 
him;
And in view of the fact that in the matter 
of the events of the April of 1919 both the said 
Governments have grossly neglected or failed to 
protect the innocent people of the Punjab, and punish 
officers guilty of unsoldierly and barbarous behaviour 
towards them, and have exonerated Sir Michael O'Dwyer 
who proved himself, directly or indirectly, respon­
sible for most of the official crimes, and callous 
to the sufferings of the people placed under his 
administration, and that the debate in the House of 
Commons and specially in the House of lords betrayed
a woeful lack of sympathy with the people of India, 
and showed virtual support of the systematic terrorism 
and frightfulness adopted in the Punjab, and that the 
latest Viceregal pronouncement is proof of entire 
absence of repentance in the matters of the Khilafat 
and the Punjab;
This Congress is of opinion that there can 
be no contentment in India without redress of the two 
aforementioned wrongs and that the only effectual m 
means to vindicate national honour and to prevent 
repetition of similar wrongs in future is the estab­
lishment of Swarajya. This Congress is further of 
opinion that there is no course left open for the 
people of India but to approve of and adopt the 
policy of progressive, non-violent Non-Co-operation 
inaugurated by Mr. Gandhi until the said wrongs are 
righted and Swarajya is established.
And in as much as a beginning should be made 
by the classes who have hitherto moulded and repres­
ented public opinion, and in as much as Government 
consolidates its power through titles and honours 
bestowed on the people, through Schools controlled 
by it, its law courts, and its legislative councils, 
and in as much as it is desirable in the prosecution
of the movement to take the minimum risk and to call 
for the least sacrifice, compatible with the
attainment of the desired object, this Congress 
earnestly advises -
(a) surrender of titles and honorary offices and 
resignation from nominated seats in local bodies;
(b) refusal to attend Government Levees, Durbars, 
and other official and semi-official functions held by 
Government officials or in their honour;
(c) gradual withdrawal of children from schools and 
colleges owned, aided or controlled by Government, and 
in place of such schools and colleges, establishment 
of National schools and colleges in the various 
provinces;
(d) gradual boycott of British courts by lawyers 
and litigants, and establishment of private 
arbitration courts by their aid, for the settlement 
of private disputes;
(e) refusal on the part of the military, clerical 
and labouring classes to offer themselves as recruits 
for service in Mesopotamia;
(f) withdrawal by candidates of their candidature 
for election to the Reformed Councils, and refusal on 
the part of the voters to vote for any candidate who 
may, despite the Congress advice, offer himself for 
election;
(g) boycott of foreign goods.
And in as much as Non-Co-operation has been 
conceived as a means of discipline and self-sacrifice 
without which no nation can make real progress, and in 
as much as an opportunity should be given in the very 
first stage of Non-Co-operation to every man, woman 
and child, for such discipline and self-sacrifice, this 
Congress advises adoption of Swadeshi in piece-goods on 
a vast scale, and in as much as the existing mills of 
India with indigenous capital and control do not manu­
facture sufficient yarn and sufficient cloth for the 
requirements of the Nation, and are not likely to do 
so for a long time to come, this Congress advises 
immediate stimulation of further manufacture on a large 
scale by means of reviving hand-spinning in every home 
and hand-weaving on the part of the millions of weavers 
who have abandoned their ancient and honourable calling 
for want of encouragement.
[Source: D. Chakrabarty and C. Bhattacharyya, Congress 
in Evolution: Being a Collection of Congress Resolutions 
from 1885 to 1934, pp. 33-5.
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Held at the Servants of India Society, Poona.
Deccan Sabha:
Minutes of Meetings and Council Meetings, 1901-19. 
Correspondence 1896. 1910, 1914-20.
Report (handwritten) of the Deccan Sabha for the years 
1909 and 1910
Draft Rules of the Deccan Sabha (n.d.).
Deccan Sabha:
Report of proceedings of Sub-Committee appointed at 
the meeting of the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee 
12 August 1917» to consider adoption of passive 
resistance.
Rules of Bombay Provincial Congress Committee (1908). 
Held at Servants of India Society, Poona.
Home Rule Leagues:
All-India Home Rule League (originally Home Rule for 
India Leaguer"
Council Minutes, 1916-17.
Correspondence (including correspondence concerning 
the formation of the League), draft Constitution, 
1915-19.Statement of Accounts, 1919.
Held at Adyar Archives, Madras.
All-India Home Rule League and Indian Home Rule League
Home Rule Leagues of Bombay, "Address to Viceroy 
and Secretary of State", (with annexure).
Held at Adyar Archives, Madras.
List of Persons Forming the Home Rule Leagues* 
Deputations and of Signatories of the Address: 
attached Address to the Viceroy and Secretary of State.
Held at Adyar Archives, Madras.
Indian Association. Calcutta:
Rules of the Indian Association [1898].
Minutes of Executive Committee Meetings, 1910-19. 
Minutes of General Meetings, 1905-20.
Held at the Association’s rooms, Bowbazar Street, 
Calcutta.
Servants of India Society:
Servants of India Society, Madras
Letters between members of the Society.
Servants of India Society. Poona
Letters between members of the Society, notably 
from H. N. Kunzru, UP, to H. Vaze, Poona, 1910-18.
West Indian National Liberal Association:
Minutes of Meetings, Feb. 1919 - Jan. 1920.
Minute Book held in the rooms of the Bombay 
Presidency Association.
Miscellaneous:
Andhra Provincial Conference Committee (Guntur), 
’’Reorganization of Indian Provinces, being a note 
presented to the Indian National Congress, 1916”.
Held at Adyar Archives, Madras.
Joint Note No. 1 by Sir William Wedderburn and Sir 
Krishna Gupta, 5 Oct 1915«
Held at Adyar Archives, Madras.
Joint Note No. 2 by Sir William Wedderburn and Sir 
Krishna Gupta, 8 April 1916.
Held at Adyar Archives, Madras.
Memo from Sir William Wedderburn adopted by the 
British Committee of the Indian National Congress,
26 April 1915.
Held at Adyar Archives, Madras.
”A Nationalist Memorandum, December 1907s Pre-Congress 
Conference, December 1907”.
Held at Adyar Archives, Madras.
Sind Provincial Congress Committee, 11 April 1920: 
printed letter from C. P. Gidwani and J. Doulatram, 
Joint Secretaries, calling a meeting at Hyderabad to 
consider the letter of Pt. Gokaranath Misra, Joint 
General Secretary of Indian National Congress urging 
consideration of programme for Congress and enclosing 
Oudh’s Nationalist Party manifesto.
Held at Adyar Archives, Madras.
II. Published 
All-India Muslim League:
All-India Moslem League Tenth Annual Session. Speech
By the Hon’ble Raja Sir Mohammad Ali Mohammad Khan.
Khan Bahadur, K.C.I.E., of Mahmudabad, President of the
All-India Moslem League on 30th December. 1917. at
Calcutta (Calcutta. Statesman Press. 1918).
All-India Moslem League Special Sessions, Bombay, August 
31st and September 1st, 1918: Presidential Address of 
the Hon, Ra.ia Sir Mohammad Ali Mohammad Khan, Khan 
Bahadur« K.C.I.B.« of Mahmudahad (no publ. details).
All-India Muslim League 11th Sessions« Delhi« 30th 
December« 1918: Dr M, A. Ansari's Address as Chairman 
of the Reception Committee (no publ. details).
Bengal Civil Rights Committee: Minutes of Proceedings of 
the Public Meeting held on Tuesday« 5th March 1918« at 
Calcutta Town Hall to Protest against the Policy of the 
Government Regarding Internments and 'Deportations (Cal­
cutta, Bengal Civil Rights Committee, [1918]).
Deccan Liberal Party Programme, 1920 (no publ. details).
Deccan Sabha Poona Golden Jubilee Celebration 1947 (Poona, 
D. V. Ambekar, 1947).
The Godavari District Association 1917: Selections from 
Proceedings (Qocanada. Godavari District Association. 1918).
Home Rule Leagues:
(a) All-India Home Rule League (originally Home Rule 
for India League)
The All-India Home Rule League Annual Meetings« 
Officers and Rules for 1919 (Advar. A-IHRL. 1919).
Home Rule [for India] League Bombay Branch, Report 
for Half Year 5 Sept 1916 to March 1917 (Bombay,
S. G. Banker, 1917;.
Home Rule for India League (Bombay Branch), Birst 
Annual Report for the Year ended 30th June 1917 
(Bombay, S. G. Banker, 1917).
Home Rule for India League, 251, Hornby Road, Port, 
Bombay, Rules and Regulations (Bombay, S. G. Banker, n.d.).
(b) Indian Home Rule League
Indian Home Rule League, Constitution and Annual 
Report 1916-1917 (Indian HRL Pamphlet No. 5l 
(Poona, C. P. Gokhale, 1917).
(c) National Home Rule League
The National Home Rule League, April 1919 (Adyar,
B. P. Wadia, 1919).
The National Home Rule League, 1921 (Madras, NHRL,
1921).
National Home Rule League, First Annual Report 
(Apr. 1919 - Dec. 1920) (Adyar, TPH, 1921).
National Home Rule League: Objects, Rules (Madras, 
NHRL, [1919]).
National Home Rule League: Why Founded and How 
(Madras, NHRL, U919]).
Indian National Congress:
Akola District Congress Committee, Draft of Proposed 
Rules and Constitution of the Indian National Congress 
(no publ. details, [l9l6]).
Chairman of the British Committee, letter to the Hon. 
Nawab Syed Mahomed and the Hon. N. Subba Rao Pantulu, 
Joint General Secretaries of the Indian National 
Congress, Madras (Madras, Guardian Press, [1914])•
Memorandum in support of the Joint Scheme of Reforms 
proposed by the Indian National Congress and the All- 
India Moslem League in December 1916, Submitted to 
the Right Hobble the Secretary of State and his 
Excellency the Viceroy and Covernor-Ceneral at Delhi 
in November 1917 by a Joint Deputation of the Congress and the League (Allahabad, C. Y. Chintamani, n.d.).
Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee 1922 
(Madras, Tagore, 1922).
Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab 
Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress (Lahore, 
K. Santanam, 1920).
Indian National Congress: Reports of Annual Sessions
Proceedings of the First Indian National Congress held 
at Bombay on the 28th, 29th and 30th December 1885.
2nd Edition (Madras, Swadesamitran Press, 1905).
Report of the Fifth Indian National Congress held at 
Bombay on the 2^th, 27th and 28th December 1889 ' 
preprinted from special verbatim reports of "Advocate 
of India”) (Bombay, Jehangir & Shroff, 1890)].
Indian National Congress: Reports of Annual Sessions
Report of the Twentieth Indian National Congress held 
at Bombay on the 26th« 27th and 28th December 1904 
(Bombay, Crown Printing Works, 1905).
Report of the Twenty-second Indian National Congress 
held at Calcutta on the 2^th, 27th, 28th, 29th December 
1906 (Calcutta, Weekly Notes Printing Works, 1907).
Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Indian 
National Congress held at Madras on the 28th« 29th and 
30th December 1908 (Madras Loganadham Bros., Mount Road, 
1909).
Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Indian 
National Congress held at Lahore on the 27th, 28th and 
29th December 1909 (Lahore, "Tribune" Steam PressY 1910).
Report of the Twenty-Fifth Indian National Congress held 
at Allahabad on the 26th, 27th, 28th and 29th December 
1910 (Allahabad/ Panch Kory Mittra. Indian Press. 1911).
Report of the Twenty-sixth Indian National Congress held 
at Calcutta on the 26th, 27th and 28th of December 1911 
(Calcutta, University Printing and Publishing, 1912).
Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Indian 
National Congress held at Bankipur, December 26-28,
1912 (Bankipur. Express Press. 119133).
Report of the Twenty-Eighth Indian National Congress 
held at Karachi on the 26th, 27th and 28th of December
1913 (Karachi/ Alex« Fonseca. "Union” (Steam) Press, n.d.).
Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Indian 
National Congress held at Madras on the 28th, 29th and 
Toth December 1914 (Madras/ Minerva Press. 1915).
Report of the Thirtieth Indian National Congress held 
at Bombay on the 27th, 28th and 29th December« 1915 
(Bombay, D. E. Wacha, Chairman Reception Committee,1916).
Report of the Thirty-First Indian National Congress held 
ad; Lucknow on the 26th, 28th, 29th and 30th December« 
1916 (Lucknow. Reception Committee. 1917).
«s
Indian National Congress: Reports of Annual Sessions
Report of the Thirty-second session of the Indian 
National Congress held at Calcutta on 26th, 28th and 
29th December. 1917 (Calcutta, 'Reception Committee,191871
Report of the Special Session of the Indian National 
Congress held at Bombay on 29th, 30th, 31st August and 
1st September« 1918 (Bombay, D. D. Sathaye, 1918).
Report of the Thirtg-third session of the Indian National 
Congress held at Delhi on the 26th, 28th, 29th« 30tlH 
31st December, 1918 (Delhi, Reception Committee, 1919)•
Report of the Thirty-fourth Session of the Indian 
National Congress held at Amritsar on the 27th, 29th,
30th, 31st December 1919 and 1st January 1920 
(Amritsar, Reception Committee, 1922).
Report of the Thirty-fifth session of the Indian National 
Congress held at Nagpur on the 26, 28, 30 and 31 
December 1920 (Nagpur, B. S. Moon.je, 1921).
Report of the 30th Indian National Congress, Ahmedabad, 
1921 (Ahmedabad, V. J. Patel, 1922).
Indian National Social Conference, Report of 30th Session 
of Indian National Social Conference, Lucknow, 1916 
(Lucknow, - , 1917)*
League of Non-Brahmin Youth (Central), fReport ofl
Proceedings of the First Provincial Conference (Madras,
- , 1927).
Madras Liberal League. First Annual Report, 1919 (Madras, 
British Press, n.d.).
Madras Mahajana Sabha:
Annual Reports for the Years 1914 to 1920 (Madras, 
Mahajana Sabha, printed by S. Varadachari, various years).
Diamond Jubilee Souvenir (Madras, Paramount Press,1194617:
Rules (Madras, Mahajana Sabha, 1896).
Rules (Madras, Mahajana. Sabha, 1910).
Rules and Memorandum of Association (Madras, Mahajana 
Sabha, 1948).
Rules and Memorandum of Association (Madras, Mahajana
Sabha, 1961).
Madras Parliament:
List of Members, 21 March 1915 (Adyar, Vasanta Press,
n.d.).
List of Members, 1 -January 1917 (Adyar, Vasanta Press, 
n.d.')'."
Commonwealth of India Act (Act III of 1916) with Speech 
of the Prime Minister (Mrs Besant) (Adyar, Vasanta Press, 
n.d.).
Madras Presidency Association:
Madura/Ramnad/Tinnevelly Group Conference on the 10th 
December 1917% Presidential Addressed delivered by 
George Joseph Esq., M.A., Bar-at-Law (no publ. details).
Rules and Office Bearers 1917 (Madras, Vavilla Press, 
1917).
Madras Provincial Congress Committee, Report of Executive 
Committee for the year ending 31 December 1919 (Madras, 
Varadachari, n.d.).
National Liberal Federation:
Third Session, Madras 1920, fL. A.] Govindaragha Aiyar’s 
Welcome Address (Madras. Central Co-operative Printing, 
n.d.).
Third Annual Session, Madras. 29 December 1920, 
Presidential Address of C. Y. Chintamani (no publ. 
details).
Nationalist Party, Programme April 1920 (Madras, Madras 
Nationalist Association, 1920)."'
Provincial and District Conferences: [arranged by provinces 
and districts in alphabetical order]
Report of the Second Andhra Conference. Bezwada, 11th 
and 12th April, 1914 (Bezwada. Reception Committee, n.d.).
Second Andhra Conference, Bezwada, 11th and 12th April, 
1914: "The Andhra Province” speech by M. Suryanarayana, 
B.A., lst-grade Pleader and Vice-President of Taluk 
Board. Vizianagram (no publ. details).
Bengal Provincial Conference, 1917. Presidential Address 
öf C. R. Das (Calcutta, Laiit Mohan Sen, n.d.).
Ninth Bihar Provincial Conference, Monghyr, 29 July 1917, 
Presidential Address of Khan Bahadur Sarfaraz Hussain 
Khan (Allahabad. C. Y. Chintamani. 1Q17).
Provincial and District Conferences:
Behar. Special Provincial Congress, 26 August 1917« 
Presidential Address" of Mr Syed Hasan Imam (Bankipore,
S. Narain Singh, 1917).
Report of the Proceedings of the Fifteenth Bombay 
Provincial Conference held at Poona on the 10th and 
11th July, 1915 (Poona, G. K. Deodhar, 1915) (copy 
held by SIS, Poona).
Seventeenth Bombay Provincial Conference, Nasik, 12th 
May 1917« Presidential Address of Hon. V. S. Srinivasa 
Sastri (Poona, Aryabhushan, 1917).
Eighteenth Bombay Provincial Conference, Bijapur, April 
25th, 1918, Presidential Address of Hon. Mr V. J. Patel 
( - , B. V. Press, n.d.).
Report of Fourth C.P. and Berar Provincial Conference, 
Nagpur, 16th - 18th November, 1915 (Nagpur, Reception 
Committee, n.d.).
The Sixth C.P. and Berar Provincial Conference, Raipur, 
April 1918, Address of Rai Bahadur D. N. Chaudhuri, 
Chairman of Reception Committee (no publ. details).
Cuddapah District Conference, 1917, Presidential Address 
of Mr T. V. Yenkatarama Aivar (Madras, India Printing, n.d.).
Report of the Twenty-second Madras Provincial Conference 
held at Madura, M a y 1916 (Madura, no other details)
(copy held at Madras Mahaj ana S abha).
Special Provincial Conference, Madras, 21st December, 
1917, Welcome Address of Mr S. Kasturiranga Iyengar, 
Chairman of Reception Committee (no publ. details).
The Third Malabar District Conference, Tellicherry,
6 - 7  May 1918, Presidential Address of Mir Asad Ali 
Khan Bahadur (Madras, Varadachari, 1918).
Fifth Malabar District Conference at Man.ieri, 1920, 
Presidential Address by S. Kasturiranga Iyengar (Madras, 
Addison Press, n.d.).
Fifth Pun.iab Provincial Conference, Lahore, 26 October 
1917, Chairman's Address of Lala Harkishen Lai (Lahore, 
Khosla Bros., 1917).
Special Punjab Provincial Conference, Amritsar, 27th and 
28th July, 1918, Presidential Address of Mr Dimi Chand 
(Lahore, Tribune Press, 1918).
Provincial and District Conferences:
Seventh Session, Sindh Provincial Conference« Sukkur,
3rd April 1920, English Version of Presidential Address 
of Seth Ha ni Ah doola Haro on (Kara chi. - . n.d.).
Seventh U. P. (Political) Conference« Fyzabad. October 
5th 1913V Draft Resolutions (no publ. details;.
The Eleventh U. P. Provincial Political Conference, 
Sitapur, 14 October 1917. Presidential Address of 
Gokaran Nath Misra (Lucknow, Anglo-Arabic Press/ 1917).
The fU. P.~l Special Provincial Congress. Lucknow, 10 
August 1917* Presidential Address of Hon. Pandit Mötilal 
Nehru (Allahabad/ Allahabad Law Journal Press. 1917).
Provincial Conferences [so-called; held by Extremists 
without authority of PCC]
[Report of Proceedings of] 16th Bombay Provincial- 
Conference held at Satara 26, 27« 28 April 1914 (Satara. 
Nyayadesh Press, 1914).
Report of 17th Provincial Conference, Poona, 8 - 1 0  May 1915 (Poona. - . n.d.).
Society for the Promotion of National Education: Draft 
Memorandum and List of Members of Governing Body. 23 
June 1917 (Advar, National Education Board. 1917).
Theosophical Society, Indian Section: Reports of the
Indian Section, Theosophical Society (Banaras, TPH, various years)
1911 to 1922.
C. PRIVATE PAPERS
1. Letters
A_dyar Archives, Theosophical Society, Adyar, Madras
Containing Mrs Annie Besant’s correspondence with 
G-okhale, Sapru and others; papers relating to the 
All-India Home Rule League I originally Home Rule for 
India League), and to Congress; her draft articles, 
and cuttings from printed and published material.
C. F. Andrews Papers, held at Rabindra-Sadana, Visva- Bharati, Santiniketan
Correspondence, 1915-1921, principally from Andrews to Tagore.
Letters:
W. L. Chiplunkar Papers, held at Theosophical Society,
Poona (President Mr G. R. Bhadbhade)
Letters to and from Tilak, 1920.
Kan.ii Dwarkadas Papers, held by Mr K. Dwarkadas, Bombay.
Letters from A. Besant, P. K. Telang and others,
1919-1927.
M. K. Gandhi Papers, held by (i) Gandhi Samarak Nidhi,
Delhi; (ii) Sabarmati Ashram, Ahmedabad. Photocopies 
held at National Archives of India, New Delhi.
Correspondence to and from Gandhiji; draft letters, 
resolutions, etc., by Gandhiji.
Moti Lall Ghose. Account of his interview with Montagu 
[l919] (typescript)* held at Adyar Archives.
G. K. Gokhale Papers, deposited by Servants of India 
Society, Poona at National Archives of India, New Delhi.
Letters to and from Gokhale.
Kasturi Ranga Iyengar Papers, copies held by Hindu office, 
Madras.
Letters to Vijiaraghavachariar, 1903-1922; from C.
Rajagopalachariar, 1919-1920.
N. C. Kelkar Papers, held by I. Y. and K. N. Kelkar, Poona.
Correspondence 1918-1919 (copies only seen).
G. S. Khaparde Papers, copies held at office of the History of the Freedom Movement Unit, Bombay.
Letters from Tilak, Pal and others, 1911-1922.
V. Krishnaswami Iyer Papers, copies held at the Servants 
of India Society, Madras.
Letters to and from Gokhale, V. S. S. Sastri and others.
Sir Pherozeshah Mehta Papers, held by Sir H. P. Mody, Bombay.
Inward correspondence from Wacha and many others,
1885-1915.
Sir Ben.iamin Robertson Papers, held by Dr D. A. Low.
A letter from Gandhi and one from Lord Minto.
Tej Bahadur Sapru Papers, held at the National Library of 
India, Calcutta.
Inward correspondence, 1920-1922.
Letters:
V. S. S. Sastri Papers, held at Servants of India Society, 
Madras.
Letters from V. S. S. Sastri, 1916-1920 (typescript 
copies).
D. D. Sathave Papers, held by his son Dr V. D. Sathaye, 
Poona.
Autobiographical note; Correspondence from Tilak 
and others, 1918-1919.
S. Satvamurti Papers, held by his daughter Mrs Lakshmi 
Krishnamurti, Madras.
Correspondence, 1919-1922.
Sachchidananda Sinha Papers, held by his son Mr Radha- 
krishna Sinha, Patna.
Correspondence, 1908-1940.
B. G-. Tilak Papers, held in the Kesari-Mahratta Trust, 
Poona.
Correspondence, 1901-1920.
C. Vi.iiaraghavachariar Papers, held by his grandson 
Mr R. T. Parthasarathy at Salem, Madras.
Correspondence, mainly from Vijiaraghavachariar,1901-1921.
II. Diaries and Memoirs
Besant, A., "Internment Diary" (handwritten diary, 1917, unpublished, in Adyar Archives).
Dwarkadas, Jamnadas, "A Memoire of Gandhiji" (unpublished 
memoirs held by the author, Bombay).
Karandikar, R. P., "Diary" (unpublished original held by 
the author*s son, Mr Vithal Karandikar, Poona).
Khaparde, G. S., "Diary" (extracts [copies] held by the 
History of the Freedom Movement Office, Bombay).
Khaparde, G. S., "Diary" (extracts [copies] held by the 
Kesari-Mahratta Trust, Poona).
Rai, Lajpat, "The Story of My Life" (unpublished memoirs 
in the keeping of Mr V. C. Joshi; written in New York, 
1914).
b42
Diaries and Memoirs:
Sastri, V. S. S., "Diaries”, 1913-1921 (held by the 
Servants of India Society, Madras).
Sathaye, D. D., "Autobiographical Note" (in his papers, 
held by his son Dr V. D. Sathaye, Poona).
Tilak, B. G-., "Diary”, Aug 1914 - Dec 1917 (held by 
Kesari-Mahratta Trust, Poona).
D. HISTORY OP THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT COLLECTIONS
Materials, principally unpublished, held in the Offices 
of the History of the Freedom Movement.
(a) Bombay Office:
"Achievements of Tilak Maharashtra Vidyapeeth" (unpub­
lished monograph).
"Contribution to Freedom Struggle by the Late Shri 
Shivaram Mahadeo Paranipye of Poona (1864-1929)" 
(unpublished monograph;.
"Contribution to Freedom Struggle in India by Shri 
N. C. Kelkar of Poona (1872-1947)" (unpublished mono­
graph) .
Gosavi, D. K., "Contribution to Freedom Struggle by 
Shri Krishnaji Prabhakar Khadilkar of Poona (1872- 
1948)" (unpublished monograph).
Government of Bombay, "History Sheet and General History of B. G. Tilak”, extracts from file no. 3074/H/l, Police 
Commissioner's Office, Bombay (other than extracts 
published in Source Material for a History of the Freedom 
Movement in India (Collectedfrom Bombay Government 
Records, 'll).
Gulamgeri. by Jyotiba Fule (translated extracts from 
original in Marathi).
"Labour Welfare Work in Gujarat" (unpublished monograph).
"Vasudeo Balwant and His Co-Workers" (unpublished 
monograph).
(For G. S. Khaparde materials held at this Office, see 
Sections CI, CII.)
(b) Delhi Office:
File nos. 
1-22/2 Sands, G. E. W., "Report on Silk Letter Conspiracy Case".
1-23/2 Report of Special Branch, Calcutta, 17 Oct 1914, on Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Ka'aba.
I1-2/2 Karandikar, J. G., "Note on Shivaji Festival", 
3 Feb 1955.
11-3/2 Barnouw, V., "The Changing Character of a Hindu Festival" in American Anthropological 
Journal, LVI, no. 1 (Feb 1954).
II-4/2 Bhat, Dr V. M., "Summary of the Abhinav Bharat or Savarkar’s Revolutionary Secret 
Organisation" (originally in Marathi).
II-19/2 Madhya Pradesh/CP Office, "Notes on the 
Congress Period from 1885 - 1919M*
VIII-1/2 Gurtu, Pt. Iqbal Narain, "Mrs Besant’s Contribution to the Indian Political Movement".
VIII-14/2 Extracts from Madras newspapers, 1910-1919» 
concerning Non-Brahmins.
A-31/2 Details of Nationalist activities in Ajmer, 
1888-1924: A. Banerji for Chief Commissioner, 
Ajmer, 17 May 1951*
Details of Home Rule movement in Madras 
Presidency: Reports to Inspector General of 
Police, Madras, based on local Police records, sent by:
District Superintendent Police, Bellary,
7 Sept 1950.
District Superintendent Police, Salem, 30 
Oct 1950.
B. N. Kalyana Rao, District Superintendent 
Police, Visakhapatnam, 31 Aug 1950.
P. Kuppaswami, District Superintendent Police 
Kozhikode, 31 July 19501
N. Ramaiah Pillai, District Superintendent 
Police, South Kanara, Mangalore, 4 Aug 1950.
History of the Freedom Movement Collections, Delhi Office:
B-35/2 "Subramania BharatiM (from review of book on 
him by Yadugiri Ammal: Bharathi Ninaivugal. 
Amudha Nilayam Ltd.) (review in Hindu, 9 Jan 
1955).
B-I44/2 Maulana Azad, extracts from Home Poll A, May 
1918, nos 627-45.
B-I45/2 Maulana Azad and the Silk Letter Conspiracy, 
extracts from Home Poll A, June 1919, nos 
517-25.
(c) West Bengal Office (at Calcutta):
Paper no. 121 "Life Sketch of Shri Byomkesh
Chakravarti”.
E. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
Dates indicate period consulted.
Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta daily; ed. Moti Lall 
Grhose): 1914-1920 (selected dates and subjects).
Held in Newspaper Room, National Library of India, 
Calcutta.
The Bombay Chronicle (Bombay daily; ed. B. G. Horniman 
[to April 1919], then D. Brelvi): 1915, 1919.
Held in Asiatic Society Library, Bombay.
.Central Hindu College Magazine (Banaras monthly; controlled 
by A. Besant): nos VII (1907) - XV (1915).
Copies held in Theosophical Society Library, Banaras.
Commonweal (Madras weekly; ed. A. Besant): 1914-1918.
Copies held in Theosophical Society Library, Adyar.
The Englishman (Calcutta weekly; British-owned):
1913-1914.
Held in Public Library of Victoria, Melbourne.
The Hindu (Madras daily: ed. S. Kasturi Ranga Iyengar):1910-1920.
Held in Madras University Library; Hindu Office (micro­
film).
Hindus than Review, formerly Kayastha Samachar (Allahabad/ 
Patna monthly; ed. S. Sinha): 1900, 19I6-I9I8 , 1946- 
1948.
Held in the Sinha Library, Patna.
Newspapers and Periodicals
The header (Allahabad daily; ed. C. Y. Ghintamani): 
1910-1920 (selected dates and subjects).
Held in Sinha Library, Patna; Servants of India Society, 
Poona.
Mahratta (Poona weekly; ed. N. C. Kelkar): 1914-1920.
Held in G-okhale Institute Library, Poona; Kesari- 
Mahratta Library, Poona.
The Modern Review (Calcutta monthly; ed. R. Chatterjee):
XV (Jan-June 1914), XXII-XXV (July 1917-June 1919).Held by the writer.
New India (Madras daily; ed. A. Besant): 1914-1920.
Held in Theosophical Society Libpary, Adyar.
The New Statesman (London weekly): 1919-1920.
Held in National Library of Australia, Canberra.
The Pioneer (Allahabad daily; British-owned): 1917.
Held in Public Library of Victoria, Melbourne.
Round Table (London quarterly): 1912-1920.
Held in Menzies Library, Australian National University.
Sarva.ianik Sab ha Quarterly Journal (Poona quarterly; ed.
N. C. Kelkar) new series: April1916-1918.
Held in G-okhale Institute Library, Poona.
The Searchlight (Patna daily; owned by S. Sinha): 1920. 
Held in Sinha Library, Patna.
The Theosophist, A Magazine of Brotherhood, Oriental 
Philosophy. Art, Literature and Occultism (Madras 
monthly; ed. A. Besant): XXIX (1907-08),XXXV-XXXVII 
(1914-1916), LI (1929), LIV, no. 2 (Apr-Sept 1933).Held in Theosophical Society Library, Sydney
Young India (Bombay weekly and bi-weekly; ed. J. Dwarkadas 
and P. K. Telang until Oct 1919> thereafter by G-andhi): 
May 1919 - Dec 1920.
Held by Shri Pyarelal Nayar, Delhi.
(for "Reports on Native Newspapers", see Section AI.)
P. OTHER PUBLISHED CONTEMPORARY MATERIALS ANDMEMOIRS
I. Speeches, Writings, Documents
Official addresses to organisations are listed under BII.
An Abominable Plot: Sir Subramaniam1s Letter to Dr Wilson (Adyar, Vasanta, n.d.).
Speeches, Writings, Documents:
Ali, Mohamed, Select Writings and Speeches of Maulana
Mohamed Ali (ed. by Iqbal Afzalj (Lahore, Ashraf,1944)•
Arundale, G. S., Home Rule for India (speech at Benares,
31 July 1916) (Home Rule Pamphlet Series No. 16)
(Adyar, Commonweal Office, 1916).
Arundale, G. S., National Education (Madras, Home Rule 
Book Shop, n.d.).
Arundale, G. S., The Spirit of Freedom (address to new 
graduates of University of Madras) (Adyar, TPH, 1917).
Arundale, G. S., Student-Citizenship (Presidential Address 
to First Convention of Bombay Presidency Students’ 
Federation 1917) (Adyar, TPH, 1917).
Aurobindo, Sri, The Doctrine of Passive Resistance
(Calcutta, Arya Publishing House, 1948) (articles from, 
or intended for, Bande Mataram. April 1907).
Banerjee, A. C., Indian Constitutional Documents (Calcutta, 
A. Mukherjee, 1945-46).
Baptista, J., The Constitution of India Act (Bombay 
National Union Series Pamphlet No. 2 ) (Bombay, A. B. 
Kolhatkar, 1916).
Besant, A., Annie Besant Builder of New India«: Her 
Fundamental Principles of Nation Building (Adyar. TPH, 
1942) [extracts from articles, writings, speeches].
Besant, A., The Besant Spirit III: Indian Problems:
Compiled mainly from the Writings of Dr Annie Besant 
(Adyar, TPH, 1939).
Besant, A., The Besant Spirit IV: A Charter of A Nation’s 
Liberty: Being the Presidential Address to the Indian 
National Congress. 1917 (Adyar. TPH. 1939).
Besant, A., A Bird’s Eye View of India’s Past as the 
Foundation for India’s Future (Adyar, TPH. 1930 (1st 
published 1915^).
Besant, A., The Birth of New India: A Collection of 
Writings and Speeches on Indian Affairs (Adyar. TPH. 
1917).
Besant, A., Britain’s Place in the Great Plan (London,TPH, 1921)"
Speeches, Writings, Documents:
Besant, A., The [Commonwealth of India] Bill (Madras, 
Commonwealth of India League, 1925).
Besant, A., The Commonwealth of India Bill: Its Journey 
from MadralTto the House of Commons (Madras, Common­
wealth of India League, 1920')'."
Besant, A., Dr Nair and Annie Besant (Supplement to Adyar 
Bulletin, Sept 1913) (Adyar, Vasanta, 1913)«
Besant, A., England. Afghanistan and India [written 1879] 
(Madras, - ,1931;•
Besant, A., England and India (Adyar Pamphlet No. 34) 
(Adyar, TPH , 1906>).
Besant, A., Essays on Socialism (London, R. Porder, 1893)*
Besant, A., Por Indians Uplift: A Collection of Speeches 
and Writings on Indian Questions (Madras, Natesan, 1917).
Besant, A., fPor India's Uplift]: Speeches and Writings,
3rd edition (Madras, Natesan, 1921).
Besant, A., The Future of Young India (Presidential Address 
to Behar Students* Conference, Muzaffarpur, 9 Oct 1915) 
(’’New India*1 Political Pamphlet No. 4) (Adyar, TPH,
1915).
Besant, A. (ed), Gandhian Non-Co-operation or, Shall 
India Commit Suicide? A Vade-mecum against Non-Co­
operation for all Indian Patriots (Madras, New India, 
1920).
Besant. A., Hindu Reform on National Lines (Adyar, TPH, 
1932).
Besant, A., Home Rule: Series of Articles from **New India1* 
(Home Rule Pamphlet Series No. 8) (Madras, Commonweal 
Office, 1916).
Besant. A., Home Rule and The Empire (Madras, Besant Press, 
n.d.) ralso published (’’New India” Political Pamphlet 
No. 13) (Adyar, Commonweal Office, 1917)].
Besant. A., How India Wrought for Freedom (Madras, TPH, 
1915). ~
Besant, A., India: A Nation, A Plea for Indian Self- 
Government (with a Foreword by C. IT. Ram as wain i Aiyar) 
(London, T. C. & E. C. Jack, [1915]).
*• L»4o
Speeches, Writings, Documents:
Besant, A., India and the Empire: A Lecture and Various 
Papers on Indian Grievances (London, TPH,' 1914).
Besant, A., India Bond or Free? A World Problem (London, 
Putnam *s, 1926).
Besant, A., India. (Essays and Addresses) (London, 
Theosophical Publishing Society, 1913), IV.
Besant, A., The Indian Government (reprinted from
Commonweal) (Home Rule Series No. 20) (Adyar, Vasanta, 
[1917]).
Besant, A., The Political Outlook (Presidential Address 
to 1915 UP Provincial Conference) ("New India” Political 
Pamphlet Ho. 2) (Adyar, Vasanta, [1915]).
Besant, A., Preparation for Citizenship (address to
Students Conference, Hellore, l6 June 1916) ("Hew India” 
Political Pamphlet Ho. 9) (Adyar, Vasanta, [1916]).
Besant, A., The Report [of Joint Select Committee 1919]: 
What We Have Gained (London, United India Co., n.d.).
Besant, A., Self-Government for India ("New India” 
Political Pamphlet No. l) [Adyar, Vasanta, 1915).
Besant, A., Social Service (speech 28 June 1916) (”New 
India” Political Pamphlet No. 10) (Adyar, Vasanta, 
[1916]).
Besant, A., Under the Congress Flag (Presidential Address 
at First Malabar District Conference 8 May 1916)
('"New India” Political Pamphlet No. 7) (Adyar, Vasanta, 
1916).
Besant, A., United India (reprinted from the Indian Review 
[Oct 1913]]! (Madras, Natesan, n.d.).
Besant, A., Wake Up. India: A Plea for Social Reform 
(Adyar, TPH, 1913).
Besant, A. and Leadbeater, C. W., Man:Whence« How and 
Whither (Adyar, TPH, 1910).
Bhate, G. S., Rationale of Self-Government (Indian 
Liberal Club Pamphlet No. 2) (Bombay, Indian Liberal 
Club, Servants of India Society, 1917).
Bombay Anti-Bon-Co-operation Committee, Pamphlets
(Pamphlet No. 1 by Sir N. Chandavarkar; Pamphlet No. 3> 
"Education and Non-Co-operation”; Pamphlet No. 4» 
"Commerce and Politics”) (Bombay, N. M. Joshi, 1920).
Bose, N. K. (ed), Selections from Gandhi (Ahmedabad, 
Navajivan, 1957).
Speeches, Writings, Documents:
Chakravarti, B., Chairman of Reception Committee of 1920 
Calcutta Congress, "Non-Co-operation? - Yes!H. Interview 
with ’The Looker On', 4 Sept 1920, extract from news­
paper fAmrita Bazar Patrika?]. p. 18.
Chatterjee, R., Towards Home Rule (ed. and mostly written 
by R. Chatterjee) (Calcutta, Modern Review, 1919)«
Chatterjee, R.. Towards Home Rule (Calcutta, Modern 
Review, 1919), III.
Chidambaram Pillai, V. 0., A Warning to the Madras and 
Southern Mahratta Railway'"Labourers (translated from 
Tamil) ("Labourer No. 4") (Perambur, - , 1920).
Congress Presidential Addresses from the Silver to the 
Golden Jubilee (Madras, Natesan, 1934 and 1935), I 
(1885-1910) and II (1911-1934).
Congress Speeches on Self-Government (Home Rule Series 
No. 1) (Adyar, A. Besant, 1916).
Curtis, L., Papers Relating to the Application of the 
Principle of Dyarchy to the Government of India ( -, 0DP 1920).
Das, C. R., Deshabandu Chitta Ran j an [Das]: Brief Survey 
of Life and Work. Provincial Conference Speeches. 
Congress Speeches (Calcutta. Ra.ien Sen. 1926).
Das, C. R., India for Indians (Madras, Ganesh, 1917). Speeches 1917-1918.
Devadhar, G. K., Joshi, N. M. and Thakker, A. V., Report 
of an Inquiry into the Agricultural Situation in Kaira (Bombay, SIS, 1918).
Dutt, R. C., Open Letters to Lord Curzon and Speeches and 
Papers (Calcutta, R. P. Mitra, 1904).
Pull and Authentic Report of the Tilak Trial (1908):
Being the Only Authorised Verbatim Account of the 
Whole Proceedings with Introduction and Character 
Sketch of Bal Gangadhar Tilak together with Press 
Opinion (Poona. N. Q. Kelkar. 1908).
Gandhi, M. K., The Gandhi Reader (ed. by Homer Jack) 
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1956).
Gandhi, M. K., Gokhale My Political Guru (Ahmedabad,
Navajivan, 1955).
Gandhi, M . K., Hind Swaraj. or Indian Home Rule
(Ahmedabad, Navajivan, 1946) [first published 1909).
Speeches, Writings, Documents:
Gandhi, M . K ., Letters to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel 
(Ahmedabad, Navajivan, 1957).
Gandhi, M. K., My Socialism (Ahmedabad, Navajivan, 1959).
Gandhi, M . K., Ruskin MUnto This Last” A Paraphrase
fSarvodayal (Ahmedabad, Nava;jivan,195£> [first published 
1904]). '
Gandhi, M . K., Satyagraha: Translation of the original 
in Gu.iarati (Bombay, S. G. Banker and U. Sobhani, 1917).
Gandhi, M. K., Satya.graha (Bombay, HRIL Branch, [1919]).
Gandhi, M . K ., Satyagraha. in Gandhiji's Ov/n Words (1910 
to 1935) (Allahabad, AIOC, 1958).
Gandhi, M. K., Speeches and Writings of Mahatma Gandhi,
4th edition (Madras, Natesan, 1933).
Gandhi. M. K., Young India, 1919-1922 (Madras, Tagore, 
1922).
Gandhi, M. K., Young India 1919-1922 (Supplement) (Madras, 
Ganesan, 1924).
Gokhale, G. K., Bast and West in India (paper read in 
London, July 1911) ("New India" Political Pamphlet No.
5) (Adyar, Vasanta, [1916]).
Gokhale, G. K., Gokhale*s Speeches and Writings (ed. by 
R. P. Patwardhan and D. V. Ambekar), I (Economic)
(Poona, Deccan Sabha, 1962).
How India Can Save the Empire: A Collection of theSpeeches delivered by the Members of the Indian Depu­
tation and Other Leaders on the Present Situation and 
the Future Work Before Us (with a Foreword by B. P.
Wadia) (Madras, Ganesh, [1918]).
Hyndman, H. M., The Truth About India (Madras, Ganesan, 
n.d.).
India’s Claim for Home Rule (Madras, Ganesh, 1917).
The Indian Demands: A Symposium on the Memorandum of the 
Nineteen and Speeches at the Congress and Moslem League 
on Their Scheme of Self-Government for India (intro­
duction by G. A. Natesan) (Madras, Natesan, [1917]).
Jinnah, M. A., Mohomed [sic] Ali Jinnah An Ambassador of 
Unity: His Speeches and Writings, 1912-17 (with a 
Foreword by Sarojini Naidu) (Madras, Ganesh, n.d.).
Speeches, Writings, Documents:
Montagu, E. S., The Rt. Hon. Mr E. S. Montagu on Indian 
Affairs (with a Foreword by Dr Sir S. Subramanya Aiyer, 
K.C.I.E., LL.D.) (Madras, G-anesh, n.d.).
Morley. J., Speeches on Indian Affairs (Madras, Natesan,
n.d.).
Naoroji, Dadabhai, Discontent in India (reprinted from 
Welby Commission Report, 1897) (Madras, Home Rule Book 
Shop, n.d.).
Naoroji, Dadabhai, The Indian Civil Service (speech to 
East India Association, July 1897) (Adyar, Vasanta, n.d.)
Nehru, J., A Bunch of Old Letters Written Mostly to
Jawaharlal Nehru and some Written by Him (Bombay. Asia,
1960)“.
Nehru, M., The Voice of Freedom: Selected Speeches of Pt. 
Motilal Nehru (ed. by K. M. Pamnikkar and A. Pershad)
{with a Foreword by Dr S. Radhakrishnan) (Bombay, Asia,
1961).
Norton, Eardley, The India Council: To End or to Mend? 
(Resolution LV at Tenth Indian National Congress, 1894) 
("New India” Political Pamphlet No. 6) (Adyar, Vasanta, 
[1916]).
On the Duty of Civil Disobedience (Madras, Vedam, n.d.).
Pal, B . C., Nationality and Empire: A Running Study of 
Some Current Indian Problems (Calcutta. Thacker,Spink, 1916).
Pal, B. C., Responsible G-overnment (Calcutta, Banner]ee,
Das & Co., 1917)".
Pal, B. C., Swadeshi and Swaraj (The Rise of New Patriotism) 
(Calcutta, Jnananjan Pal, 1954).
Petition about the Internment (text of Petition lodged in 
the Privy Council on Mrs 3esant's behalf, during her 
internment, by Sir John Simon, and others) (London,
Humphrie s,1917).
Pradhan, R. 0.. Observations on Indian Home Rule (Poona, author, 1916).
The Present Crisis (Adyar, Commonweal Office, 1918).
Questions and Answers: On Besant Policy (National HRL 
Pamphlet No. 1^) (Adyar, Vasanta, [1*921]).
«5
Speeches, Writings, Documents:
Rai, Lajpat, Young India: An Interpretation and a History 
of the Nationalist Movement from Within (Lahore,
Servants of the People Society, 1927).
Ranade, M. G., The Wisdom of A Modern Rishi: Writings and 
Speeches of Liahadev G-ovind Ranade with an Address on 
Rishi Ranade by the Rt. Hon'ble V. S.S. Sastri (ed. by 
T. N. Jagadisan) (Madras, Rochouse & Sons, n.d.).
Rizvi, S. A. A., The Congress Rebellion in Azamgarh, Aug.- 
Sept. 1942, as recorded in the Diary of the late R. H. 
Niblett (with a Foreword by A, N. Jha) (Allahabad, 
Superintendent Government Printing, 1957).
Sastri, V. S. S., Letters of V. S. Srinivasa Sastri (ed. 
by T. N. Jagadisan) (Madras, Rochouse & Sons, 1944).
Sastri, V. S. S., ftMy Master Gokhale”: A Selection from 
the Speeches and Writings of the Rt. Hon’ble V. S. 
Srinivasa Sastri (ed." by T. N. Jagadisan) (Madras,
Model Publications, 1946).
Sastri, V. S. S., Self-Government for India under the 
British Plag (SIS Political Pamphlet No. l") (Allahabad, 
SIS, 1916).
Subramania Aiyer, S., India’s Claim for Home Rule (Madras, 
Ganesh, 1917).
Subramania Aiyer, S., Speeches and Writings of Dr (Sir)
S. Subramania Iyer (Madras, Murthy, n.d.), Part I: 
Political and Educational.
Subramania Aiyer, S., Young India ("New India" Political 
Pamphlet No. 12) (Adyar, Vasanta, n.d.).
The Swadeshi Movement: A Symposium: Views of Represen­
tative Indians and Anglo-Indians (Madras, Natesan,
1917).
Thadani, R. V. (comp), The Historic State Trial of the 
Ali Brothers and Five Others (Karachi. Thadani, 1921).
Thoreau, H. D., The Works of Thoreau (ed. by H. S. Canly) 
(Cambridge, Mass., Houghton Mifflin, 1937;.
Tilak, B. G., All About Lok. Tilak (with a Foreword by 
Mr Joseph Baptista) (Madras, Sastrulu, 1922). Appendix 
D: "Speeches and Writings”.
Tilak, B. G., A Step in the Steamer [and other speeches] 
(prelude by D. A. Tulzapurkar et al) (Bombay, National 
Bureau, 1918).
Speeches, Writings, Documents:
Tilak, B. G., Bal Gangadhar Tilak: His Writings and 
Speeches (with an Appreciation by Aurobindo Ghose) 
(Madras, Ganesh, 1919)*
Varadarajalu Naidu, P., The National Pharma: Life,
Speeches and Writings of Dr P. Varadarajulu Naidu 
(Salem, Tamil Nadu Go., 1948).
Yijiaraghavachariar, G., Swaraj Constitution (address to 
Indian National Congress, 1927) (Madras, National Press, 
1927).
Vyasa Rao, K., Story of a Blunder (with a Foreword by 
Sir Subramania Aiyer) (Madras, Ganesh, 1917).
Wacha, D. E., Speeches and Writings (Madras, Natesan,[1920]).
Whitehead, H., National Christianity in India (Madras, 
Christian Literature Society for India, 1911).
Wilson, Dr Woodrow, Freedom and Democracy: America’s 
Ideal (Wilson’s address to U.S. Congress, April 1917)
("New India” Political Pamphlet No. 15) (Madras,
Yasanta, n.d.).
II. Memoirs, Autobiographies
Aga Khan, The Memoirs of Aga Khan: World Enough and Time 
(London, Cassell, 1954).
Amery, L. S., My Political Life (London, Hutchinson, 1953) II and III.
Azad, Abul Kalam, India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical 
Narration (Calcutta, Orient Longmans, 1959).
Banerjea, Sir S., A Nation in Making, Being the Remin­
iscences of 50 Years of Public Life (Madras, OUP. 1925).
Banerji, N. C., At the Cross Roads (1885-1946)(Calcutta.
A. Mukherjee, n.d. [preface 1950J).
Besant. A., Autobiography, 2nd edition (London, Unwin, 
1917).
Casey, R. G., An Australian in India (London, Hollis & Carter, 1947).
Chaudhuri, N. C., The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian 
(London, Macmillan, 1951).
Memoirs, Autobiographies
Cousins, J. H. and M. E., We Two Together (Madras, Ganesh, 
1950).
Deshpande, Gangadharrao. The Story of My Life (Bombay,
Manj, Prakashan, I960; [in Marathi, kindly translated 
for the writer by Dr U. Mahajani].
Dwarkadas, Kanji, 45 Years with Labour (Bombay, Asia,
1962).
Gandhi, M. K., An Autobiography, or The Story of My 
Experiments with Truth (Ahmedabad, NavajiVanY 1940).
Gandhi, M. K., Satyagraha in South Africa (Ahmedabad,
Nava jivan, 1928).
Hardinge, C. H. baron, My Indian Years 1910-1916 (London, 
Murray, 1948).
Jayakar, M. R., The Story of My Life (Bombay, Asia, 1958),
I, II.
Karandikar, R. P., The Diary of the Late Raghunath 
Pandurang alias Dadasaheb Karandikar (comp, by V. R. 
Karandikar) (Satara, compiler, 1962) [in Marathi, extracts in the original English].
Khaliquzzaman, C., Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore, Longmans,1961).
Khare, N. B., My Political Memoirs or Autobiography 
( - , J. R. Joshi, 1959).
Maulana Mohamed Ali, My Life a Fragment: An Autobiographical 
Sketch of Maulana Mohamed Ali (Lahore, Ashraf. 1942).
Montagu, E. S., An Indian Diary (London, Heinemann, 1930).
Morley. J. M., viscount, Recollections (London, Macmillan,
1921).
Munshi, K. M., Autobiography (Bombay, Bharatiya Vidya 
Bhavan, n .d.) [in Gujarati, kindly translated for the 
writer by the author].
Munshi, K. M., I Follow the Mahatma (Bombay, Allied 
Publishers, 1940).
Nehru, J., An Autobiography; with Musings on Recent Events 
in India (London, Lane, 1936).
Nehru, J., The Discovery of India (Bombay, Asia, 1961).
Memoirs, Autobiographies
Nehru, J., Toward Freedom: The Autobiography of Jawaharlal 
Nehru (New York, John Day, 1941).
O’Dwyer, Sir M., India As I Knew It: 1885-1925 (London, 
Constable, 192 5T.
Pal, B. C., Memories of My Life and Times (Calcutta,
Modern Book Agency. 1932), I; (Yugayatri Prakashak,
1951), II (1886-1900).
Prasad, Rajendra, Autobiography (Bombay, Asia, 1957).
Prasad, Rajendra, Mahatma Gandhi and Bihar: Some 
Reminiscences (Bombay, Hind Kitabs, 1949)•
Prasad. Rajendra, Satyagraha in Champaran (Madras, Canesan,
1928).
Ranga Iyer, C. S., A Voice from Prison (Madras, Canesh, n.d.
Ray, P. C., Indian National Congress. A New Chapter 
(Calcutta, 15 Peb 1916).
Reed, Sir Stanley, The India I Knew: 1897-1947 (London, 
Odhams, 1952).
Dr Sachchidananda Sinha, ’’Recollections and Reminiscences”, 
published in Hindustan Review. 1946-1948.
Sastri, Rt. Hon’ble V. S. S., ’’Aspects of My Life”,
translated by S. V. R. and S. V. H. and S. R. Venkata- 
raman, in Sunday Times (Madras), 3 May 1959 to 27 Dec 
1959.
Sathaye, D. D., My Recollections of the Congress and 
Lok. Tilak (Poona, V. D. Sathaye, 1956) Lin Marathi, 
kindly translated for the writer by the author's son,
Dr V. D. Sathaye].
Shraddhanand, Swami, Inside Congress (Bombay, Phoenix,
1946).
Subhas Chandra Bose, The Indian Struggle. 1920-1934 
(Calcutta, Thacker, Spink, 1948).
Sydenham, £. S. C., 1st baron, My Working Life (London,
- , 1927).
Templewood, viscount, Nine Troubled Years (London, Collins, 
1954).
Yajnik, I. K., Gandhi As I Know Him (Bombay, G-. Bhat, n.d. 
Lc. 1931]) and (Delhi, Danish Mahal, 1943).
Zetland, L. J. L. D., marquis, Essayez. the Memoirs of 
Lawrence, Second Marauis of Ze11and (London, Murray.
g . SECONDARY WORKS
I. Biographies, Biographical Dictionaries
Adam, C. F., Life of Lord Lloyd (London, Macmillan,
1948).
All About Lok. Tilak - see Tilak, B. G., Section FI.
Asylum Press Almanack and Directory of Madras and South- 
era India. 1922 (Madras, Associated Printers, 1922).
Athalye, D. V., The Life of Lokamanya Tilak (with a 
Foreword by C. R. Das) (Poona, Annasahibchiploonkar, 
1921).
Baljin, J. M. S. Jnr., The Reforms and Religious Ideas 
of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (Lahore, Orlentalia, 1958).
Bannerjea, D. N., India's Nation Builders (New York, 
Brentano's, n.d. [c. 1919J).
Bapat, S. Y. (ed), Reminiscences and Anecdotes of 
Lokamanya Tilak (Poona, S. V. Bapat. 1925), II;
(with a Foreword by Dr Annie Besant) (Poona, S. V. 
Bapat, 1928), III.
Mrs Annie Besant (Madras, Natesan, n.d.).
Bhat, V. G., Lokamanya Tilak (His Life, Mind, Politics 
and Phi1o s o phy) C Poona, Prakash, 1956).
Birla, G. D., In the Shadow of the Mahatma, A Personal 
Memoir (Bombay, Orient Longmans, 1953)»
Bolitho, H., Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan (London, Murray, 
1954).
Brecher, M., Nehru: A Political Biography (London, OUP, 
1959).
Sir Narayan Chandavarkar: A Sketch of His Life and 
Career (Madras. Natesan. 1918).
Chandavarkar, G. L., A Wrestling Soul: Story of the
Life of Sir Narayan~handavarkar (Bombay, Popular Book 
Depot, [1955]).
Chaturvedi, B. and Sykes, M., Charles Freer Andrews:
A Narrative (London, Allen & Unwin, 1949).
Cowles, Y., Winston Churchill: The Era and The Man 
(London, H. Hami1ton, 1953).
Das Gupta, H. N., Deshbandu Chittaran.ian Das (Delhi, 
Publications Divn., Government of India, i960).
Biographies, Biographical Dictionaries
Desai, M. H., Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the President of 
the Indian National Congress: A Biographical Memoir 
(Agra, Shiva Lai Agarwala, 1945) .
Dictionary of Biography of Modern Times (1818-1945)
~(ed. byChitrav) (Poona, Chitrav, 194^5, III [in Marathi, selected entries kindly translated for the 
writer By Mr M. V. Sovani, Gokhale Institute, Poona.].
Dictionary of National Biography (London, OUP, various 
years).
Dutt, Paramananda, Memoirs of Moti Lai Ghose (Calcutta, 
Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1935).
Dwarkadas, Kanji, G-andhi,ii Through My Diary Leaves. 
1915-1948 (Bombay, author, 1950).
Dwarkadas, Kanji, Rut tie Jinnah: The Story of a. (Great 
Friendship (Bombay, author, n.d.).
Felton, M., I Meet Ra.ia.ii (London, Macmillan, 1962).
Harris, F. R., Jamset.ii Nusserwan.ii Tata: A Chronicle 
of His Life (Bombay, Blackie, 1958).
Heroes of the Hour. Mahatma G-andhi, Tilak Mahara.i. Sir 
Subramanya Iyer (with a Foreword by A. Besant) (Madras, 
Ganesh, n.d. [1918]).
Holmes, W. H. G., The Twofold Gandhi: Hindu Monk and 
Revolutionary Politician (London. A. R. Mowbray. 1952).
Husain, M. A., Fazl-I-Husain: A Political Biography 
(Bombay, Longmans Green, 194*5).
Indian Leaders of Today (Karachi, Laxman Jairam, n.d.), II.
The Indian Nation Builders (Madras, Ganesh, n.d.),
I (3rd edition, 11921?'!]), II (6th edition), III (3rd 
edition, [1921?]).
The Indian Year Book and Who1s Who 1937-38 (Bombay,Bennett, Coleman, 1938).
Jeejeebhoy, J. R. B., Dr Sir Chimanlal H. Setalvad: A 
Biography (Bombay, C. H. Mehta, 1939)•
Joshi, V. S., Vasudeo Balvant Phadke: First Indian Rebel 
Against British Rule (Bombay. D. S. Marathe. 1959).
Kabir, Humayun (ed), Maulana Abul Kalam Azad: A Memorial 
Volume (Bombay, Asia, 1959).
Biographies, Biographical Dictionaries
Karandikar, S. L., Lokamanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak: the 
Hercules and Prometheus' of Modern India (Poona, author, 
1957).
Kelkar, N. C., Landmarks in Lokamanya1s Life (Madras, 
G-anesan, 1924)•
Kellock, J., Mahadev Govind Ranade, Patriot and Social 
Servant (Calcutta, Association Press, 1926).
Khair, Syed Abul, Short Life of Mohammad Ali (Patna, 
Dineshwar Jha, 1935).
Kodanda Rao, P., The Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastri,
A Political Biography (Bombay, Asia, 1963).
Latthe, A. B.f Memoirs of His Highness Shri Shahu
Chhatrapati, Maharaja of Kolhapur (Bombay. Times Press, 
1924), I and II.
Mahadevan, P., Subramania Bharati. Patriot and Poet: A 
Memoir (Madras, Atri Publishers, 1957).
Masani, R. P., Dadabhai Naoro.ii (’’Builders of Modern 
India” Series, I) (Delhi, Publications Divn., Govern­
ment of India, I960).
Masani, R. P., Dadabhai Naoro.ii: The Grand Old Man of 
India (London, Allen & Unwin, 1939).
Matthew, A. V., Karmaveer Bhaurao Patil: An Amazing Story 
of Leadership and Organisation in Rural Education 
(Satara, Rayat Shikshan Sanstha, 1957).
G. V. Mavalankar. Father of the Lok Sabha (Ahmedabad, 
Harold Laski Institute of Political Science, 1957).
Jamshed Nusserwaniee [Mehta]: A Memorial (Karachi,
Jamshed Memorial Volume Committee, 1954).
Mersey, C. B. viscount, The Viceroys and Governors- 
General of India. 1757-1947 (London. Murray. 1949).
Mody, H. P., Sir Pherozeshah Mehta: A Political Biography 
(Bombay, The Times Press, 1921), I and II.
i ‘ jMorley, Mary, countess of, India.Minto and Morley 1905- 
1910 (London, Macmillan, 1934).
Rao Bahadur R. N. Mudholkar: A Sketch of His Life and 
His Services to India (Madras. Natesan. n.d.).
Mukerjee, H., Gandhiii: A Study (New Delhi, People’s 
Publishing House, I960).
Biographies, Biographical Dictionaries
Munshi at Seventy-Five: Volume of Articles on the various 
facets of Dr K. M. Munshi by his contemporaries (with 
a Foreword by Dr Rajendra Prasad) (Bombay, Dr K. M. 
Munshi*s 76th Birthday Celebrations Committee, 1962).
Munshi His Art and Work: Fifty Years of Politics (Bombay, 
Shri K. M. Munshi 70th Birthday Citizens Celebrations 
Committee, 1956), II.
Nair, L. R., Motilal Nehru Birth Centenary Souvenir (New 
Delhi, Motilal Nehru Centenary Committee, 1961).
[Nair, T. M.], the Editor of Justice. Evolution of Mrs 
Besant. Being the Life and Public Activities of Mrs 
Annie Besant (Madras. Justice. 1918).
Nanda, B. R., Mahatma Gandhi: A Biography (London, Allen 
& Unwin, 1959).
Nanda, B. R., The Nehrus. Motilal and Jawaharlal (London, 
Allen & Unwin, 1962).
Nehru, J., Mahatma Candhi (Calcutta, Signet Press, 1949).
Nethercot, A. H., The First Five Lives of Annie Besant 
(London, Hart-Davis, 1961).
Nethercot, A. H., The Last Four Lives of Annie Besant 
(London, Hart-Davis, 1963).
Nicolson, H., Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925: A Study 
in Post-War Diplomacy (London. Constable. 1934).
Pal, B. C., Character Sketches (Calcutta, Yugayatri, 1957).
Paranjpye, R. P., Copal Krishna Cokhale (Poona, A. V. 
Patwardhan, 1915).
Parikh, N. D., Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (Ahmedabad, 
Navajivan, 1953 and 1956), I and II.
Parthasarathy, R. T., Dawn and Achievement of Indian 
Freedom Being the Life and Times of Dr C. Vi.iiaragha- 
vachariar - Patriotand Thinker (Salem. Court Press. 
1953).
Parvate, T. V., Bal Cangadhar Tilak: A Narrative and 
Interpretative Review of His Life. Career and Con­
temporary Events (Ahmedabad. Nava1ivan. 1958).
Parvate, T. V.. Copal Krishna Cokhale: A Narrative and 
Interpretative Review of His Life. Career and Con­
temporary E ven t s (Ahm e d ab ad. Na va .i i van. 1959).
Parvate, T. V., Jamnalal Baia.i l~A Brief Study of His Life 
and CharacterIC Ahmedabad. Navaiivan ~ 1QfiP V.
Biographies, Biographical Dictionaries
Patel, G. I., Vithalbhai Patel: Life and Times (Bombay, 
Laxmi Narayan Press, n.d. [preface 1950]), I and II.
Polak, H. S. L. et al.. Mahatma Gandhi (London, Odhams, 
1949).
Pradhan, G. P. and Bhagwat, A. K., Lokamanya Tilak: A 
Biography (Bombay, Jaico, 1958).
Prakasa, Sri, Annie Besant (Bombay, Bharatiya Vidya 
Bhavan, 195 4).
Ramaswami Aiyar, C. P., Annie Besant (Delhi, Publications 
Divn., Government of India, 1963).
Ram Rao, Rao Sahib S. M. Raja, Sir Subramania Aiyer.
K.C.I.B.: A Biographical Sketch '(flrichinopoly, Wednesday 
Review Press, 1914).
Ratcliffe, S. K., Sir William Wedderburn and the Indian 
Reform Movement (London, Allen & Unwin, 1923).
Ray, P. C., Life and Times of C. R. Das: The Story of 
Bengal's Self-Expression (London. PUP, 1927).
Reading, G. P. I., 2nd marquis, Rufus Reading. 1st 
Marquess of Reading (London, Hutchinson, 1945).
Saiyid, M. H., Mohammad Ali Jinnah (A Political Study) 
(Lahore, Ashraf, 1945).
Srinivasa Iyengar, K. R.. Sri Aurobindo (Calcutta, Arya 
Publishing House, 1945).
Tahmankar, D. V., Lokamanya Tilak: Father of Indian
Unrest and Maker of Modern India (London. Murray. 1956)
Tandon, P. D. (ed), Acharya J. B. Kripalani (Bombay,
Hind Kitabs, 1948).
Tendulkar, D. G., Mahatma. Life of Mohandas Karamchand 
Gandhi (Bombay, V. K. Khaveri and author, 1951),
I (1869-1920) and II (1921-1929).
Thacker's Indian Directory (Calcutta, Thacker, Spink, 
various years), 1917-18 and 1923 editions.
Vasudeva, P. L., 200 Great Indians: Biographies (Delhi, 
Capital Book Co., n.d. [c. 1949]).
Wacha, D. E., Reminiscences of the late Hon. Mr G. K. 
Gokhale (Bombay, Port Printing Press, 1915).
Biographies, Biographical Dictionaries
Wedderhurn, W., Allan Octavian Hume. »Father of the 
Indian National Con.gressn. 1829 to 1912 (London,
Fisher Unwin, 1913).
Who * s Who (London, A. and G. Black, various years),
1914, 1929-1940, 1941-1950 editions.
Vfho's Who in India containing Lives and Portraits of 
Ruling Chiefs. Nobles. Titled Personages, and other 
Eminent Indians Ced. by ?. N. Bhargava) (Lucknow,
Newul Kishore Press, 1911), 1 and II.
Wolpert, S. A., Tilak and Gokhale: Revolution and Reform 
in the Making of M o d e m  India (Berkeley & Los Angeles, 
University of California Press, 1962).
Zetland, L. J. L., 2nd marquis, The Life of Lord Curzon 
(New York, Boni & Liveright, 1928).
II. General Works
More important works marked *
Aga Khan, India in Transition: A Study in Political 
Evolution (Bombay. Bennett, Coleman, 1918).
Alexander, H., et al., Social and Political Ideas of 
Mahatma Gandhi (Madras, PUP. 1949).
Andrews, C. P., India and Britain: A Moral Challenge 
(London, SCM Press, 1935).
♦Andrews, C. P., Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas Including
Selections from His Writings (with an Introduction 
by H. G. Alexander) (London, Allen & Unwin, 1929)*
♦Andrews, C. P. and Mukerii, C., The Rise and Growth of 
the Congress in India (London, Allen & Unwin, 1938).
Anstey, V., The Economic Development of India (London, 
Longmans Green, 1942).
♦Baden-Powell. B. H., The Land-Systems of British India 
(OUP, 1892), III.
♦Bagal, J. C., History of the Indian Association (Calcutta, 
Harendra Nath Mazumdar, 1953).
♦Barns, M ., The Indian Press: A History of the Growth 
of Public Opinion in India (Liverpool, Allen & Unwin.
1940).
General Works
Basham, A. L., The Wonder That Was India (London,
Sidgwick & Jackson, 1956).
Bevan, E., Thoughts on Indian Discontents (London, Allen 
& Unwin, 1929;.
*Bhattacharya, B. K., A Short History of the Indian 
National Congress (Calcutta, Book Emporium, 1943).
*Bondurant, J., Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian 
Philosophy of Conflict (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1958).
Bose, N. K., Modern Bengal (Calcutta, Vidyodaya Library 
Private Ltd., 1959)•
*Bose, N. K., Studies in Gandhism (Calcutta, author, 1962).
Brown, D. Mackenzie, The White Umbrella: Indian Political 
Thought from Manu to Gandhi (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
University of California Press, 1953;.
Buch, M. A., Rise and Growth of Indian Militant
Nationalism (Baroda. Atmaram Printing Press.1940).
Buchanan, D. H., The Development of Capitalistic Enter­
prise in India (New York, Macmillan, 1934).
*Case, C. M., Non-Violent Coercion: A Study in Methods 
of Social Pressure (New York, Century Co.. 1923).
*Chakrabarty, D. C. and Bhattacharyya, C. (compilers), 
Congress in Evolution (Calcutta, The Book Co., 1935).
Chib, S. N ., Language. Universities and Nationalism in 
India (London, OUP, 1936).
Chintamani, Sir C. Y., Indian Politics Since the Mutiny: 
Being an Account of the Development of Public Life and 
Political Institutions and of Prominent Personalities 
(Allahabad, Kitabistan, 1937).
Chirol, Sir V., Indian Unrest (London, Macmillan, 1910).
*Cole, G. D. H., British Working Class Politics 1832- 
1914 (London, Routledge & Sons, 1941).
Coleman, J. S., Nigeria: Background to Colonialism 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California 
Press, 1958).
The Congress and the National Movement (from a Bengali 
Standpoint) (written under the direction of Reception 
Committee of Indian National Congress, 1928) (Calcutta, 
Makhan Lai Sarkar, 1928).
General Works
*Coupland, R., The British Anti-Slavery Movement (London, 
Thornton Butterworth, 1933).
*Coupland, R., The Indian Problem 1833-1935: Report on 
the Constitutional Problem in India (London, OUP.
1942), Part I.
*Datta, Lr K. K., History of the Freedom Movement in 
Bihar (Patna, Government of Bihar, 1957), 1:1857- 1928.
Davis, K., The Population of India and Pakistan (Prince­
ton, Princeton University Press, 1951).
Desai, A. R., Social Background of Indian Nationalism 
(Bombay, Popular Book Depot, 1954).
*Desai, M. H., A Righteous Struggle (A Chronicle of the 
Ahmedabad Textile Labourers* Fight for Justice 
(Ahmedabad, Navajivan, 1951).
Deutsch, K. W., Nationalism and Social Communications 
(New York, John Wiley, 1955).
*Dodwell, H. H. (ed), The Cambridge History of India 
(Cambridge University Press, 1932), Vis "The Indian Empire 1858-1918”.
Dutt, R. C., India in the Victorian Age: An Economic 
History of the People (London. Kegan Paul. Trennh. 
Trttbner & Co., 1904).
Duverger, M., Political Parties Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (London. Methuen. lQSA).
East, W. G. and Spate, 0. H. K. (eds), The Changing Map 
of Asia: A Political Geography (Great Britain, Methuen, 1950).
Emerson, R., From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self- 
Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Cambridge. Mass., Harvard University Press, I960).
Enthoven, R. E., The Tribes and Castes of Bombay (Bombav. 
1921). --------------------------
Evans, E. W., The British Yoke: Reflections on the 
Colonial Empire (London. Wm. Hodge, 1QAQ).
*Farquhar, J. N., Modern Religious Movements in India (New York, Macmillan, 1919).
Faruqi, Ziya-ul-Hasan, The Deoband School and The Demand 
for Pakistan (Bombay, Asia, 1963).
General Works
Gadgil, D. R., The Industrial Evolution of India in 
Recent Times (Calcutta, OUP, 1948).
♦Ghosh, P. C., The Development of the Indian Rational
Congress. 1892-1909 (Calcutta, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay
1960) .
Ghurye, G. S., Caste and Class in India (Bombay, Popular 
Book Depot, 1957)•
Gibb, H. A. R., Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey 
(London, OUP, 1953)»
Gluckman, M., An Analysis of the Sociological Theories 
of Bronislaw Malinowski (Cape Town, OUP, 1949)«
Gluckman, M ., Rituals of Rebellion in South Bast Africa 
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1954).
*Gopal, R., Indian Muslims: A Political History (1858- 
1947) (Bombay, Asia, 1959)»
♦Gupta, A. (ed), Studies in the Bengal Renaissance 
(Jadavpur, National Council of Education, 1958).
Hancock, W. K., Argument of Empire (London, Penguin, 
1943).
♦Hancock, W. K., Four Studies of War and Peace in this 
Century (Great Britain, Cambridge University Press,
1961) .
♦Hancock, W. K., Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs 
(Great Britain, OUP, 1937), Is "Problems of Nation- alism, 1918-1936".
Hardie, J. Keir, India. Impressions and Suggestions 
(London, Independent Labour Party, 1909)V
♦Harrison, S. S., India: The Most Dangerous Decades 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, I960).
Hiriyanna, M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy (London, 
Allen & Unwin, 1932)•
♦A History of the Freedom Movement (Karachi, Pakistan 
Historical Society, 1961), III (1831-1905 [printer's 
error, should be 1906-1936]), Part I.
Hodgkin, T., Nationalism in Colonial Africa (London,
F. Muller, 1956).
Hopkins, E. W., The Religions of India (Boston, Ginn & 
Co., 1895).
G-eneral Works
Hutton. J. H., Gaste in India (Cambridge University Press, 
1946).
Jennings, Sir Ivor, The Approach to Self-Government 
(Cambridge University Press, 1956).
Jinarajadasa, C. (ed), The Golden Book of the Theos- 
ophical Society (Adyar, TPH, 1925).
Jones, L. Bevan, The People of the Mosque (Calcutta, 
Association [Y.M.C.A.]Press, 1932)*
Kabir, Humayun, Muslim Politics 1906-1942 (Calcutta,
Gupta, Rahman & Gupta, 1944).
Karve, I., Hindu Society - An Interpretation (Poona,
S. M . Katre, 1961)"."
Keith, A. B., A Constitutional History of India. 1600- 
1935 (London, Methuen, 1936).
Kennedy, M. T., The Chaitanya Movement: A Study of the 
Vaishnavism of Bengal (Calcutta, Association [Y.M.C.A.] 
Press, 1925).
Kohn, H., A History of Rationalism in the East (New 
York, Harcourt Brace, 1929)•
Kohn, H., Prophets and People: Studies in Nineteenth 
Century Nationalism (New York, Collier, 1961).
*Lal Bahadur, The Muslim League: Its History. Activities 
and Achievements (Agra, Agra Book Store, 1954).
Laslett, P., MThe Pace to Pace Society” in P. Laslett 
(ed), Philosophy. Politics and Society (Oxford,
B1ackwell, 1956).
Leigh, M. S. (comp), The Punjab and the War (Lahore, 
Government Printing, 1922).
Lewis, 0., Village Life in North India (University of 
Illinois Press,1958).
Lipset, S. M., Political Han: The Social Bases of 
Politics (New York, Doubleday, I960).
Lovett, V., A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement 
(London, Murray, 1921).
*McCully, B. T., English Education and the Origins of
Indian Nationalism (New York. Columbia UniversityPress
1940).
G-eneral Works
*McCord, N., The Anti-Corn Law League 1838-1846 (London, 
Allen & Unwin, 1958).
Mack, E. C., Public Schools and British Opinion since 
1860 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1941).
Macleod, R. D., IOS (Ret*d), Impressions of an Indian 
Civil Servant (London, H. R. & Gr. Witherby, 1938).
Macnicol, N., The Making of Modern India (London, OUP, 
1924).
Mahomedan, An Indian, British India from Queen Elizabeth 
to Lord Reading (London, Pitman, 1926).
♦Majumdar, R. C., History of the Freedom Movement in 
India (Calcutta, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1963),
II [1905-1918].
Majumdar, R. C., Raychaudhuri, H. C. and Datta, K.,
An Advanced History of India (London, Macmillan, 1950).
Malinowski, B., The Dynamics of Culture Change: An 
Enquiry into Race Relations in Africa (ed. with an 
Introduction by P. M. Kaberry) (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1945).
Mannoni, 0., Prospero and Caliban? The Psychology of 
Colonization (London, Methuen, 1956).
Manshardt, C., The Hindu-Muslim Problem in India (London, 
Allen & Unwin, 1936).
Mansur, P., Process of Independence (London, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1962).
Mazumdar, A. C., Indian National Evolution, A Brief 
Survey of the Origin and Progress of the Indian 
National Congress and the Crowth of Indian Nationalism 
(Madras, Natesan, 1917).
Millikan, Lerner, de Sola Pool, Pye, Rosenstein-Rodan, 
Rostow et al., The Emerging Nations: Their Growth 
and U.S. Policy"'(Boston. Little. Brown, 1961).
Misra, B. B., The Indian Middle Classes: Their Growth in 
Modern Times (London, OUP, 1961).
*Mitra, H. N. (ed), The Indian Annual Register 1919 
(Calcutta, N. N. Mitter, 1919).
Mitra, H. N., Punjab Unrest, Before and After (Calcutta, 
- , 1921).
General Works
♦Mukherjee, H. and U., "Bande Mataram” and Indian 
Nationalism (1906-1908) (Calcutta, Firma K. L. 
Mukhopadhyay, 1957).
♦Mukherjee, H. and U., Sri Aurobindo's Political Thought 
(1893-1908) (Calcutta, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1958).
Myrdal, G., Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions 
(London, Duckworth, 1957).
Nair, Kusum, Blossoms in the Dust: The Human Element in 
Indian Development (London« Duckworth, 19&2).
Naoroji, Dadabhai, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India 
(London, Swan Sonnenschein, 1901).
♦Narasimhan, V. K., The Making of Editorial Policy: A 
Study of the Indian Press (Madras, P. Varadachari,
195W.
Nevinson, H. W., The New Spirit in India (London, Harper,
1908).
♦Noman, M., Muslim India (Rise and Growth of the All India 
Muslim League) (Allahabad, Kitabistan, 1942).
♦Nundy, A., Indian Unrest. 1919-20 (Dehra Dun, Garhwali 
Press, 1921).
♦O'Brien, C. C., Parnell and His Party 1880-90 (London,
0UP, 1957).
0'Hegerty, P. S., A History of Ireland under the Union« 
1801-1922 (London, Methuen, 1952).
O'Malley, L. S. S., The Indian Civil Service 1601-1930 
(London, Murray, 1931)•
Overstreet, G. D. and Windmiller, M., Communism in India 
(Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California 
Press, 1959)»
Pal, B. C., Bengal Vaishnavism (Calcutta, Modern Book 
Agency, 1933).
♦Park, R. L. and Tinker, I. (eds), Leadership and Political 
Institutions in India (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1959).
Philips, C. H., (ed), Politics and Society in India 
(London, Allen & Unwin, 1963)•
Plamenatz, J., On Alien Rule and Self-Government (London, 
Longmans, i960).
bh
General Works
Pradhan, R. G., Indian Struggle for Swaraj (Madras, 
Natesan, 1930).
Raghuvanshi, V. P. S., Indian Nationalist Movement and 
Thought (Agra, Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, 1959). *
*Ramana Rao, M. V., Development of the Congress Constitution 
(New Delhi, All India Congress Committee, 1958).
Redfield, R., Peasant Society and Culture: An Anthro­
pological Approach to Civilization (Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 1956).
Risley, Sir H. H., The People of India (Calcutta, Thacker, 
Spink, 1915).
Rudolph, S. H., The Action Arm of the Indian National 
Congress, the Pradesh Congress Committee (Cambridge. 
Mass., MIT, 1955 [mimeographed]).
Sankaran Nair, Sir C., Gandhi and Anarchy (Madras, Tagore,
1922).
Schuster, Sir G. E.and Wint, G., India and Democracy 
(London, Macmillan, 1941).
Sethi, R. R.. The Phase of British Sovereignty in India 
(1919-1947) “Being the Concluding Chapters of * The 
Cambridge History of India*, Vol. VI”. (Delhi, S. Chand, 
1958).
*Shridharani, K., War without Violence: A Study of 
Gandhi*s Method~nd Its Accomplishments (London.
Gollancz, 193~9~)V "
Singer, M., (ed), Traditional India: Structure and Change 
(Philadelphia, American Folklore Society, 1959).
*Sitaramayya, Dr B. Pattabhi, The History of the Indian 
National Congress (Bombay, Padma Publications, 1935),
I (1885-1935).
*Smith, D. E., India as a Secular State (Princeton, 
Princeton Uni vers it"y Press, 1963).
Smith, V. A. and Spear, P., The Oxford History of India (London, OUP, 1958).
*Smith, W. Cantwell, Islam in Modern History (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1957).
Smith, W. Cantwell, Modern Islam in India: A Social 
Analysis (London, Gollancz, 1946).
Smith, W. R., Nationalism and Reform in India (New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 1938).
General Works
Spate, 0. H. K., India and Pakistan: A General and 
Regional Geography (London, Methuen, 1957).
Spear, P., India: A Modern History, (Ann Arbor, Univer­
sity of Michigan, 1901")".'
Spratt. P., Gandhism: An Analysis (Madras, Huxley Press,
n.d.).
Stokes, E., The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1959).
Student of Public Affairs, Has Congress Failed? A 
Historical Study of the Years 1918-1939 (Bombay,
Times of India Press, 1943)«
Swinson, A., Six Minutes to Sunset (London, Peter Davies, 
1964).
Thornton, A. P., Imperial Idea and Its Enemies: A Study 
in British Power (London, Macmillan, 1959).
Tinker, H., Ballot Box and Bayonet: People and Government in Emergent~Asian Countries (OUP [Chatham House Essays"!, 
1964).
Weber, M., The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hindu­
ism and Buddhism (translated and edited by H. H. Gert hi 
and D. Martindale) (Glencoe, Illinois, Free Press,
1958).
Weber, M., The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 
(London, Wm. Hodge, 1947).
Weiner, M., Party Politics in India: The Development of 
a Multi-Party System (Princeton. Princeton University 
Press, 1957).
Weiner, M., Political Change in South Asia (Calcutta,
Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1963).
Williams, R., Culture and Society. 1780-1950 (London, 
Chatto & Windus, 1958).
Wilson, F. W., Some Indian Problems: Being Some Essays 
Addressed to Patriots with the "Congress Mentality” 
(with a Foreword by J. Nehru) (Allahabad, Lala Ram 
Mohanlal, 1929).
*Wilson, H. H. (comp), A Glossary of Judicial and Revenue 
Terms and of Useful Words Occurring in Official Docu­
ments Relating to the Administration of the Government 
of British India (London. W. H. Allen. 186>0).
General Works
Wilson, H. H., Religious Sects of the Hindus (Calcutta, 
Susil Gupta, 1958).
*Woodruff, P., The Men Who Ruled India: The Guardians 
(London, Jonathan Cape, 1954), II.
*Zacharias, H. C. E., Renascent India: From Rammohan Roy 
to Mohandas Gandhi (London, Allen & Unwin, 1933)*
Zaheer, S. Ali, ”The Dead Past”: A Collection of Writings 
from 1937 to 1947 (Lucknow, Ra.ia Ram Kumar Press, 1950).
III. Journal Articles
Bose, N. K., ’’East and West in Bengal1’, Man in India. 
XXXVIII, no. 3 (July-Sept 1958), 157-75.
Bose, N. K., ’’Modern Bengal”, Man in India, XXXVIII, no. 4, 
(Oct-Dec 1958), 239-295.
Bose, N. K., ’’Some Aspects of Caste in Bengal”, Man in 
India. XXXVIII, no. 2 (Apr-June 1958), 73-97.
Broomfield, J. H., ’The Vote and the Transfer of Power:
A Study of the Bengal General Election, 1912-1913”» 
Journal of Asian Studies. XXI (Feb 1962), 163-181.
Chaudhuri, N., ’The Language Question for the Millions”,
The Statesman. 2 Jan 1956, p. 10.
Cohn, B. S., ’The Initial British Impact on India: A 
Case Study of the Benares Region”, Journal of Asian 
Studies. XIX, no. 4 (Aug I960), 418-431.
Cohn, B. S., ’’Some Notes on Law and Change in North India”, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, VIII, no. 1 
(Oct 19591, 79-93.
Girish Mishra, ’Caste in Bihar Politics”, Mainstream.
7 Dec 1963.
Gould, H. A., ’’Sanskritization and Westernization: A 
Dynamic View”, Economic Weekly. XIII, no. 25 (June 24, 
1961), 945-950.
Gould, H. A., ’Sanskritisation and Westernisation: Further 
Comments”, Economic Weekly. XIX, no. 2 (Jan 13, 1962), 
48-51.
’India: Old Ways and New”, Round Table. Ill (Dec 1912), 
52-80.
’’Indian Problem in East Africa”, Round Table. XII 
(Sept'1921-Dec 1922), 338-361.
Journal Articles
Joshi, Dr P. C., "Ruin of Artisans in U.P. and Manpower 
Surplus", Rational Herald, 24 and 31 March 1957.
Marriott, McKim, "Interactional and Attributional
Theories of Caste Ranking", Man in India, XXXIX, no. 2, 
(Apr-June 1959)» 92-107.
Mayle, J. 0., "Tocqueville on India", Encounter, XVIII 
(May 1962).
Mehrotra, S. R., "Imperial Federation and India, 1868- 
1917*', Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, I, 
no. 1 (Nov 1961), 29-40.
Mehrotra, S. R., "Gandhi and the British Commonwealth", 
India Quarterly, XVII, no. 1 (Jan-Mar 1961), 44-57.
Miller, E. J., "Caste and Territory in Malabar", American 
Anthropologist, LVI (1954), 410-20.
Moore, Barrington, Jnr., "Notes on the Process of Acquir­
ing Power", World Politics, VIII (Oct 1955), 1-19.
Orans, M., "A Tribe in Search of a Great Tradition: the 
Emulation-Solidarity Conflict", Man in India, XXXIX, 
no. 2 (Apr-June 1959), 108-114.
Partridge, P. H., "Politics, Philosophy, Ideology", 
Political Studies. IX (Oct 1961), 217-235.
Patterson, M. L., "Caste and Political Leadership in 
Maharashtra: A Review and Current Appraisal", Economic 
Weekly. VI, no. 39 (25 Sept 1954), 1065-67.
Pocock, D. F., "Notes on the Interaction of English and 
Indian Thought in the Nineteenth Century", Journal of 
World History. IV, no. 4 (1958), 835-848.
"Political Crime in India", Round Table, III (Dec 1912), 
303-317.
Pye, L. W., "The Non-Western Political Process", Journal 
of Politics, XX, no. 3 (Aug 1958), 468-486.
Rothermund, D., "Constitutional Reforms versus National 
Agitation in India, 1900-1950", Journal of Asian 
Studies. XXI (Aug 1962), 505-522.
Rudolph, L. I. and Rudolph, S. H., "The Political Role 
of India’s Caste Associations", Pacific Affairs. XXXIII, 
no. 1 (Mar I960), 5-22.
Rudolph, S. H., "Consensus and Conflict in Indian Politics 
World Politics. XIII, no. 3 (Apr 1961), 385-399.
Journal Articles
Sachithanandan, V., "Bharati and Whitman”, Literary 
Clarion (Madras), 1962.
Singer, Milton, ”The Cultural Pattern of Indian Civili­
zation”, Par Eastern Quarterly, XV, no. 1 (Nov 1955), 
23-36.
Srinivas, M. N., ”Caste in Modern India”, Journal of 
Asian Studies, XVI, no. 4 (Aug 1957), 529-548.
Srinivas, M. N., ’’Changing Institutions and Values in 
Modern India”, Economic Weekly. XIV, nos 4-6 (Peb 1962), 
131-137.
Srinivas, M. N., ”A Note on Sanskritization and 
Westernization”, Par Eastern Quarterly. XV, no. 4 
(Aug 1956), 481-496.
Weiner, M., ’Struggle Against Power: Notes on Indian 
Political Behavior”, World Politics, VIII (Apr 1956), 
392-403.
IV. Unpublished Works
Brooks, R. W., ”A Study of Satyagraha: Gandhi vs.
Besant” (dissertation, held by author).
Broomfield, J. H., ’’The Civil Constitution of Bengal,
1854-1912” (seminar paper, Australian National University,I960).
Broomfield, J. H., ’Politics and the Bengal Legislative 
Council, 1912-1926” (Ph.D. thesis, Australian National 
University, 1963).
Catanach, Ian, ’The British and the Moneylender in India" 
(seminar paper, Australian National University, 1963).
Crane, R. I., "The Indian National Congress and the Indian 
Agrarian Problem 1919-39n (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 
microfilm, 1951).
Dungen, P. H. M. van den, "Gandhi as a Political Leader” 
B.A. Hons thesis, University of Western Australia, 1962).
Dungen, P. H. M. van den, "Land Transfers and Revenue 
Administration in the Nineteenth Century Punjab”
(seminar paper, Australian National University, 1963).
Dungen, P. H. M. van den, "Note on Punjab Rural Society 
before 1900” (note, held by author).
Unpublished Works
Dungen, P. H. M. van den, "Social Change in the Punjab 
(1849-1900)" (seminar paper, Australian National 
University, 1962).
Graham, B. D., "The Quest for Social Basis. U.P. Party 
Politics in the Sixties" (paper, Australian National 
University, 1962).
Irschick, E., "Politics and Social Conflict in South 
India: The Non-Brahmin Movement and Tamil Separatism 
1916 to 1929" (thesis outline, University of Chicago).
Irschick, S., "A Preliminary Note on the Intellectual 
Background to Tamil Separatism, 1900-1929” (paper, 
University of Chicago).
Kumar, R., "State and Society in Maharashtra in the
Nineteenth Century" (Ph.D. thesis, Australian National 
University, 1964).
Low, D. A., "The Government of India and the First Non- 
Co-operation Movement 1920-23" (seminar paper,
Australian National University, 1963).
Low, D. A., »U.P., 1860-1960: the »Husk-Culture* and
its Aftermath" (paper, Australian National University).
Morris-Jones, W. H., "Behaviour and Ideas in Political 
India" (seminar paper, Australian National University, I960).
Narasimhan, V. K., "Kasturi Ranga Iyengar: A Biography" 
(typescript monograph in preparation for publication; 
held by author, Madras).
Reeves, P. D., "The Character of U.P. Politics 1860- 
1950" (paper, Australian National University, 1962).
Reeves, P. D., "Landlord Associations in U.P. and Their 
Role in Landlord Politics, 1920-1937” (seminar paper, 
Australian National University, 1961).
Reeves, P. D., "The Landlords* Response to Political
Change in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, India, 
1921-1937” (PH.D. thesis, Australian National University, 
1963).
Reeves, P. D., "The Politics of Order: 'Safety Leagues' 
Against the Congress in the United Provinces, 1921-22" 
(seminar paper, Australian National University, 1962).
Rogers, P., "Some Aspects of British Public Opinion on 
India, 1870-1900" (seminar paper, Australian National 
University, 1963).
Unpublished Works
Rothermund, D., "Latency and Ultra-Stability in U.P.- 
Politics" (paper, Australian National University, 
1962).
Rothermund, D., "The Nation and the Political Society in 
India, 1900-1950" (seminar paper, Australian National 
University, 1962).
Subramaniam, V., "Tamil Political Journalism - The Pre- 
G-andhian Period" (paper, University of Western 
Australia
H. INTERVIEWS
The following were interviewed by the writer on the dates 
and at the places shown.
Adwani, Durgdas
21 and 25 April 1963, Bombay
Sindi lieutenant of Mrs Besant and Gandhi, 1914-20 
Adwani, P.
12 April 1963, Adyar
Theosophist; associate of politicians in Sind
Ali Khan, Maharajkumar Md. Amir 
4 Aug 1963, Lucknow
Son of Maharajah of Mahmudabad, UP Muslim political leader
Ambekar, D. V.
9, 10 May 1963, Poona
Secretary of the Servants of India Society
Banker, Shankarlal G-.
27 June 1963, Ahmedabad
Bombay lieutenant of Mrs Besant, 1915-18, and Gandhi 
from 1918.
Bapat, S. V.
21 May 1963, Poona
Worker in Tilak's HRL, Poona, from 1916
•
Beg, Naseer Ullah 
4 Aug 1963, Lucknow
Judge and son of Samiullah Beg, UP "nationalist"
Muslim politician 1912-18.
Bhende, V. R.
18 June 1963, Bombay
Journalist and ex-Secretary of Bombay Presidency Association
Interviews
Bose, N. K.
30 Aug 1963, Calcutta
Anthropologist and Congress worker from 1921
Chaudhuri, N . C.
26 July 1963, Delhi Bengali author and journalist
Dwarkadas, Jamnadas
27 May, 1 and 9 June 1963, Bombay
Leading Bombay lieutenant of Mrs Besant and Gandhi
Dwa rk ad as, Kan j i
27 May, 1 and 9 June 1963, BombayHRL politician, Theosophist, labour organiser and MLC
Belton, lies M.
6 Sept 1963, Madras
Biographer of C. Rajagopalachariar
Ghose, Principal D. P.
2 Sept 1963, Calcutta
Follower of B. Chakravarti from 1917
Gurtu, Pt. Iqbal Narain
7 Aug 1963, Banaras
Prominent educationist, Theosophist, leading UP member 
of A-IHRL
Harkaran Nath Misra 
5 Aug 1963, LucknowActive supporter of Mrs Besant, 1915-18, and of 
Gandhi from 1919
Mr Hazare
18 May 1963, PoonaTheosophist; worker in New India. HRL offices, Madras 
from 1914
Husain, Tajamul 
18 Aug 1963, Patna
Son of Khan Bahadur Sarfaraz Husain Khan, Patna 
"nationalist” Muslim politician
Hyder Khan, Maharajkumar Md Amir 
4 and 5 Aug 1963, Lucknow 
Son of Maharajah of Mahmudabad
Imam, Mehdi
4 Aug 1963, Lucknow
Son of Hasan Imam, Patna "nationalist" Muslim politician
Interviews
Karandikar, Vithal 
15 June 1963, PoonaSon of R. P. Karandikar, Tilak's Satara lieutenant
Katagade, N. Y. ("PundalikjiH)
11 June 1963, BombayEx-secretary to Gangadharrao Deshpande
Kelkar, K. N. and Kelkar, Y. N.
17 and 19 May 1963» Poona Sons of N. C. Kelkar
Kher, Mr
April 1963, Poona Sub-editor of Kesari
Kitchlu, Dr Saifuddin 
19 Peb 1963, DelhiLeading Muslim politician, Amritsar, from 1912
Kunzru, Dr H. N.
27 July 1963, DelhiPresident, Servants of India Society, UP Liberal
Mukherjee, Prof. Satish
27 Aug 1963, Rampur Hat, W. Bengal 
Acquaintance of Jitendralal Bannerjee
Munshi, K. M.
28 April 1963, BombayAuthor, editor, Bombay HRL and Congress politician
Katara3an, Mrs S
17 June 1963, Bombaydaughter of Umar Sobhani, lieutenant of Mrs Besant and 
Gandhi
Pal, Jnanajan
28 Aug 1963, Calcutta Son of B. C. Pal
Parthasarathy, R. T.
29 Mar 1963, Salem, South India 
Grandson of C. Vijiaraghavachariar
Mr Patmanabhan
1 Mar 1963, Madras 
Research Officer, Hindu
Patwardhan, Prof. R. P.
13 May 1963, PoonaEducationist, editor of Uaoroji Papers
Interviews
Phatak, Prof.
24 and 25 April 1963, Bombay
Administrative Secretary, History of the Freedom 
Movement Office, Bombay
Rajagopalachariar, C. ("Rajaji")
20 and 21 Mar 1963» Madras
Gandhi's leading Madras lieutenant, later Governor- 
General of independent India
Ramachandra Shukla 
8 Aug 1963, Banaras
General Secretary, Indian Section, Theosophical Society; 
member of HRL, Allahabad and Kanpur
Ramaswami Aiyar, C. P.
31 Mar 1963, Annamalai University, Chidambaram 
Educationist, statesman; General Secretary, HRL,
1916-17.
Sathaye, Br V. D.
16 and 18 May 1963, Poona
Son of Dr D. D. Sathaye, Tilak’s Bombay lieutenant 
Shiva Rao, B.
20 Dec 1962, 14 Jan, 21 Feb and 1 Aug 1963, Delhi 
Journalist, trade-union organiser, associate of 
Mrs Besant from 1914
Shivdasani, Prof. G.
24 April 1963,' Bombay
HRL politician, Hyderabad (Sind)
Sipahimalani, Miss J.
23 April 1963, Bombay 
Sindi follower of Gandhi
Sri Ram
February 1963, Adyar
President of the Theosophical Society
Sundararajan, P. G.
4 April 1963, Madras 
Biographer of S. Satyamurti
Venkataraman, S. R.
5 April 1963, Madras
Member of Servants of India Society, Madras
Zaheer, Hon. Syed Ali 
4 Aug 1963, Lucknow
Son of Wazir Hasan, Sec. AIML 1912-19.
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